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Consolidating peace and legitimacy in Rwanda

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Commission on
State Fragility, Growth and Development

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About the commission

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Abbreviations

ADFL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo
AEO	Authorised Economic Operator
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
BMI	Building Materials Investments Limited
BRD	Development Bank of Rwanda
CEPGL	The Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries
CNDP	Le Congrès national pour la défense du peuple/ National Congress for the Defence of the People
CHW	Community Health Worker
DfID	The United Kingdom Department for International Development
DRC	The Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
EC	European Commission
EDPRS	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
Ex-FAR	Ex Forces Armées Rwandaises/Ex Armed Forces of Rwanda
FAR	Forces Armées Rwandaises / Armed Forces of Rwanda
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
HSM	Holy Spirit Movement
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT	Information and communications technology
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPAR	The Institute of Policy Analysis and Research
LRA	Lords Resistance Army
M23	Mouvement Vingt-Trois
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MINECOFIN	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MMI	Military Medical Insurance
MRND	Mouvement Révolutionnaire National Pour le Développement
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontier

Abbreviation	Full
MSME	Micro, small, and medium enterprises
NCO	Non-commissioned officer
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NRM	National Resistance Movement
OAG	Office of the Auditor General
ODA	Overseas development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIM	Organisation for International Migration
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PSO	Peace Support Operations
PFM	Public Financial Management
RANU	Rwandan Alliance for National Unity
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
RDB	Rwanda Development Board
RDF	Rwandan Defence Force
RPA	Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RRA	Rwanda Revenue Authority
RSSB	Rwanda Social Security Board
SACCOs	Savings and credit cooperatives
SMEs	Small and medium enterprises
SPU	Strategy and Policy Unit
UNAMID	United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
ZCSS	Zigama Credit & Savings Society

Introduction

1

In August 1994, Rwanda had just suffered one of the most extreme crises of any state in modern times. Following a four-year civil war, in just 100 days of the genocide against the Tutsis, an estimated 800,000 were slaughtered. Two million Rwandans (a third of the population) fled to neighbouring countries, as did the army and officials of the genocidal government.

For several years preceding the genocide, a sustained and vicious campaign stoked hatred and fear of the minority Tutsi ethnic group – with pains to demonise the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), who by August 1994 had won the war and assumed effective leadership of the country. A state of greater fragility, social upheaval, mistrust, and destruction is hard to imagine.

Just over twenty years later, Rwanda is one of top performers in Africa on measures including economic growth, health and welfare, as well as fighting corruption, and security. Indeed, Rwanda has made rapid and quite sustained progress towards these outcomes, since as early as 1995. Although several risk factors remain, Rwanda's achievements in removing the causes of state fragility are remarkable, and other countries on the continent regularly look to Rwanda's example for guidance and inspiration.

This paper explores how this transition was achieved through five key dimensions of fragility: state effectiveness, private sector development, security and conflict, resilience, and legitimacy. The discussion is structured around three time periods: the initial conditions in 1994-5; the early reconstruction period of 1996-2000; and a period of modernising reforms and consolidation from 2000 to the present.

In each period, the discussion is organised around three key 'programmes of action' for the state – state effectiveness (developing effective institutions for the delivery of public goods), private sector development, and security. In Rwanda, resilience and legitimacy are deeply interdependent with the state's delivery of public goods, economic development, and security, as both are key to the state's achievement of these outcomes, as well as being strengthened by those same achievements. Resilience and legitimacy are thus discussed in a cross-cutting manner throughout the paper. For a brief exposition of our conceptual framework for each dimension, see Annex 1.

Another focus is the spill-over of Rwanda's actions on other countries; this is mainly discussed in relation to the international dimensions of conflict, again in a cross-cutting manner. Fragility risks for Rwanda going forward, and lessons to draw from Rwanda's case, are highlighted throughout, but summarised together in the conclusion.

1994-1995: A decimated state

2

The human trauma left by the civil war (beginning in October 1990) and genocide was extreme. Approximately 40% of the population were dead or had left the country as refugees; 13% (one million people) were internally displaced; 400,000 were widowed; 500,000 were orphaned; and the huge death of men meant women and girls now represented 60-70% of the population.

By the end of July 1995, 80,000 people had been imprisoned on suspicion of committing acts of genocide, compared to the 30,000 capacity of the already greatly expanded prison system, and the even lower capacity of the judiciary to try cases. Almost all infrastructure, public buildings, and factories had been badly damaged.¹

Institutions of the state had to be rebuilt from scratch, with 40% of civil servants dead or fled, records destroyed, and reserves from the central bank stolen by the fleeing government. While aid disbursements to Rwanda spiked with a burst of humanitarian support from 1994-1996, these fell far short of the government's requirements to rebuild the government and country, and were overwhelmingly off-budget.²

Conflict and insecurity

Social and ethnic mistrust

In the years before the RPF took power in Rwanda, they and the Tutsi ethnic group had been the subjects of an omnipresent and potent propaganda campaign. This campaign demonised the RPF as foreign powers genocidally motivated against the Hutu majority, and all Tutsi as complicit in this ploy to achieve Tutsi dominance.

¹ International Monetary Fund IMF (2000). Rwanda: Recent Economic Developments, International Monetary Fund Staff Country Report, No. 4. Accessible: <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2016/12/30/Rwanda-Recent-Economic-Developments-3391>

² Versailles, Bruna (2012). Rwanda: aid management from 2002 to 2011, Budget Strengthening Initiative, the Overseas Development Institute. Accessible: <https://bsi.odi.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Rwandaaidmanagement.pdf> ODI.

In other contexts, liberation movements can command high popular legitimacy, by 'delivering' liberation to citizens.³ The RPF were praised internationally for ending the genocide. However, in July 1994, the large share of Rwandans who took part in, or otherwise supported, the genocide following this hate campaign surely did not see the RPF as their liberators and legitimate rulers. More than two million citizens (almost a third of the population) left the country as the RPF advanced (from April to August 1994), mostly following the pre-genocide government to Zaire (though sometimes under duress).

The RPF's popularity was higher among the Tutsi survivor community, but even here, some suspicions circulated that the RPF had focused too little on saving Tutsi as opposed to gaining power.⁴ As a largely external movement, the RPF had few grassroots links with communities in Rwanda (including genocide survivors), and no national structures for reaching out to the population, upon assuming office.

Blurring of civilian and combatant

Beyond widespread (perceived) civilian participation in the genocide, and subjection to years of anti-RPF propaganda, some Hutu civilians also began supporting the former Armed Forces of Rwanda (the former Ex Forces Armées Rwandaises, or ex-FAR) insurgency into North Western Rwanda from Zaire. The line between 'civilians' and 'combatants' was thus blurred from the start in post-genocide Rwanda. With such widespread complicity, and without the military intelligence to immediately know who was responsible for what crimes, or who would prefer the overthrow of the new government, everyone was somewhat suspect.

Hostile forces re-grouping in Zaire

The North-West of Rwanda was former president Habyarimana's home area and had been the epicentre of much Hutu extremist mobilisation before the RPF took power. It was over the North-Western border with Zaire that Habyarimana's government, army, and Interahamwe militias (a Hutu paramilitary organisation) fled, taking 1.5 million Rwandan refugees with them in just three months.

These refugees and militias entered a densely-populated region – Zaire's Kivu Provinces – home to ongoing land conflicts, the privatisation of violence by small armed groups, and volatile ethnic politics. This ethnic politics included many 'Rwandophones', native to Congo/Zaire, and the subject of contestation over the past half century. Therefore, the international spill-overs of Rwanda's fragility had

³ Dorman, Sara Rich (2006).. "Post-liberation politics in Africa: Examining the political legacy of struggle", *Third World Quarterly* 27.6: 1085-1101.

⁴ This argument is not one that commands broad assent, and is made most prominently in: Kuperman, Alan J. (2004) "Provoking genocide: a revised history of the Rwandan Patriotic Front", *Journal of Genocide Research* 6.1: 61-84.

a huge destabilising effect on the already teetering Zairean regime.⁵

Approximately \$1 billion of aid flowed to camps in neighbouring countries (mostly Zaire) from April to December in 1994.⁶ This was intended to fuel a massive humanitarian operation. However, the former Rwandan government (the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement/MRND) quickly re-formed and manoeuvred to control the Kivu camps, channelling aid resources to rearm its military (ex-FAR) and interahamwe militias, to contest the new government in Kigali.

Mobutu embraced the Hutu refugee crisis as a political opportunity. His legitimacy had been called into question following Zaire's national conference in the early nineties, so he manoeuvred himself to appear indispensable to the resolution of the crisis, helping to arm the génocidaires to re-enter their country and repatriate refugees. Donors funding the camps, meanwhile, made no efforts to demilitarise them, or separate civilians from military.

The camps were thus used to provide shelter, supplies, manpower, and a revenue stream for the ex-FAR's incursions into North-Western Rwanda. By 1995, the ex-FAR were conducting raids on non-military targets (e.g. commune offices) and ambushes on rural roads, sabotaging infrastructure (power lines, water resources, and so on), assassinating political figures, and murdering genocide survivors and witnesses. One RPA army log shows an average of eight direct engagements between the RPA and ex-FAR in North-Western Rwanda per month from January to August 1995.⁷

Worse, at the outset the insurgents were popular, and were regularly assisted by the local community. Many chose to operate in areas where they had direct kin. This allowed them to spread the message that the new rulers in Kigali were an ethnically homogenous clique intent on creating a Tutsi supremacy.

Weak national security infrastructure

There was no international peacekeeping force in Rwanda following the closure of France's Operation Turquoise in August 1994. The country's own security infrastructure was extremely weak and its situation precarious. To fill this gap, the RPF transitioned from a rebel force to Rwanda's national army. Its lack of internal readiness produced two converse challenges:

First, while the RPF in 1990 was a small, tight, group of well-trained rebels, steeped in liberation ideology, from 1993-5 (and particularly during and immediately after the genocide), a tide of new volunteers joined its ranks. These

⁵ See Adelman, Howard (2003). *The Use and Abuse of Refugees in Zaire, Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering*, edited by Stephen John Stedman and Fred Tanner. Brookings Institution Press, and Lischer, Sarah K. (2006). *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid*, Cornell University Press. Chapter 4., Polman, Linda (2010). *War Games: The Story of Aid and War in Modern Times*, Translated by L. Waters. Penguin. Chapter on Congo., and Terry, Fiona (2002). *Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action*, Cornell University Press.

⁶ Eriksson, JohnEriksson et al. (1996). *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience: Synthesis Report*, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Accessible: <http://www.oecd.org/derec/sweden/50189495.pdf> OECD (1996)

⁷ Quoted in Orth, Richard (2001). "Rwanda's Hutu Extremist Genocidal Insurgency: An Eyewitness Perspective, *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 12, no. 1.

(mainly Tutsi from Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, and elsewhere) were not well-trained; had not received the same intensive ideological education; and many had seen their families murdered in front of them. This created a huge challenge for the internal discipline, coherence, and centralised control, required of a legitimate national army.

The converse challenge was in transitioning from a still relatively small rebel force to a national army (the RPF's military wing was soon renamed the Rwandan Patriotic Army/RPA). The RPA's numbers remained small compared to the former national army (ex-FAR) over their border in Zaire. In addition, the profiles and structures appropriate for a guerrilla rebel movement can be problematic when grafted into a national army overnight, from the personalities of commanders and fighters, to the high degree of autonomy lent to battle commanders, to the typically deep reluctance to chastise 'brothers in the struggle' who have endured hardship and displayed valour together during civil war. Such features raised the risk of abuses of power, particularly in a context with such extreme mistrust and ethnic tension. What's more, such abuses were liable to deeply damage the RPF's prospects for future domestic legitimation.

