Can climate change-induced resource scarcity increase the likelihood of conflict?

The World Bank estimates that by 2030, up to two-thirds of the global extreme poor will live in countries affected by fragility, conflict and violence. Climate change is set to intensify these pressures. The frequency and severity of natural disasters have increased fivefold over the past 50 years, while slow-onset impacts, such as rising temperatures, desertification and biodiversity loss, are further undermining livelihoods, particularly for those who live in rural areas and depend on rapidly degrading natural resources.

Climate change as a threat multiplier for human security

A growing area of concern is how climate change-induced resource scarcity will trigger intense competition among individuals or communities set to benefit from these resources. This area of research has increasingly garnered attention from national security actors who view resource scarcity or competition over newly accessible resources as emerging threats to state stability. 

However, political ecologists argue that political institutions and processes deeply mediate the physical state of the environment and that framing any conflict as primarily a dispute over ‘natural resources’ can obscure their deeper socio-political dimensions. With this in mind, the consensus that climate change threatens human security through intensifying existing socioeconomic stresses has gained the most traction across academic and policy circles. Proponents of this concept insist that climate change does not directly predicate conflict but acts as a ‘threat multiplier’ that may make such outcomes more likely.

Pathways from resource scarcity to civil conflict 

The escalation of civil conflict as a result of scarcity could operate through two primary mechanisms: First, climate change-induced resource scarcity may prompt resource capture by dominant social or political groups. This process marginalises weaker populations, often driving them to challenge existing power relations through insurgency or rural rebellion. One of the clearest examples of this phenomenon occurred in Darfur, where prolonged droughts during the 1980s and 1990s reduced the availability of fertile land and water. While wealthy groups were able to secure control of the remaining productive areas, nomadic herders and smallholder farmers faced severe restrictions on access to land and water. Coupled with ethnic and political marginalisation, this triggered violent clashes that escalated into a protracted civil war.

A second mechanism through which scarcity can cause conflict is by destabilising livelihoods and eroding the human and social capital needed to sustain productivity. A commonly cited example of this is the Syrian civil war. Between 2006 and 2010, the country experienced one of the most severe droughts in its recorded history, leading to dramatic falls in agricultural production, which catalysed economic distress. As rural livelihoods collapsed, mass migration ensued, with rural Syrians migrating to urban centres in search of new employment. Cities were overwhelmed, and the government was criticised for its inadequate response to these new pressures. This public dissent eventually manifested in anti-government protests. Therefore, in states with weak or unsupportive governments, declining productivity and food security can prime the political environment for protest and rebellion

Rational choice, opportunity costs, and the economics of conflict

While scarcity can heighten grievances, it does not always translate into violence. In fact, some scholars critique the deterministic relationship between livelihood collapse and civil conflict for overemphasising political grievances while overlooking economic factors. In many cases, increased scarcity can push individuals into a state of survival, which makes the opportunity costs of engaging in conflict far too high. Therefore, even in situations where resource scarcity does intensify grievances, the likelihood of fighting depends on a careful calculation about the potential gains versus the costs of fighting. This framework recognises that conflict is often a rational decision based on a cost-benefit analysis, where, in many cases, peace may be more attractive. 

By the same token, economic drivers of civil conflict may actually drive armed activity as individuals seeking to secure an income engage in conflict-related economies to survive. This has been true in Colombia, where, despite the introduction of the National Illicit Crop Substitution Programme under the 2016 peace agreement, the provision of alternative, licit livelihoods in parts of the country has been slow. For many rural farmers engaged in coca cultivation in areas where armed groups continue to control large swathes of rural territories, the opportunity costs of violence are reduced, and recruitment into armed groups can become the only viable option in the face of dwindling resources and economic prospects. 

Finally, while a country’s resource wealth is often used to explain causal relationships between natural resources and the onset of civil war, scholars have noted that both conflict and resource dependence are ultimately linked to a country’s economic structure. For example, a state with a weak rule of law may struggle to attract investment in its manufacturing sector and therefore rely more heavily on resource exports, which in turn triggers the risk of civil war through heightened competition among groups. From this perspective, the potential for shifting climatic conditions to affect human security depends largely on a country’s level of economic diversification and overall adaptability.

Effective governance and institutions matter

Climate change does not affect conflict in isolation but through a range of mediating variables. While climate change can modify resource availability and heighten pressures on resource-dependent communities, the outcomes of such stressors often depend on state capacity and institutional strength. Where effective governance, social safety nets, and effective conflict mitigation mechanisms exist, these pressures can be mitigated or even serve as catalysts for reform. Where these support frameworks are absent, resource scarcity can unearth latent grievances and lead to conflict over access, especially when distribution is perceived as unequal.

Climate-induced resource scarcity can heighten the risk of conflict, particularly in contexts with weak governance and limited economic resilience. But could effective natural resource management support peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery? The next blog in this series explores this question.