

Working paper

Funding political parties in Ghana

Nature, challenges
and implications

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November 2015

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FINAL REPORT

**FUNDING POLITICAL PARTIES IN GHANA:
NATURE, CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS**

By

E.K. Sakyi, K.S. Agomor & Daniel Appiah

November 5, 2015

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List of Abbreviations

ADB - Agricultural Development Bank

CDD – Centre for Democratic Development

CPP – Convention People Party

EC – Electoral Commission

IDEG – Institute for Democratic Governance

IEA – Institute of Economic Affairs

LECIAD – Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy

NDC – National Democratic Congress

NIP – National Independence Party

NLCD – National Liberation Council Decree

NPP- New Patriotic Party

PNC – People National Convention

PNDC – People National Defense Council

SMCD – Supreme Military Council Decree

Abstract

This study examines the nature and challenges of funding political parties in Ghana. Data were collected through semi-structured elite interviews and survey of 1600 self-declared card-holding members and 200 self-declared non-card holder members of the seven political parties that contested the 2012 general elections. The findings of the study indicate that all Ghanaian political parties obtain their major funding from rich individuals, special contributions and donations rather than membership dues. And, some rich individuals fund more than one political party; also, funding from foreigners especially Chinese, Lebanese and Indian businesses is common within the two bigger political parties. The study conclusions are that, Ghanaians are divided on the question of state funding for political parties. But then, support for state funding is stronger among the elite political class and party executives than ordinary party members. Institutional weakness emerged as one of the severest challenge to political parties in mobilising financial resources for their activities. And, this institutional weakness manifest in the lack of transparency and accountability frameworks and weak internal organisational mechanisms required to mobilise funds from ordinary members. The following recommendations have been proposed during the study to address the funding problem. The need to provide support for political parties to build organisational capacity to enable them mobilise funds and improve internal transparency and accountability regimes. The Electoral Commission would have to be strengthened to enforce the rules governing funding of political party activities. Unwavering support from the political elites is required so as to intensify public discourse on the vexed question of state funding of political parties. Also, a more vibrant civil society to continuously demand accountability and compliance with the laws on party funding is needed. An overwhelming majority of interviewees recommended that, Ghanaian political parties themselves would have to start showing unimpeachable signs of being very transparent and accountable internally to their own membership.

Acknowledgements

This research report was funded by the International Growth Centre (ICG) and is part of a larger effort to understand the factors shaping social, political and economic development in developing countries including Ghana. It was written by E. Kojo Sakyi with support from Kingsley Agomor and Daniel Appiah. The research report also benefited from Charles Gyamfi-Ofori, Ernest Apau and Eric Yobo who assisted with data collection.

1.0 Introduction

This report presents the findings of a research on the nature and challenges of funding political parties in Ghana. The aim of this research is to further expand our understanding of: (a) the current institutional frameworks governing the funding of political parties; (b) the nature of funding political parties; (c) the challenges of funding political parties; (d) the effectiveness in enforcing regulations governing the funding of political parties; (e) why policy recommendations made by advocacy groups have not produced legislation and implementation of policies on political party financing; and, (f) implications for nurturing democratic politics and good governance in Ghana. The research was carried out from 1 March 2014 to 28 February 2015. The report is divided into three broad sections: section one is devoted to the review of the literature on party funding and legal framework for funding political parties in Ghana. Section two describes the methodology, and section three presents the findings of the study, conclusions and recommendations.

1.1 Literature review on political party financing

This section reviews relevant literature on the contested issue of political party financing. The review covers the views on political party and party finance, sources and nature of financing and perceived potential problems associated with the various sources of finance. The literature review also provides insight into some of the arguments for public subsidies or state funding and the situation in developing African countries.

There are various conceptions and theoretical conjectures on the term political parties and their importance to sustaining democratic statecraft. To a large extent political parties are perceived as the engine or the heart and soul of democracy because of the critical roles they play in the formation of government and grooming of political leaders at national and sub-national levels (Bienzen, 2004; Bofo-Arthur, 2003).

Perspectives on political party funding are largely shaped by ones orientation, appreciation and persuasion about the roles parties play in a democracy. But political party financing is not only accepted as essential but as a critical requirement for the survival of democratic government. Yet the concept remained ambiguous and suffers from narrow and unclear definitions and contestations. Basically, funding of political is about the manner in which political parties and individual candidates who seek to get elected to political office mobilise financial and non-financial resources for election campaigns (see Fambom, 2003). Ohman and Zainublai (2009) argue that political party finance means fundraising and spending that political parties do during elections. Political party finance is all about the use of funds by political parties for political activities including elections. More importantly, political parties by their nature are organisations (or exhibit all the features of a bureaucratic organisation) and for them to maintain and sustain themselves as such depends upon the availability of reliable sources of funding. Political party funding is therefore perceived by majority of scholars and political elites as indispensable; an important lubrication that greases the engine of party politics (Institute of Economic Affairs, 2008) or as the main driving force for modern competitive political systems (Nassmacher, 2003; Gyampo, 2015). Other scholars have emphasised that, it is about how parties and individual candidates running for political office

raise money to organise a successful election campaign (Ssenkumba, 2005). These definitions have one common denominator, that is; political party activities especially election campaigns require numerous programme of activities ranging from traveling, advertisements and other huge logistical needs which demand that any serious candidate or a political party would have to devote energy and time to mobilize money to finance these inevitable expenditures. Essentially, individuals, groups and political parties themselves during election and non-election periods incur huge financial expenditure. Political finance is therefore the ways and means to support individuals and political parties to undertake these political activities effectively. In effect, political financing is both the object and end result of political processes. As such, political finance and concomitant processes are directed at two activities, that is running campaigns and to be active and visible during non-elections periods. The nature of financing and the reliability of the flow of funds uninterrupted is crucial for the survival and influence of political parties and candidates in a modern democracy.

All the above claims are being made because political parties are seen and accepted as necessary and desirable institutions of modern democracy (Bienen, 2004). Also, because huge sums of money is required to design and execute the activities of political parties (Gidlund, 1994; Hopkin, 2004)). This of course, include reaching out to voters in the remotest locations, breaking down public inertia and buying goods, skills and services aimed at securing political activity needed for sustaining government and governance (Wiberg, 1991).

Funding sources for political party activities

A variety of sources are available for financing political party and individual party activities. The most common sources of funds are party membership dues, fund-raising through party activities and donations from sympathizers and profit accruing from properties and businesses owned by a political party (Ninsin, 2006). Membership contributions is considered as most reliable, effective and attractive means of party financing. These funds are voluntarily given and are not conduits for influence on party decisions or access to party functions or positions. Dues from members are seen as equally genuine and has the potential to give members a certain degree of influence regarding internal party politics without allowing individuals or groups to dominate party affairs. However, regarding membership dues as a reliable source is questionable because it is dependent on the size of the membership support base of the individual party.

Donation is another source of funding which is considered as a very important source of funds in most African countries (Ninsin, 2006). Party donation come in different forms and from a variety of sources, for example salary worker, professionals, wealthy business executives, civil society groups and philanthropists. Most opposition political parties in Africa benefited from donations. Donations are becoming more reliable and desirable source of funding, in that it encourages increased participation of citizens in political party activities. Apart from that, donations give quite a good free-hand to parties to generate their funds. Donation also serves as a means for parties to establish strong bondage between parties and their grassroots supporters. But it must be noted that there are inherent dangers in relying overly on donations for party financing. Private donations and gifts are unreliable and

unpredictable; hence reliance on them is a recipe to party failure. Besides, the unequal access and unequal distribution of donations may have debilitating effect on political engagement, participation, internal party democracy and healthy political competition. In short, it has the penchant of creating an uneven playing field.

Political parties also solicit financial support from their local fund raising activities. Some of their funds are raised by organizing special dinners, breakfast meeting and special meetings with contractors, oil tycoons and business tycoons who are interested in getting their names in the good books of the party. Indirect funding is also quite popular: that is parties receive valuable resources which have significant effect upon the electioneering activities of parties. Typically, such indirect sources take the form of free air time, free advertising, free mobile networks aimed to disseminate party information to a broad spectrum of electorate (Austin and Tjerns, 2003). Nonetheless, indirect funding creates problems such as unequal access to the state media, mobile networks, internet and other vital publicly owned digital platforms. The pervasiveness of this situation has the tendency to erupt into serious tensions which may affect the peaceful conduct of campaigning.

Overview of reasons for state funding of political parties

Various reasons or arguments have been made in favour of state funding or public subsidy for political parties. The first reason given is that state or public funding has to do with the increasing need to control the influence of individual and private money and to limit their potential effect on the democratic political process. The aim here is to protect the public good and ensure that the public interest rather than individual interest and money shapes the conduct of political parties and elected political actors. Alexander and Shiratori (1994) make a similar assertion in regards to the limitation placed on private donations or campaign expenditure. It is expected that this situation will help reduce corruption in the political process. This view is the state-centric perspective, and, it is regarded as a popular suggestion to solving the perennial problem of funding political parties where the state provides financial and non-financial resources to political parties from the public purse. This may be in the form of cash or kind or both.

The second reason for state funding has to do with the realisation that political parties have for a long time been suffering from a growing disconnection of citizens from conventional politics, which manifests in lack of trust in parties, identification with parties, increasing apathy and partisan and resultant decrease in the number of party memberships (Dalton et al, 2000; Mair and ran Biezen, 2001). As a consequence, political parties have lost a significant number of volunteers who would have to work for the party as unpaid political missionaries or carrying out intensive campaign activities for free. (E.g. in Africa, the support-base of the nationalist political parties have diminished due to demographic changes and harsh socio-economic conditions of the post-independence periods especially in the 1970s, 80s and 90s). This loss has pushed most parties to resort to the recruitment of large number of paid political-workers resulting in increasing cost for running party activities. This declining membership resulted in loss of major revenue and membership dues/subscription causing most parties to go out of their way in search of financial assistance from alternative

unorthodox sources. It is for this recognition that, some scholars and political elites are advocating an intervention from the state to prevent the collapse of political parties and the implications for government, governance and civil society. Van Biezen (2007) in this connection noted that, ‘because parties had come to be seen as a vital political institutions for democracy, it is just logical for the state to intervene with direct financial support in order to facilitate or guarantee their continued existence and survival’.

