Managers, motivation, and worker productivity: Evidence from survey enumerators in Uganda

How do supervisors impact the performance of the workers they manage? In large companies (particularly in the manufacturing and service sectors), the role of direct supervisors is often distinct from organisation-wide policies on wage structure and recruitment. Instead, supervisors rely on non-monetary mechanisms within the firm such as worker motivation and support to incentivise better performance (Lazear et al., 2015). The role of these managerial inputs may be especially salient for firms in low- and middle-income countries with limited recourse to use formal incentives such as enforceable employment contracts. Whereas economists have extensively studied the effect of managers on performance (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003), the paucity of granular data on employee-level output and supervision has limited a deeper exploration of how these effects take place. 

This project unpacks the "manager fixed effect" or a supervisor’s value-added component in employee performance through two distinct channels: monitoring and motivation. Causal evidence on the impact of supervision on employee performance through these channels can inform organisations’ investment decisions in frontline supervision, as well as personnel policies to maximise workplace productivity. To investigate this question, this project partners with a large survey research company in Uganda, studying the role of supervisory inputs for the output of survey enumerators in primary data collection activities. This has the added advantage of furthering our understanding of how investments in supervision translate into better quality data for research purposes.