

Road Infrastructure and Enterprise Development in Ethiopia

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Background & Question

Africa's poor infrastructure:

- Small manufacturing sector; little exports
- High transport costs offer protection from competition for local firms
- A large share of small firms supplying the local market (Collier, 2000; Tybout, 2000).
- Ethiopia: Landlocked; practically no railways; few navigable rivers.
- Big improvements in road infrastructure over the last decade thanks to the Road Sector Development Program (RSDP) 1997-2010.

Background & Question

Over the same period:

- The number of formal manufacturing firms in the country more than **doubled**
- The **geographical distribution** of firms has changed: Decentralization; less concentration of firms to biggest towns.
 - Have improved roads played a role for these developments?
 - To find out: Match census data on firms with GIS panel data on roads development and investigate the relationships.
- Literature: Duflo, Banerjee & Qian (2012); Baum-Snow et al. (2012; presented at GW); Donaldson (2012). China & India.
- No similar study on Africa.

Road Placement in Ethiopia

- The road sector has been a policy priority during the last decade.
- Three RSDPs during the period 1997-2010. Total cost \$4.12 Billion, partly donor financed.
 - 43 projects to rehabilitate / upgrade major trunk roads,
 - upgrading of 32 link roads
 - construction of 73 link roads.
- According to the Ethiopian Road Authority, the total road network expanded from 26,550 km in 1997 to 46,812 km in 2007 (ERA , 2009).

Table 1: Improvements in Road Infrastructure

Indicator	1997	2009
Proportion of asphalt roads in good condition	17%	70%
Proportion of gravel roads in good condition	25%	54%
Proportion of rural roads in good condition	21%	50%
Proportion of total road network in good condition	22%	54%
Road Density/ 1000 sq. km	24.1km	42.6km
Road Density/ 1000 Population	0.46km	0.57km
Road Density/ 1000 sq. km (including community roads)	24km	120.5km
Proportion of area more than 5km from all weather road	79%	65.3%
Average distance to all weather road	21.4km	11.8km

Source: Table 8, ERA (2009)

The political process: Road Placement

- Proposals for **new** roads come mainly from regional states.
- The ERA assesses the regional proposals using the following **five** criteria
 - Roads providing access to areas with economic development potential (20%)
 - Roads leading to areas with surplus food and cash crop production (20%)
 - Roads that link existing major roads (20%)
 - Roads providing access to large and isolated population centers (30%)
 - Roads that bring balanced development amongst the regions in the country and that provide access to emerging regions (10%)
- Proposal goes to the government.
- Road upgrading: similar procedure; more weight to traffic density.
- Not clear what specific variable ERA uses to determine economic development potential etc.


Data & Descriptive Statistics

- Using GIS data obtained from the ERA, we measure **travel time** between fixed points, and **areas accessible** from a particular location (node).
- We match these data to census panel data on formal manufacturing firms.
- We identify 106 towns in the country which have hosted at least one manufacturing firm at some point during the sampling period.

Data & Descriptive Statistics

- Three measures of infrastructure quality
 - Total **distance** travelled during a 60-minute drive from node (using all roads serving the town)
 - Areas **accessible** during those 60 minutes of drive, using a 5 km buffer zone (“area of influence”) on both sides of the road.
 - An aggregate measure of town’s **connectivity** using the average travel time to major economic centers using the “Origin Destination (OD) matrix” analysis tool of GIS. 15 major economic destinations were selected; we then calculate the average travel time from each town (origin) to these major economic destinations as a measure of town’s connectivity.
- Constructed for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2006 and 2008.

Illustration: Area accessible during a 1hr Drive from Addis Ababa



Summary statistics: Infrastructure variables

- Improvements are visible in the data
- Only minor improvements in the beginning of the period; because
 - Initial focus on restoration (new roads later)
 - Significant lags

Table 2: Trends in Road Accessibility (Annual Mean)

Year	Area Accessible (Km2)	Travel Distance (Km)	Travel Time to Major Destinations (hours)
1996	1098.2	210.6	379.9
1997	1100.9	210.9	379.8
1998	1103.7	211.2	379.7
1999	1108.5	211.8	378.5
2000	1113.3	212.5	377.3
2001	1139.7	216.3	369.4
2002	1166.2	220.1	361.4
2003	1181.2	222.3	359.7
2004	1196.1	224.4	358.0
2005	1235.3	230.4	350.9
2006	1274.6	236.4	343.9
2007	1317.7	246.4	334.7
2008	1360.9	256.4	325.5
2009	1360.9	256.4	325.5