The third reason for state involvement in party financing of political parties derives from the believe in the creation of an equal playing field, equal opportunities, fairness and to enhancing quality of political competition (Gunlicks, 1993:5). Given that all political parties are not equally resourceful and those who are unable to benefit from private funding should not be allowed to suffer unduly or be disadvantaged. This concerns is of importance, particularly in regard to smaller and new parties whose programme is unlikely to appeal to wealthy individuals and established groups and new parties with no connection with social and economic interests (e.g. Trade Unions, Women groups, farmers associations; youth groups and grassroots associations etc.). The justification for state funding in such cases is that, it would facilitate a more equal level playing field, by enabling new, small and less resourceful parties to compete on a more equitable basis with the dominant and financially more privileged and entrenched parties.

The fourth argument in favour of state funding relates to the desire to restrict the influence of private money and curtails its potential for distorting the democratic political process. The aim is to prevent the unfortunate situation where private financiers take an entire political party and party officials’ hostage resulting in dangerous manipulations and corruption. Similar arguments hold for the limitation placed on private donations or campaign expenditure through regulatory policy from the state (Alexander and Shiratori, 1994; Alexander, 1996). The use of public legislation would empower the state and its institutions to control the indiscriminate and inordinate influence of private-money in politics. It also offers the state a greater opportunity to legitimately exercise supervisory responsibility and protect undue influence of private businesses to the disadvantage of the ordinary members and the public interest. This notion is embedded in contemporary notion of the relevance of political parties for the survival of democracy (Hopkin, 2004). In this regard Paltiel has observed as follows: “Whether the motive for state intervention is for financial stringency, the reduction of the burden of rising election cost, or the desire to escape the taint of corruption or mixture of these, efforts was made to justify the changes in terms of liberal democratic ideology” (quoted in Alexander, 1989:16). For the foregoing reasons, parties have become and are seen as indispensable public goods and the state is obliged to play a legitimate role in their survival by financing their activities (Biezen and Kopecky, 2001; Biezen, 2007; Paltiel, 1981).

The fifth reason is that party politics and democratic development in all modern societies has become increasingly expensive. The continuing rising cost of the democratic process coupled with a decreasing revenue to its principal actors require public funding. Politics has become expensive in developed and developing countries. This is because of the more use of the mass media, more cost-intensive campaign methods; and, resources needed by parties have

increased at central headquarters and constituency offices and this require better staffing and more money for effective administration and intensive election campaign, (Mair,1994; Farrell, 2002; Pinto-Duschinsky1990; Pinto-Duschinsky, 2002). Therefore, state funding in such a situation is never a luxury but necessity.

Despite the foregoing arguments in favour of a more prominent role of the state in the funding of political parties, these propositions would have to be understood within the context of the ongoing predominant discourse, which holds that parties make a positive contribution to democracy and to the public interest (Bienen, 2004; Patiel, 1981; Doorenspleet, 2003). In fact, the increasing importance being attached to state participation in party financing has become acceptable mainly for the recent ideological change that has accompanied the development of modern democracy in the developed, transition and developing countries. Political parties have over the years grown from organizations perceived as incompatible to democracy, to institutions that are generally seen not only as its principal promoters but an indispensable backbone (Bienen, 2004; Pinto-Duschinsky, 2001).

This perceived change in the role of political parties informed Biezen and Kopecky (2007) submission that a growing and more generally shared and positive recognition came to be attached to the role of parties in representative democracy only in the immediate post-war period (Bienen, 2004; Randallo and Lars Svasand, 2002). They argued that beginning with the restoration of democracy in the developed countries in central Europe, political parties came to be seen as valuable and crucial to the point that they are generally considered as the necessary condition for the organization of the modern democratic polity and for the expression of political pluralism and participation (Nassmacher, 2001 cited in Ayee et al., 2007). Bienen (2004) and Biezen and Kopecky (2007)) further argued persuasively that the centrality of political parties for representative democracy is generally accepted both by contemporary party scholars – although arguably not by many political theorists – and by policy-makers charged with fostering the development of newly emerging democracies and with improving the quality and sustainability of democracy in established democracies.

All in all, the growing appreciation over the course of the last five decades of the positive contribution that parties make to democratic development underline the justification for the shift in the theoretical postulations on the role of political parties and modern democracy. Because political parties have now become valued key democratic institutions, it has become necessary for the state to play a direct role in financing them in order to facilitate their continued existence, to foster equal access to resources, and to prevent personal forms of party financing (Biezen and Kopecky, 2007).

Overview of party funding in developing African countries

It is important to note that the justification or the debate of state funding of political parties is indeed not new but it has over the last two decades gained currency following the wind of democratic reforms which have engulfed the entire world especially the transition countries of the former Soviet Union and developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Asia.

For most developed countries which are stronger economically with a vibrant civil society and stronger business class, the question of party funding is not much of a problem. In fact, quite a number of developed countries already have party funding incorporated in their public expenditure and it constitutes a large share of their national income set aside for electoral and

political party activities. However, Africa is lagging behind in terms of the number of countries providing public money to support political party activities (see Ohma, 1999; Austin and Tjernstrom, 2003). Ghana for example, is not among the countries currently providing state support to political parties. Ghana needs to invest more in nurturing, consolidating and sustaining democracy. Ghana's current situation suggest that, the inherent question of whether state funding of political parties would pay-off remained unanswered or unaddressed. In the peculiar case of Ghana, the issue is left to the opposition parties while the ruling party and government remained mostly unconcerned. Ninsin (2006) laments that, "the Ghanaian political financing regime virtually bequeaths party funding to market forces. He argued that, realising effective party organisation in the domain of the private sector has nevertheless proven illusory and problematic". Even the two major political parties in Ghana – the NPP and the NDC – have found it extremely difficult to finance their operations from private sources. The fact therefore is that finance is a major problem for all the political parties in Ghana except the party that is in power. It is therefore not surprising that, all the non-governing parties have at one time or the other supported state subvention of political parties (Ninsin, 2006). He has further observed that:

"When the NPP was in opposition it was a vocal advocate of state funding of political parties. But since it was voted into power it has been less enthusiastic about the issue of state funding of political parties while the NDC, which is now out of power, has been lamenting the paucity of funds for party work, and has now joined the smaller parties to advocate state funding of political parties" (Ninsin, 2006: 17-18).

Several studies have attempted to answer the state funding question in the new democracies in Africa (Ninsin, 2006; Ashiagbor, 2005; Ayee et al. 2007; Boafo-Arthur, 1996; Kumado, 1996). Many of these studies claimed that state funding serves as an important boost to new parties especially smaller parties which have no or limited access to other sources of money to undertake their political activities (Ikstens et al., 2002). Essentially, funding provided to a new and small party in its infant stages may would help it not only to survive and compete in elections but to engage in relevant political activity during and after elections. Arguably, state funding has the tendency to diversify the party system, improve internal party democracy and boost democratic competition (Samuels, 2001; Boafo-Arthur, 1996). Whereas state or public funding of political parties is seen to be good, the extent to which state funding may bring about change in political competition is largely contested by many because it is dependent on how it is conceived, designed and implemented by the political elites of a country. Undeniably, when public funding or subsidy policy is well framed through consultation and massive engagement with stakeholders before implementation, it would strengthen the party system and urge parties to embrace political change. Political parties are essentially an assembly of social groups, they are products and properties of society; and, public funding of their activities would serve as stimulus for them in several ways. It would enable them to operate as professional, social and political organisations. Any carefully fashioned public policy aimed at supporting their activities would make them less dependent on rich individual businessmen and businesswomen for money. Also, public funding when packaged properly would help political parties build stronger structures that would improve internal democracy,

enhance their national and social character and enable them engage in active social and political activities at all times (IDEA, 2003; Ayee et al. 2007; Gyampo, 2015).

In fact, the current situation in Ghana and most African countries where the responsibility of funding political parties remains the concern of a small group of rich individuals and organizations is not the best for nurturing representative democracy and good governance in developing African countries. The availability of appropriate funding for election campaign, headquarters and constituency administration and education activities of political parties is very important. It is unfortunate that after nearly two and half decades of multi-party experiment in Ghana, the issue of funding of political parties has not been seriously discussed especially within the economic and social context, even though it remains a vexed and contentious political topic (Gyampo, 2015; Ayee, 1993; Kumado, 1996). Public opinion on the question of state funding of political parties is still divided, and, despite circumstantial evidence of support for public funding of parties, there remained several unanswered questions on the issue in Ghana today (Gyampo, 2015).

The present study attempts to provide answers to some of these questions. Specifically, this study attempts to answer the following interrelated questions: (a) what is the nature of political party funding in Ghana? (b) What is the dominant opinion of voters, party members and executives about the reasons for state funding? (c) What are the major challenges of political party funding? (d) What are the potential policy effects and implications of state funding?

1.2 Methodology

Data for the study were collected through qualitative and quantitative research methods from all the seven political parties, which contested in the 2012 general elections. They included the National Democratic Congress (NDC), New Patriotic Party (NPP), Convention People’s Party (CPP), People’s National Convention (PNC), Progress People’s Party (PPP), Great Consolidated Popular Party (GCPP) and United Front Party (UFP).

