

# LSE Course DV450

## Policy, Bureaucracy and Development: Theory and Practice of Policy Design, Implementation and Evaluation

***Teacher: Dr. Adnan Khan***

***Teaching Assistant: Dr. Geoff Goodwin***

### *Syllabus 2016-17, Half-Unit - MT*

Building an effective state is critical to promoting economic growth and development but in a sizable number of developing countries the state, and public sector in particular, fails to deliver on development. A well-functioning public sector that provides key inputs to development ultimately relies on the performance of the individuals who provide public services, the bureaucrats. Bureaucratic performance matters for development in multiple ways since development failures often happen not only because of failure to adopt policies necessary for sustained economic development but, perhaps more importantly, also because of failure to successfully implement public policies and programmes. Identifying opportunities for policy change thus requires an understanding of the internal working of the state and of bureaucratic performance.

The instructor brings to the class 15 years of experience as a bureaucrat in different policy positions and 10 years as a researcher, catalyser of other people's research and as someone who connects research and policy worlds on growth and development. This course is intended to be a balance of theory and practice, and draws on policy questions and examples from the real world and is designed to engage development professionals and anyone interested in public policy in thinking more deeply about policy challenges and finding feasible solutions. The seminars, conducted by an experienced development specialist, are aimed at critically engaging with course material, at asking thought-provoking questions and at developing structured thinking on public policy issues. The course brings the world of practice into the world of academics and will invite guest lectures from bureaucrats and other policy actors engaged in practice.

This course uses principal-agent model as the main analytical framework along with practice to examine public policies, government performance and their impact on development outcomes. It integrates analytics and empirics with practice on public policy to encounter conventional wisdom on policy reform that include greater spending, technocratic interventions, best-practice solutions and capacity building and discusses evidence suggesting that these per se are not sufficient for improving government performance. For instance, evidence suggests that public school teachers are better trained and educated and get paid far

more than their private sector counterparts and yet perform at similar or lower levels. The course relies on credible, current evidence to provide a basis for informed discussion and to explore options for reform. This course is aimed at anyone interested in public policy, economic development, and in building more effective governments in low-income countries that are accountable to their citizens.

The course will start with an introduction to policy and bureaucracy in the developing world, discussing how thinking on bureaucracy has changed and showing how cutting-edge research is helping us gain a better understanding of how states operate and perform. The second part of the course (Weeks 2-4) deals with personnel economics and in particular with selection and incentive structures for bureaucrats. The principal-agent model is introduced and applied to explore how best to recruit, train, motivate and monitor bureaucrats. We will discuss signalling and screening models for selecting job applicants and the role of ability, personalities, motivation and contract employment. We will also examine when performance rewards improve performance, if these crowd-out intrinsic motivation and if these ever fail. Other options for improving government performance through broad motivators like improved management practices, career concerns, and rules versus discretion will also be evaluated.

Since policy formulation and implementation are embedded in politics, the third part of the course (Weeks 5-7) covers political economy of government performance and introduces the long and short routes of accountability. Given the trade-off in delegation, we will explore conditions under which politicians delegate to bureaucrats and hold them accountable for performance. We will then look at information flows and potential improvements through monitoring, and examine current evidence on conditions that enable more effective monitoring of government workers by citizens. The potential for collective action to enable citizens to mobilise for pro-poor development reforms and hold public workers and agencies to account will also be evaluated. We will then turn to the role of institution and explores when political system generates incentives for adopting and implementing better policies to promote growth and development. This section concludes by exploring policy determination and accountability failures like elite capture and looks at ways of making politics work for development.

Given that policy actors in developing countries today have growing access to new sources of evidence whose use can potentially improve policy effectiveness and development outcomes, the fourth part of the course (Weeks 8-9) covers evidence-informed policy formulation. Drawing on the latest research in the field, we will explore when policy actors can effectively use evidence to inform policy decisions. We will look at biases in policy judgements and decision-making and discuss ways of de-biasing policy decisions. The lectures and seminars will examine programme evaluation, issues in evaluating an evaluation and discuss cases where good evidence is produced, understood and acted upon to shape policy in critical ways, even in environments characterised by limited resources and weak governance. The course concludes with a discussion on creating, identifying and building on opportunities for policy change.

## Teaching

Lectures will give students a thorough overview of the key themes and debates related to policy, bureaucracy and development, drawing on a range of theoretical and empirical materials, insights from practice and using a variety of teaching methods. Students will deepen their understanding in seminars by analysing and presenting case studies, critically evaluating literature and working through group exercises.