Meanwhile, the pre-genocidal police forces⁸ were famously understaffed, under-resourced, and badly organised.⁹ They, and the entire judicial system, were also discredited for their complicity in the genocide. Yet tens of thousands of citizens had been arrested on genocide and war crimes charges – a caseload the courts had no chance of processing, while exceeding the prison capacity many times over. Lacking manpower, experience, and physical infrastructure, the RPF had no choice but to retain and use many of the pre-genocide domestic security structures in the immediate aftermath of the genocide, as discussed below.¹⁰

Economic collapse

The economy in the 1980s had suffered poor macroeconomic management, state ownership of key industries (including a monopoly on coffee and tea exports – 80% of all export value), and highly protectionist import tariffs (from 10 to 100% on all items). Meanwhile, prices of key export commodities were falling, and pressures on land intensifying.¹¹

The private sector

Thus, before Rwanda's civil war, gross domestic product (GDP) had grown at just 1.5% a year for a decade, and the private sector accounted for just 50%

⁸ The gendarmerie under the Ministry of Defence, the police communale under the Ministry of Local Government, and the police judiciaire.

⁹ Baker, Bruce (2007). "Reconstructing a policing system out of the ashes: Rwanda's solution", *Policing & Society* 17.4: 344-366.

¹⁰ Returnees from Anglophone countries, notably Uganda, became familiar with an entirely different legal code and system, meaning that diaspora returnees could not substitute for provision in the justice sector as they could in other contexts.

¹¹ Stoelinga, Dimitri and Gathani, Sachin (2012). *Understanding Rwanda's Agribusiness and Manufacturing Sectors*, the International Growth Centre (IGC).

of formal sector employment, excluding the civil service. Compounding this, Rwanda was landlocked and resource-poor, with a small domestic market, poorly educated workforce, and hilly topography, making it characteristically difficult to farm or traverse. Regional markets (in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya) were under-developed, while many offered favourable conditions for many productive activities (for example, Uganda's greater availability of land; Tanzania and Kenya's port access; and the DRC's minerals).

1990-1994 added to this the catastrophic impact of the conflict on private enterprise. Most business leaders had fled or been killed, while others had funded or cooperated with the genocide and could not be allowed to resume business activities (though others did return, as discussed below). Food production fell by a third, and most livestock were dead.¹² Banks and businesses were plundered. Electricity supply did not return to pre-1994 levels until 1998. Factories and infrastructure were hugely damaged (one history of Rwanda's manufacturing and agribusiness sector gives examples of the direct capital damage to many factories and machinery, which led many major plants to resume operations only in 2000-2007, while many others saw repair cost as not justified by the rewards and were liquidated).¹³

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that by 1996, only about 60% of pre-conflict enterprises had resumed operations.¹⁴ The collapse of the state also created huge policy upheaval and uncertainty, as well as institutional gaps for managing the private sector. There was also a leap in the cost of doing business. Private investors are risk averse, meaning few would invest in an environment of such insecurity and fragility. Consequently, by 1994, GDP fell by half, exports by 60%, and inflation was 64%.

Migration and rights

The huge flight and return of people accompanying the conflict also created serious uncertainty over property rights. Many villages across Rwanda were all but empty by July 1994, as those not massacred fled the advancing RPF; over a third of the population (two million Rwandans) had arrived in refugee camps in neighbouring countries by August 1994. This was accompanied by an unprecedented in-migration, of over half a million 'old caseload' Tutsi refugees from abroad. In 1996/7, the hundreds of thousands of refugees in neighbouring countries also returned en masse. There was also substantial migration around the country, such as the huge influx into Kigali from rural areas, as people fled insecurity in the countryside (Figure 1).

People thus began to inhabit and farm the land, and even operate the businesses, of those killed or fled, creating ownership disputes, often along ethnic lines, as prior owners and managers returned. Tom Goodfellow describes how in Kigali, "Tiny plots of land were disputed by as many as four separate families; people were hounded out of their houses by having their tin roofs constantly pummelled with stones" (Goodfellow, 2013).


¹² The International Monetary Fund (2000).

¹³ Stoelinga, Dimitri and Gathani, Sachin, p25-26 (2012).

¹⁴ The International Monetary Fund (2000).

The new government thus had to take highly sensitive decisions, in an already fragile social context, about the property rights of refugees and business leaders who had fled the RPF, as they returned en masse in the following years, while finding a solution to accommodate 'old caseload' (mostly Tutsi) refugees who returned immediately after the genocide, sometimes occupying land of those who had fled.

Figure 1: Migrants to Kigali by prior location and year of migration, 1990-2007¹⁵



Banking

The banking sector had suffered rising non-performing loans before the genocide (10% of total credit in 1993), but these increased significantly thereafter (reaching 60% by mid-1999), with debtors killed, fled, or unable to repay due to damage to their factories. Furthermore, banks could not foreclose on properties lacking title deeds, which were also often missing or disputed. Contested or illicit withdrawals had also been made during the conflict, and books lost or damaged. The banks then faced complex decisions, such as whether to lend to defaulting debtors whose collateral had been destroyed so they could rebuild their businesses, and how to verify the collateral of new returnees.¹⁶

State assets

In the face of such extreme challenges, the new government was at least equipped with certain assets, some of which were critical to Rwanda's ability to recover.

¹⁵ Author's Own Calculation from the 2013/14 Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey (EICV4). This data covers only people still living in Kigali in 2013/14, when the EICV4 survey was conducted. It would thus tend to under-estimate migration in earlier years, relative to migration in later years, by not representing those who have since moved out of the city or died.

¹⁶ The International Monetary Fund (2000).

Legacy of the state

The new government did inherit remnants of a strong state system with deep historical roots. The previous government had managed the economy poorly in the preceding decade, often acted repressively, and rarely delivered basic public goods. However, Rwandans were at least accustomed to a state, with dense relationships of influence over the lives of ordinary citizens (even where these were negative). This state also had deep historical roots in Rwanda, rather than being viewed as a purely foreign-imposed artefact.¹⁷ The RPF did not inherit a system, therefore, where Rwandans had no prior expectations of the state, or immediately rejected its legitimacy, and this was some help to both the effectiveness and domestic legitimacy of the state post 1994.

International legitimacy

The new government in Kigali was quickly recognised as legitimate by much of the international community. The orchestration of genocide by the former government, and the RPF's role in ending this, made the RPF's legitimacy immediately compelling for many (with the important exception of French, who had supported the previous regime, including military support to repel the RPF invasion in 1990, and to subsequently shelter officials complicit in genocide).

The RPF had also made sustained and adept efforts to establish the trust of donors and influential international figures prior to their victory, such as reaching out to international journalists during the genocide to ensure the depth of the atrocity, failure of the international community, and promising leadership of the RPF, were communicated.¹⁸

A more superficial international legitimisation was offered by the government's formal commitment to the Arusha Accords. This peace treaty, signed in 1993 before the genocide or subsequent RPF victory, committed to a broad power-sharing Government of National Unity.¹⁹ In line with these agreements, senior figures from pre-genocidal opposition movements²⁰ were integrated into government (as were many more junior officials further down the administrative hierarchy²¹). This proved important in bridging the gap between the RPF and the

¹⁷ See Will Jones (forthcoming.) Rwanda Since 1994: Capital, Coercion, and Consent. Oxford University Press.

¹⁸ BBC journalist Andy Kershaw describes being approached by a friendly RPF outreach officer in the Bujumbura Novotel bar (where most reporters in Rwanda were stationed) in May 1994 and being persuaded to take a trip into Rwanda under the RPF's protection, to report on the horror left in the genocide's wake. See Kershaw, Andy (2014). No Off Switch, Chapter 36, Buster Press.

¹⁹ The Fundamental Law of 1994 set Rwanda's post-conflict governance framework, integrating the 1991 Constitution and the Arusha Peace Agreement, and declaring that power would not be shared with parties that participated in the genocide.

²⁰ For example, Seth Sendashonga, who had been prominent in student opposition to Habyarimana before the genocide, only joined the RPF in 1992, and went on to become Minister of the Interior during the mid-1990s. After falling out with the government and trying to set up an opposition party in exile, he was killed by gunmen who have never been identified in 1998.

²¹ For example, although it is impossible to arrive at precise figures, much anecdote suggests that many Habyarimana-era bourgeois who had not been implicated in genocide were retained afterwards, simply to retain some administrative structure in the countryside. This class of individuals were not replaced in full until the local elections of 1999.

Rwandan population in the early years following the genocide.

This mechanism of international legitimation was nevertheless shallow, as implementation of the Accords was undoubtedly partial: the RPF assigned themselves three of the five cabinet posts the Accords allocated to the former ruling party (the MRND), giving them a blocking minority, while much key decision-making took place outside of cabinet and the structures of Arusha, among the RPF leadership. The Arusha Accords had, furthermore, never commanded legitimacy within Rwanda, many seeing them as imposed on the country by foreign powers.

Resounding victory

The RPF's outright victory in the civil war lent them considerable authority to pursue their vision and exercise leadership upon first assuming power (including overlooking elements of the Arusha Accords). This contrasts to the often chaotic internationally-imposed 'grand coalitions', common in many post-conflict scenarios. This was undoubtedly important for state effectiveness in the early post-genocide years, as more formal policy-making institutions and laws were being rebuilt from a very low base.

Narrow patronage requirements

Though in many respects a challenge, young, narrow, movements also bring certain advantages to government. Other states in the region have come up against formidable entrenched interests when trying to push through reforms. By contrast, the Government of Rwanda (as discussed later) was able to conceive and push through bold new agendas without serious opposition.²²

Their success may have parallels with the theories of Thomas Callaghy²³, who demonstrated that the ability of states to implement structural adjustment in the early 1980s was hindered to the extent that their elites and bureaucracies were committed to long-standing networks of patronage and reciprocity. Unexpectedly, this meant that the youngest, least stable regimes were actually most able to bring about wide-reaching change.

Despite close internal ties formed during the war, the RPF lacked extensive patronage networks upon taking power in Rwanda, constructing many formal and informal governance institutions practically 'from scratch'. Thus, certain reforms could be incurred with reduced opposition (such as devaluation of the currency, implementing meritocratic hiring, reduced import tariffs that sent some firms out of business, and so on).

In Rwanda, this narrow patronage requirement was coupled with a relatively large diaspora, often educated at elite foreign schools. While overall human resource challenges were a strong negative factor for the new government, this

²² For examples, see Chemouni, Benjamin (2017). The politics of core public sector reform in Rwanda, Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) Research Centre Rwanda'. Working Paper n°88, University of Manchester.

²³ Callaghy, Thomas M. (1990). "Lost Between State and Market: the Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria", in Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: the Politics of Adjustment in the Third World, ed. Nelson, Joan M., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

at least strengthened the government's ability to stock its reformed institutions with the requisite technical and professional skills, as an elite diaspora returned during the 1990s. This also helped the RPF to recruit senior experts without strong local support bases, upholding a centralisation of power.

RPF resilience and leadership

The RPF was a highly resilient, adaptable, and effective body at their assumption of power in July 1994. The quality of the RPF, particularly its leadership, has been key to Rwanda's success subsequently. The RPF's leadership were deeply experienced in war, sensitive to security risks, and adaptable. Children of the failed *inyenzi* guerrillas of the 1960s, who were brought up as refugees in Uganda, suffered massacres by Idi Amin's military in 1978-1979, counter-massacres soon after, and further anti-Rwandan pogroms in 1982, were deeply accustomed to insecurity and the need for vigilance.

They had demonstrated considerable creativity and adaptability in responding to these risks; then organised as "RANU" (the Rwandan Alliance for National Unity), and responded to the aforementioned massacres by joining armies or rebel movements in their host states to learn the skills of war.²⁴ For those who joined the National Resistance Movement (NRM) rebels in Uganda, the NRM's victory in 1986 propelled many into the military and intelligence elite in Uganda (including Paul Kagame as deputy of military intelligence), where they could exploit training, equipment, and connections to transition from a situation of relative dependency and helplessness, to a serious force to be reckoned with.

The RPF had also displayed deep resilience to shocks suffered: after their first invasion of Rwanda in 1990 failed catastrophically (their commander Fred Rwigyema was killed on the second day of fighting, and two interim commanders, Peter Banyingana and Chris Bunyenyezi, were killed the following month), the RPF survived, suffered no high-ranking defections (as far as reported).

