Personalities and Public Sector Performance: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan

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Partners and Collaborators

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- Farasat Iqbal, Punjab Health Sector Reforms Program
- Asim Fayaz, World Bank/Technology for People Initiative
- International Growth Center (IGC)

- We report results from two experiments targeting health worker absence
- Focus on a *common* and *intractable* service delivery issue in Latin America, East Africa, and South Asia
 - ▶ (▶ Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer, Muralidharan, and Rogers, 2006

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- Question 3: Do personality measures predict who will act on information?

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 - Personality measures rival or exceed IQ in terms of predictive power in several domains (Heckman, 2011)
- Several possible benefits:
 - 1. Diagnostics and insights into bureaucratic decision-making
 - 2. Profile of applicants responds to adjustable features of the position (Dal Bó, Finan, Rossi, 2013)
 - 3. Traits are malleable, providing an avenue for policy (Almund, Duckworth, Heckman, Kautz, 2011)

This Project

- 1. Experiment 1: implement a smartphone monitoring system
- 2. **Experiment 2:** make absence data salient to senior health officials
- 3. Measure Performance:
 - doctor attendance
 - health inspections
 - collusion between inspectors and doctors

4. Measure Personality Traits:

- ► A large, representative sample of doctors in Punjab
- The universe of health inspectors in Punjab
- The universe of senior health officials in Punjab

Preview of Findings


- 1. Personality traits (Big 5 and Public Sector Motivation) positively predict doctor attendance and negatively predict whether doctors collude with inspectors
- 2. Traits strongly predict responses to monitoring intervention
 - one SD increase in Big 5 is associated with 27 percentage point differential in attendance response
- 3. Personality traits strongly predict which senior officials act on reports of doctor absence
 - one SD increase in Big 5 is associated with an additional 40 percentage point reduction in doctor absence

Outline


I. Introduction

- II. Monitoring the Monitors
- III. Research design
- III. Traits and Public Sector Performance
- V. Results
- VI. Conclusion

Context: Punjab Department of Health




Rural Clinic Sample



Rural health clinics




Same data, new interface



Smartphones for health inspectors



Online dashboard—summary stats



Online dashboard—visit logs

Compliance Status Fa	cility Status	Recent Visits Indicators	Time Trend Cha	rts Photo Verifi	cation Map Change Passv	vord Logout
ou are currently viewin	are currently viewing District Attock		(Please click to change view)		🖨 Prin	
Recent Facility Visits						
Visits highlighted indicate significant staff absence.						
 พระเธาญรายุปายนายนอย่างสายสายสายสายสายสายสายสายสายสายสายสายสายส						
BHU RHC	тно р	но				
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Showing all entries						
5						
Displaying 1-30 of 734 result(s). Go to page: < Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Next >						
Facility	Tehsil	Visiting Officer	Date	мо	Other Absent Staff	Report
Facility	rensii		Date		other Absent Stan	Summary
		+		;		
BHU KANI	JAND	DDO Jand	2012-07-11	Absent	LHV, SHNS,	
BHU BHANGAI	HAZRO	DDO Hazro	2012-07-11	Present	Computer operator,	
BHU HAJI SHAH	ATTOCK	DDO Attock/Hassanabda	2012-07-11	Present		
BHU TRAP	JAND	DDO Jand	2012-07-11	Present	Dispenser, LHV, SHNS,	
BHU DHURNAL	FATEH JANG	G DDO Fateh Jang	2012-07-11	Present	Computer operator,	
BHU DAKHNAIR	ATTOCK	DDO Attock/Hassanabda	2012-07-11	Present		
BHU SOJANDA	ATTOCK	DDO Attock/Hassanabda	2012-07-11	Position Not Filled	Dispenser,	
BHU SHAMSABAD	HAZRO	DDO Hazro	2012-07-11	Present	Computer operator,	Carl I

Potential workers or shirkers







Health Department, Government of the Punjab Smart monitoring and reporting USING MOBILES TO IMPROVE MONITORING AND DATA COLLECTION



in collaboration with IGC, LUMS and Urban Unit



District-level randomization



Personality measures—Big 5 Personality Traits

- Five dimensions:
 - 1. openness
 - 2. conscientiousness
 - 3. extroversion
 - 4. agreeableness
 - 5. emotional stability

Personality measures—Big 5 Personality Traits

- Five dimensions:
 - 1. openness
 - 2. conscientiousness
 - 3. extroversion
 - 4. agreeableness
 - 5. emotional stability
- Example statements:
 - I like to be amongst lots of people.
 - I don't want to waste time day-dreaming.
 - ► I try to be polite to everyone I meet.
 - I keep all my things clean and tidy.