1.2.1 Data Sources

Primary data for the study were collected through elite interviews and mass survey. The description of the data collection procedure is discussed in the sub-section below.

i. Elite Interviews

The qualitative data was collected through semi-structured key informant interviews with Members of Parliament (MPs), political party executives, card-holding ordinary members of political parties, officials of the Electoral Commission, academics, and civil society actors. A total of twenty-three interviews were conducted. The sample distribution of the in-depth interviews is presented in Table 1 below:

Table 1 Sample distribution of in-depth interviews

Institution	No. of interviews
• Electoral Commission	3
• Civil Society Organizations	5
• Political Party Executives	17

- Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) 1

TOTAL 26

Source: Field Data, 2014; N= 26

ii. Mass Survey

Questionnaire Development

The development of the questionnaire was informed by the objectives of the study. Twenty questionnaires were pre-tested from March 24-26, 2014 in Accra. Responses and report from the pre-testing were used to finalise the survey instrument. The final instrument comprised three sections. The first section of the questionnaire asked for information on party affiliation or membership status. The second section focus on the nature of sources of party funding, support for state funding and challenges of funding. The last section of the questionnaire collected information on the background of the respondents with respect to age, sex, education, occupation, income level, region and constituency.

Questionnaire Administration

The questionnaires were administered at various party offices, homes, party congresses and party programmes. On Saturday April 5, 2014, the CPP held its National Executive Congress at Tamale, some Research Assistants were deployed to administer some number of questionnaires. Also, on April 12, 2014 and December 20, 2014, the opposition NPP organised its national delegate's congresses at Tamale in the Northern region and Kumasi in the Ashanti region respectively to elect national executives of the party. The researchers took advantage of these congresses to administer majority of the questionnaires with the help of Research Assistants. Over 60 percent of the total questionnaires were therefore administered at these party congresses using convenience and stratified sampling procedures. The stratification was done on the basis of membership positions of the respondents, for example, constituency, regional and national executives of the parties. This helped the researchers to reduce known variances in the population which the convenience sampling was likely to create. Likewise, Research Assistants were also deployed to the Western (Takoradi), Volta (Hohoe), Eastern (Donkorkrom), Brong Ahafo (Techima), Upper East (Bolgatanga), and Upper West (Wa) regions to administer the survey questionnaires. This second grouped of interviews aimed to ensure regional representation of the sample and to correct any potential researcher biases which might have occurred during the first phase. The regional distribution of the respondents are presented below in Table 2.

The survey data covered 1600 self-declared card-holding members of the seven political parties that contested the 2012 general elections and 200 self-declared non-card holding members of the political parties. The two biggest political parties in Ghana (NDC and NPP) were allocated two-thirds of the questionnaires and the remaining one-third were distributed among the five smaller political parties. Concerning the survey of political party members, the NPP and NDC were each allocated 600 questionnaires due to their almost equal strength in the last three general elections; and, the percentages of total votes of the five smaller parties in the last three elections were used as a proxy to distribute the remaining 600 questionnaires to the respondents.

Table 2: Political party and region

Party	Region of affiliation ¹											Total
	N/R	WR	CR	GAR	VR	ER	AR	BAR	NR	UEW	UWR	
NPP	17	29	11	117	63	68	95	36	91	31	42	600
NDC	32	29	33	104	43	38	118	27	72	55	49	600
CPP	1	8	11	35	6	7	20	10	30	11	9	148
PNC	2	8	7	47	9	3	16	10	39	20	16	177
PPP	0	6	5	1	2	1	2	4	11	6	5	43
GCPP	0	3	0	6	0	2	7	6	0	1	1	26
UFP	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	0	0	0	6
N/A	13	30	8	74	4	3	44	17	5	1	1	200
Total	65	113	75	384	127	122	304	114	248	125	123	1800

Source: Survey Data, 2014

In June 2014, 100 questionnaires were sent to Parliament House and distributed to MPs out of which 90 were completed and returned. Most of the questionnaires were self-administered. Therefore, there were many non-responses to some of the questions. For example, over 40 percent of the questionnaire from parliament did not provide information on their regions and constituencies. Given that we have only one MP for each constituency, such information would compromise anonymity of the responses. Respondents who failed to indicate their party affiliation and the major source of funding to their parties were not included in the sample. This is because the main aim of the study is to identify major sources of funding to political parties in Ghana. The positions occupied by respondents in their parties is shown below in table 3.

Table 3: Membership positions of respondents of political parties

	NPP	NDC	CPP	PNC	PPP	GCPP	UFP	N/A	Total
Member of Parliament	56	60	4	1	0	0	0	0	121
National Executive	9	14	4	4	1	2	0	0	34
Regional Executive	37	36	30	9	6	0	0	0	118
Constituency Executive	263	262	27	40	12	4	3	0	611
Polling Station Executive	72	82	42	25	5	5	1	0	232
TESCON/TEIN Executive	54	40	2	3	0	0	0	0	99
Council of Elders	9	3	2	1	0	2	0	0	17
Overseas Branch Executive	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	4
Ordinary Member	100	100	36	94	19	13	2	0	364
No Party	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	200	200
Total	600	600	148	177	43	26	6	200	1800

Source: Survey Data, 2014

1.2.2 Characteristics of Survey Respondents

¹ Respondents were selected across all the ten regions of Ghana namely Western Region (WR), Central Region (CR), Greater Accra Region (GAR), Volta Region (VR), Eastern Region (ER), Ashanti Region (AR) Brong Ahafo Region (BAR), Northern Region (NR), Upper East Region (UER) and Upper West Region (UWR). Sixty-five of the survey respondents did not indicate the region in which their constituencies are located (N/R).

The background of the respondents for the study in relation to the demographic statistics such as gender, age groupings, educational levels and occupations are presented below in table 3. The survey was dominated by male respondents who formed over 60% of the total respondents. The predominant age group was those aged between 31 to 40 years with the average age being approximately 38 years. With respect to the educational level of the respondents, most of them had a form of tertiary education. Thus about 63% of the respondents had either completed a university, a teacher training college or any other form of tertiary education.

Majority of respondents were employed and out of these about 34% were employees of private businesses. The government employees constituted about 28% of the total number of respondents. Majority of the respondents were mainly Christian (over 60% of the total respondents). See Table 4 below.

Table 4: Demographic characteristics of respondents

Item	Number of respondents	Percentage of respondents
Gender		
No response	103	5.72%
Male	1110	61.67%
Female	587	32.61%
Age grouping		
No response	22	1.22%
18-30 years	481	26.72%
31-40 years	582	32.33%
41-50 years	450	25.00%
51-60 years	217	12.06%
60 years and above	48	2.67%
Educational level		
Non response	35	1.94%
No formal education	62	3.44%
Primary education	46	2.56%
JHS	138	7.67%
SHS	385	21.39%
Tertiary	1134	63.00%
Occupation		
No response	52	2.89%
Artisan	234	13.00%
Employed by the state	509	28.28%
Employed by a private business	618	34.33%
Unemployed	387	21.50%
Average monthly income		
No response	286	15.89%
Less than 500	512	28.44%
500-2000	745	41.39%
2001-4000	132	7.33%

4001-6000	57	3.17%
Above 6000	68	3.78%
Religion		0.00%
N/R	42	2.33%
Traditional	38	2.11%
Christian	1126	62.56%
Islam	589	32.72%
Others	5	0.28%

Source: Survey Data, 2014

1.2.3 Data analysis procedure

Word-Excel and the Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) version 20.0 were the computer software used for analyzing the quantitative data. Word-Excel was used to develop tables, figures and charts. The statistical results are presented in the form of percentages, frequency tables and cross-tabulations. The recorded interviews were transcribed and analysed thematically according to the research questions of the study. The coding and analyses were based on the research questions and related dominant themes which emerged from the interviews. These influence the analyses and where possible, the interview responses were quoted verbatim to support a point.

2.0 Overview of the legal and institutional context of party financing in Ghana

This section presents a summary of the institutional framework which governs the formation of political parties and the nature of financing political parties. It provides an insight into the regulatory activities of the Electoral Commission and its mandate to enforce the rules governing political party funding in Ghana.

2.1 Rules governing the formation and funding of political parties

After Ghana's independence from Great Britain in 1957, the Convention People Party government passed the *Discrimination Avoidance Act (C.A. 38)* that same year to, among other objectives, regulate the formation and activities of political parties in the country. The Act prohibited the formation of political parties that sought to promote tribal, regional, religious or racial interests. Subsequently, *the National Liberation Council Decree (NLCD) 345 of 1969* and *the Supreme Military Council Decree (SMCD) 229 of 1979* were passed by Military ruling regimes that followed the overthrow of the first post-colonial government to consolidate the formation of political parties that promoted national interests.

The 1969, 1979 and 1992 Constitution makers who ushered in the second, third and fourth republics of Ghana followed the same tradition of banning the formation of political parties based on the promotion of ethnic, religious, regional and racial interests. The current 1992 Constitution makes it obligatory for the National Executive Committee of a political party as well as the founding members of a political party to come from all the regions of Ghana. To deepen the national character of political party organization, the constitution further requires that a political party should have a founding member from each district of the country. Moreover, "For the purposes of registration, a prospective political party...shall satisfy the

[Electoral] Commission that...the party is organized in not less than two-thirds of the districts of each region.”

Under Ghana’s 1992 constitutional democratic dispensation, “the internal organization of a political party shall conform to democratic principles”. Playing the game of democratic politics requires a fair and independent minded agency to function as a referee for the political parties who are going to play the game to win elections. The search for an independent minded referee has also been taken seriously by constitutional designers since the overthrow of the one-party state government in 1966. The 1969, 1979 and 1992 constitutional designers created an independent Electoral Commission to manage free and fair elections and supervise the activities of political parties. The Political Parties Act, Act 574, of 2000 was passed to give more impetus to the work of the independent Electoral Commission.

