While multiple studies have shown that a woman’s control over land is positively associated with bargaining power outcomes, few have succeeded in highlighting successful methods for increasing this control. We report on a policy experiment in an unplanned settlement in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, that provided access to formal land titles to informal settlers at randomized prices, with additional price discounts conditional on designating a woman as owner or co-owner of the land in question. Results show that the household’s are highly responsive to price incentives, as households offered a small conditional discount are roughly 30% more likely to co-title their land. Despite these large differences, households offered conditional discounts are just as likely to purchase a formal land title as those offered general discounts. We discuss the implications of these results for the expected bargaining power impacts of the intervention.
The data sits under “Appendix C. Supplementary Data”. They include Stata do files, and relevant data in .dta format.