Personality measures—Perry Public Service Motivation

- Six dimensions:
 - 1. attraction to policymaking
 - 2. commitment to policymaking
 - 3. social justice
 - 4. civic duty
 - 5. compassion
 - 6. self-sacrifice
- Example statements:
 - Politics is a bad word.
 - The attitude of an elected official is just as important as his/her competency.
 - The words 'work', 'honor' and 'country' evoke strong emotions in the bottom of my heart.


I. Introduction

- II. Monitoring the Monitors
- III. Research design


III. Traits and Public Sector Performance

- V. Results
- VI. Conclusion


When will monitoring help?



Doctor personality and doctor attendance



Doctor personality and doctor-inspector collusion






These measures have more predictive power than:


- Tenure in post
- Tenure in government
- Age
- Education
- other demographics

Results from Experiment 1


Context: Punjab Department of Health



Results




Non-parametric differential effects by inspector personality



Results from Experiment 2

Context: Punjab Department of Health




Experimental manipulations of data—making absence salient

Compliance Status	Facility	/ Status	Recent Visits	Indicators	Time Trend Charts	Photo Verification	Мар	Change Password	Logout	
You are currently vie	ewing		Dis	trict Attock		(Please click to cha	ange vie	ew)	🖨 Print	

Recent Facility Visits

Visits highlighted indicate significant staff absence.

BHU RHC	THQ DHQ								
(Filter by Period) (Clear Filter) Showing all entries									
			Go to page:	< Previous 1	Displaying 1-30 of 7	34 result(s)			
Facility	Tehsil	Visiting Officer	Date	мо	Other Absent Staff	Report Summary			
		\$		•]			
BHU KANI	JAND	DDO Jand	2012-07-11	Absent	LHV, SHNS,				
BHU BHANGAI	HAZRO	DDO Hazro	2012-07-11	Present	Computer operator,	1			
BHU HAJI SHAH	ATTOCK	DDO Attock/Hassanabdal	2012-07-11	Present					
BHU TRAP	JAND	DDO Jand	2012-07-11	Present	Dispenser, LHV, SHNS,				
BHU DHURNAL	FATEH JANG	DDO Fateh Jang	2012-07-11	Present	Computer operator,	1			
BHU DAKHNAIR	ATTOCK	DDO Attock/Hassanabdal	2012-07-11	Present					
BHU SOJANDA	ATTOCK	DDO Attock/Hassanabdal	2012-07-11	Position Not Filled	Dispenser,				
BHU SHAMSABAD	HAZRO	DDO Hazro	2012-07-11	Present	Computer operator,	177			



Differential clinic 'flagging' effects by senior health officer Big 5personality

			Doct	or absent	(-1)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(-1)	(6)	(7)
Clinic flagged as underperforming on dashboard	-0.146	-0.159	0.467	1.331	1.089	-1.012**	0.318
Flagged \times Big5 index	(0.103)	(0.113) -0.402** (0.200)	(1.022)	(0.843)	(1.231)	(0.490)	(0.965)
Flagged × Agreeableness			-0.166 (0.278)				
Flagged × Conscientiousness			(*****)	-0.359* (0.202)			
Flagged × Extroversion				(0.202)	-0.322 (0.318)		
Flagged × Emotional stability					(0.510)	-0.361* (0.205)	
Flagged × Openness						(0.203)	-0.157 (0.326)
Mean of the dependent variable	0.480	0.480	0.480	0.480	0.480	0.480	0.480
# Observations	123	123	123	123	123	123	123
# Clinics	106	106	106	106	106	106	106
R-Squared	0.204	0.231	0.206	0.227	0.211	0.219	0.205

Notes: $*\rho < 0.1$, $**\rho < 0.05$, $***\rho < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered at the clinic level reported in parentheses. All regressions include district and survey wave fixed effects. Clinics were flagged as underperforming if 3 or more of the 7 staff were absent in the last visit. All columns restrict the sample to those clinics where only 2 or 3 staff were absent (up to 7 staff can be marked absent).