2.2 The laws governing the financing of political parties

The funding of political parties has remained a contentious issue in Ghanaian politics, especially between the creation of the Second and Fourth Republics of Ghana. Since the Second Republic, the law banned foreigners and non-Ghanaian businesses from “directly or indirectly making any contribution or loan (whether in cash or kind) to funds held or to be held by or for the benefit of any political party and no political party or person whatsoever shall demand, obtain or accept any such contribution or loan from any alien or company, firm or business house not wholly owned by citizens of Ghana.” The law was justified on the grounds that financial influence of foreign actors or donors in Ghana’s multi-party politics could undermine the ability of elected governments to promote national interests.

It is important to emphasise that prior to 1979, the law permitted Ghanaians to contribute any amount of money for the benefit of any political party. Following series of military governments and the fight against acts of corruption in the country, the 1979 Political Parties Decree (SMCD, 229) was passed to limit the financial contributions of a citizen of Ghana to political party funds to one thousand (1,000) cedis per annum. The Decree also required political parties to show the sources of their funds by indicating in their financial statements a list of persons who make contributions to the party. The financial statements of political parties were to be audited once a year by an auditor approved by the Registrar-General who retains a copy of the audited accounts.

In 1991, PNDCL 281 re-stated the ceiling placed on individual financial contributions to a political party. Opposition political parties however contested the issue in court on the grounds that the financial ceiling was too low. The opposition parties though accepted in principle the need for a ceiling on individual contributions to a party but argued for an increase of the ceiling. This led to the promulgation of the Political Parties (Amendment) Law, PNDCL 283, of 1992 which allowed the Electoral Commission to increase the ceiling to one million (1,000,000) Cedis.

The 1992 Constitution however did not consolidate the limitation on individual contributions to a political party when the country returned to democratic rule under the Fourth Republic. The Constitution however maintained that “Only a citizen of Ghana may make a contribution or donation to a political party registered in Ghana.” Moreover, under the 1992 Constitution, Political parties shall be required by law to declare to the public their revenues and assets; and, to publish to the public annually their audited accounts. In 2000, the Political Parties Act, Act 574, was passed by Parliament to elaborate on the issues of party formation, organization, funding and other matters pertaining to the supervisory role of the Electoral Commission.

Other provisions have been made in the Political Parties Act (Act 574) to help interested citizens to appreciate the architecture of funding political parties in Ghana. The Act states that, *“Every political party shall, within ninety days after the issue to it of a final certificate of registration or such longer period as the Commission may allow, submit to the Commission a written declaration giving details of all its assets and expenditure including contributions or donations in cash or in kind made to the initial assets of the party by its founding members.”* It further states that *“A declaration submitted to the Commission shall state the source of funds and other assets of the political party.”* A political party is legally obliged to declare to the EC its assets and liabilities twenty-one days to an election, and *“within six months after a general or by-election in which it has participated, submit to the Commission a detailed statement in such form as the commission may direct of all expenditure incurred for that election.”*(Republic of Ghana, 2000).

The Political Parties Act also contain provisions on the submission of annual financial statements to the EC. Section 21 of the Act states that:

“A political party shall within six months from 31st December of each year, file with the Commission a return in the form specified by the Commission indicating: (i) the state of its accounts; (ii) the sources of its funds; (iii) membership dues paid; (iv) contributions or donations in cash or kind, (v) the properties of the party and time of acquisition; (vi) such other particulars as the Commission may reasonably require and, audited accounts of the party for the year”.

Further, the Electoral Commission may at any time upon reasonable grounds order the accounts of a political party to be audited appointed by the Commission whose fees and expenses shall be paid by the Commission and also request the political party to file with the Commission the audited accounts at a time to be specified by the Commission. Finally, the Act makes provision for any person, on payment of a fee determined by the Commission, to inspect or obtain copies of the returns and audited accounts of a political party filed with the Commission.

It is important to note that neither the 1992 Constitution nor the Political Parties Act (Act 574) specify the format in which political parties are to make declarations of assets, expenditure, and contributions or donations to the initial assets of a party. It is the legal responsibility of the EC to specify the appropriate format to the parties. To forestall

resistance of the political parties to be transparent with the EC concerning its finances and other activities, Act 574 strengthens the authority of the Commission to direct the political parties to declare to the Electoral Commission “*such other particulars as the Commission may in writing direct.*” There is no doubt that Ghana has a comprehensive legal regime that makes it possible for citizens to understand the funding of political parties provided the EC enforces the rules. The next section examines the EC’s enforcement of the rules to enable citizens have a clear and objective understanding of the nature of funding political parties in Ghana.

2.3 The EC and enforcement of the rules governing party funding

This section discusses the effectiveness of the EC in enforcing the legal rules regarding the obligation of political parties “*to declare to the public their revenues and assets and the sources of those revenues and assets.*” The discussion focuses on such annual declarations to the EC regarding: (i) the state of its accounts; (ii) the sources of its funds; (iii) membership dues paid; and, (iv) contributions or donations in cash or kind. Two questions are crucial to unearthing the reality of the EC’s capability in enforcing compliance on the part of political parties. These are: Have the political parties been willing to submit such annual returns to the EC? In the event that political parties fail to comply with the rules, does the EC use its legal authority to force the parties to comply with the rules? The findings are discussed below.

The study found that since the enactment of the Political Parties Act, Act 574, the EC has failed to prescribe a standard format to be used by the political parties in the preparation of their annual financial statements. Consequently, the political parties prepare their statements in the manner they deem fit. Over the past ten (10) years, from 2005 to 2014, not a single political party has filed with the EC an up-to-date annual audited statements of accounts. The NPP had submitted only 2005 and 2006 audited accounts; the CPP had submitted for 2005, 2006 and 2012; the NDC had submitted from 2005 to 2010 and the PNC had submitted from 2005 to 2009. All the political parties that have contested elections since the fourth republic have defaulted in the submission of an up-to-date annual audited accounts to the EC. In the last general elections of 2012, none of the parties which contested the elections complied with the legal obligation to submit to the EC a declaration of their assets and liabilities twenty-one days to the election. And within six months after the 2012 general election, none of the participating parties fulfilled the legal obligation to submit to the EC a detailed statement in such form as the commission may direct of all expenditure incurred for that election. Incidentally, the EC has never been able to sanction any of the political parties for breaching the rules.

It shows clearly that, the EC has not been effective in enforcing the rules. When asked why the EC has perpetually failed in this duty, a Director of Finance at the EC explained as follows: “*The provisions in the law do not have an enforcing order. Every law is a law for the country. So if somebody breaks any aspects of the law, it is the courts that should adjudicate, but the EC is not a court, EC is a regulatory body and can counsel, advise, can even instruct, but does not have the power to enforce.*”

Sections 29-32 of the Political Parties Act, Act 574, 1992 contain penalties and regulations that may be used by the EC to enforce compliance to the rules. For instance, section 31 of the Act suggests that the EC has been empowered to cancel the registration of a political party and “*On an application made by the Commission the High Court may make such orders as appears to the Court just and equitable for the winding up and dissolution and disposition of the property, assets, rights and liabilities of a political party whose registration has been cancelled.*” The explanation that the EC does not have the power to enforce the law is therefore strange.

3.0 The study findings

This section presents the findings of the study based on the interview and survey data obtained from the fieldwork. The issues include but not limited to: (i) the nature of funding of political parties;(ii) state funding; (iii) obstacles to mobilising funds for political party activities; (iv) the adoption of a national policy on party financing, and (v) suggested policy responses to address the problems.

3.1 The nature of funding political parties in Ghana

Evidence from the data on the nature of political party funding may be broadly categorized as follows:(i) payment of membership dues; (ii) special financial contributions (iii) donations by party executives, ordinary members and non-members; (iii) sale of party souvenir, (iv) grants from organizations, (v) investment income and (vi) finances by rich individuals and loans. It has been gathered from the findings that all the political parties obtain their major funding from rich individuals, special contributions and donations rather than from the payment of membership dues. Interviewees expressed the view that funds flowing to political parties in the form of membership dues are usually very scanty and that this is largely due to non-existence of adequate data on party members. A civil society informant remarked:

“..... the political parties do not have data on up to 30 percent of their membership hence it is difficult to mobilise funds from them, it is not and cannot be true that ordinary party members pay significant dues to their parties, in any case, there are not even adequate records of those activities.....” (Head of Research; CDD-Ghana: Field notes; 2014).

In the opinion of an NPP Executive (interview with National Treasurer, July, 2014), though the party has made improvement and collected dues by text messaging, the numbers as well as amounts generated were still meagre compared to those anticipated. An NDC interviewee also bemoaned the fact that “*there were serious data challenges of membership and this inhibits effective collection of membership dues*”. In their opinion, dues collection among ordinary members was not effective and adequate. Overall, lower incomes emanating from the weak nature of the national economy, inadequate mobilization by parties and general mistrust in the Ghanaian political system to deliver with less corruption was mentioned by respondents. In addition, lack of transparency and accountability regarding party funds were among the reasons adduced by interviewees to explain the problem. It was also the general opinion of respondents that if the above is addressed and political parties could restore hope, and the ability and willingness of members to pay dues will improve.

Regarding the issue of party reliance on a wealthy few, respondents were unanimous that reliance on rich individuals for political party funding is a common phenomenon in Ghana. It was noted that, apart from money, most financiers could even donate personal or family buildings for use as office space for the party; the former aspiring NPP regional chairman of the Ashanti Region in 2014 was specifically named by interviewees as a case in point. An insider interviewee revealed that:

“In his bid, he alone donated a three story office complex to the party in central Kumasi and later won the election”. The majority of the interviewees opined that: ...*“those rich individuals tend to be so powerful in the decision making process of their parties such as choice of candidates during internal contest, influencing appointments, contracts and many more when the party wins power”*.