Source: Authors' computation based on ERA data

Firms

- Census panel data (source: CSA) covering (supposedly) all MFG firms in the country that
 - have >10 workers
 - use power in production
- The total number of firms increased from about 617 in 1996 to 1,713 in 2009
- Concentration changes: Small towns have seen a faster entry rate of firms than the biggest towns
 - In 1996, 76% of all firms located in 5 largest towns
 - In 2009, 55%

Road Accessibility and Firm Location

- The geographical distribution of firms in the country has changed. Have improved roads played a role?
- Cross-sectional analysis:

$$\ln(N)_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 RN_i + u_i$$

N = number of mfg firms in town i;

RN = measure of road accessibility of firms town i.

$$\ln(N)_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 RN_i + u_i$$

- Road placement not exogenous.
- Add to the specification proxies which we hope control for endogenous road placement.
 - Proxy agricultural potential by dummy for food self-sufficiency (info obtained from the Productive Safety-Nets Program; woredas participating in the PSNP are considered low agricultural potential).
 - Initial condition: The number of mfg firms in the town in the beginning of the period (recall v. little change in infrastructure before 1999).
 - Population (one of the criteria for road placement; measured in 2007 – not ideal but it's the best we've got).
 - Region fixed effects.

Cross-Sectional Analysis: Results

Table 4: OLS Estimates: Dependent variable log number of Firms (Town Level) - Area Accessible as Measure of Road Accessibility

	1	2	3	4
ln(acc_9909)	1.0417 (0.3456)***	0.4709 (0.2501)*	0.4795 (0.2719)*	0.7699 (0.2840)***
ln(N_9698)		0.9279 (0.0701)***	0.9474 (0.0867)***	0.8810 (0.1061)***
Food Surplus			-0.0796 (0.3010)	0.2197 (0.3198)
ln(woreda_pop)			-0.0825 (0.1360)	0.0555 (0.1571)
Region Dummies	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	-6.3902 (2.4285)**	-2.7589 (1.7722)	-1.8195 (2.5053)	-4.6934 (2.6266)*
R^2	0.13	0.67	0.66	0.70
N	88	79	73	73

Note: *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance.

Robust standard errors in parenthesis

Travel distance

Table 5: OLS Estimates: Dependent variable log number of Firms (Town Level) – Travel Distance as Measure of Road Accessibility

1				
ln(trvd_9909)	0.8909 (0.2756)***	0.3743 (0.2091)*	0.3867 (0.2296)*	0.6251 (0.2437)**
ln(N_9698)		0.9229 (0.0730)***	0.9425 (0.0889)***	0.8775 (0.1088)***
Food Surplus			-0.0896 (0.2941)	0.2091 (0.3164)
ln(woreda_pop)			-0.0847 (0.1393)	0.0465 (0.1612)
Region Dummies	No	No	No	Yes
Constant	-3.8030 (1.4634)**	-1.4318 (1.1192)	-0.4643 (2.0259)	-2.5367 (2.2548)
R^2	0.14	0.66	0.66	0.70
N	88	79	73	73

Note: *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance.

Robust Standard errors in parenthesis

Panel Data Approach

- Use internal instruments (lags) to address endogeneity (SYS-GMM; Blundell & Bond, 1998)
- Controls for town fixed effects and also year effects common across the towns:

$$\ln(N)_{it} = \beta_0 \ln(N)_{it-1} + \beta_1 RN_{it} + v_t + e_i + u_{it}$$

- System of equations: Levels eq. + 1st differenced eq.
 - Lagged levels instruments for differences
 - Lagged diffs instruments for levels

SYS-GMM Results:

Dependent Variable: $\log(N_{it})$

	(1) Travel Distance	(2) Area Accessible	(3) Travel Time to Major Destinations
$\ln(N)_{it-1}$	0.7524 (0.0641)***	0.7490 (0.0702)***	0.7939 (0.4096)*
$\ln(\text{trvd})_{it}$	0.3559 (0.1596)**		
$\ln(\text{acc})_{it}$		0.4076 (0.2064)**	
$\ln(\text{ttod})_{it}$			-0.1492 (0.7765)
Year Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1170	1170	1118
Number of Towns	90	90	86
Sargan statistic and p-value	81.498 (0.207)	82.004 (0.196)	77.436(0.734)
AR1	0.000	0.000	0.000
AR2	0.405	0.410	0.374