	Share senior official			
	time monitoring facilities			
	(1)	(2)		
Number of clinics flagged as underperforming on dashboard	0.009	0.014***		
	(0.006)	(0.004)		
# flagged x Big5 index		0.031*		
		(0.016)		
Mean of the dependent variable	0.097	0.097		
# Observations	17	17		
R-Squared	0.124	0.361		

Senior health official time use by personality

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Sample limited to senior health officials in treatment districts. Clinics were flagged as underperforming if 3 or more of the 7 staff were absent. The number flagged is the total number of clinics flagged in each district priort to our second endline (when we also collected senior health official personality and time use). Each regression also contains a control for the personality measure uninteracted.

Summary

- Designed and implemented smartphone monitoring system that was highly effective (roughly doubled inspection rates)
- The effectiveness of this incentive reform depended on traits:
 - ► Experiment 1: 1SD higher health inspector Big5 index → 27% differential increase in inspections in treatment vs control districts.
 - ► Experiment 2: 1SD higher senior health official Big5 index → 40% reduction in doctor absence following underperforming facility flag in treatment districts.

Policy Implications

- 1. Intrinsic factors/personalities matter in this domain
- 2. The same monitoring intervention can have different effects, depending on the profile of public servants
- 3. Simple manipulations to data can have big impacts \rightarrow Gains from considering decision processes and heuristics

Thank you!

	Absence rates (%) in				
	Primary schools	Primary health centers			
Bangladesh	16	35			
Ecuador	14	_			
India	25	40			
Indonesia	19	40			
Peru	11	25			
Uganda	27	37			
Unweighted average	19	35			

Provider Absence Rates by Country and Sector

From: Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer, Muralidharan, and Rogers. 2006. "Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(1): 91-116. Go Back

Doctor summary statistics

	Mean	SD	P10	P50	P90	Obs
Big5 personality traits						
Big 5 index (z-score)	0.05	0.79	-0.99	0.05	1.14	192
Agreeableness	3.57	0.66	2.67	3.67	4.42	192
Conscientiousness	4.02	0.55	3.33	4.00	4.75	192
Extroversion	3.69	0.48	3.17	3.67	4.33	192
Emotional stability	-2.54	0.70	-3.50	-2.50	-1.67	192
Openness	2.92	0.44	2.42	2.92	3.50	192
Public Sector Motivat	ion					
PSM index (z-score)	0.02	0.67	-0.83	-0.01	0.92	192
Attraction	3.46	0.60	2.60	3.40	4.20	192
Civic duty	4.22	0.53	3.43	4.29	5.00	192
Commitment	3.79	0.45	3.29	3.86	4.29	192
Compassion	3.55	0.53	2.88	3.50	4.25	192
Self Sacrifice	4.09	0.60	3.38	4.12	4.88	192
Social justice	3.96	0.59	3.20	4.00	4.60	192
Performance						
Present $(=1)$	0.23	0.42	0.00	0.00	1.00	1197

Notes: Sample: doctors in control districts that completed the personalities survey module, given in waves 2 and 3 and during a tracking round. Doctors were only asked to complete the module once. All personality traits and public sector motivation variables measured on a one to five Likert scale unless otherwise indicated.

Health inspector summary statistics

	Mean	SD	P10	P50	P90	Obs
Big5 personality traits						
Big 5 index (z-score)	0.02	0.75	-1.26	0.11	1.04	48
Agreeableness	3.66	0.54	2.67	3.79	4.25	48
Conscientiousness	4.12	0.54	3.33	4.21	4.75	48
Extroversion	3.73	0.46	3.17	3.70	4.33	48
Emotional stability	-2.34	0.62	-3.25	-2.25	-1.58	48
Openness	3.11	0.35	2.67	3.17	3.58	48
Public Sector Motivation						
PSM index (z-score)	0.07	0.61	-0.77	0.13	0.69	49
Attraction	3.57	0.57	2.80	3.60	4.25	49
Civic duty	4.44	0.42	3.86	4.57	5.00	49
Commitment	3.97	0.37	3.43	3.86	4.50	49
Compassion	3.66	0.49	3.00	3.62	4.25	49
Self Sacrifice	4.40	0.45	3.86	4.50	5.00	49
Social justice	4.20	0.43	3.60	4.20	5.00	49
Performance						
Inspector inspected in the last two months $(=\!1)$	0.53	0.49	0.00	1.00	1.00	1263

Notes: Sample: health inspectors in control districts that completed the personalities survey module, given during a single round after the final wave of clinic visits. All personality traits and public sector motivation variables measured on a one to five Likert scale unless otherwise indicated.