Under Paul Kagame, they totally re-invented their strategy, switching from conventional military sorties to a guerrilla strategy of hit-and-run attacks from the hostile Virunga mountains. Volunteer recruits (mostly Tutsi) continued to flow to the RPF from Burundi, the DRC, and Tanzania. The RPF was, thus, arguably the model of a 'learning army'²⁵, highly resilient thanks to its tenacity and creativity in preparing for risks, adaptability, and cohesiveness.

It is also relevant that the RPF founders were considerably driven by 'liberation ideology' – to liberate Tutsi in Rwanda from repression, Tutsi in the diaspora from dependency and discrimination, and also citizens in Rwanda from poor and divisive governance. In contrast to a more two-dimensional and cynical 'power grab', this ideological narrative was a boon to the RPF's cohesion, motivation, and discipline, including upon assuming office.

The character of the RPF's leader, Paul Kagame, was also an important factor. Kagame is widely seen to be an unusually able, committed, and compelling

²⁴ Mushemeza, Elijah E.D. (2007). The politics and empowerment of Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda, 1959-2001, Kampala: Fountain, p103.

²⁵ Nagl, John A. (2005). Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

leader, both in Rwanda and among relatively disinterested parties overseas. These qualities alone (beyond subsequent achievements on development outcomes) lend his office considerable 'good will', to mobilise support and action domestically and internationally. Quality of leadership must also directly account for many of the small and large decisions the government has taken to steer the ship of state effectively.

Finally, Kagame has commanded huge loyalty from the military for his leadership during the war and genocide, and afterwards for consistently driving its professionalisation and ethnic integration. This arguably lends his office a 'final security guarantee' necessary to take unpopular actions, push and discipline elites, and refuse to engage in spoils politics.



1995-2000: Consolidating peace


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1995-2000 was a period of rebuilding shattered institutions, social relations, and the economy; developing the popular legitimacy of the new government, particularly the RPF, from a very low basis; and consolidating the place of Kagame as leader of the RPF and country. This was achieved with considerable success, as outlined below.

By 2000, huge numbers of ex-combatants and Hutu had been incorporated into the state and RPF, and several measures demonstrated that neither favours nor punishments would be meted out along ethnic lines. This went far in convincing the population that the new government might in fact intend represent all Rwandans as they claimed, which was critical to building legitimacy and trust.

Rwanda also implemented a raft of macroeconomic reforms for stabilisation and privatisation, discussed under 'private sector development'. Many 'outcome measure' statistics for Rwanda post-1991 begin in 2000, making preceding measures of progress on welfare difficult to trace in the period. However, GDP began to grow as soon as 1995, and grew rapidly and robustly for the remainder of the decade; GDP had recovered to 'pre-war' levels by 2000 and GDP per capita by 2002, led by a state-led push to the agricultural sector (services and manufacturing recovered by early 2002 and 2005 respectively).

Figure 2: The recovery of GDP and GDP per capita, 1989 to 2002



Security

Breaking the cycle of ethnic violence

Senior leadership of the RPF acted early to build a government and army that could be seen as 'for the people' and break the cycle of ethnic violence. They quickly took steps to reform institutions and communicate to the population that the RPF were a party for all Rwandans, not only Tutsi, or those involved in the struggle.

Exercises of mass incorporation into state and party began almost immediately. An Igando ('solidarity') military integration programme was introduced as early as 1994, to support reintegration of ex-FAR into the military (this also became the standard on-boarding for all new recruits): this comprised of first, intensive political education emphasising the pre-colonial role of the army to serve all citizens, and the historical unity of Rwandans; followed by the deployment of new recruits to units with 'pre-genocide' RPA, to build camaraderie through living and working together; and finally, deploying the recruits in their former community, where they would help 'spread the good news' of equality and integration under the new government.

Marco Jowell records how a senior ex-FAR, who attended the first Igando in 1994, described its effect on him: "We were with the RPA... and we were taught about the history of Rwanda and we discussed a lot. As a result we began to share the same ideology... we received the same training in the same place together. Everyone was treated as an equal in that respect. Hierarchy and promotion is based on meritocracy. This all led to a cohesive force. We all work for the same purpose, the security and welfare of Rwandans. The political education did a lot for this."²⁶

One of the first actions of the Rwandan army after its invasion of Zaire in 1996 was to forcibly repatriate ex-FAR soldiers in the Kivu refugee camps. These soldiers were, likewise, pleasantly surprised to find that they were not summarily executed, but rather rapidly and successfully integrated into the new Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), following the same igando process. By 1998, at least 38,500 ex-FAR and armed groups had been integrated into the RPA, which was majority Hutu by the late 1990s.²⁷

The new government also showed an early willingness to forgive and re-integrate citizens complicit in genocide. In 1995, faced with 80,000 genocide suspects, they passed a law on 'alternative justice' that facilitated plea-bargaining to clear people through the system.²⁸ In 1997-8, the RPF re-established Local Defence Forces to address chronic shortages in policing, incorporating significant numbers of Hutu into the state security structures.²⁹

On the other hand, many RPF/RPA units were heavy-handed against civilians in the early period. This included human rights abuses, some on a large scale,

²⁶ Jowell, Marco (2014). "Cohesion through socialization: liberation, tradition and modernity in the forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF)", *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8.2: 278-293.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ The International Monetary Fund (2000).

²⁹ Their role was transitioned later to community (village) policing structures.

during the war and again in communities suspected of supporting insurgents in the North West in the early period of the insurgency.³⁰ This clearly worked against other efforts to communicate unity and incorporation – although of relevance, and a matter of wide disagreement, is the size (how many killed), scope (who was targeted), and the degree of organisation from top officials in ordering these attacks.³¹

Reform, retribution, and reconciliation

The risks of such abuses of power were heightened by the army's transition from a guerrilla rebel movement to a national army, the extremity of ethnic tension and mistrust attendant on the widespread participation in genocide, and early civilian support to the insurgency. However, there was also an early and serious commitment to stem retributive violence and centralise the control of power.

The former genocidal government's army (ex-FAR) had launched an insurgency in North-Western Rwanda, which was receiving considerable support from the local population. Hard-line tactics from the RPF were fuelling ex-FAR propaganda, and by mid-1996, the insurgency was not only continuing unabated, but building momentum: the ex-FAR had reorganised into two divisions (for North and South Kivu, respectively) and plans were underway to launch an offensive to retake Rwanda with a force in excess of 100,000. The Rwandan army had just over half that many men.

The army underwent considerable reforms over the course of 1997, in line with the classical counter-insurgency doctrine to win 'hearts and minds'. Hard-line commanders were replaced with those who understood the political aspect of counter-insurgency.³² The Rwanda Military Information Platoon (RMIP) was established, trained for a month by a United States (US) team, then embarked on a nationwide campaign of posters, leaflet drops, and small group meetings to reinforce the message of national unity, reconciliation, and amnesty for insurgents who had not been involved in the genocide.³³

The Auditorat Militaire was created to address impunity for war crimes committed by the RPA; it publicly prosecuted several high-ranking RPA officers, sometimes rapidly following their abuses, diffusing considerable tension with the population and setting a new tone that punishment for misdeeds would be (relatively) universal.³⁴

The ex-FAR in Zaire, meanwhile, continued their own more hard-line insurgency tactics, launching attacks on places like schools, where they would order students to separate based on ethnicity, then kill the Tutsis. As 1997 wore

³⁰ In Omaar, Rakiya and de Waal, Alex (1998). Rwanda: the Insurgency in the Northwest, African Economic Analysis. Accessible: <http://www.afbis.com/analysis/rwanda.htm>

³¹ After assuming power in July 1994, the RPF quickly split its political wing (remaining the 'RPF') from its military (RPA).

³² Such as the appointment of Lt. Gen. Caesar Kayizari, who had hitherto been 301st Brigade Commander in the South-West, to Gisenyi in 1997.

³³ This unit was built out of the propaganda corps of the struggle period and received training from a three-man US team between 15 March to 20 April. See the DOD's Report on US Military Activity in Rwanda between 1994 and 1997, available at <http://www.dod.mil/pubs/rwanda/summary.html>.

³⁴ Omaar, Rakiya and de Waal, Alex (1998).

on, more and more frequently, people refused to cooperate.³⁵

There is some consensus that, by the late 1990s, the nature of state violence in Rwanda had changed considerably. It was, crucially, far lower in scale, and also targeted strategically, under tight control from the centre. Important to note here is that senior leaders in the RPF showed willingness to 'take the first step' to break the cycle of ethnic violence, 'forgiving' and integrating Hutu they knew may have been complicit in genocide (and in fighting the RPF invasion), almost from day one. This is undoubtedly a lesson for other post-conflict governments.

Beyond counter-insurgency tactics, other factors may have strengthened the RPF's resolve to break the cycle of ethnic violence. The movement was grounded in an ideology of liberation, and of an idealised pre-colonial ethnic harmony of Rwandans. The RPF's narrow sociological base created a real politik requirement for incorporation of Hutu. Founding members had witnessed the failure of repressive regimes in Uganda, and many had both been involved with – and seen the effects of – more brutal campaigns against Uganda's Lords Resistance Army (LRA) and Holy Spirit Movement (HSM).

As discussed under the security section for 2000-present, the complicity of integrated parties was also forgiven, but not forgotten. Mass incorporation was coupled with the implementation of serious surveillance structures and penalties for misdeeds.

Security spill-overs: Defeating the ex-FAR in Zaire

The RPF took advantage of the shifting situation in the DRC to weed out the insurgency at its source. The RPF's own origins made them keenly aware that Rwandan refugees over Rwanda's border, under the influence of groups trenchantly opposed to Rwanda's state project and committed to violent reform, constituted a serious security threat. By 1996, only 300,000 of the 1.5 million Rwandan refugees in Zaire had returned. President Mobutu, meanwhile, was supporting the ex-FAR with arms, while donors did nothing to separate civilians and the growing military in the camps.

The Rwandan government thus put the force of their military behind the October 1996 L'Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) rebellion in Zaire, the final end of which was to unseat President Mobutu and establish a regime, under Larent-Désiré Kabila, that would deal with the Kivu security threat (and more generally support Rwandan interests). One of the first actions of the Rwandans in this rebellion was to send Rwandan civilians and ex-FAR back to Rwanda.

Less than eight months after the initial rebellion, the rebels had crossed over 2,500km of challenging terrain to unseat a President who had ruled for 32 years. Kabila was sworn in as President in Kinshasa on 31 May 1997. However, Kabila quickly began to resent the RPF's attempts to influence his rule, and faced accusations domestically of being Rwanda's puppet, undermining his legitimacy. Just a year later, on 22 July 1998, Kabila announced that all Rwandan military personnel had to leave the country. Within a week, the last planeload of Rwandans had returned to Kigali.

³⁵ Orth, Richard (2001).

This exclusion of Rwandans from the governance structures of the DRC undermined the security guarantee for which Rwanda had gone to war, and the Rwandan leadership rapidly engineered a new assault. Just four days after the Rwandans returned from Kinshasa (2 August), the 10th Brigade of the Congolese Army rebelled against Kabila's government in Goma, and Rwanda's Kayumba Nyamwasa took the 211th Brigade of the Rwandan army over the border to join them.

The first action of these Brigades was, again, to engage the former Rwandan army operating from the Kivus (the ex-FAR), in a series of engagements, which the Brigades won crushingly. Over the course of the Second Congo War that followed, the pro-Rwandan rebel group, the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD), also gained control of much of the DRC's border with Rwanda and its hinterland, depriving the ex-FAR insurgents of their base and access to the wider set of sympathetic armed groups in the region.

As noted, the Zairean regime was unstable before the influx of Rwandan refugees in 1994, and this refugee influx itself (which can hardly be blamed on the RPF) was a further destabilising factor.³⁶ However, it is relatively unambiguous that Rwanda's subsequent incursions in the DRC, had a severely destabilising effect on the Congolese state. Though the First Congo War was relatively brief, and Kabila was seen as somewhat legitimate and popular within the DRC, the Second Congo War was particularly protracted, deadly (mostly through indirect causes), and contested within the DRC.

