Miguel Almunia

Miguel Almunia is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Warwick (UK) and Research Associate at the Centre for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE). His research uses administrative tax data to improve our understanding of tax evasion and avoidance behaviour, both in advanced and developing countries. Miguel received a PhD in Economics from UC Berkeley and an MPA in International Development from Harvard Kennedy School.

Content by Miguel Almunia
  • Project

    Mapping domestic and international trade networks

    Why do developing countries tax imports so highly when the distortionary effects of tariffs are well-known and access to imported inputs can benefit economic growth (Koren and Csillag 2016, Goldberg et al. 2010)? One possibility is that, in low state capacity contexts, it is easier to enforce tariffs and hence generate revenue at the border than it is to enforce...

    23 Nov 2017 | Justine Knebelmann, Miguel Almunia, Jonas Hjort

  • Project

    Information, fiscal capacity, and tax enforcement: An experimental evaluation

    With the recent decline in revenues from trade tariffs and official aid, developing countries have to rely increasingly on domestic taxes for revenue collection. One of the most important potential sources of domestic tax revenue is the value-added tax (VAT), a tax instrument that has been increasingly adopted by developing countries over the past decades. In theory, the...

    26 Oct 2017 | Francois Gerard, Miguel Almunia, Jonas Hjort, Justine Knebelmann

  • Publication - Project Report

    An analysis of discrepancies in tax declarations submitted under value-added tax in Uganda

    2 May 2017 | Miguel Almunia, Francois Gerard, Jonas Hjort

  • Publication - Working Paper

    Fiscal capacity and tax revenues in Uganda

    1 Oct 2015 | Miguel Almunia, Francois Gerard, Jonas Hjort

  • Project

    Fiscal capacity and tax revenues in Uganda

    Fiscal capacity is one of the most important constraints on economic growth (Besley and Persson, 2013). In developing countries, the state’s ability to tax its citizens is typically limited by (a) the cost of acquiring accurate information on taxable activities, and (b) the tax agency’s capacity to enforce the tax rules. The literature has highlighted the central role...

    1 Dec 2013 | Miguel Almunia, Francois Gerard, Jonas Hjort