Differential LATEs by inspector Big 5 personality

			tor inspec			is (=1)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Monitoring (=1)	0.111	0.101	-0.671	-1.107	-0.311	0.815**	-1.022
	(0.115)	(0.101)	(0.646)	(0.794)	(0.633)	(0.324)	(0.692)
	[0.182]						
Monitoring x Big5 index		0.271*					
		(0.135)					
		[0.095]					
Monitoring × Agreeableness			0.215				
			(0.167)				
			[0.294]				
Monitoring × Conscientiousness				0.295			
				(0.185)			
				[0.184]			
Monitoring x Extroversion					0.114		
					(0.162)		
					[0.306]		
Monitoring × Emotional stability						0.305**	
						(0.128)	
						[0.039]	
Monitoring x Openness							0.370
							(0.228)
							[0.033]
Mean of dependent variable	0.575	0.575	0.575	0.575	0.575	0.575	0.575
# Districts	35	35	35	35	35	35	35
# Clinics	707	707	707	707	707	707	707
# Observations	2115	2115	2115	2115	2115	2115	2115
R-Squared	0.062	0.082	0.085	0.080	0.064	0.081	0.073

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in parentheses. P-values from Fishers Exact Test reported in brackets. All regressions include clinic and survey wave fixed effects and the interaction of a post treatment dummy with each trait.


Doctor Big 5 personality and doctor attendance

		Doc	tor atter	ndance ((=1)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Big 5 index (z-score)	0.037					
	(0.034)					
Agreeableness		0.009				
		(0.036)				
Conscientiousness			0.098**			
			(0.047)			
Extroversion				0.093*		
				(0.052)		
Emotional stability					0.037	
					(0.036)	
Openness						-0.043
						(0.059)
Mean of dependent variable	0.493	0.493	0.493	0.493	0.493	0.493
# Clinics	190	190	190	190	190	190
# Observations	479	479	479	479	479	479
R-Squared	0.192	0.190	0.197	0.195	0.191	0.190

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the clinic level reported in parentheses. All regressions include Tehsil (subdistrict) and survey wave fixed effects. Sample: control district clinics for which doctor personality data is available.



Flagging effects



Notes: Each point represents a coefficient from one regression of absence on a series of dummies for the maximum number of individuals absent at a facility in any visit during a flagging window. The regression includes district and survey wave fixed effects. 95 percent confidence intervals are shown, from standard errors clustered at the clinic level. Note clinics were flagged as underperforming if 3 or more of the 7 staff were absent in the last visit.

Doctor PSM personality and doctor attendance

	Doctor attendance (=1)								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)		
PSM index (z-score)	0.074** (0.036)								
Attraction		0.048 (0.042)							
Civic duty		. ,	0.115** (0.051)						
Commitment			· · /	0.060 (0.052)					
Compassion				. ,	0.015 (0.053)				
Self Sacrifice					()	0.089** (0.042)			
Social justice							0.047 (0.038)		
Mean of dependent variable # Clinics # Observations R-Squared	0.493 190 479 0.196	0.493 190 479 0.192	0.493 190 479 0.199	0.493 190 479 0.192	0.493 190 479 0.190	0.493 190 479 0.197	0.493 190 479 0.192		

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the clinic level reported in parentheses. All regressions include Tehsil (subdistrict) and survey wave fixed effects. Sample: control district clinics for which doctor personality data is available.