During the Second Congo War, the Rwandan government and RPF also became substantially involved in the minerals economy of the DRC. Though officially disputed, several observers have reported that an administrative entity known as the Congo Desk, located in an office of the Ministry of Defence, applied taxes on Congolese minerals being traded³⁷, made decisions as to which mineral resources to exploit, and issued licensing for minerals exporters (comptoirs).³⁸ In addition, people or firms closely associated with the RPF owned many of the companies involved in this trade, including most notably Grands Lacs Metals, and (Tri-Star's) Rwanda Metals.

Rwanda's involvement, particularly since the Second Congo War, led to heightened popular mistrust of Rwanda in the Eastern DRC, as well as international donor resistance and the obvious bilateral diplomatic tension. Extricating the state and associates from this economy, and winding down military involvement in the volatile region, was thus a challenge for Rwanda to deal with in the post-2000 period.

³⁶ These conflicts have spawned an excellent and truly enormous literature. For example, Stearns, Jason (2011). *J. Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa*, New York, NY: Public Affairs; Turner, Thomas (2007). *T. The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality*, London: Zed; Prunier, Gérard (2009). *From Genocide to Continental War: The 'Congolese' Conflict and the Crisis of Contemporary Africa*, London: Hurst; Lemarchand, René (2011). *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa*, University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

³⁷ Amnesty International (2001). *Democratic Republic of Congo: Rwandese-controlled east: devastating human toll* (AFR 62/11/01), Amnesty International.

³⁸ Vlassenroot, Koen and Raeymaekers, Timothy (2001). *Conflict and social transformation in Eastern DR Congo*, chapter on Goma. Also, United Nations Security Council (2001). *Security Council Condemns Illegal Exploitation of Democratic Republic of Congo's Natural Resources*, United Nations Security Council Press Release. Accessible: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2001/sc7057.doc.htm> (2001).

Centralisation of resources

For many post-liberation governments, struggle-era solidarities diminish over time, leading to, firstly, a precarious narrowing of the circle of power, and secondly, increased use of patronage to paper over cracks.³⁹ The RPF, however, has weathered repeated senior elite defections in the nineties and beyond,⁴⁰ successfully negotiated a generational watershed on many civil-war era military figures, and implemented serious anti-corruption drives, with very little effect on political stability within Rwanda.⁴¹ The repressive capacity of the Rwandan state is usually cited as the core explanation for Rwanda's ability to weather these shocks. However, this begs the question, as to whether such elite defections and demobilisation would fragment that very coercive capacity in other contexts.

More important is the centralisation of financial resources within party and state institutions, and the centralisation of authority within the person of President Kagame, rather than allowing either to flow to scattered individuals. This meant that those who did defect (or were removed) were unable to take resources or loyalty with them with which they could later challenge the state, instead becoming pariahs.

From 1997-2000, RPF-owned company Tri-Star, was a significant institution for the centralisation of financial resources. It became a destination for many domestic businesses, keeping domestic business elites 'under one roof', where their influence was more vulnerable to centralised control.⁴² The RPF 'old guard', recycled during reforms of the army or broader public sector, have also often been transferred into such state or party affiliated institutions,⁴³ reducing the security risks associated with demobilisation and institutional turnover. Importantly, all profits from Tri-Star flowed to the institution of the RPF, rather than to individuals.

Anti-corruption reforms were also critical to the centralisation of resources but have been pursued with the most vigour from 2003 onwards, and so discussed below.

³⁹ Reuss, Anna and Titeca, Kristof (2017). "When revolutionaries grow old: the Museveni babies and the slow death of the liberation", *Third World Quarterly* (2017): 1-20.

⁴⁰ The nineties saw a steady trickle of exits from the RPF, often into exile. Most, most famously former Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu, Speaker of Parliament Joseph Sebarenzi, and Minister of the Interior Seth Sendashonga, as well as Major Alphonse Furuma (member of the RPF executive), Major Gérard Ntashamaje (Secretary-General, Ministry of Justice), Déo Mushayidi (Chairman, Rwandan Union of Journalists), Jean-Bosco Rutagenwa (President, IBUKA Genocide Survivors Organisation), Josué Kayijaho (Vice-President, IBUKA), Valens Kajeguhakwa (Parliamentarian), and middle-ranking Majors such as Abdul Joshua Ruzibiza, Fred Kwiriza, and Michel Mupende. In March 2000, President Pasteur Bizimungu resigned and went on to found an opposition party. The most prominent later example is Rwanda's 'Gang of Four', exiled dissidents who founded an opposition party, the Rwandan National Congress in January 2011. This was comprised of Former Army Chief of Staff General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, Chief of Military Intelligence Lt. Colonel Patrick Karegyeya, Chief of Staff to the President Theogène Rudasingwa, and Chief Advisor in the Ministry of Justice Gerald Gahima.

⁴¹ Betts, Alexander and Jones, Will (2016). *Mobilising the Diaspora*, Cambridge University Press.

⁴² With no individual shareholders, profits from Tri-Star (later Crystal) are kept within the company and party, rather than empowering individuals.

⁴³ Behuria, Pritish (2016). "Centralising rents and dispersing power while pursuing development? Exploring the strategic uses of military firms in Rwanda", *Review of African Political Economy* 43.150: 630-647.

Rebuilding the state

Institutional rehabilitation

A 2000 IMF retrospective stated that in immediate post-genocide Rwanda, there was, “a virtual collapse of the administrative capacity at the central and local government levels, and the delivery of almost all social and financial services was paralysed.”⁴⁴ Around 40% of civil servants were dead or had fled, including skilled professionals like national bank staff and health workers.

High inflation and low wages heightened the human resource challenge, as remaining qualified citizens opted for better-paid non-governmental organisation (NGO) or private sector work (Figure 3). Indicative of this crisis, by 1996, 80% of public employees had not completed high school, and only 3.5% of the Ministry of Health’s 4,809 employees were qualified doctors or nurses.

Figure 3: Low public sector wages in 1997⁴⁵ (in thousands of Rwanda francs per month) (Source: Rwanda authorities) (Key: 1/Foreign-owned private enterprise, 2/US Agency for International Development, 3/Excluding fringe benefits)

Grade	Bralirwa 1/	USAID 2/	UN	Civil Service 3/
Director	228.5	249.0	337.2	45.5
Chief Accountant	116.1	240.0	-	36.3
Accountant	259.7	125.0	196.6	27.3
Secretary	91.4	-	132.5	14.4
Driver	53.3	75.0	62.0	11.3
Messenger	25.1	50.0	43.9	6.8

The crippled institutional environment contrasted with the magnitude of the development challenges to be tackled. The government thus undertook several steps to incrementally rebuild, and strengthen, the capacity of the public sector.

From 1995-7, the government attempted to reduce the number, and raise the skill and remuneration, of civil servants. However, implementation was hindered by weak implementation controls, unclear job descriptions and requirements, and a lack of resources to seriously improve wages. Thus, in 1998, more effective measures included highly centralised hiring to reduce patronage,⁴⁶ centralised

⁴⁴ International Monetary Fund (2000).

⁴⁵ Ibid. Fringe benefits were close to zero for junior staff, but Director’s received benefits worth more than seven times their base salary.

⁴⁶ All applications were submitted by the agency hiring to the Ministry of Civil Service, which reviewed them all, then submitted the final candidate’s application to the Ministry of Finance for approval.

and computerised payrolls, a physical civil service census to identify unpaid and ghost workers and taking stock of human resource gaps, and requirements that vacant posts be advertised publicly and with clear qualification requirements.

Perhaps most importantly, salary structures underwent a substantial reform in 1999. As the IMF noted, “Under the old structure, the ratio of the salary of the... highest-paid public employee to that of the lowest-paid... including fringe benefits... was 60:1. Under the new structure, all fringe benefits were monetised, and... a top-bottom ratio of 19:1 was adopted.” The removal of fringe benefits (such as cars, fuel, and housing benefits) for senior government employees illustrates the RPF’s resilience, as other governments have attempted and failed to make such reforms. It was arguably an important step in setting the tone for a serious, professional, austere, low-corruption, government going forwards.

Figure 4: Rwanda’ civil service pay scale, 1995-8 vs 1999⁴⁷ (in Rwanda francs per month)

Civil Service Employment	1995 - 98		From 1999
	Base salary	Including fringe benefits	Monetised salary
Secretary General	49,487	539,487	251,002
Director General	45,540	535,540	209,503
Director	39,924	330,757	157,615
Chief Supervisor	36,281	36,281	106,455
Supervisor	32,789	32,789	57,789
Administrative Secretary	28,538	28,538	53,538
Principal Civil Worker	27,332	27,332	37,332
Civil Worker	25,006	25,006	35,006
Principal Secretary	21,528	21,528	28,028
Secretary	20,203	20,203	26,703
Assistant Secretary	18,547	18,547	25,047
Third-Class Principal Officer	16,934	16,938	20,934
Second-Class Principal Officer	15,379	15,379	19,379
First-Class Principal Officer	14,040	14,040	18,540

⁴⁷ International Monetary Fund (2000), p 33.

Civil Service Employment	1995 - 98		From 1999
Principal Agent	12,420	12,420	16,420
Officer	10,620	10,620	15,120
Assistant Officer	9,000	9,000	13,000
Ratio: highest to lowest	5.5 to 1	60 to 1	19 to 1

Top-down decision-making plus ownership

In such a weak institutional environment, the RPF's resounding victory in the civil war and strong leadership capacity allowed their senior leaders to exercise a degree of authority, contrasting with the more diffuse rule of 'grand coalitions' common in post-conflict settings. From 1995-2000, the Presidency (though itself still a plural institution, under President Bizimungu, with Kagame as Vice-President) was established as an elevated authority, with the final say over policy and asserting some right to work around formal structures.⁴⁸ Gérard Prunier claims that from 1995-7, many priority policy questions (such as the military, resettlement, and the integration of refugees) were largely decided outside formal government structures, by President Bizimungu and a close circle around him.⁴⁹

There was also considerable pruning of the political elite in this period. The RPF's Kicukiro-I meeting in February 1998, saw the election of a significantly renewed RPF National Executive Committee (NEC) (four of the seven long-standing commissioners from the struggle-era were replaced) and Political Bureau. At the same meeting, Kagame was promoted from Vice-President to President of the party – a meaningful consolidation of his legitimacy and power within, and leadership of, the party, preceding his assumption of the Presidency of Rwanda in 2000.⁵⁰

Senior leadership also became more socially narrow over the period, as seats vacated by senior figures from the pre-genocide anti-Habyarimana opposition

⁴⁸ As one illustrative example, Prunier cites a challenge by a Minister over the disbursement of large unauthorised sums of money to the military: '[In 1996] then Minister of Finance, Marc Ruganera, was asked... by an RPA colonel to give him USD 500,000 "to take care of urgent matters"... The Minister then asked him for a detailed list of personnel for whom this money was earmarked and what their salaries were. Whereupon the Colonel exploded and told Ruganera that he would "hear about it". Later, Vice President and Minister of Defence Major General Paul Kagame phoned Ruganera and told him to pay the USD 500,000 to the Colonel "for the good of the country". Ruganera did not push the matter any further and arranged for payment of the monies.'

⁴⁹ Prunier, Gérard (1997). The Social, Political, and Economic Situation, "Issue Paper. Formerly formerly accessible: <http://www.writtenet.org> (now available from the author on request)

⁵⁰ Kimonyo, Jean-Paul (2015). A strong man building strong institutions in a weak society?, New Times, Rwanda's Leading Daily, Opinion Piece. Accessible: <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/190418/> <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/190418/>

were filled from more trusted RPF members.⁵¹ Thus, gradually, an elite more trusted by Kagame and the RPF gained control of key institutions.

