The effect of incentive structures on driver behaviour and urban road safety in Addis Ababa
This pilot study in Addis Ababa examines how financial and non-financial incentives influence minibus driver behaviour using high-frequency GPS safety data. It finds that public safety score disclosure modestly improves driving behaviour, while financial penalties are less effective, suggesting scalable non-financial approaches to enhance road safety.
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Adego-Demeke-Shah-Sial-Policy-Brief-March-2026.pdf
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- This brief explores findings from a pilot study of minibus drivers in Addis Ababa seeking to understand how financial and non-financial incentives can improve their driving behaviour and road safety outcomes.
- GPS monitoring devices were installed in 50 minibuses, which captured high-frequency road safety alerts, including speeding (> 70 km/hr) and sharp braking.
- A non-financial incentive where drivers are added to a Telegram group chat and their weekly safety scores (i.e. the number of safety alerts they generate) are revealed to the group, leads to a small decrease in speeding and sharp breaking (one to two fewer safety alerts per week).
- In comparison, a financial incentive where drivers are given a maximum prospective weekly bonus with a small amount deducted for every safety alert they trigger is less effective.
- This brief highlights some preliminary, suggestive evidence that non-financial incentives can be an effective and feasible tool to improve road safety outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa, and recommends a scaled-up version of the pilot study to more precisely measure effects and guide policymaking in this space.