Inspector Big 5 personality and health inspections

	Health	inspect	or inspe	ction in	last two	months $(=1)$
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Big 5 index (z-score)	-0.063 (0.049)					
Agreeableness	. ,	-0.047 (0.061)				
Conscientiousness		()	-0.100* (0.059)			
Extroversion			()	-0.093 (0.073)		
Emotional stability				· · · ·	-0.102 (0.061)	
Openness					. ,	0.038 (0.078)
Mean of dependent variable	0.511	0.511	0.511	0.511	0.511	0.511
# Clinics	46	46	46	46	46	46
# Observations	523	523	523	523	523	523
R-Squared	0.181	0.179	0.182	0.182	0.183	0.178

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the clinic level reported in parentheses. All regressions include Tehsil (subdistrict) and survey wave fixed effects. Sample: control district clinics.

Inspector PSM personality and health inspections

	Health	inspect	or inspe	ction in	last two	o month	s (=1)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
PSM index (z-score)	-0.021						
	(0.058)						
Attraction		-0.027					
		(0.065)					
Civic duty			0.017				
			(0.060)				
Commitment				-0.016			
				(0.087)			
Compassion					-0.095		
					(0.114)		
Self Sacrifice						-0.002	
						(0.044)	
Social justice							-0.031
							(0.080)
Mean of dependent variable	0.495	0.495	0.495	0.495	0.495	0.495	0.495
# Clinics	47	47	47	47	47	47	47
# Observations	539	539	539	539	539	539	539
R-Squared	0.199	0.200	0.199	0.199	0.202	0.199	0.199

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the clinic level reported in parentheses. All regressions include Tehsil (subdistrict) and survey wave fixed effects. Sample: control district clinics.



Doctor Big 5 personality and doctor-inspector collusion

	Doctor-inspector collusion $(=1)$									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)				
Big 5 index (z-score)	-0.112***									
	(0.031)									
Agreeableness		-0.128***								
		(0.043)								
Conscientiousness			-0.120***							
			(0.038)							
Extroversion				-0.141***						
				(0.042)						
Emotional stability					-0.106***					
					(0.031)					
Openness						-0.056				
						(0.065)				
Mean of dependent variable	0.092	0.092	0.092	0.092	0.092	0.092				
# Clinics	239	239	239	239	239	239				
# Observations	239	239	239	239	239	239				
R-Squared	0.438	0.434	0.418	0.420	0.422	0.383				

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the clinic level reported in parentheses. All regressions include Tehsil (subdistrict) and survey wave fixed effects. Sample: clinics in treatment districts with doctors that completed the personalities survey module. Collusion is a dummy variable coded as 1 when a doctor is reported absent in both survey waves 2 and 3 but is reported as present by DDOs during every visit between the launch of the program and present (up to 73 visits).

Doctor PSM personality and doctor-inspector collusion

	Doctor-inspector collusion $(=1)$									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)			
PSM index (z-score)	-0.150***									
	(0.035)									
Attraction		-0.102***								
		(0.036)								
Civic duty			-0.107***							
			(0.037)							
Commitment				-0.149***						
				(0.047)						
Compassion					-0.164***					
					(0.046)					
Self Sacrifice						-0.140***				
						(0.038)				
Social justice							-0.107***			
							(0.036)			
Mean of dependent variable	0.092	0.092	0.092	0.092	0.092	0.092	0.092			
# Clinics	239	239	239	239	239	239	239			
# Observations	239	239	239	239	239	239	239			
R-Squared	0.478	0.416	0.419	0.432	0.439	0.437	0.415			

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the clinic level reported in parentheses. All regressions include Tehsil (subdistrict) and survey wave fixed effects. Sample: clinics in treatment districts with doctors that completed the personalities survey module. Collusion is a dummy variable coded as 1 when a doctor is reported absent in both survey waves 2 and 3 but is reported as present by DDOs during every visit between the launch of the program and present (up to 73 visits).



Inspector Big 5 personality and doctor-inspector collusion

	Doctor-inspector collusion (=1)									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)				
Big 5 index (z-score)	0.041									
	(0.045)									
Agreeableness		0.015								
		(0.064)								
Conscientiousness			0.009							
			(0.037)							
Extroversion				0.109*						
				(0.055)						
Emotional stability					0.011					
					(0.024)					
Openness						-0.021				
						(0.046)				
Mean of dependent variable	0.088	0.088	0.088	0.088	0.088	0.088				
# Inspectors	47	47	47	47	47	47				
# Observations	251	251	251	251	251	251				
R-Squared	0.142	0.140	0.140	0.154	0.140	0.140				

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the clinic level reported in parentheses. All regressions include Tehsil (subdistrict) and survey wave fixed effects. Sample: clinics in treatment districts. Collusion is a dummy variable coded as 1 when a doctor is reported absent in both survey waves 2 and 3 but is reported as present by DDOs during every visit between the launch of the program and present (up to 73 visits).