Another respondent also observed that:

“... we all know that few rich people fund the parties and, it has become a business as he who ‘pays the piper calls the tune’. According to him, *“it is a major reason for corruption and the appointment of incompetent and second-rated political officials into government. I belong to a political party but could not remember the last time I paid my membership dues; how much worse, ordinary members whose incomes are often scanty and are not even well organised by political party executives?”*(A Research Fellow LECIAD: Field notes; August, 2014).

Interviewees suggested a comprehensive review of the current situation so as to enable more ordinary members to fund parties. An NPP respondent has alluded to the fact that, *“... the efforts to fund parties by getting more from ordinary members would boost political participation, ownership and strong demand for competitive policy alternatives which will reduce corruption and improve the quality of governance.”*(A Volta Regional Party Executive: Field notes; August, 2014).

Interviewees recalled that: *“When rich individuals and local businesses fund political parties openly, they often become targets especially if their party loses elections”*. Some notable examples have been identified. For instance, the NDC government was accused of gaining unlawful access to the Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) account details of a known elite farmer who single handedly funded the National Independence Party (NIP). In another instance a former President (of NDC) was accused of openly discouraging Ghanaians from patronizing soap manufactured by known NPP financier’s company. The alleged business harassment of an NDC financier by the erstwhile NPP government among others was also noted.

Furthermore, the interviewees remarked that a lot of rich individuals fund more than one political party and mostly in varying amounts. While some interviewees considered funding by such rich individuals and businesses as a sign of commitment to their party, the majority on the other hand emphasized that, they do it not for benevolence but purely as an investment in order to get some reward whenever their party won political power. Most of the respondent however indicated that the political persecution of businesses of party financiers by

opponents has affected employment, business initiative and the general economy negatively. Condemning the practice, ruling governments are advised to be more tolerant. Interviewees suggested further that all stakeholders join the debate to articulate an acceptable policy which would create a platform to determine the modalities by which businesses can partner with governments in addressing this national electoral and developmental problem. A Senior Research Fellow intimated that: “..... *it will guide people to manage businesses fairly without depending on the political systems for favours and this would reduce political patronage....*” (A Research Fellows, Danquah Institute: Field notes; July, 2014).

Another dimension the financing of political party question explored during the interview was the contribution of foreigners. The majority of interviewees were emphatic that it was a common practice even though it is illegal. A party stalwart admitted that:

“Almost all parties are guilty of this offence; and, such funds often come in forms of both cash and kind such as vehicles, motorcycles and bicycles for campaigns. Sometimes, the printing of party paraphernalia such as flags, shirts, caps and others are sponsored by foreign companies and this is common knowledge. They do it as investment and anticipate getting contracts while engaging in other softer and unethical ways of doing business in Ghana” (NDC Regional Executive: Field note; June, 2014).

An overwhelming majority of respondents identified the common culprits as Chinese, Lebanese and Indian businesses whose activities and dealings with political parties have attracted the most suspicion. The respondents contend that the Chinese businesses are notorious for sponsoring Members of Parliament, endorsement of District Chief Executives and even giving tips to local opinion leaders and traditional rulers especially in mining areas. To some respondents, this results in relaxing the full implementation of mining laws and thereby creating environmental and such related problems in the country. A member of the CPP who is also an academics thus disclosed: “.....*we know all kinds of money such as drug money, laundered money and even stolen monies find their way into funding political parties in Ghana but when you ask the parties, they would deny it.....*” (A Research Fellow, LECIAD: Field note; August, 2014).

Respondents however suggested a regime of full disclosure of sources of funds for parties in Ghana, a practice they strongly believe is not being well observed by any of the parties. While some blame the EC for not being up to its task, others identified legislative inadequacies as a part of the problem since the EC does not have enough powers such as those of the courts to fully implement decisions. In that regard, interviewees were unanimous in their demand for a review of the laws to give real enforcement powers to the EC.

3.2 State funding of political parties

Opinions on the vexed question of state funding were mixed. Whereas some respondents consider state funding of political parties as unimportant, a relatively smaller number of the respondents including a Senior Research Fellow of a civil society organization strongly recommends partial state funding. The core reasons which have been cited as the basis for the

rejection of state funding are given as follows: uncontrolled proliferation of parties; unnecessary pressure on the tax payer; the state's inability to tackle political corruption, and the challenge of determining how much to pay. and being tagged as a lethargic approach to addressing the funding problem of political parties were among the reasons for rejecting state funding of parties as an option. A respondent argues that, "*... we must never under any circumstances continue to argue for state funding of political parties, nothing will come out of it than the promotion of mediocrity, proliferation and I can assure you that it is not; and, cannot be an antidote to corruption. I have presented several papers on this at many places and will always accept to do more upon invitation*"(A Research Fellow, LECIAD: Field notes; August, 2014).

As indicated earlier, relatively few respondents who endorse state funding would however want it done partially. Interviewees suggested that, *government could adopt selective sponsorship where some activities of political parties such as training of party agents and supply of basic needs like vehicles etc. could be provided to parties.* However, the possible inability of genuine and competent people to serve in government simply because of lack of money emerged as a major worry to many respondents. Thus, an interviewee recalled that some form of state funding is already being practiced in Ghana, "*..... government, through the EC, NGOs and other development partners has done this partial funding as in the case of 2004 where vehicles were given to political parties with representation in parliament by a given formula. I was part of that mobilization and would strongly advocate this and such forms of partial state funding to continue. In any case, there is already a semblance of such partial state funding.....*"

(A lecturer, Department of Political Science: University of Ghana, Field notes; May/June, 2014). Overall, the evidence from the interviews suggest that majority of Ghanaians disagree with the idea of wholesale state funding of political parties; the main contention is that, it is not desirable at this time. At worst, there could be a partial or limited state funding.

4.0 Major obstacles to mobilizing funds and resources for political activities

The study investigated the question of funding political parties further through interviews and survey of party members and executives with emphasis on factors which militate against their parties' ability to mobilise funds for various political activities. The summarised results are presented in the following sub-sections. The first part presents the findings from the semi-structured interviews and followed by the results from the survey data.

4.1 Weak economy

The general performance and inherent weaknesses of the Ghanaian economy was identified by an overwhelming majority of the interviewees as unpredictable and not too encouraging over the years. This has rendered income of businesses and individuals unpredictable. Specific examples of a weak economy mentioned included but not limited to falling value of the cedi against major trading currencies, high inflation and high price of good and services, increases in fuel prices and recent frequent power outages resulting in reduced productivity and employee lay-offs. Interviewees' views were that "*citizen's capacity and willingness to pay dues to political parties depends to a large extent on the consistent flow and constancy of their incomes*". Lower income of party members is therefore identified as a challenge to their readiness and how much they could give. Essentially, income inconsistency of citizens and party members has resulted in lower capacity of parties to raise membership dues which should ideally form the chunk of funds for parties in Ghana. The reality is that, membership of parties has been reduced to running of errands instead of playing active and supportive

financial roles. According to an interviewee, “.....*opposition parties are more challenged since the financiers are smart and would want to fund the winning side. When there is a more winnable candidate in an election, they hedge.....*” (NPP card-bearing member: Tamale: Northern Region; July, 2014).

4.2 Absence of accurate data

Absence of accurate data of party membership is another challenge identified during the interview and, it is important to emphasize that this is characteristic of all political parties in Ghana. All interviewees of the political parties which participated in the study have affirmed that political parties have inadequate data of members. A respondent observed that most often, people rush to do party identity cards only when they are about to seek a benefit from their party and they are not even consistent in performing membership responsibilities. He bemoaned the fact that, even the whole country does not have an accurate data on the entire Ghanaian citizenry. All the interviewees were worried at this situation and noted that all parties and even government find it very hard at addressing it with urgency. An interviewee and research fellow at the Danquah Institute questioned: “... *How could parties raise enough funds without database of their membership?*” He added: “*It is a big joke and even the whole country fails to have accurate data on citizens. This is a real sabotage of the state by politicians and even the national identification exercise has become a fiasco. Political parties must wake up and do the right thing*” (A Senior Programme Officer; Danquah Institute: July, 2014).

4.3 Lack of credibility within the political system

Respondents were unequivocal on the lack of credibility in Ghana’s political system as a major impediment to funds and resource mobilization for serious political activity during and after elections. Firstly, the interviewees held the view that:

“The political parties have not been accountable to their own membership regarding the little dues they collect”. Secondly and most importantly, they unanimously noted that, “Ghanaian politicians have over the years tended to be very corrupt in office and, this is demotivating genuine people who would wish to fund political parties even without the expectation of reaping benefits through corrupt means. It is, however, difficult for members to raise funds for parties only to see that their conditions of living continue to be bad”. (Party and Non-party members in Accra, field notes: May/July, 2014).

All political parties especially the National Democratic Congress and New Patriotic Party have been identified by the participants as most guilty. Some respondents lamented that *the situation where governments seem to be collaborating with people and businesses to loot the state is very dreadful*. An employee of the Electoral Commission during the interview remarked as follows:

”.....It is very demotivating for someone to fund a party with good intention only to see continuously that government appointees do very little but rather loot the state. How come it is now obvious that people could collaborate with say, the Attorney General and other state institutions to steal so much money yet no serious attempts are made to safeguard our

resources? To me, the NPP and NDC are both very guilty and I would not be surprised that whichever party comes to power was going to do same. There is no confidence in the system.....” (A Senior Officer, Electoral Commission: Field notes; August, 2014)

4.4. Apathy and bad-mannered politicians

Interviewees pointed at apathy and linked it to corruption, conceitedness and bad-mannered politicians as obstructive to the flow of monies and other resources to political parties. A CPP interviewee stated that:

“.....the funds are no longer coming as interest and enthusiasm has fallen because of pride and voracity of our politicians. The few financiers are aging and getting financially fatigued, the CPP would have to work to get a new pool of dedicated financiers.....”