## Evaluation

Students will be required to write two individual policy memos (15% of total mark), undertake one group project (35%) and produce one individual 4,000 word essay (50%). Policy memos will be submitted in Week 6 and Week 10. The group project will involve the analysis of case studies related to issues discussed on the module. Groups will present their findings to the class and submit a brief written report in Week 11. The deadline for the individual essay will be the first day of Lent Term.

Evaluation will also include formative assessment. Students will be required to present in at least one seminar and also be expected to write a formative policy memo which will be submitted in Week 3. Students will also be encouraged to write essay plans and discuss them with the tutors before the end of term.

Feedback will be provided on all forms of summative and formative evaluation.

## Week 1: Introduction: Rethinking Policy and Bureaucracy in the Developing World

- Development and government performance
- Changing perspectives on the role of bureaucracy - beyond Weberian ideal types
- Development failures, public policy and bureaucracy – why have traditional reforms not delivered?

### Core Readings:

- Cristina Corduneanu-Huc, Alexander Hamilton and Issel Masses Ferrer. 2012. “Understanding Policy Change: How to Apply Political Economy Concepts in Practice” (Washington D.C.: World Bank Publications) [Chapter 1]
- Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo. 2011. “Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty”, Public Affairs (New York) [Chapter 4]
- Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson. 2004. “[The Power of Information: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign to Reduce Capture](#)”, Working Paper

### Recommended Readings:

- James Q. Wilson. 1989. “Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why they Do it” (New York: Basic Books) [Chapters 1-2]
- Finan, Frederico, Benjamin Olken, and Rohini Pande. 2015. “[The Personnel Economics of the State](#)”, Prepared for the Handbook of Field Experiments

### Additional Readings:

- William Easterly. 2013. “The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor”, Basic Books [Chapters 1,2]
- Paul Collier. 2007. “The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can be Done about it”, (Oxford University Press) [Chapters 1,5]
- Evans, Peter, and James E. Rauch. 1999. “Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-National Analysis of the Effects of “Weberian” State Structures on Economic Growth.” American Sociological Review 64 (5): 748-765.
- Bauer, Peter Tamas. 1972. “Dissent on Development”. Harvard University Press.
- Bates, Robert. 1981. “Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies”. University of California Press.
- Malcolm Wallis. 1989. “Bureaucracy: Its Role in Third World Development”, Macmillan Development Studies Series
- ‘Yes Minister’ and ‘Yes Prime Minister’, [BBC TV series](#); ‘The Complete Yes Minister’ book by Jonathan Lynn and Antony Jay, BBC Books. 1988.
- Jan Banning, ‘[Bureaucracy: A Global Portrait of Red Tape](#)’, Photo exhibition.

## Weeks 2 - 4: Principal-Agent Framework and Bureaucratic Performance

### Key Themes:

- Principal-Agent Model and Personnel Economics
- Selection and Recruitment:
- Signalling and screening models
- Role of ability, motivation, and personalities
- Incentive structures for bureaucratic performance
  - Performance rewards
  - Intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation
- Broad motivators:
  - Management practices
  - Career concerns

### Key Questions:

- How to best recruit, motivate and train bureaucrats?
- When do performance rewards improve performance? When do they fail? Do these crowd out intrinsic motivation?
- When do non-financial rewards and broad motivators for performance work?
- What are optimal incentive structures for bureaucratic performance?

### Practitioners' Perspective:

Guest Lecture (TBD)

### Core Readings:

- Dixit Avinash. 2002. "[Incentives and Organisations in the Public Sector](#)", *Journal of Human Resources* XXXVII
- Edward P. Lazear and Michael Gibbs. 2009. "Personnel Economics in Practice" (John Wiley & Sons Inc) [Chapter 2, 9]
- Dal Bó, Ernesto, Federico Finan, and Martín A. Rossi. 2013. "Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128 (3): 1169-1218.
- Khan Adnan, Asim Khwaja, and Benjamin Olken. 2016. "[Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors](#)", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*.
- Ashraf, Nava, Oriana Bandiera, and Kelsey Jack. "[No Margin, No Mission? A Field Experiment on Incentives for Public Services Delivery.](#)" *Journal of Public Economics* [View Details](#)
- Iyer, Lakshmi and Anandi Mani. 2012. "Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 94 (3): 723-739.
- Rasul Imran and Daniel Rogger. "[Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service](#)", Working Paper.
- Finan Federico, Benjamin Olken, and Rohini Pande. 2015. "The Personnel Economics of the State". Prepared for the *Handbook of Field Experiments*.

