Improving Electoral Accountability

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Sources of Deviations from Accountability in the Electoral Process

- Prior to election:
  - Suffrage restrictions;
  - Restrictions on formation or operation of political parties;
  - Intimidation of groups of voters;
  - Manipulation of registration requirements;
  - Vote buying, patronage politics, local capture;

- During the election:
  - Violence or intimidation at the polls;
  - Queue jumping and other forms of voting interference;
  - Use of marked or non-Australian (secret) ballot;
  - Duplicate and other forms of fraudulent voting;

- After the election:
  - Booth capturing and ballot stuffing;
  - Fraud in tallying the votes;
  - Nullification of the results.
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Characteristics of Bad Governance

- Do various aspects of bad governance go together?

Do more corrupt countries also experience more electoral fraud and more electoral violence?

Hypothetical (perhaps historical) scenario:
1. Don’t hold elections;
2. Use violence to keep opposition supporters away from the polls;
3. Use fraud to tamper with results;
4. Raise campaign funds through corruption (illegal kickbacks for public construction) and outspend the opposition.
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Income and Pre-Electoral Violence (1985-2005)

Data courtesy Leo Arriola.
Corruption and GDP in 157 Countries (2010)
Corruption and GDP (2010) by Regime Type (2008) in 93 Developing Countries
Types of Solutions to Electoral Violence, Fraud, and Corruption

- Provide voters more information (Humphreys and Weinstein).
Indian Parliamentary Constituencies with at Least Criminal Candidate, 2004 Lok Sabha Elections
Indian Parliamentary Constituencies with at Least Criminal Candidate, 2009 Lok Sabha Elections
Types of Solutions to Electoral Violence, Fraud, and Corruption

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  - What kind of information? When is information effective in eliciting a response?
- Provide voters mechanisms to coordinate electoral retaliation for poor performance (Collier and Vicente).
Proportions of Charged and Not Charged Italian Deputies Reelected by Legislature (Serious Offenses Only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislature</th>
<th>Charged</th>
<th>Not Charged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I (1948–53)</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II (1953–58)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III (1958–63)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV (1963–68)</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V (1968–72)</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI (1972–76)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII (1976–79)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII (1979–83)</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX (1983–87)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X (1987–92)</td>
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<td>60%</td>
</tr>
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<td>20%</td>
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Types of Solutions to Electoral Violence, Fraud, and Corruption

- Provide voters more information about political malfeasance (Humphreys and Weinstein);
- Provide voters mechanisms to coordinate electoral retaliation for malfeasance (Collier and Vicente);
- Use other actors or technologies to monitor politicians for malfeasance (Callen and Long).
Concluding Policy Implications

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