(Director of Administration, CPP Headquarters: Field notes; May 2014).

Many parties in Ghana have experiences of some of their members defecting to another party, others losing interest and when people continue to support parties financially without winning, they often give up. In a related discussion during the interview, the respondents identified monetization of politics in Ghana as a major challenge to party funding. Many interviewees have observed that:

“Starting from internal politics where filing fees and campaign expenditures are most often very high, the more competent but financially weak persons are often disqualified from contesting; but the situation is even more disturbing where aspirants would have to buy votes in an election”.(Some non-cardholding members; NDC and NPP: Field notes; July, 2014).

These findings have affirmed that, political parties and individuals spend so much money and this is worse on voting days where huge amounts are spent on transport, agent fees and others. It was also noted that some politicians and the electorate engage in all manner of unethical activities such as encouraging vote buying and selling. The majority of respondents were of the view that, if monetization of politics is not controlled, only richer individuals and parties would continue to win elections as is the case currently.

4.5 Why no policy on political party financing?

Interviewees’ opinions on the entire system of political party financing in Ghana suggest that almost every political actor or party is guilty of one issue or the other. However, several reasons have been assigned regarding why suggestions by stakeholders could not result in the enactment of the appropriate policy and legislation to resolve the problem. The following are some of these reasons.

Ruling governments benefit from the weaknesses in the system in several ways and would wish to keep such systems to protect themselves. As noted in the discussion, illegal sources such as foreigners funding politics in Ghana are common. Though parties would often deny this practice, they are perceived to have been rewarding such illegal contributors with contracts and this has led to increased political patronage.

The winner takes all principle in Ghanaian politics and excessive executive powers of the President have overshadowed the willingness of the actors to operationalize policy

recommendation to improve party funding in Ghana. This is seen in how the President of Ghana is so powerful to the extent that even ordinary administrative duties such as directors of National Service, National Disaster Management Organization and others are appointed by the President. It is more interesting that, at a change of government, such officers themselves are too willing to vacate their offices to be taken over by appointees of the new government. Strangely, there are no constitutional provisions endorsing most of such actions by the President. For example, an interviewee and a Senior Research Fellow (LECIAD) and a leading member of the CPP lamented that, “... *I do not understand why the Inspector General of Police should change with a change of government, this is purely a professional position, it has become as though their office runs co-terminus with that of the President, it is both illegal and unethical, let us stop encouraging it.....*”. (A Research Fellow, LECIAD; Field notes; August, 2014).

The existence of weak civil society has been identified by respondents as also contributing to the inability of state institutions to formulate appropriate policy that will improve the funding of political parties Ghana. Respondents were of the view that if stakeholders were genuinely pressing consistently on various social and political actors, the situation would have changed. According to a Senior Research Fellow of IDEG: “*I wonder why people would form pressure groups such as Alliance for Accountable Government and Committee for Joint Action mainly to unseat ruling governments instead of a more neutral civil position to press for policy reforms*”. (A Research Fellow; IDEG, Field notes; July, 2014). By and large, the genuineness of most civil society organisations and even some policy advocacy groups and advocates’ commitment to contribute to improve policy on party financing in Ghana is contested by many respondents in the study.

Fundamentally, the generally high level of political illiteracy in Ghana has contributed to the inability of mass action to positively result in the implementation of policy reviews on party funding. Many interviewees reported that Ghanaians do not appreciate the workings of these civil society and political institutions; because they are mostly handicapped in making any meaningful contribution to the resolution of the problem. At worse, they merely have to follow the masses and in which case, they get misled. In that regard, interviewees recommended vigorous political education, the building of social consciousness and active stakeholder participation.

Probing the issue further, the interviewees noted that “*entrenched partisan position of the masses of Ghanaians on many developmental issues including legal and more ethical ways of funding parties has prevented the implementation of reforms in that direction*”. This is because many people perceive reforms with partisan mentality and have mostly supported movements for change only in circumstances that suit their personal partisan positions. An interviewee emphasized that, “we have lost because partisan positions cannot deliver realistic national policy direction”. Respondents recommended improved literacy including political literacy if the nation is to build consensus, adopt and implement reforms on political party financing.

5.0 Quantitative results: nature and challenges of funding of political parties

In this section the key questions of the study, that is, the nature, challenges and state funding of political parties were examined using statistical tests of the survey data. The results are presented in the sub-sections which follows.

5.1 The nature of funding political parties

Respondents were made to rate on a scale of one to five, their levels of agreement of each of the identified sources of funding for political parties. The scores were averaged out across all the respondents thereby giving scores ranging from a minimum of 1 to a maximum of 5. Given in Table 2 are the available sources of funding for the political parties. As shown in Table 2, the most predominant funding sources for the political parties as noted by the respondents were from rich individuals of the party (Mean = 4.41, SD = 0.77). Other dominant sources of party funding came from founding members, members of parliament and other executive members of the party. The least identified funding source was related to the state or government funds (Mean = 2.71, SD = 1.71) and the ordinary members (Mean = 2.93, SD = 1.38).

Analysis of variance tests show that differences exist in the dominance of the funding sources as perceived by the respondents ($p < 0.01$). Further post hoc tests using the Tukey's HSD procedure illustrates that the actual differences occurred between sources of funding from rich individuals and all other sources of funding. Similarly, differences existed between the ratings of the sources of funding from ordinary members and all the other sources of funding. The details of the post hoc tests are as given in Table 4.

Table 3: Sources of funding for political parties

Source of funding	Average	Standard deviation
Rich individuals of the party	4.41	0.77
Founding members	4.06	1.02
Members of parliament	4.04	1.11
Executive members of the party	3.94	0.9
Contributions from overseas branches	3.84	1.17
Local businessmen/businesswomen	3.83	1.59
Foreign businesses	3.24	1.44
Ordinary Members	2.93	1.38
State/Government funds	2.71	1.71

Source: Survey Data, 2014

Table 4: pairwise differences for post hoc tests

Funding source	OM	RI	FM	LB	MP	SGF	EM	OB
RI	1.48*							
FM	1.13*	0.35*						
LB	0.91*	0.57*	0.22*					
MP	0.90*	0.58*	0.23*	0.01				
SGF	0.21*	1.69*	1.34*	1.13*	1.11*			
EM	1.11*	0.37*	0.02	0.19*	0.21*	1.32		
OB	1.01*	0.47*	0.12	0.10	0.11	1.23*	0.10	

FB 0.31* 1.17* 0.82* 0.60* 0.59* 0.53* 0.80* 0.70*

* Pairwise Difference is significant; Source: Survey Data, 2014

Key

OM - Ordinary members of the party RI - Rich individuals of the party
 FM – Foreign Members of the party LB - Local Businessmen/ Businesswomen
 MP – Members of parliament SGF – State/ government funds
 EM - executive members of the party OB – Overseas Branches
 FB – Foreign Businesses

5.2 Difficulties to mobilise funds by political parties

Four items were used to identify the challenges faced by the political parties. An exploratory factor analysis was conducted to identify the major categories that contain the challenges faced by the political parties in mobilising funds. The tests for model adequacy yielded significant results as the Bartlett’s test of model adequacy yielded a p value less than 0.01. This indicates that the sample selected is adequate for factor analysis. The factor analysis extracted two factors that explained 69% of the total variation present within the data set. Table 4 gives details of the factor loadings on the two distinct factors.

The first factor extracted explained 39% of the total variation. This factor contained challenges that were related to institutional flaws within the party. This includes the issue of corruption, lack of accountability and the presence of weak organisational capacity to mobilise funds for the political party. The second factor extracted approximately 30% of the total variation. Within this factor were issues that are related to the ordinary members of the party. This includes the issues that are related to financial weakness of the ordinary members and their fear of being victimised by other members of the party.

Further tests were conducted to examine the existence of substantial differences between the two identified factors. An independent samples t-test conducted yielded significant differences between the severity of the challenges resulting from the institutional factors and the challenges resulting from the weakness of the ordinary members (p<0.01). Institutional challenges were found to be more severe than the challenges that were related to the weaknesses of the ordinary members.

Table 5: Factor analysis of challenges of mobilising funds

challenge of mobilising funds	Loadings on Factors	
	Institutional factors	Ordinary member weakness
Lack of transparency and accountability	.850	.121
Weak organizational capacity to mobilize funds from ordinary members	.828	.175
Ordinary members fear political victimisation	.140	.800
Ordinary members are financially poor	.141	.800

Source: Survey Data, 2014

5.3 Respondent perceptions on party financing

Respondents were also made to indicate their perceptions generally on financing political parties. Four items were identified for the respondents to respond to. In each case they were made to state their level of agreement to the identified items. Table 6 gives the responses based on the percentage of respondents that agreed to the identified item on party financing.

Further a sample chi square test was used to test for the significance of the differences among the proportions of the identified items.

As shown in table 7, respondents believed that wealthy people within the party tend to influence the outcome of the elections. In addition, respondents were generally of the view that sources of funds should be made by the political parties. With regards to the moneys given to parties by individuals as donations, respondents were generally of the view that the state must not limit the amount to be donated.