Inspector PSM personality and doctor-inspector collusion

	Doctor-inspector collusion $(=1)$										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)				
PSM index (z-score)	-0.075** (0.032)										
Attraction		-0.117* (0.068)									
Civic duty			0.039 (0.049)								
Commitment			()	-0.132*** (0.042)							
Compassion				. ,	-0.052 (0.047)						
Self Sacrifice					. ,	-0.055 (0.034)					
Social justice						· · /	-0.073* (0.041)				
Mean of dependent variable	0.091	0.091	0.091	0.091	0.091	0.091	0.091				
# Inspectors	48	48	48	48	48	48	48				
# Observations	253	253	253	253	253	253	253				
R-Squared	0.152	0.149	0.140	0.163	0.143	0.143	0.147				

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the clinic level reported in parentheses. All regressions include Tehsil (subdistrict) and survey wave fixed effects. Sample: clinics in treatment districts. Collusion is a dummy variable coded as 1 when a doctor is reported absent in both survey waves 2 and 3 but is reported as present by DDOs during every visit between the launch of the program and present (up to 73 visits).


Differential LATEs by inspector PSM personality

	Inspector inspection in last 2 months (=1)												
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)					
Monitoring (=1)	0.121	0.110	-1.022**	0.648	-0.282	-0.530	-0.122	-0.752					
	(0.112)	(0.105)	(0.473)	(0.682)	(0.688)	(0.784)	(0.884)	(0.713)					
	0												
Monitoring x PSM index		0.160											
		(0.140)											
		[0.211]											
Monitoring × Attraction			0.316**										
			(0.123)										
Monitoring x Civic duty			[0.02]	-0.124									
wonitoring x Civic duty				(0.154)									
				[0.723]									
Monitoring × Commitment				[0.725]	0.098								
0					(0.165)								
					0.297								
Monitoring x Compassion						0.175							
						(0.199)							
						[0.198]							
Monitoring x Self sacrifice							0.056						
							(0.189)						
							[0.363]	0.000					
Monitoring x Social justice								0.206					
								[0.179					
Mean of dependent variable	0.567	0.567	0.567	0.567	0.567	0.567	0.567	0.567					
# Districts	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35					
# Clinics	721	721	721	721	721	721	721	721					
# Observations	2157	2157	2157	2157	2157	2157	2157	2157					
R-Squared	0.063	0.072	0.079	0.065	0.077	0.066	0.063	0.073					

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in parentheses. P-values from Fishers Exact Test reported in brackets. All regressions include clinic and survey wave fixed effects and the interaction of a post treatment dummy with each trait.



Differential LATEs by doctor personality



Notes: Each row represents the interaction coefficient from a regression of doctor attendance on the shown personality trait interacted with a treatment dummy. Regressions include a post*treatment dummy and survey wave and clinic fixed effects and SEs are clustered at the district level.

Differential LATEs by doctor Big 5 personality

	Doctor attendance (=1)										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)				
Monitoring (=1)	0.019	0.022	0.144	-0.232	-0.073	-0.061	-0.006				
	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.417)	(0.495)	(0.374)	(0.252)	(0.530)				
	[0.336]										
Monitoring × Big5 index		0.005									
		(0.086)									
		[0.545]									
Monitoring × Agreeableness			-0.033								
			(0.116)								
			[0.627]								
Monitoring × Conscientiousness				0.063							
				(0.123)							
				[0.489]							
Monitoring x Extroversion					0.026						
					(0.097)						
					[0.443]						
Monitoring × Emotional stability						-0.031					
						(0.090)					
						[0.619]					
Monitoring × Openness							0.009				
							(0.177)				
							[0.450]				
Mean of dependent variable	0.540	0.540	0.540	0.540	0.540	0.540	0.540				
# Districts	34	34	34	34	34	34	34				
# Clinics	474	474	474	474	474	474	474				
# Observations	1216	1216	1216	1216	1216	1216	1216				
R-Squared	0.013	0.013	0.016	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013				

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in parentheses. P-values from Fishers Exact Test reported in brackets. All regressions include clinic and survey wave fixed effects.

