Political Clientelism and Government Accountability in West Bengal: Theory and Evidence (Policy Brief) Policy brief 1 Dec 2012 State and Tax Project Political Clientelism and Government Accountability in West Bengal: Theory and Evidence Authors Pranab Bardhan Professor of the Graduate School, University of California - Berkeley Dilip Mookherjee Professor of Economics and Director Institute for Economic Development, Boston University Bardhan-Mookherjee-2010-Policy-Brief.pdf Download PDF document • 303.68 KB Share Share More from Political Clientelism and Government Accountability in West Bengal: Theory and Evidence Political Clientelism and Government Accountability in West Bengal: Theory and Evidence (Working Paper) Pranab Bardhan, Dilip Mookherjee Working paper More from IGC IGC-CATA AI Taskforce Bootcamp 25–26 August 2026 Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Past Event Gender, fragility, and energy access: A neglected intersection Sanjana Srivastav Blog Data and AI How can AI help detect non-compliance and improve tax enforcement? Laura Fras Blog How to use third-party reporting to raise VAT compliance: Evidence from Paraguay Michael Carlos Best,, Florian Grosset-Touba, Gaston Pierri, Evan Sadler, Panos Toulis Policy brief Themes State Tax Countries India - Central