A further breakdown was made to ascertain whether the general perceptions of party financing varied across executive members and ordinary members. The chi square tests still yielded similar results as it was when individuals were not considered. Similarly the perceptions on party financing did not differ when categories of party affiliation was considered. This is to say that the general perceptions of party financing are independent of one's portfolio within a political party and the party affiliation (see tables 7 and 8)

Table 6: General perceptions of party funding

	% disagree	% neutral	% agree	Chi square p value
• Wealthy people who provide money for the party tend to influence the outcome of elections within the party	12.9	10.1	76.6	0.00*
• Parties should fully disclose sources of income	13.8	12.5	72.5	0.00*
• Political parties should fully disclose to the public their expenditure	13.3	12.9	73.2	0.00*
• The State should limit the amount of money that individual citizens and companies can donate to parties	44.6	20.7	34.3	0.00*

Source: Survey Data, 2014

5.4 State funding of political parties

Respondents were made to state whether they were in support of state funding of political parties or not. Approximately 42% of the respondents were in support of state funding of political parties whilst 38% were not in favour. The remaining 18% were left undecided. Tables 9 and 10 give cross tabulations between support of state funding and the political party preference as well as support of state funding and the position held in the party. A binomial test of the significance of the proportions yielded significant differences between the proportions of those who are in support, those not in support and the respondents who were undecided. This test considers the null hypothesis of equal representation of respondents within the three categories.

Table 7: Political party funding and political party affiliation cross tabulation

Party affiliation	Party funding items			
	A	B	C	D
NPP % disagree	15.7	19.0	18.2	51.3

	% neutral	10.0	18.2	18.5	23.5
	% agree	74.3	61.8	63.0	24.8
NDC	% disagree	12.5	12.3	12.0	43.0
	% neutral	10.2	12.2	10.7	21.7
	% agree	77.0	74.8	76.8	34.8
CPP	% disagree	4.7	7.4	6.8	29.7
	% neutral	6.1	6.1	5.4	18.9
	% agree	88.5	84.5	87.2	51.4
PNC	% disagree	5.6	4.5	4.0	42.9
	% neutral	7.9	.6	2.8	7.9
	% agree	86.4	94.4	92.1	49.2
Others	% disagree	20.0	13.3	14.7	40.0
	% neutral	9.3	16.0	13.3	9.3
	% agree	70.7	69.3	72.0	50.7

Source: Survey Data, 2014

Table 8: Political party funding and portfolio cross tabulation

Portfolio		Party funding items			
		A	B	C	D
Executive member	% disagree	13.7	13.1	12.7	46.8
	% neutral	9.7	13.1	12.2	19.3
	% agree	76.5	72.9	74.6	33.7
Ordinary member	% disagree	8.8	15.1	14.3	37.9
	% neutral	8.5	11.5	12.9	22.5
	% agree	82.4	72.3	72.3	39.0

Source: Survey, 2014

Chi square tests for independence show that support for state funding of political parties depends on political party preference ($p < 0.05$). As seen from table 8, the proportion of respondents who are either in favour of state funding across the CPP, PNC and the other smaller parties far outweighs the proportion of respondents in the NPP and NDC parties that support state funding. This pre supposes that the support of state funding of political parties is predominant among the smaller political parties.

Table 9: State funding support and political party preference cross tabulation

Support state funding		political party					Total
		NPP	NDC	CPP	PNC	Others	
do not support	Number of respondents	241	260	42	37	32	612
	% within support	48.4%	50.9%	38.5%	28.0%	46.4%	46.4%
support	Number of respondents	257	251	67	95	37	707
	% within party1	51.6%	49.1%	61.5%	72.0%	53.6%	53.6%
	Number of respondents	498	511	109	132	69	1319
	% within party1	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Survey Data, 2014

Table 10: State funding support and party portfolio cross tabulation

State funding support		Portfolio		Total
		Executive member	Ordinary member	
Do not support	Number of respondents	450	162	612
	% within portfolio	43.1%	58.7%	46.4%
Support	Number of respondents	593	114	707
	% within portfolio	56.9%	41.3%	53.6%
Total	Number of respondents	1043	276	1319
	% within portfolio	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Survey data, 2014

Similar tests for independence show that the support for the state funding of political parties is rather dependent on the portfolio of the respondents based on whether the person is an ordinary member or not. The table further indicates that the proportion of party portfolio holders in favour of state funding outweighs the proportion of ordinary members who are in favour of the support of state funding. This shows that ordinary members of political parties are not in favour of state funding of political parties whilst executive members of political parties are in favour of state funding of political parties.

6.0 Conclusions

This study examined the nature of funding for political parties in Ghana and the problems faced by parties in mobilising funds to support their political activities. Also, the issue of state funding was interrogated. Based on the findings the following conclusions were drawn:

- In Ghana, few rich individuals are the major financiers of political parties. Funding from foreigners is a common practice especially within the bigger parties. The second reliable source of funding comes from founding members and executive members of the party. Membership dues and public funding are not only the least but an unpredictable source of funds to political parties.
- Ghanaians are divided and ambivalent on the question of state funding. Those who oppose across-the-board state funding policy outnumber those who support the idea.
- Support for state funding is strongest among party executives, but for ordinary party members, state funding of political parties is an undesirable policy option at this time. What one could deduce from the findings is that state funding is seen as entirely bad, but private funding especially by rich individuals is not seen as bad. Both private and state funding, however, need effective regulation by the establishment and implementation of disclosure and transparency laws.
- Institutional weaknesses within the parties are responsible for their failure to mobilise resources for party activities. These weaknesses include corruption, lack of accountability and transparency in funds management, and weak organisational capacity to mobilise funds.
- The EC lacks the powers of a court, EC is a regulatory body and can counsel, advise, and instruct, but does not have the power to enforce laws. Political parties need to

endeavour to grow as law abiding public organisations so as to be able to earn the trust of ordinary members who would willingly offer financial support.

Policy recommendations

The interviewees recommended the following policy responses:

- ***Support political parties to build organizational capacity to enable them mobilise funds***
Political parties in Ghana – whether big or small – have demonstrated weak organisational capacity to mobilize funds for their activities. The study has shown that the public remained indecisive and is unlikely to support any blanket policy of state funding of political parties. It emerged from the study that Ghanaians would prefer an approach where both state and non-state actors would be encouraged to support political parties with the necessary financial and non-financial resources to effectively perform their interest articulation and mobilisation functions.
- ***Improve transparency and accountability regimes within political parties***
Interviewees recommended that parties adopt and implement appropriate and aggressive measures and policies which support a transparent and accountable regime for managing all political party funds. Indeed, improving transparency and accountability in the activities of political parties may not only reduce corruption; it would gradually increase public confidence in the internal party politics and system and the entire electoral political process. Transparency and accountability in the use of public/communal resources are central principles which must guide the decisions of all political party actors at local and national levels.
- ***Enforcement of the legal rules governing political party activities***
The Electoral Commission has been unsuccessful in implementing several aspects of the Political Parties Act, Act 574, of 2000. This situation has given many a political party the opportunity to disregard the legal requirements for ensuring transparency and accountability in managing party finances. Issues of organisational capacity as a qualification for engaging in national politics would have to be taken more seriously. Some of the participants expressed serious apprehension about the weaknesses and failings of the EC in the performance of its legal responsibilities. It was recommended that the EC would have to pursue the necessary legal procedures at the High Court to cancel the registration certificates of political parties that have persistently failed to submit details of their annual financial reports and related documentations as specified by the law. It is also recommended that, to ensure effective enforcement of the rules, the EC should first prescribe a standard format of financial reporting to the political parties. This would become a benchmark against which the EC could measure the accountability credentials of the political parties.
- ***Intensify public dialogue on state funding of political parties***
Discussants stated that the discussion on the issue of state funding would have to continue. Interviewees observed that the arguments for and against state funding of political parties in Ghana is far from settled. It is recommended that relevant CSOs be given the necessary support to facilitate healthy debates between the proponents and opponents of public funding of political parties.

- Some relatively smaller interviewees recommended that political parties should be represented on the boards of the EC. This they believe would improve debates and the quality of services of the Commission regarding the regulation of party financing. Respondents have submitted that this would increase the confidence the parties and the masses of the citizens have in the EC.
- The phenomenon in which some businesses and individual financiers of political parties rise or fall as governments rise or fall should be interrogated. This knowledge would inform ethical, reliable and productive ways by which individuals and businesses could contribute to party funding.
- A more vibrant civil society to continuously demand accountability and compliance with the laws on party funding is needed. This should even start with parties being very accountable internally to their own membership.

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Appendix: 1

RESEARCH PROJECT: POLITICAL PARTY FINANCING IN GHANA: NATURE, CHALLENGES AND POLICY IMPLICATION INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR ELITE SURVEY

Issue 1

What is the major source of funding for your party?

Probe:

- Are there any other sources?
- Will you agree that rich individuals are the main financiers of the party?
- Why do you think rich individual support the party?
- How are funds mobilized from them?
- How does the involvement of rich individual in party financing affect their businesses?
- Will you agree that the party is dependent on these few rich individual financiers

Issue 2

To what extent do rich individual influence internal democracy:

Probe: (e.g. Election of: constituency, regional and national party executives)

Issue 3

How does the party's reliance on rich individuals for funding affect party capacity to sanction or discipline rich individuals when they violate party constitution/rules

(E.g. open declaration of support for potential flag bearers)

Issue 4

What are the expectations of rich individuals and businesses who made financial contribution to the party during elections? **Probe:** *Is the party able to meet their expectations? Please give examples of the form benefits or favours extended to them.*

Issue 5

What is the major challenge facing the party in mobilizing funds for party activities?

Probe: *Questions raised by party members regarding lack of **transparency and accountability** in the use of the funds?*

Issue 6

Do you support state funding? Yes/No

Give reasons for your answer.

