

Improving the Quality of Public Services: Evidence from Nigeria, Uganda, and Elsewhere

Daniel Rogger

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Delivering public services

- **Public services matter**: 12% of Uganda's economy and direct impacts on the private sector
- **Room for improvement** in public sector outputs e.g. Chaudhury et al (2006) study public worker absence in Uganda:
 - ▶ 27% of teachers absent from primary schools (19%)
 - ▶ 37% of medical workers absent from primary health centres (35%)
- **Motivation of civil servants** is central to the provision of public services

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Using external incentives

● Politicians provide 'top-down' incentives

- ▶ Ferraz and Finan (2011): Brazilian politicians faced by political competition **improve bureaucratic output**
- ▶ Rogger (2013): Nigerian politicians facing political competition **delegate to autonomous civil servants** and **provide informal incentives**

● Citizens provide 'bottom-up' incentives

- ▶ Reinikka and Svensson (2003): Ugandan schools receive an average of 13% of capitation grants
- ▶ Reinikka and Svensson (2005): Ugandan newspaper campaign **reduced capture of public funds**

Using internal incentives

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- **Autonomy:**
 - ▶ Bureaucrats can input into policy formulation; and,
 - ▶ Flexibility with which bureaucrats can respond to project peculiarities.
- **Performance management:**
 - ▶ Collect performance indicators;
 - ▶ Review them at regular intervals; and,
 - ▶ Provide associated rewards.

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- Independent evaluations of 4,700 public projects across 63 organisations (2006/7 Nigerian federal budget)
- 'OPEN evaluation process' used independent engineers and civil society to document project progress and quality
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- Surveys of management staff at each of the 63 organisations
- Translated existing management surveys to civil service setting (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007)
- Run in collaboration with the Presidency and the Head of Civil Service of the Federation
 - ▶ Questionnaire developed in collaboration with public officials
- Interviews enumerated by Nigerian civil servants
 - ▶ Directorate staff formed consensus for each question as well as filled their own surveys

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Management in Nigeria

- High degree of variation in management practices across organisations
 - ▶ Tenure based system of progression into management
- Positive correlation between autonomy management and performance management (0.24)
- Distinct managers from the same organisation had similar management scores


What did we find?

- Correlate proxies of organisation output with management practice:

OLS estimates	(1) Proportion completed	(2) Quality-adjusted
Index of autonomy	0.18*** (0.03)	0.11*** (0.04)
Index of performance management	-0.14*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)
Other management practices	0.08*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)
Organisation and Project Controls	Yes	Yes
Observations (clusters)	4,721 (201)	4,721 (201)

How do we explain our results?

Figure 1: Project Ambiguity and the Response to CS-Incentive Management Practices



Conclusions

- **Core civil servants** are critical to the delivery of public services:
Evidence from Uganda on capture
- **External incentives** increase public sector outputs: an additional newspaper leads to 5% higher enrollment
- **Management practice has substantial impacts on productivity:**
32% increase in output for standard deviation change
 - ▶ Proxies of government output in Uganda?
 - ▶ Civil servants and management surveys of public sector?
- For more complex tasks, engaging in a partnership with civil servants (targets, flexibility) may be more effective than judging them using performance targets

Thank you

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