A high degree of senior autonomy and flexibility in policy-making was arguably necessary in a context where institutions were so decimated, broad human capital so weak, and challenges so unprecedented. However, the weak institutionalisation of the development agenda, and weakness or absence of certain critical formal processes, also introduced several challenges, such as mobilising and coordinating development aid (discussed below), leaving ill-defined mandates for government ministries, and identifying and penalising embezzlement or patronage. From 1998, this consolidated authority was thus channelled towards considerable early institution-building, and to defining Rwanda's development vision following the expiry of the Arusha Accords and launch of the new Constitution in 2003.

From 1998 to 2000, the public face of this exercise were the Urugwiro Consultations, which ran from May 1998 to March 1999. Guests – trusted individuals from across society⁵² – would meet on Saturdays at events convened by President Bizimungu, to thrash out statements of vision and objectives across practically every sector of Rwandan life. This culminated, principally, in Vision 2020⁵³ – the government's flagship document to define the national development agenda, around which all later policies have been oriented.

Critics dismiss these consultations as stage-managed performances or information-sharing platforms.⁵⁴ They were certainly focused on more sympathetic 'opinion leaders', rather than a more plural crowd with whom such consultations would have collapsed into incoherence almost immediately. They were not intended as flawless examples of mass deliberative democracy but were significant for engendering wider ownership of the national vision as defined. This pattern of somewhat top-down or technocratic decision-making, complimented by robust communication to promote broad ownership of the development agenda, has also characterised much Rwandan policy-making since 2000.

⁵¹ Omar McDoom assembles the following list of significant departures during this period: "(i) Prime Minister Faustin Twigaramungu, a Hutu of the MDR party in 1995; (ii) Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga, a Hutu from the RPF in 1995; (iii) Justice Minister Alphonse Nkubito, a Hutu in 1995; (iv) Minister of Information, Jean-Baptiste Nkuriyingoma, a Hutu in 1995; and (vi) the Minister of Transport and Communication, Immaculée Kayumba, a Tutsi again in 1995. Later on, several other high-profile departures occurred: (i) Prime Minister Celestin Rwigema, a Hutu of the MDR party in 2000; (ii) President of the Transitional National Assembly, Joseph Sebarenzi, a Tutsi in 2000; and (iii) President Pasteur Bizimungu, a senior Hutu in the RPF, in 2000." in McDoom, Omar (2013). , 'Rwanda's exit pathway from violence: a strategic assessment,assessment' World Development Report Working Paper, p12, World Bank.

⁵² Some of the cabinet, the Presidents of the important Commissions, big national organisations such as ISHEMA, pro-femmes and LIPRODHOR, préfets, religious leaders, and so on.

⁵³ The Consultations also informed the National Unity and Reconciliation Policy, the comprehensive reform, and other key policies.

⁵⁴ Gready, PaulP (2010). ""You're either with us or against us': Civil society and policy making in post-genocide Rwanda", *African Affairs*, 109(437), 637-657, Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society. Accessible: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40928367>.

Mobilising finance

The RPF invested effort early and adeptly to build strong relationships with the international community and mobilise aid. It quickly built trust with the IMF and World Bank, demonstrating seriousness and strong credentials for economic management (particularly compared with the previous regime) by committing to accelerate structural adjustment and exercise tight fiscal responsibility despite the hugely challenging environment,⁵⁵ as summarised in a 1996 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) review of aid to Rwanda:⁵⁶

“In spite of... the numerous difficulties... the present government appears committed to continuing and accelerating reforms begun under the structural adjustment programmes of the previous regime. In consultation primarily with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the government has taken a series of measures... that confirm its seriousness about economic reform.”

As early as July 1994, the government and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had established the “UNDP Trust Fund for Rwanda” to streamline aid for rebuilding government capacity. By January 1995, a “Round Table Conference for Rwanda Reconstruction” was sponsored by the government and the UNDP, at which aid of \$700 million was pledged and mechanisms to track disbursement established. The RPF also established Community Development Committees in this period, to offer grassroots direction to donor development assistance.⁵⁷

Although aid spiked immediately following the genocide, much emergency aid was delivered late; aid overall fell rapidly with the transition from humanitarian relief to the larger rebuilding exercise; and aid remained overwhelmingly off-budget. Thus, although \$707 million was pledged at a January 1995 roundtable, just \$68 million had been disbursed by mid-1995, and only \$22.8 million to the government directly.

To disburse direct budget support, donors required a degree of transparency and coherence in government planning, budgeting, spending, and monitoring, for which institutions had not yet been established. Public financial management (PFM) systems were extremely weak, with the first budget presented to Parliament only in 1998, and there being no credible paper trail for public spending until reforms to the auditor-general and accountant-general functions post-2003.

Rwanda also lacked a coherent, comprehensive, and formally agreed development framework that donors could get behind with budget support (as later provided by Vision 2020 and the PRSPs/EDPRSs). On the donors’ side, donors also tended to choose their own autonomy over empowering governments’ development agendas in this period, before the Rome and Paris Declarations in the early 2000s, which raised donors’ focus on coordination and streamlining aid through national structures.

The government thus often lacked the financial resources required to rebuild its institutions and rehabilitate the country. However, several off-budget aid projects were effectively mobilised to this end. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) rehabilitated houses destroyed during the

⁵⁵ ErikssonErikson, John et al. (1996). <https://www.oecd.org/countries/rwanda/50189495.pdf>


⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Inzego z’abari n’abategarugori (‘National Governance Structures for Women and Girls’)

genocide, and the Organisation for International Migration (OIM) supported the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees to their homes, and the resettling of 'old caseload' refugees on rural government land.

With a more long-term view, the World Bank funded the 1998 civil service census that enabled the government to clear ghost workers from the payroll and plan a coherent human resources agenda. The European Commission (EC) supported the rehabilitation of the tea sector (despite many plantations at that stage still being owned by the government), returning production to pre-war levels by 1998. The United Kingdom Department for International Development (DfID) provided considerable technical assistance to the revenue authority, to rebuild the government's domestic resource mobilisation.

Figure 5. Net overseas development assistance (ODA) to Rwanda, 1994-2015




Source: World Development Indicators

Faced with the dearth of on-budget donor aid, the government prioritised rehabilitation of institutions for domestic revenue collection. The skills and institutions required for effective tax administration could not be re-built overnight, but tax revenue as a share of GDP was, impressively, recovered to its 1990-1991 level by 1998. The Large Enterprise Unit was an early innovation, to ensure Rwanda's 150 largest firms were taxed; this accounted for 80% of early tax revenue (though firms' rebuilding costs and lost books dented profit taxes).

More importantly, taxes on goods and services, and turnover taxes, were raised progressively (and simplified), accounting for the greatest revenue improvements. Large tax exemptions offered by the previous government were also curtailed. To modernise and professionalise revenue collection, the new Rwanda Revenue Authority was created in 1997, with improved pay, grading structures, merit-based recruitment, and the replacement of half of former staff.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ International Monetary Fund, p 33 (2000).

Figure 6: Rwanda's investment and savings rate, 2010-2014



Private sector development


Rwanda experienced strong recovery growth in the post-genocide period. Output growth for agriculture, services, and manufacturing resumed in 1995, and Rwanda in fact transitioned to a higher growth rate plateau of 8% per annum from 1995-2015, compared to 1.5% average growth in the decade preceding the genocide. This accelerated growth was generally stable, cross-sectoral,⁵⁹ and far outlasted the 'catch up' recovery period.

Nevertheless, GDP did not recover to pre-war levels until 2000, and GDP per capita until 2002 (Figure 7). While agricultural output was restored to pre-genocide levels within four years (by 1998) (Figure 10), services output only recovered to pre-genocide levels by 2002 (Figure 9), and the manufacturing sector took a decade to recover to the levels seen before the war and genocide (Figure 8) (until 2005). Exports averaged a fairly low 7% of GDP from 1995-7, and were poorly diversified and vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations, with coffee and tea constituting 80% of export value from 1992-8.

As well as the damage to infrastructure and factories, Rwanda now offered private investors a huge conflict risk premium, decimated institutions for economic management, and crippled local purchasing power. Although a robust private sector was unlikely to arise in the decade following the genocide, the government took important steps to prepare ground for private sector confidence.


⁵⁹ The insurgency in the North West – Rwanda's prime agricultural region – brought agricultural growth down to 4% in 1997.

Figure 7. GDP and GDP per capita, 1980-2016




Source: World Development Indicators

Figure 8. Manufacturing value added 1965-2015 (Constant 2010 \$ millions)




Source: World Development Indicators

Figure 9. Services value added in Rwanda (Constant 2010 \$ millions)



Source: World Development Indicators

Figure 10. Agriculture value added in Rwanda (Constant 2010 \$ millions)



Source: World Development Indicators

Macroeconomic reforms

Important macroeconomic reforms were implemented early, despite the challenging institutional environment. With collapsed output followed by huge donor inflows, inflation was at 64% in 1994, and 35% in 1995. The government implemented a raft of measures to stabilise macroeconomic aggregates. They contracted the money supply and implemented demonetisation (introducing a new currency). The exchange rate and interest rates were liberalised. The government also committed to keeping the public wage bill to no more than 50% of its pre-war level.⁶⁰ Sound systems of PFM were also restored by the 2000s, with Parliament adopting annual budget laws since 1998 (Chemouni, 2017).

Competition was raised, despite the challenging environment. Price controls were removed, and import tariffs were cut by half (as part of a comprehensive tax

⁶⁰ Eriksson, John (1996). <https://www.oecd.org/countries/rwanda/50189495.pdf>

reform that raised revenue from other sources, as above). The IMF noted that, “the increased external competition was genuine, as it led to reductions in, or even cessation of, production in several industries, including corrugated iron sheets, soap, and cosmetics.”⁶¹

Protecting property rights

A critical decision taken by the incoming government was to quickly recognise all pre-existing property rights of those who had fled the country in the prior 12 years⁶² (including foreigners).⁶³ With this guarantee, many large business owners returned to Rwanda immediately after the cessation of conflict, to claim their property and factories, and to restart operations. One study of 55 of the largest agribusiness and manufacturing firms in Rwanda after the genocide found that 29% of manufacturing firms had restarted production by the end of 1994, and 62% by the end of 1995.⁶⁴ Laws were also amended to ensure that the property and firms of men killed would be passed onto their widows.⁶⁵

This was significant not just for business but for social reconciliation. ‘Old caseload’ (mostly Tutsi) refugees who returned with the RPF’s victory were mostly not allowed to remain on the (mostly Hutu) land or houses they had temporarily occupied. Instead, government-owned rural land was distributed to these ‘old caseload’, and some new, returning refugees – a factor that also contributed to the faster rebooting of agricultural production. This was complemented by a parallel effort to clamp down on land-grabs by senior military officials.

Unclear land and property rights were also exacerbating problems in the banking sector, which required title deeds to foreclose properties constituting capital for (the many) bad loans. The central bank pressured local authorities to accelerate issuance of title deeds. Land titling would not be comprehensively addressed until 2008-12. Meanwhile, however, a dedicated and innovative arbitration court was established, through which creditors and debtors were required to discuss bad loans and collateral in public, often ‘shaming’ debtors into catching up on payments.⁶⁶

Delivering through RPF and state enterprises

In contrast to the cash-strapped state, the RPF upon assuming power had sizeable remaining unspent funds from the war effort, held and managed in its Wartime Production Unit. In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, with many private sector enterprises and farms abandoned, and little chance of new foreign investment, this unit thus assumed several critical and urgent tasks to rebuild and

⁶¹ International Monetary Fund, p 33 (2000).

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development/UNCTAD (2006). Examen de la politique d’investissement du Rwanda, Conférence des Nations Unies sur le Commerce et le Développement. Accessible: http://unctad.org/fr/Docs/iteipc200611_fr.pdf

⁶⁴ Gathani and Stoelinga (2012).

⁶⁵ International Monetary Fund, p 33 (2000).

⁶⁶ Ibid.

restart the economy. This included infrastructure repairs, trade in basic goods, farming, and paying civil service salaries (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012).

