Dilip Mookherjee is Professor of Economics at Boston University since 1995 and the Director of the Institute of Economic Development at Boston University since 1998. He graduated from the Delhi School of Economics and the London School of Economics where he received his PhD in 1982. He taught at Stanford University from 1982 to 1989, the Indian Statistical Institute in New Delhi from 1989 to 1995. He is Fellow of the Econometric Society, recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship and the Mahalanobis Memorial Award of the Indian Econometric Society. He is currently President of BREAD (Bureau for Research in Economic Analysis of Development). He has held visiting professor positions at Centre for Studies in Social Science at Calcutta and at the People's University in Beijing. Dilip Mookherjee is an associate editor of the Journal of Development Economics, Rand Journal of Economics, and the B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. His current research interests include development, inequality and public policy in various contexts such as land reform, local governance, deforestation, finance, microcredit, agricultural marketing, middlemen and trade. Published books include Market Institutions, Governance and Development (Oxford Univ Press 2006), and Incentives and Institutional Reform in Tax Enforcement (Oxford University Press 1998). Dilip Mookherjee has had over fifty refereed papers published in the top journals and has published eleven books as editor or co-editor, as well as writing chapters in a host of other books. He is the author most recently of The Crisis in Government Accountability: Governance Reforms and Indian Economic Performance.
Many developing countries are decentralizing delivery of public services to local governments in the hope this will enhance accountability of service providers. To what extent is it actually succeeding? As highlighted by the 2004 World Development Report, this issue has become highly relevant in large parts of the developing world, given widespread evidence of serious problems of corruption, diversion of antipoverty programs to groups that are not intended beneficiaries, and high rates of absenteeism among service providers in health and education.
Credit and information constraints are particularly acute for farmers in developing countries, and can have a strong impact on their productivity. This project studies pass-through of fluctuations of retail prices to farm-gate prices in the context potato cultivation in West Bengal, India. The primary focus is on credit and information constraints faced by potato farmers and how these influence contractual relationships with trading middlemen in a random sample of 72 villages in Hugli and West Medinipur, two prominent potato growing districts of the state.
Over the last few years, large-scale land acquisitions of farmland for business in Africa, Latin America, and Asia have often made headlines because of controversies concerning compensation paid to displaced farmers. This has led to political strife, often leading to the abandonment of profitable projects, thereby dealing a blow to the development process. The issue of transfer of land from agriculture to industry has not received much attention in development economics.