Differential LATEs by doctor PSM personality

	Doctor attendance (=1)									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)		
Monitoring (=1)	0.019	0.020	-0.123	-0.067	0.231	0.296	-0.114	-1.058***		
	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.313)	(0.547)	(0.409)	(0.369)	(0.535)	(0.327)		
	U									
Monitoring x PSM index		0.057								
		(0.086)								
Monitoring × Attraction		[0.279]	0.040							
Wontoring x Attraction			(0.040							
			[0.355]							
Monitoring x Civic duty			[0.555]	0.021						
				(0.125)						
				[0.543]						
Monitoring × Commitment				11	-0.056					
					(0.111)					
					[0.619]					
Monitoring x Compassion						-0.077				
						(0.106)				
						[0.771]				
Monitoring x Self sacrifice							0.033			
							(0.135) [0.496]			
Monitoring × Social justice							[0.490]	0.273***		
Wolltoning x Social Justice								(0.090)		
								[0.028]		
Mean of dependent variable	0.540	0.540	0.540	0.540	0.540	0.540	0.540	0.540		
# Districts	34	34	34	34	34	34	34	34		
# Clinics	474	474	474	474	474	474	474	474		
# Observations	1216	1216	1216	1216	1216	1216	1216	1216		
R-Squared	0.013	0.018	0.016	0.013	0.019	0.016	0.013	0.027		

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the district level reported in parentheses. P-values from Fishers Exact Test reported in brackets. All regressions include clinic and survey wave fixed effects.



Differential clinic 'flagging' effects by senior health officer PSM personality

			D	octor abse	ent (=1)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Clinic flagged as underperforming on dashboard	-0.165	0.326	0.137	2.449	-0.418	-0.433	1.187	
	(0.105)	(0.661)	(0.946)	(1.673)	(1.134)	(0.903)	(0.938)	
Flagged × PSM index	-0.124							
	(0.169)							
Flagged × Attraction		-0.128						
		(0.180)						
Flagged × Civic duty			-0.065					
			(0.214)					
Flagged × Commitment				-0.700				
				(0.450)				
Flagged × Compassion					0.071			
					(0.292)			
Flagged × Self sacrifice						0.066		
						(0.205)		
Flagged × Social justice							-0.343	
							(0.240)	
Mean of dependant variable	0.480	0.480	0.480	0.480	0.480	0.480	0.480	
# Observations	123	123	123	123	123	123	123	
# Clinics	106	106	106	106	106	106	106	
R-Squared	0.208	0.207	0.204	0.217	0.204	0.204	0.219	

Notes: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the clinic level reported in parentheses. All regressions include district and survey wave fixed effects. Clinics were flagged as underperforming if 3 or more of the 7 staff were absent in the last visit. All columns restrict the sample to those clinics where only 2 or 3 staff can be marked absent).



Differential clinic 'flagging' effects by senior health officer personality

	Doctor absent (=1)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)		
Clinic flagged as underperforming on dashboard	-0.100	-0.146	-0.094	-0.159	-0.098	-0.165		
	(0.067)	(0.103)	(0.067)	(0.098)	(0.070)	(0.105)		
Flagged × Big5 index			-0.118	-0.402**				
			(0.131)	(0.200)				
Flagged × PSM index					0.016	-0.124		
					(0.108)	(0.169)		
Mean of the dependent variable	0.521	0.480	0.521	0.480	0.521	0.480		
# Observations	326	123	326	123	326	123		
# Clinics	228	106	228	106	228	106		
R-Squared	0.114	0.204	0.117	0.231	0.114	0.208		
Sample	Full	Discontinuity	Full	Discontinuity	Full	Discontinuity		

Notes: p < 0.1, $t^*p < 0.05$, $t^{**}p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered at the clinic level reported in parentheses. All regressions include district and survey wave fixed effects. Clinics were flagged as underperforming if 3 or more of the 7 staff were absent in the last visit. Columns 2 and 4 restrict the sample to those clinics where only 2 or 3 staff were absent (up to 7 staff can be marked absent). We call this sample the "discontinuity" sample.

