Improving conservation payments: Targeting and accountability in Liberia

Policy brief Energy, Sustainable Growth and Climate and Growth Initiative

Conservation payment programmes often struggle to reduce deforestation effectively and distribute benefits fairly, with payments sometimes reaching low-risk communities or being captured by local elites. The Targeting Incentives for Environmental Stewardship (TIES) programme in Liberia tests improved targeting alongside stronger community accountability for benefit sharing. A large-scale randomised trial across 190 communities compares a standard payment scheme with one that includes community monitoring of fund use. Expected in 2027, the findings will help donors and governments design conservation programmes that achieve stronger environmental and social outcomes.

  • Conservation payment programmes can fall short in practice, both in reducing deforestation and in sharing benefits fairly. Payments may go to communities that would not have cleared forests anyway, raising concerns about the additionality of emissions reductions. At the same time, benefits may be captured by local elites rather than reaching those who depend on forest land.
  • A new programme in Liberia tests two practical solutions: better targeting and stronger accountability. As Liberia develops rules for forest-carbon transactions, the Targeting Incentives for Environmental Stewardship (TIES) programme shows how payments can be directed to high-risk communities while testing accountable community-level processes for benefit-sharing and safeguards.
  • A large-scale randomised trial compares two approaches. Across 190 communities, the programme tests a standard conservation payment scheme against an enhanced model that includes community monitoring of how funds are used.
  • The enhanced model aims to reduce the misuse of funds and increase cooperation. Giving community members a voice in assessing fairness may improve both compliance with conservation rules and trust in local leaders.
  • The findings will inform how donors and governments design conservation programmes. Results (expected in 2027) will show whether combining financial incentives with simple accountability tools can deliver better environmental and social outcomes.