Appendix: 2

Political Party Financing in Ghana Survey Instrument

This study seeks to understand the nature of political party financing in Ghana. It will help contribute to the on-going debate on party financing and democracy in Ghana. The study is being funded by the International Growth Centre (IGC). It would be appreciated if you could spare some time to answer the following questions as best as you can:

SECTION A: PARTY AFFILIATION

1. Are you a card holding member of any political party? (1) Yes (2) No
2. If yes, which political party?
(1) NPP (2) NDC (3) CPP (4) PNC (5) PPP (6) GCPP (7) UFP
3. [If Yes to question 1] How long have you been a member of the party?
(1) Less than 1 year (2) 1 - 5years (3) 6 -10 years
(4) 11 -15 years (5) 16 - 20 years (6) 20 years and above
4. [If No to question 1] Do you identify with or a sympathizer of any political party?
(1) Yes (2) No
- 4.b If yes which party? (1) NPP (2) NDC (3) CPP (4) PNC (5) PPP (6) GCPP (7) UFP
5. Do you currently hold any position in your party? (1) Yes(2) No
6. If yes, which of the following positions in your party have you ever contested for?
(i) Member of Parliament (MP) []
(ii) National Executive []
(iii) Regional Executive []
(iv) Constituency Executive []
(v) Polling Station Executive []
(vi) TESCON Executive []
(vii) Council of Elders []
(viii) Overseas Branch Executive []
(ix) Any other, specify []

SECTION B: POLITICAL PARTY FINANCING

7. Do you pay party membership dues? (1) Yes (2) No
8. Who pays your party membership dues? (please tick all that apply)
(i) I always pay it myself []
(ii) Other party executives sometimes pay for me []
(iii) Some wealthy non-Executive members of the party pay for me []

(iv) Some wealthy non-party members pay it for me []

(v) Other (specify)..... []

9. Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement that the party obtains its major funds from the following financial contributors.

Party Financial Contributors	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. Ordinary members	1	2	3	4	5
2. Rich individuals of the party	1	2	3	4	5
3. Founding members	1	2	3	4	5
4. Local Businessmen/Businesswomen	1	2	3	4	5
5. Members of Parliament	1	2	3	4	5
6. State / Government funds	1	2	3	4	5
7. Executive members of the party	1	2	3	4	5
8. Contributions from overseas branches	1	2	3	4	5
9. Foreign businesses	1	2	3	4	5
10. Any other, specify	1	2	3	4	5

10. Which **one** of the above financial contributors to the party would you say is the major source of funding for your party?[]

11. Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the following statements.

Party Financial Contributors	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
The party is more dependent on the financial contributions of wealthy members.	1	2	3	4	5
The party is more dependent on the financial contributions of ordinary members.	1	2	3	4	5
Wealthy people who provide money for the party tend to influence the outcome of elections within the party	1	2	3	4	5
The State should fund political parties	1	2	3	4	5
Political parties should fully disclose to the public their sources of funds	1	2	3	4	5
Political parties should fully disclose to the public their expenditure	1	2	3	4	5
The state should limit the amount of money that individual citizens and companies can donate to parties	1	2	3	4	5

12. Are you aware of the practice where some individuals pay party dues for party members?

(1) Yes (2) No

13. Apart from the payment of party membership dues, have you ever made other financial contribution to the party? (1) Yes (2) No

14. What do you expect in return from your political party for the financial contributions that you have made for its activities?

Expectations for making financial contributions	Please tick as many that apply
Executive position in the party	
A position in Local Government if the party wins	
A position in National Government if the party wins	
Award of government contract if party wins elections	
Other (specify)	

15. Indicate your level of agreement or disagreement about how wealthy individuals who finance your party influence the outcome of elections within the party.

Party Financial Contributors	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
They impose candidates on the party	1	2	3	4	5
They pay membership dues for potential delegates and aspirants	1	2	3	4	5
They provide economic and social incentives	1	2	3	4	5
They offer gifts in cash and kind	1	2	3	4	5
They fix high election filling fees	1	2	3	4	5

16. What is your level of agreement or disagreement with the following as factors that affect the ability of your party to mobilize funds from ordinary members of the party?

Factors affecting mobilization of funds from ordinary party members	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Lack of transparency and accountability in the use of party funds	1	2	3	4	5
Weak organizational capacity to mobilize funds from ordinary members	1	2	3	4	5
Ordinary members are financially poor	1	2	3	4	5
Ordinary members fear political victimization	1	2	3	4	5

17. What do you suggest should be done by your party to mobilize more money from the ordinary members of the party?

.....

18. What recommendations would you suggest to help improve party financing in Ghana?

.....

SECTION C: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

19. Age (1) 18- 30 (2) 31-40 (3) 41-50 (4) 51-60 (5) 60 and above
 20. Gender (1) Male (2) Female
 21. Marital Status (1) Married (2) Never Married (3) Not married
 20. Level of Education
 (1) No formal education (2) Primary education (3) JHS (4) SHS (5) Teacher training (6) Tertiary
 22. Employment status?
 (1) Artisan (2) Employed by the state (3) Employed by private business (4) Unemployed
 23. What is your average monthly income?
 (1) Less than 500 (2) 500 – 2,000 (3) 2,001 – 4,000 (4) 4,001 – 6,000 (5) Above 6,000
 24. Which of the following religious groups do you identify with?
 (1) Traditional (2) Christian (3) Islam (4) others (specify).....

25. Region of your constituency	WR 1	CR 2	GAR 3	VR 4	ER 5	AR 6	BAR 7	NR 8	UER 9	UWR 10
26. Name of your Constituency										

Appendix 3:

Political party and region of affiliation cross tabulation

Party	region of affiliation											Total
	N/R	WR	CR	GAR	VR	ER	AR	BAR	NR	UEW	UWR	
NPP	17	29	11	117	63	68	95	36	91	31	42	600
NDC	32	29	33	104	43	38	118	27	72	55	49	600
CPP	1	8	11	35	6	7	20	10	30	11	9	148
PNC	2	8	7	47	9	3	16	10	39	20	16	177
PPP	0	6	5	1	2	1	2	4	11	6	5	43
GCPP	0	3	0	6	0	2	7	6	0	1	1	26
UFP	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	0	0	0	6
N/A	13	30	8	74	4	3	44	17	5	1	1	200
Total	65	113	75	384	127	122	304	114	248	125	123	1800

The survey respondents were selected across all the ten regions of Ghana namely Western Region (WR), Central Region (CR), Greater Accra Region (GAR), Volta Region (VR), Eastern Region (ER), Ashanti Region (AR) Brong Ahafo Region (BAR), Northern Region (NR), Upper East Region (UER) and Upper West Region (UWR). Sixty-five of the survey respondents did not indicate the region in which their constituencies were located (N/R).

Party insiders were sometimes employed as Research Assistants to administer the questionnaires. On Saturday April 5, 2014, the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) held a National

Appendix 4:

List of Interviewees – Understanding Political Parties in Ghana

	Name of Interviewee	Name of Organization Affiliated	Position
1	Mr. Jonathan Attoh	Convention Peoples Party (CPP)	Party Headquarters Administrator
2	Mr. David Apasera	Peoples National Convention (PNC)	National Treasurer
3	Mr. Christian Owusu-Parry	Electoral Commission (EC)	Director of Public Affairs
4	Mr. Samuel Y. Aidoo	Electoral Commission	Finance Director
5	Dr. Ransford Gyampo	Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)	Senior Research Fellow
6	Dr. Vladimir Antwi Danso	CPP/Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD)	Leading Member of CPP; Senior Research Fellow
7	Dr. Iddi Ziblim	University of Ghana, Department of Political Science.	Senior Lecturer
8	Nana Atobra	Danquah Institute	Research Officer
9	Mr Kwasi Jonah	Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG)	Senior Research Fellow
10	Mr John Mensah	Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ)	Research Department
11	Mr. Ernest Apau	New Patriotic Party (NPP)	Constituency Chairman
12	Mr. Prince Joshua Adoba	Convention Peoples Party	Constituency Secretary
13	Mr. Saeed Ahmed	National Democratic Congress (NDC)	President of the Tertiary Education Institutions Network
14	Mr. Kofi Kye-Duodu	Electoral Commission	Senior Electoral Officer
15	Dr. Archibald Yaw Letsa	New Patriotic Party (NPP)	Regional First Vice Chairman
16	Foga Nukunu	National Democratic Congress (NDC)	Constituency Secretary,
17	Mr. Vincent Norgbedzi	Convention Peoples Party (CPP)	Member
18	Mr. Forster Segbe	Progress People's Party (PPP)	Regional Secretary
19	Mr. David Addo	Progress People's Party (PPP)	Constituency Chairman
20	Mr. Achianu Ain Mawunyo	Progress People's Party (PPP)	Constituency Organiser
21	Mr. Ashiboe Adjei Mensah	Convention Peoples Party (CPP)	Constituency Chairman
22	Mr. Gadotor Charles Kwasi	New Patriotic Party (NPP)	Director of Administration
23	Mr. John Aikins Shammo	New Patriotic Party (NPP)	Constituency Secretary
24	Mr. Desmond Kwaku Tsewu	National Democratic Congress (NDC)	Deputy Constituency Secretary, Ketu South
25	Mr. Michael Nutsuga	National Democratic Congress (NDC)	Constituency Chairman, Ketu South
26	Mr. Pascal Kumazah	Convention Peoples Party (CPP)	Constituency Secretary, Ketu South

Appendix 5: Respondents by Party

	Frequency	%
NPP	600	33.3
NDC	600	33.3
CPP	148	8.2
PNC	177	9.8
PPP	43	2.4
GCPP	26	1.4
UFP	6	0.3
N/A	200	11.1
Total	1800	100

Source: Survey Data, 2014

Appendix 6: Respondents by Non Party members

	Frequency	%
NPP	70	3.9
NDC	70	3.9
CPP	15	0.8
PNC	15	0.8
PPP	8	0.4
GCPP	12	0.7
UFP	10	0.6
N/A	1600	88.9
Total	1800	100

Source: Survey Data, 2014

This represents the breakdown for 200 ordinary Ghanaian interviewees

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