In 1997, the unit was replaced with Tri-Star, founded as a holding company in which the RPF was the sole shareholder (this was rebranded to Crystal Ventures in 2002). The activities of the wartime production unit were brought under Tri-Star, and Tri-Star went on to expand considerably, establishing new firms, acquiring and rehabilitating private sector firms, and partnering with new foreign investors (for example, bringing the telecommunications network provider, MTN to Rwanda in 1998). The company's subsidiaries soon included the largest firms across many sectors, spanning real estate, infrastructure, food and drinks, telecommunications, minerals, media, and graphic design, among others.

Tri-Star's growth in this period served three purposes. First, with a poor outlook for purely private investors, it would make use of remaining RPF funds to rehabilitate domestic production in critical areas like construction, trade, and telecommunications. Second, it would provide a return on investment to finance the RPF, at a time when mass domestic fundraising was hardly an option. Third, it aimed to keep private sector profits and resources centralised, to avoid the emergence of alternative centres of power while governance structures and legitimacy were still being consolidated. A concern here was the akazu business elite of pre-genocide Rwanda, who had been instrumental in provoking and funding the genocide. Thus, all profits from Tri-Star, and later Crystal Ventures, flowed back to the RPF rather than to individuals.⁶⁷

The state also inherited a range of companies in 1994, including mines, cement factories, tea plantations, and coffee exporters. Competition with these firms was raised; for example, competition was introduced for all stages of coffee production. A Privatisation Law was also introduced in 2006. However, most activities were not privatised in practice until the 2000s. The government held onto tea plantations to invest in their rehabilitation (discussed above).

The government owned the largest mining concessions under REDEMI, but these were fairly neglected in this period, perhaps due to the more intensive capital rehabilitation and policy infrastructure required, or a greater focus on minerals trading from DRC. State pyrethrum firm OPYRWA was inactive most of the decade, due to instability from the North-West insurgency, where it was located. Cement manufacturer, CIMERWA was jointly owned by the government and a Chinese firm, under a pre-genocide 'Build, Own, Operate, Transfer' agreement, that expired only in 2006.

⁶⁷ All details available in Booth, David and Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick (2012). Developmental, 'Development Patrimonialism? The Case of Rwanda, *African Affairs*, Oxford Academic, Volume 111, Issue 444. Accessible: <https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article/111/444/379/152698>

2000-2017: Consolidating legitimacy

4

The RPF-led government today presents itself to the public with a great degree of credibility. It bases this legitimacy on it being the government that has put more food on the table than any government in Rwanda's history, led the most rapid and sustained period of growth, cut maternal and child mortality, and kept the peace after ethnic turmoil.

GDP growth averaged 8.8% from 2000 to 2014 – well beyond any plausible 'catch-up' period. Income per capita has tripled. Rwanda is one of the few countries to have reached most of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs):

- the fertility rate has fallen by 1.6 children per woman (to four, the lowest level in East Africa);
- a quarter of the population have left multidimensional poverty;
- Rwanda has gone from the highest to the lowest in East Africa for maternal and under-five mortality (it fell by 85% and 78% respectively);
- and 91% of births are now attended by skilled health professionals – 30 percentage points higher than any other East African country (Annex 2).

Some international researchers have questioned the veracity or durability of certain headline developmental gains,⁶⁸ although plenty believe them to be real and robust.⁶⁹ Important for the purposes of popular legitimation, is that the RPF's developmental justification is generally accepted by the population.

This has reflected a strong, coordinated push for development, facilitated by the launch in 2000 of Rwanda's Vision 2020 – a coherent, comprehensive,

⁶⁸ For example, Ansoms, An (2008).. "Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor? A Critical Review of Rwanda's Rural Sector Policies", "The Journal of Modern African Studies 46, no. 01 (2008): 1-32, Cambridge University Press.

⁶⁹ For example, Verpoorten, Marijke. (M. 2014).. Growth, poverty and inequality in Rwanda: A Broad Perspective, United Nations University WIDER Working Paper 138/2014, Helsinki. Accessible: <https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/growth-poverty-and-inequality-rwanda>

and highly ambitious agenda to guide government and donor activities. The government has also in this period reaped the benefits of seeds sown from 1995-2000, in terms of the more consolidated legitimacy of the RPF and President, and the centralisation of resources and of control over state violence, providing greater security to pursue bolder, more challenging, agendas.

Building an effective state

Strengthened donor management

Off-budget aid in the 1990s limited the government's capacity to channel donor finance to its priority projects or the rebuilding of institutions. In 2002, Rwanda launched its first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) off the back of Vision 2020. The PRSP was widely seen to provide a coherent, comprehensive, and authoritative programme for donors to get behind with funding. This was complemented by PFM reforms from 2003 (discussed below). Aid dispersals climbed substantially after the period, including on-budget support.

This movement to on-budget aid was strengthened by the 2003 Rome and 2005 Paris Declarations, which raised the international community's commitment to coordinating and streamlining aid through national structures. However, most important to aid-effectiveness was the government's own efforts to force donor coordination and streamlining around the national development agenda.

The 2006 Rwanda Aid Policy clarified the government's preferred framework for donor support, emphasising on-budget, less conditional, aid; donor pools for any project-based funds to improve coordination;⁷⁰ and even stating that aid would be refused if not sufficiently aligned to the government's priorities. This streamlining is supported by a raft of institutional arrangements, such as:

- clear Sector Strategic plans with log frames and SMART outcome targets;
- a 'division of labour' among donors, pressing each to work only on sectors assigned to them by the government, to reduce the coordination burden;
- a mutual accountability framework⁷¹ holding donors, as well as the government, mutually accountable for delivering agreed results in their sector;
- the government's Aid Procedures manuals;
- and donor coordination institutions like the 'External Finance Unit' in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN), annual 'Development Partner Retreats', and regular Development Partners Coordination Group meetings.

⁷⁰ Versailles, Bruna (2012).

⁷¹ Ibid.

Aid has been critical to Rwanda's economic growth, fiscal stability, and delivery of the welfare measures mentioned above. Economic growth has been driven by high public investment (Figure 11), fuelled by foreign savings (mostly ODA) (Figure 6). Important government programmes financed by donor aid since 2000 include:

- Rwanda's national land tenure regularisation (DfID);
- the modernisation of the Rwanda Revenue Authority (DfID) and Office of the Auditor General (Dutch and Swiss aid, then DfID);
- income support and public works for the poorest households through the Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP) (DfID and USAID);
- health insurance for poor households (a rare case of a country winning broad health financing support from the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDs, Tuberculosis, and Malaria);
- other massive health-sector support (aid represented two thirds of health spending from 2010-2014);⁷²
- and construction of 211 coffee washing stations (from 2 in 2000) to provide more cash income to rural farmers (USAID).⁷³

Elevated national agenda

The institutions of the state have expanded and developed in sophistication and formalisation, requiring a broader and more technocratic pool of managers, and entailing a less directive role for the Presidency compared to the earliest post-genocide years. The model senior figure in Rwandan government today is a relatively young, foreign-educated, technocrat, and there has been considerable 'civilianising' of the ruling elite, particularly since 2010.

A number of such highly capable individuals, often personally appointed and trusted by the President, are given considerable decision-making power in key institutions in charge of planning the national agenda, allocating budgets, and monitoring and managing performance. In addition, a significant number of staff at lower levels (heads of units, finance directors, directors, and so on) are also Cabinet (effectively, Presidential) appointments, often given little choice about joining government from the private or other non-government sectors.

Through these networks of trusted and capable appointees help the Presidency to push through policy when required. However, once appointed, many of these officials have considerable authority to implement, and even innovate, within their mandates.

⁷² Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Health (2016). Rwanda Health Resource Tracking Output Report, Expenditure FY 2013/14 and Budget FY 2014/15." Government of Rwanda.

⁷³ Democracy in Africa (2014). Bringing industrial policy back in: A new flavour to the narrative of post-1994 Rwanda, Democracy in Africa. Accessible: <http://democracyinafrica.org/bringing-industrial-policy-back-new-flavour-narrative-post-1994-rwanda/>

Promoting ownership and self-help

In general, policies are set in a technocratic and centralised manner, not unlike the situation in many developed countries. However, the government makes serious investments to promote widespread ownership of the development agenda once set. This can be seen in the Urugwiro Consultations and annual National Dialogue, discussed elsewhere, the communication of government programmes in village umuganda meetings, and the widespread publicity to launch the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) (which included car bumper stickers and even a hit pop song in which Rwanda's most sought-after pop stars rapped and sang about the EDPRS targets).⁷⁴

Ownership of the development agenda is not only important for national unity, but also for mobilising resources for development in a low-income context. This ownership has often been encapsulated in the concept of *agaciro* ('dignity'); regularly stressed by President Kagame, particularly after Rwanda's aid was temporarily cut, *agaciro* entails that every Rwandan should be an active agent in their own, as well as the nation's, development, rather than a passive or helpless recipient. People and communities are regularly asked to solve their own problems, including implementing major parts of the government's development programme. For example:

- Each household in every village in Rwanda must take part in monthly 'umuganda' public works (often neighbourhood cleaning and repairs) as well as contribute labour to school building.
- Villages organise their own garbage collection and security patrols for which each household pays a means-tested fee.
- Villages are also responsible for identifying their poorest members (categorising themselves into *ubudehe* poverty levels) to receive income support under the VUP.
- Village-level women's groups meet monthly to support each other with advice, lending money, or richer villagers paying poorer villagers' health insurance.
- Mandatory health insurance was ratified in 2007, often defended with the argument that "free thing[s] destroy the mentality of the people", and that "What matters is the contribution".⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Niyigaba, Eric (2013). EDPRS by Knowless ft Rideman Jay Polly New Rwandan. DJ YANDRAM, YouTube. Accessible: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFfpWwcl5e4> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFfpWwcl5e4>

⁷⁵ Quotes from former Ministers of Health, Joseph Karemera and Vincent Biruta, respectively. Source: Chemouni, Benjamin (2016). The political path to universal health coverage: Elite commitment to community-based health insurance in Rwanda, Effective States and Inclusive Development Research Centre (ESID) Working Paper no. 72. Accessible: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2893122

Decentralised basic services

In 2012, Rwanda outlawed orphanages, and has since transitioned to the retention of children in their homes (with family counselling) or placement of children with (Rwandan) foster or adoptive families.⁷⁶ Even the army, after approaching the Ministry of Finance for a greater budget in 2007, was asked to do more to fund itself, inspiring the creation of the Horizon Group to invest military savings, and support the expansion of peacekeeping operations.

Health sector achievements have particularly relied on mass mobilisation and 'self-help'. In 2007, a system of was introduced whereby each village appoints four members to be Community Health Workers (CHWs). These CHWs typically have no prior health training (and receive only modest training after their appointment) and have been largely unpaid (in theory, performance-based financing is allocated to a CHW cooperative, but CHWs have noted low awareness of and ability to utilise this money).⁷⁷

In 2005 the government launched a national health insurance scheme, *mutuelle de santé*. Subscription to the annual fee is voluntary, but heavily encouraged. One study found subscription rates in some areas as high as 92%. Together, these initiatives are widely credited with leading to significant improvements in healthcare outcomes. For example, in one district, the percentage of women birthing at a formal healthcare centre increased from 9% to 72% within a five year period during these reforms.⁷⁸

Several of the above-mentioned contributions demanded of citizens are considerably taxing, especially when considered together, yet citizens typically comply and there is little public complaint. In some cases, this reflects active enthusiasm for the programmes and internalisation of the development agenda. In others, citizens surely comply despite disliking the demands made of them. Such discontent with particular policies is perfectly compatible with acceptance of the overall legitimacy of the state (and indeed is common to governments across the world), and such a situation in fact underscores the resilience of the state imposing it. More critical commentators (such as Ansoms, Purdekova, Ingelaere, and others), by contrast, have posited that the discontent and resentment is deeper more severe, constituting a fragility risk.