Note: *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance.
Standard errors in parentheses

Compare to simple FE model

Table 8: Fixed Effects Estimates: Dependent variable log number of firms

	(1) Travel Distance	(2) Area Accessible	(3) Travel Time to Major Destinations
ln(trvd)	0.3482 (0.1583)**		
ln(acc)		0.3128 (0.1585)**	
ln(ttod)			-0.5350 (0.1875)***
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1260	1260	1204
Number of towns	90	90	86
R-squared	0.23	0.23	0.23

Note: *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance. Standard errors in parentheses

The Size of New Start-Ups

- If better infrastructure implies better market access, we might expect to see an increase in size of new entrants.
- Outcome of interest: The average size of firms entering the market.

Positive association between average size of entrants and infrastructure quality

	(1) Travel Distance	(2) Area Accessible	(3) Travel Time to Major Destinations
ln(acc)	0.1457 (0.0787)*		
ln(trvd)		0.1329 (0.0769)*	
ln(ttod)			-0.2258 (0.0968)**
ln(woreda_pop)	0.1261 (0.0407)***	0.1294 (0.0410)***	0.1868 (0.0394)***
Food Surplus	-0.3383 (0.1566)**	-0.3172 (0.1578)**	-0.3089 (0.1562)**
Year Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes
Region Dummy	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2016	2016	1979
R-squared	0.05	0.05	0.05

Note: *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance. Robust standard errors in parentheses

Infrastructure and Value-Added Productivity

$$\ln\left(\frac{Y}{L}\right)_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 RN_t + \beta_2 X_{it} + \gamma_t + \eta + \tau + \varepsilon_{it}$$

VARIABLES	OLS		Firm fixed effects		Differenced equations	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
lacc _t	0.0214 (0.0955)		0.784** (0.333)		1.152** (0.493)	
ltrvd _t		0.0455 (0.0858)		0.760** (0.325)	-0.151 (0.445)	0.916*** (0.337)
lod_mean _t	-0.279** (0.123)	-0.277** (0.122)	0.432 (0.462)	0.316 (0.469)	0.306 (0.499)	0.101 (0.523)
Ln(K/L) _t	0.216*** (0.0122)	0.216*** (0.0122)	0.0627*** (0.00993)	0.0627*** (0.0100)	0.0817*** (0.0116)	0.0818*** (0.0116)
Public _t	0.564*** (0.0724)	0.566*** (0.0720)	0.0281 (0.0851)	0.0287 (0.0852)	0.0534 (0.0558)	0.0529 (0.0560)
Export Dummy _t	0.491*** (0.174)	0.492*** (0.175)	0.150* (0.0785)	0.147* (0.0787)	0.317** (0.152)	0.315** (0.152)
Constant	8.505*** (1.031)	8.421*** (0.898)	0.112 (4.718)	2.156 (4.198)	-0.0692** (0.0338)	-0.0689** (0.0338)
Sector	Yes	Yes				
Region	Yes	Yes				
Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6,220	6,220	6,220	6,220	3,411	3,411
R-squared	0.289	0.289	0.016	0.016	0.017	0.016
Number of eid			2,613	2,613		

Conclusions

- Existing literature: Little evidence on the relationship btw road infrastructure & firm development in SSA.
- Roads placement endogenous. Safest to interpret our results as indicating associations, rather than causality.
- Consistent with the prevalent notion in the literature, the results suggest better roads lead to:
 - more start-ups
 - larger start-ups

Conclusions (cont'd)

- Infrastructure improvement associated with productivity increase
- This effect appears to be **temporary**; a few years after the infrastructure innovation, productivity differences can no longer be observed.

Policy implications?

- Better roads result in more, larger firms... so build more roads??
 - Not necessarily: Depends on the return to building roads (look across all sectors)
- Adds to accumulating evidence on how the market structure in Ethiopia shapes business decisions (Fafchamps and Söderbom, 2012; Bigsten et al. 2012).
- Fragmented markets & high transport costs provide incentives for strategic substitution: Find a niche unique to the local market, extract local rents. Disincentive for firms to cluster.
- Policy measures that strengthen incentives to agglomerate may raise aggregate productivity & generate more jobs.
- Reduce local rents. Roads may be one such instrument, but may or may not be the most cost-effective one. Market integration.

Thank you