### Recommended Readings:

- Duflo, Esther, Rema Hanna, and Stephen P. Ryan. 2012. "Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School." *American Economic Review*, vol. 102(4), pp. 1241 –78.
- Muralidharan Karthik, Venkatesh Sundararaman. 2011. "Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India" *Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 119, issue 1, pages 39 – 77
- Malcolm Wallis. 1989. "Bureaucracy: Its Role in Third World Development", Macmillan Development Studies Series
- Abhijit Banerjee, Rukmini Banerji, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Stuti Khemani. 2010. "Pitfalls of Participatory Programs: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Education in India," *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1): 1-30.
- Fryer, Ronald J. 2013. "Getting beneath the veil of effective schools: Evidence from New York City" *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*. 2013. 5 (4): 28-60.

### Additional Readings:

- Khan, Adnan, Asim Khwaja and Benjamin Olken. 2016. "Performance-Ranked Serial Dictatorships: Experimental Evidence on Lateral Transfers as an Incentive Device". NBER Working Paper.
- Chaudhury, Nazmul, Jeffrey Hammer, Michael Kremer, Karthik Muralidharan, and F. Halsey Rogers. 2006. "Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, vol. 20(1), pp. 91–116.
- Callen, Michael, Saad Gulzar, Ali Hasanain, Yasir Khan, and Arman Rezaee. 2015. "Personalities and Public Sector Performance: Evidence from a Health Experiment in Pakistan." NBER Working Paper 21180.
- Kleven, Henrik, Claus Thustrup Kreiner, and Emmanuel Saez. 2009. "Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries". NBER Working Paper No. 15218.
- Kleven, Henrik, Martin Knudsen, Claus Thustrup Kreiner, Soren Pedersen, and Emmanuel Saez. 2011. "Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark." *Econometrica* 79(3): 651-692.
- Banerjee, Ritwik, Tushi Baul, and Tanya Rosenblat. 2015. "On Self Selection of the Corrupt into the Public Sector." *Economic Letters* 127: 43-46.
- Bandiera, Oriana, Andrea Prat, and Tommaso Valletti. 2009. "Active and passive waste in government spending: evidence from a policy experiment." *American Economic Review* 99, no. 4 (2009): 1278-1308.
- Banerjee, Abhijit V., Rachel Glennerster, and Esther Duflo. 2008. "Putting a Band-Aid on a Corpse: Incentives for Nurses in the Indian Public Health Care System." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 6 (2/3): 487-500.
- Banuri, Sheheryar and Philip Keefer. 2013. "Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6729.
- Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2006. "Incentives and Prosocial Behavior." *American Economic Review*, 96 (5): 1652-1678.
- Besley, Timothy and Maitreesh Ghatak. 2005. "Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents." *American Economic Review* 95 (3): 616-636.
- Bloom, Nicholas, and John Van Reenen. 2007. "Measuring and Explaining Management Practices Across Firms and Countries." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 122(4): 1351-1408.

- Bloom, Nicholas, Benn Eifert, Aprajit Mahajan, David McKenzie, and John Roberts. 2013. "Does Management Matter? Evidence from India." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128(1): 1-51.
- Bandiera, Oriana, Michael Best, Adnan Khan and Andrea Prat. 2016. "Motivating Public Servants: Autonomy vs. Performance Pay for Public Procurement".
- Deserranno, Erika. 2015. "Financial Incentives as Signals: Experimental Evidence from the Recruitment of Health Workers." Working Paper.
- Francois, Patrick. 2000. "'Public Service Motivation' as an Argument for Government Provision." *Journal of Public Economics* 78 (3): 275-299.
- Gertler, Paul and Christel Vermeersch. 2012. "Using Performance Incentives to Improve Health Outcomes." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6100.
- Glewwe, Paul, Nauman Illias, and Michael Kremer. 2010. "Teacher Incentives." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 2 (3): 205-227.
- Gneezy, Uri and Aldo Rustichini. 2000. "A Fine is a Price." *Journal of Legal Studies* 29 (1).
- Hanna, Rema and Shing-Yi Wang. 2014. "Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India." NBER Working paper 19649.
- Perry, James L. 1996. "Measuring Public Service Motivation: An Assessment of Construct Reliability and Validity." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 6 (1): 5-22.
- Perry, James L. and Annie Hondeghem. 2008. "Building Theory and Empirical Evidence about Public Service Motivation." *International Public Management Journal* 11 (1): 3-12.
- Pomeranz, Dina. 2015. "No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax." *American Economic Review* 105 (8): 2539-69.
- Prendergast, Canice. 2007. "The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats." *American Economic Review* 97 (1): 180-196.
- Sundell, Anders. 2014. "Are Formal Civil Service Examinations the Most Meritocratic Way to Recruit Civil Servants? Not In All Countries." *Public Administration* 92(2): 440-457.
- Kingdon, Geeta Gandhi and Mohd Muzammil. 2001. "A Political Economy of Education in India: I: The Case of UP". *Economic and Political Weekly*, 3052-3063.
- Lindbeck, A. and Snower, D.J. 2001. "Insiders versus Outsiders", *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 15(1): 165-88.