⁷⁶ The Economist (2017)., Closing African Orphanages May Be Less Heartless Than It Seems. Accessible: <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21727118-case-can-be-made-against-such-institutions-particularly-bigger-ones-closing> .” <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21727118-case-can-be-made-against-such-institutions-particularly-bigger-ones-closing>

⁷⁷ Condo, Jeanine et al. (2014). Rwanda’s evolving community health worker system: a qualitative assessment of client and provider perspectives, HealthHuman Resources for Health. Accessible: <https://human-resources-health.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1478-4491-12-71>

⁷⁸ Figures from Chambers, Victoria and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi (2012). Is the Bride Too Beautiful? Safe Motherhood in Rural Rwanda, Africa Power and Politics Programme Research Report, the Overseas Development Institute. Accessible: <https://www.odi.org/publications/6347-bride-too-beautiful-safe-motherhood-rural-rwanda>

Technocratic policy-making

The elections and free discussion characterising liberal democracies can help ruling parties learn how policies are playing out in given sections of the population, and identify groups that are unhappy, in order to course-correct. The chance that a leader may be replaced in an election tends to raise leaders' appetite for such information. In other contexts, when incompetence is not communicated or punished by dismissal through the ballot box, an entrenched-but-ineffective regime is often created (as in Uganda, Tanzania, or South Africa).

The effectiveness of elections in delivering these epistemic benefits is contested, particularly in patrimonial contexts where elections often lead to 'spoils politics' and escalating graft, and in post-conflict contexts where elections (and even 'free speech') can foster destabilising identitarian discourse and conflict.⁷⁹

These epistemic functions are clearly unlikely to be fulfilled through the above channels in a country where the lowest proportion of the vote the RPF have ever received in any form of election is 78.76% (in the 2008 elections to the Chamber of Deputies), and public criticism of government policy (such as in the media) is restricted. The Government of Rwanda has instead invested in a considerable infrastructure of data collection and consultation, to monitor its own performance and seek citizen and other stakeholder feedback.

Citizen and private sector consultations

The Rwandan government regularly runs mass consultation exercises, most famously the annual National Dialogue and other President-citizen consultations around the country, which receive huge crowds and media coverage. At these events, citizens queue up to tell the President (over the microphone and to the whole crowd) about challenges they have faced, particularly with government delivery, and the President proposes solutions. There is evidence of course correction following such events. For example, following citizens' allegations of corruption in Rwanda's flagship *girinka* ('one cow per poor family') programme, raised at the 7th National Dialogue, 17,000 cows were redistributed.⁸⁰

Regular consultations are also held with more specialist groups of stakeholders. 'Sector Working Groups' bring together stakeholders in Rwanda's key sectors (such as agriculture, education, private sector development, urbanisation and rural settlements) to monitor and inform government programmes. Anyone who knows of the meetings may attend, and the audience usually comprises cross-ministerial policy-makers, donors, researchers, private sector, NGOs, and civil society.

At these meetings, feedback is typically invited and taken seriously: government policies and reports to be discussed there are usually circulated in advance for comments, discussion at the meetings is recorded in official

⁷⁹ See, for example, Schedler, Andreas (2013). *The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism*. Oxford University Press. or Bratton, Michael and van de Walle, Nicholas (1997). *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge University Press.

⁸⁰ Ntambara, Paul (2010). Re-distribution of cows under 'Girinka' program on track – Governor, *The New Times*. Accessible: <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/15541> <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/15541>

minutes, and feedback is integrated into planning where deemed helpful by the line Ministry.

Large private investors also receive dedicated meetings to note their challenges and request policy changes. The Rwanda Development Board holds 'investor meetings' and the Rwanda Revenue Authority provides individual RRA tax advisers, as well as collective meetings, under the Large Taxpayers' Department. These have also led to policy changes.⁸¹

Despite sometimes implementing bold policies with little consultation, the government typically follows up with more serious studies on the impact of their decisions, and has also shown a capacity to learn and course-correct following such feedback; programmes boldly announced are often adjusted in stages.⁸² This suggests that, although restrictions on criticism reduce the depth of popular debate, the government is able to accurately gather information about policy effectiveness where it wishes, and often displays the resilience and self-confidence to course-correct.

A challenge, or opportunity, going forwards is to broaden the capacity and strengthen the mandate of government institutions to receive feedback, and properly evaluate the impacts of social and economic programmes. Feedback that must be communicated in person to the President himself entails an obvious bottleneck.

There are opportunities to strengthen existing institutions, such as Mayors' public meetings, umuganda meetings, investor consultations, and the imihigo process, to improve the flow of feedback and ideas from relevant stakeholders via and to government structures. The government could likewise harness its bold e-governance agenda to mobilise more direct feedback and monitoring from citizens across the country. There also remain opportunities to strengthen evaluation of the impact of policies, to complement the strong checks on implementation achieved by imihigo, audits, ombudsman reports, and so on.

Imihigo Performance Contracts⁸³

Imihigo is a refitting of the traditional Rwandan public vow (historically called imihigo) to honour the community with one's bravery, but also a distinctively modern idea from the performance-based financing models of McKinsey et al. The idea, at its core, is that government authorities sign contracts in which they promise to deliver certain measurable development outcomes.

The initiative was launched in 2006, focused on incentivising local governments to deliver on agreed development targets. District Majors signed

⁸¹ See e.g. Steenbergen, Victor and Javorcik, Beata S. (2017). Analysing the Impact of the Kigali Special Economic Zone on Firm Behaviour, International Growth Centre (IGC) Working Paper. Accessible: <https://www.theigc.org/project/analysing-impact-kigali-special-economic-zone-firm-behaviour/>

⁸² For example, after health insurance was rolled out in 2005, fees were fine-tuned on multiple occasions in response to reports that costs were too onerous for many poorer households, before settling in the current means-tested system. The ban on second hand clothes was first softened with an introductory stage of elevated tariffs. After gorilla permit prices were doubled 'overnight', the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) immediately began to study impacts on demand.

⁸³ Most information comes from field notes, and: Goyal, Radhika, Leaver, Clare, Murray, Sally, Serneels, Pieter and Zeitlin, Andrew (2014). Strengthening Public Sector Performance Contracts, unpublished International Growth Centre (IGC) Rwanda Rapid Response Paper.

contracts with President Kagame himself, and the Ministry of Local Government, and their achievements were followed closely by citizens at lively bi-annual evaluation meetings chaired by the President. Through this system, local officials are held accountable according to their delivery of more centrally-established targets, rather than their communities' direct satisfaction.

Because local officials are mostly selected and de-selected through the imihigo and other central processes, unlike in many countries in the region, senior government figures rarely emerge through strong local support bases. This reduces the likelihood of separate centres of power emerging that could otherwise undermine the cohesion of the regime and upholds centralised control of local officials and activities.

District imihigos showed the model's potential, however there were complaints from districts about how poor performance at the national level was impeding their ability to achieve their targets. Thus, in 2011, the system was extended to central government ministries, and to individual civil servants. Institutional contracts had to reflect national goals (Vision 2020 and the EDPRSs), and employees' goals had to in turn support their Ministry's action plan. Achievement of targets was linked to promotions, annual bonuses, and dismissals, although somewhat weakly, as managers struggled to penalise their staff, and civil servants were careful to select targets they could be sure to achieve.

In 2015, a further reform strengthened the alignment of imihigo with Vision 2020 and EDPRS, and the demandingness of individual targets. There was an impression that employees were setting targets for themselves that were easy to achieve, rather than those most important to delivering priority outcomes. The reform forced Ministries to ensure that the sum of individuals' targets would deliver the overall Ministerial goals (and thus, together, Vision 2020/EDPRSs outcomes). This included the creation of an electronic cross-governmental dashboard to track live progress against each target and identify sources of hold-ups down to the individual level. In addition, the Ministry of Finance's planning department reviews and approves all Ministerial imihigo, to ensure that targets are set appropriately to deliver the national development agenda.

Most recently, imihigos have even been extended to households and private investors. Each household is required to make vows to their village authority, committing to raise their personal development levels. Performance contracts with firms have typically committed them to employment or export targets, in return for government support, such as infrastructure provision.

There remains a risk that external circumstances impede delivery of imihigo targets, or on the other hand, are used as an illegitimate excuse for poor performance. For example, the Ministry of Trade's target to reach 18% export growth is heavily dependent on world commodity prices; nevertheless, this should not grant the Ministry a 'free pass' to under-perform, such as by promoting non-commodity export sectors. A related risk is the 'gaming' of imihigo targets by creating false data. For example, three District mayors (and several more junior local officials) were arrested in 2014-15 after it emerged they had inflated mutuelle enrolment numbers to meet imihigo targets.

Some institutions may not 'game' their scores but use harsh (sometimes illegal) measures to attain them. For instance, again to meet health insurance enrolment targets, local officials have been found to have confiscated livestock, banned entrance to marketplaces, or denied administrative documents to those without insurance. In other cases, local officials took money from a community health-workers' cooperative, or VUP transfers, to pay mutuelle for the population.⁸⁴ Such harsh implementation strategies risk creating resentment among the population and constituting a fragility risk, particularly where practices are seen as supporting

⁸⁴ Chemouni, Benjamin (2016).),

central agendas, rather than constituting ‘corrupt’ practices of local officials.

The most important reform to combat gaming was the introduction of external audits for imihigo performance, by the Institute of Policy Analysis and Research (IPAR-Rwanda). In addition, taking a more flexible approach, institutions like the Strategy and Policy Unit (SPU) in the Office of the Presidency work to identify serious impediments to meeting high-priority national targets, then work with the relevant stakeholders to find solutions. The SPU is constituted by a small team of highly able, trusted, Rwandans, empowered to take a particularly open and frank approach.

The SPU also contributes to informal auditing: for identifying and resolving problems. An illustrative example comes from 2014/15, when to prepare for the National Leadership Retreat, an SPU team visited rural schools, farms, hospitals, and villages, and asked the citizens, nurses, and teachers to explain all the problems they faced with government provision, to a rolling camera. At the following National Leadership Retreat, thematic sessions opened with the video of these complaints, and the responsible Minister was asked to explain themselves.

Law and order

RPF members saw corruption as a factor in Rwanda’s slide into genocide, both for the direct cost to state delivery and for the empowerment of the akazu business elite (social contacts of the former first lady), who led much preparation for the genocide. Likewise, civil service hiring is a prime avenue for patronage, often along ethnic or tribal lines, in many developing countries, so instituting meritocracy was important for the government’s message of equal incorporation into the state.

Instituting meritocracy

Rwanda has introduced rigorous procedures for meritocratic hiring across the civil service. These include ‘blind’ marking of tests, video recording of interviews, public posting of failed and successful candidates, and a channel for appeals. The government also commissioned surveys in 2010 and 2013 to review the implementation and impact of these procedures, reflecting a high degree of scrutiny and seriousness about the reforms.⁸⁵

However, some perceptions of favouritism in hiring appear to remain. Chemouni⁸⁶ notes that the above mentioned 2010 and 2013 government surveys found that:

- no more than 10% of people in each of the ten districts surveyed said there was never favouritism in government hiring;
- only 35% felt the pre-selection process was fair;⁸⁷
- and 37% were not satisfied overall with government hiring procedures (ranging from 30-50% for individual districts).
- Marco Jowell also notes that senior liberation-era figures remain dominant in the military.

Contrasting these perceptions with Rwanda’s unusually transparent hiring and promotional procedures, Chemouni notes that English language requirements could lead to perceptions of favouritism towards the Rwandan families – mostly Tutsi – with strong links in Uganda. Degrees

⁸⁵ Chemouni, Benjamin (2017)..

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ 31% felt these were ‘somewhat fair’ and 34% felt they were ‘not fair’.

are also necessary for most positions, and dedicated grants cover university fees for genocide survivors (in most other cases, students must take 'soft' loans from the Rwanda Education Board). Although this is a small group, the number of university graduates is also small, and this constitutes at least a 'face-value' way genocide survivors may seem more supported in accessing government jobs.

Chemouni also notes that although expertise is a necessary condition for advancement, it is also clearly insufficient, as those seeking to move up the ladder of state must also demonstrate political loyalty. Similar to this last point, regarding the continued dominance of senior RPA-era figures in the military (in 2014), Marco Jowell posits that this has reflected their military dominance, the political respect they receive within the RPF, and some remaining mistrust of combatants who served during the state-sponsored genocide.