## Weeks 5-7: Political Economy and Government Performance

### Key Themes:

- Making politics work for development and the accountability triangle
- Long and short routes of accountability
- Delegation from politicians to bureaucrats
  - Necessity and cost of delegation
  - Ex-ante and ex-post control mechanisms
- Effective monitoring of government performance
- Collective action
- Potential of CA in mobilising citizens for pro-development reform
- Logic of collective action

- Role of institutions
- Elite capture

### Key Questions:

- How can politics be made to work for development?
- What constraints do political structures and processes place on bureaucracies? How can they be alleviated or overcome?
- Under what conditions can government performance be improved through top-down and bottom-up monitoring? When do ex ante and ex post control mechanisms work?
- How can collective action improve policy implementation and strengthen accountability?
- Should policy interventions take the current distribution of political power as given, or take into account elite capture?

### Practitioners' Perspective:

Guest Lecture (TBD)

### Core Readings:

- Huber and Shipan. "Politics, Delegation and Bureaucracy." Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. [Chapter 14]
- Cristina Corduneanu-Huc, Alexander Hamilton and Issel Masses Ferrer. 2012. "Understanding Policy Change: How to Apply Political Economy Concepts in Practice." Washington D.C.: World Bank Publications. [Chapters 4]
- Pande Rohini. 2011. "Can informed voters enforce better governance? Experiments in low income democracies" *Annual Review of Economics*, 2011:3 215-237.
- Matt Andrews. 2013. "The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development." Cambridge University Press. [Chapter 10]
- Lant Pritchett. 2011. "[Isomorphic Mimicry: Can Camouflage be Sabotaged?](#)"

### Recommended Readings:

- Jean-Marie Baland, Karl Ove Moene and James A. Robinson. 2010. "Governance and Development" in *Handbook of Development Economics*, Chapter 69, Volume 5.
- Andrews Matt, Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock. 2010. "[Capability Traps? The Mechanisms of Persistent Implementation Failure](#)"
- World Bank. 2004. "World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People." World Bank 2004. [Chapters – Overview, 3, 6]
- Cristina Corduneanu-Huc, Alexander Hamilton and Issel Masses Ferrer. 2012. "Understanding Policy Change: How to Apply Political Economy Concepts in Practice." Washington D.C.: World Bank Publications. [Chapters 5,6,8]
- Bobonis, Gustavo J., Luis R. Cámara Fuertes, and Rainer Schwabe. 2015. "Monitoring Corruptible Politicians." Working Paper.
- Barnwal, Prabhat. 2014. "Curbing Leakage in Public Programs with Biometric Identification Systems: Evidence from India's Fuel Subsidies." Job Market Paper.
- Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan. 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123 (2): 703-745.



- Banerjee, Abhijit V., Raghavendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Daniel Keniston, and Nina Singh. 2014. "Can Institutions be Reformed from Within? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment with the Rajasthan Police." NBER Working Paper 17912.
- Banerjee, Abhijit V., Rema Hanna, Jordan Kyle, Benjamin Olken, and Sudarno Sumarto. 2015. "The Power of Transparency: Information, Identification Cards and Food Subsidy Programs in Indonesia." HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series.
- Björkman, Martina, Damien de Walque, and Jakob Svensson. 2014. "Information is Power: Experimental Evidence on the Long-Run Impact of Community Based Monitoring." World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7015.
- Björkman, Martina and Jakob Svensson. 2010. "When is Community-Based Monitoring Effective? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Primary Health in Uganda." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 8 (2/3): 571-581.
- Olken, Benjamin A. 2007. "Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia." *Journal of Public Economics* 115 (2): 200-249.
- Hirschman, A. 1986. "Exit and Voice: An Expanding Sphere of Influence" in *Rival Views of Market Society*, New York: Harvard University Press
- Ostrom, E. 1990. "Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action", Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press [Chapter 1]

#### **Additional Readings/References:**

- North, Douglass C. 1981. "Institutions, institutional change and economic performance: Political economy of institutions and decisions." Cambridge University Press.
- Miguel, Edward. 2004. "Tribe or Nation? Nation-Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania." *World Politics* 56(3): 327-362.
- Michels, Robert. ([1911] 1962). "Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy." New York: Free Press.
- Callen, Michael, Ali Cheema, Adnan Khan, Asad Liaqat, Farooq Naseer and Jacob Shapiro. 2016. "Candidate Attributes and Political Accountability".
- Riker, William H. 1986. "The Art of Political Manipulation." Yale University Press.
- Gagliarducci, Stefano and Tommaso Nannicini. 2011. "Do better paid politicians perform better? Disentangling incentives from selection." *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2013, 11(2), 369-398.
- Fujiwara, Thomas. 2015. "Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence from Brazil." *Econometrica* 83 (2): 423-464.
- Mansuri, Ghazala, and Vijayendra Rao (2012), "Localizing Development: Does Participation Work?" World Bank Policy Research Report, World Bank.
- Epstein, D. and S. O'Halloran. 1999. "Delegating Powers." New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Huber, John D. and C. Shipan. 2002. "Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy." New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Franchino F. 2004. "Delegating powers in the European Community." *British Journal of Political Science*, 34: 269-93.
- Bawn, K. 1997. "Choosing strategies to control the bureaucracy: statutory constraints, oversight and the committee system." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*, 13: 101-26.

- Gailadi, F. 2002. "Policy credibility and delegation to independent regulatory agencies: a comparative empirical analysis." *Journal of European Public Policy*, 9: 873-93.
- Huber, John D. 2000. "Delegation to civil servants in parliamentary democracies." *European Journal of Political Research*, 37: 397-413.
- IGC film: [Taxing Pakistan: How to motivate civil servants](#)
- IGC film: [Health Workers in Zambia](#)

## Weeks 8-9: Evidence-informed Policy Formulation

### Key Themes:

- Role of evidence in development policy
  - Potential and challenges
- Biases in policy judgments
  - De-biasing decision-making
- Programme Evaluation and evaluating an evaluation
- Promoting use of evidence in development

### Key Questions:

- When do policy actors use evidence to inform policy decisions?
- How does policy and programme evaluation improve development outcomes?
- What are the principle challenges of policy and programme evaluation and evidence-informed policy formulation? What methods, practices and processes are required to overcome these challenges?

### Practitioners' Perspective:

Guest Lecture (TBD)

### Core Readings:

- Gertler, Paul J., Sebastian Martinez, Patrick Premand, Laura B. Rawlings, Christel M. J. Vermeersch. 2011. "Impact Evaluation in Practice." Washington D.C.: The World Bank. [*Chapters 1-3, 13*]
- Carden, Fred. 2009. "Knowledge to Policy: Making the Most of Development Research." International Development Research Centre, Sage Publications, Ottawa. [*Chapter 1-3*]
- Duflo, Esther, Michael Greenstone, Rohini Pande, and Nicholas Ryan. 2013. "Truth Telling by Third-Party Audits and the Response of Polluting Firms: Experimental Evidence from India." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 128 (4): 1499-1545.

### Recommended Readings:

- Angrist, Joshua D., and Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2014. "Mastering Metrics: The Path from Cause to Effect". Princeton University Press.
- Kahneman, D. and S. Frederick. 2002. "Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment". In T. Gilovich, D. Griffin and D. Kahneman (Eds.) "Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment" (pp. 49-81). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- *Logged On (Chapters 1-3)*
- Redelmeier, Donald A. 2012. "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Debiasing the Policy Makers Themselves". In Shafir, Eldar (Ed). *The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy*. Princeton University Press.

- Callen, Michael, Asad Liaqat, Adnan Khan, and Asim Khwaja. 2016. "Precision versus Proximity: Evidence from Survey Experiments with Civil Servants".

**Additional Readings:**

- Kahneman, Daniel. 2011. "Thinking Fast and Slow". New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux.

## Week 10: Pro Development Change

**Key Themes:**

- Civil service reform
- Building effective states for development
- Exploring opportunities for change
- Identifying and mobilising reform drivers

**Key Questions:**

- How does pro-development policy change happen?
- What is the role for politicians, bureaucrats and civil society actors in driving change?
- What incentives are required to encourage politicians and bureaucrats to introduce and implement pro-development policy?

**Core Readings:**

- Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo. 2011. "Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty", Public Affairs, New York. [Chapter 10]
- Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson. 2011. "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters", Princeton University Press, New Jersey. [Chapter 9]

**Recommended Readings:**

- IGC Evidence Paper. 2015. "[State Effectiveness, Growth and Development](#)"

## Week 11: Group Student Presentations