In addition, children of some of the most respected liberation-era figures grew up in the diaspora, receiving far superior elite foreign educations, and sometimes holding impressive professional portfolios overseas. These represent a scarce combination of high skill and high trust from current leaders that is much in demand, often leading to their recruitment to influential positions.

Any of these aspects could lead Rwandans from the pre-genocide population, and particularly Hutu, to feel disadvantaged in their access to government positions, despite (or in fact, because of) broadly meritocratic hiring. This is a potential public relations challenge for the government. It is worth noting that, despite 'under-spending' on education overall (12.5% of spending in 2016), Rwanda directs a particularly high share of its education budget to tertiary education. This may reflect a political drive to equalise access to the middle and political classes across ethnic and social lines.

Combatting corruption

The Office of the Auditor General (OAG) and Office of the Ombudsman have been progressively strengthened, to monitor implementation and corruption by government officials and institutions.⁸⁸ The OAG was founded in 1998, when MINECOFIN realised there was no institution to audit the first post-genocide national budget presented to Parliament. Its importance was heightened by the December 26-27 (also 1998) Kicukiro-II meeting of the RPF – a dedicated two-day forum for members to air growing anxiety about corrupt practices within the RPF, and to agree on a way forwards.

Paul Kagame was by then the new party President (and Rwanda's Vice-President), and his most quoted comment from the meeting was that, "if necessary, I will put my boots back on and return to the bush to fight against the akazu". This likened corrupt RPF officials to the pre-genocide business elite that led preparations for the genocide (the akazu). Strong words were coupled with a more modern, technocratic, approach. "Responding to newspapers accusations that he did not respond quickly enough... he explained that his strategy... involved three phases: establishing institutions of accountability and transparency, building awareness of corruption, and then applying severe sanctions, beginning with party members."⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Unless otherwise states, the source for all discussion of the Office of the Auditor General (OAG), in Chemouni, Benjamin (2017).

⁸⁹ Kimonyo, Jean-Paul (2015). <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/190418/>

The OAG's role became most serious after 2003, when the new Constitution awarded it greater authority and independence, and the government recruited a talented auditor-general from the diaspora. The 2003 Constitution also demanded creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, with a mandate to identify injustices by the government, including corruption.

A raft of PFM reforms were necessary to enable the OAG's work. Chemouni reports:

"At the time... there was no bank reconciliation, no cashbooks existed and expenditures were rarely accounted for. The role of the OAG was as much about... teaching public institutions about PFM... The auditor general was instrumental in convincing MINECOFIN that an accountant general was needed... [and] establishing the Institute of Certified Public Accountant of Rwanda (ICPAR)."

In 2009 the Office of the Ombudsman was also strengthened, allowing its agents to act as judicial police in order for anti-corruption investigations to be fully conducted in-house, rather than relying on the under-capacitated and often corrupt national police. The general prosecutor of the time noted that he regularly updated President Kagame on anti-corruption activities, and that Kagame asked him to, "follow corruption wherever it led."

A 2010 Constitutional amendment further raised the profile and pressure of public audits, requiring Parliament to 'examine [the OAG report] and take appropriate actions within six months'. Parliament thus established the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) in 2011, which quickly became one of the most prestigious and high-profile Parliamentary bodies. Chemouni writes:

"[I]t conducted hearings of top officials, open to the public, and often packed with journalists and MPs... covered live by the media... Pretexting illness or a full agenda, some officials tried to avoid the unpleasant exercise. In October 2014, under the repeated attacks of MPs, the National University of Rwanda's Vice Rector for Administration and Finance even cried.

Institutions were established to ensure the OAG's recommendations were implemented, including a dashboard to track progress in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and integration of OAG recommendations in district imihigo performance contracts. Though uncommon, Ministries could penalise staff responsible for accounting errors, such as with temporary salary deductions.

In 2013, the powers of the Ombudsman were completed with a law granting the office powers of prosecution. This had become necessary, partially because of inadequate accounting knowledge in the general judiciary, but particularly because the Ombudsman had faced, and regularly called out, significant corruption within the judiciary itself, leading to resentment and compromising prosecutions.

Institutional overhauls

Reforming institutions gradually can be challenging, due to entrenched interests in the status quo. The RPF has often opted to create entirely new bodies, helping to obviate these difficulties. In other cases, institutions were put through wholesale reforms, including large staff turnover combined with lending the institution a degree of autonomy from more entrenched elements of the state.

For example, the Rwanda Revenue Authority has faced multiple overhauls of staff – firstly in 1997, when it was established to replace an earlier authority,

and again in 2001. On both occasions, everyone had to undergo externally administered competence and integrity examinations. Substantial numbers of staff were replaced. Of the 650 staff it employed in 2006, 90% were under 45; large numbers of young highly-qualified Rwandans are anecdotally common across all high-performing ministries. The RRA was also given considerable managerial autonomy and decent funding to remunerate skilled department managers, enabling it to take decisions on business-like principles and pursue its mandate with reduced interference.

The RRA's procedural and policy innovations, and ultimately the improvements in delivery, make it stand out from more entrenched, traditional, ministries with broader mandates (education, health, agriculture, local government, and so on), in which management reforms have been far less radical, autonomy lower, and remuneration, human capital, and motivation 'drop off' at much higher levels of seniority. Tax revenues rose from 10.3% in 1999 to 15.6% by 2015/16, outpacing far more established regional neighbours such as Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania.

Private sector development


As noted, Rwanda has continued to deliver high growth, far out-stripping pre-genocide levels. The private sector remains nascent however, and public investment has played a substantial role in growth (Figure 11). This raises a sustainability risk if private investment does not soon follow.

Rwanda is arguably progressing through a standard well-trodden path of private sector development, which has included:

- small scale agriculture and informal trading immediately after the genocide;
- larger-scale agriculture and infrastructure projects (often government-led);
- early 'safe' foreign investments (in services like telecoms and hotels, and privatised mines and tea plantations) by the early 2000s;
- and the acceleration of broader foreign direct investment (FDI) since 2006 (particularly since 2011).




Figure 11: High public and low private investment in Rwanda



World Bank, 2015

Figure 12. FDI inward stock as percentage of GDP (EAC Countries, 1994-2016).




Source: UNCTAD data

Growth has been accompanied by poverty reduction and income diversification for the poor, led by a transition out of agriculture to higher (although still low) productivity services for many poor rural citizens (World

Bank, 2016). It has achieved levels of exports to GDP comparable to those in other East African Community (EAC) countries, and exports have also diversified considerably (Figure 13). Major success stories for private sector development include tourism (growing at about 10% per year), coffee value addition, the sectoral shift from farming to services, and cross-border trade to the DRC. Manufacturing remains relatively weak.

Figure 13. Diversification of formal exports from Rwanda, 2004 to 2015
(English, 2016)



Reforms

Rwanda has taken pains to project a welcoming environment for new private investors, developing a strong international reputation and brand. Since 2008, it has climbed from 148th to 41st globally, and 2nd in Africa, on the World Bank Doing Business indicators. This has been achieved through relentlessly targeting the indicators, online and simplified formal processes, and the reduction of input costs, such as regional transport coordination and investments. These efforts have included a nationwide land titling exercise, formally titling almost every plot in the country and instituting simple, formal, and well-publicised methods for transfer of ownership – arguably with important cross-cutting impacts for security and human development.

Rwanda has also focused on developing the professionalism of the investment promotion and facilitation agency, the Rwanda Development Board. Corruption – both petty and institutionalised – has been tenaciously combatted from all angles. Public tendering processes are highly transparent, and often require foreign bidders; institutional accounts are rigorously audited; and those found

guilty of corruption are heavily punished (Behuria, 2015) (Chemouni, 2017). There is no robust evidence of 'corruption' in favour of more state- or party- affiliated firms, and few reports of this by independent business people. Several more independent private firms successfully compete close to the state and party.⁹⁰

Foreign investment

Rwanda has pursued FDI, with a focus on sectors it perceives to be transformative. Special tax incentives are offered for priority sectors including finance, energy, transport, affordable housing and information and communications technology (ICT).⁹¹ The Rwanda Development Board is also charged with supporting and attracting foreign investors, and has been well supported in presenting a professional face to potential investors.

Despite Rwanda's lack of large deposits of gas and oil that dominate FDI in other contexts, inward FDI stocks in GDP grew more than seven-fold from 2006 to 2015, reaching a level above the Sub-Saharan African average. Early FDI centred on the telecommunications and financial services sectors, through 'safer' investments like banks and telecoms networks.⁹² More recently, in identifying textiles as a priority for mass urban job creation, the government has attracted China's C&H Garments with additional (best practice) training subsidies and the higher education sector, to name a few.

Industrial policy

With an improved macroeconomic environment, security, and rehabilitation of infrastructure and factories, several state or party firms were privatised from 2001 onwards. Behuria reports that 31 public companies were privatised between 1997 and 2003, and many more followed (Table 1).

A bold move was seen in the privatisation of the mining sector from 2002: government firm, REDEMI was the sole concession holder in the 1990s, and exported 60% of Rwanda's cassiterite and 65% of its wolfram in 2004. By the end of 2005, it held just two active concessions. By 2013, Rwanda had 170 registered operators and 434 active mine permits. By 2015, two large foreign firms exported 75% of Rwanda's minerals. In 2002, Tri-Star's foreign minerals trading firm, Rwanda Metals, was also sold to a Belgian firm (following controversy over conflict minerals in the DRC), and Rwanda's biggest tin smelter to a European firm.⁹³

⁹⁰ Several foreign banks compete successfully with the Bank of Kigali (in which the government and pension fund have over 50% of shares). Tigo mobile networks is more popular than (formerly) Crystal's MTN Rwanda in many areas. Several coffee washing stations, tea plantations, and mines previously owned by the state have been sold in part or whole to foreign investors under a privatisation drive. Many more examples could be offered. There are also sectors where competition with state or party-affiliated firms is less open. However, however the dairy sector is particularly dominated by Crystal firm Inyange, while Crystal's private security firm, ISCO, are (perhaps more understandably) the only security firm licensed to carry guns.

⁹¹ Steenberg, Victor and Javorcik, Beata S. (2017).

⁹² English, Philip et al. (2016). Raising exports and attracting FDI in Rwanda, Policy brief 38402, International Growth Centre (IGC) Policy Paper. Accessible: <https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/English-et-al-2016-policy-brief.pdf>

⁹³ Behuria, Pritish (2015), "Between Party Capitalism and Market Reforms", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 53,3, Cambridge University Press. Accessible: eprints.lse.ac.uk/64190/

Table 1. Selected firms privatised 2001-2016

Year	Company	Sector	Sold by	Sold to	Reacquired by state/party firm?
2001	SOPYRWA	Pyrethrum	Government	Four domestic businessmen	Horizon, 2006
2001-2	Tin smelting plant	Tin	Government	European firm	
(NMC Metallurgie, later Phoenix)	State, 2017				
2002	Rwanda Metals	Minerals trade (DRC)	Tri-Star	Botswanan firm	No
2004-5	REDEMI				
(6 of their 8 active concessions)	Domestic minerals				
	Government	Several domestic and foreign private investors	No		
2006	CIMERWA	Cement	Government		
(managed by Chinese firm CBMC)	Rwanda Investment Group (RIG)	Most shares sold to BRD, RSSB, Crystal, Horizon (through BMI)			
2007	Kigali Intercontinental and Kivu Sun Hotels	Hotels	Prime Holdings	Serena Group	No
2016	MTN Rwanda	Telecoms	Crystal Ventures		
(final 20%)	MTN Group	No			

Privatisation brought several challenges, with some new private investors failing to make adequate capital investments or suffering weak management. Under its new domestic private investors, SOPYRWA's output (mega tonnes of dried flowers) declined by 85% from 2004 to 2008, while farmers didn't receive payments, and buyers didn't receive their orders. After the company filed for bankruptcy, it was taken over by the army-financed, Horizon Group.

European firm, Phoenix Metals didn't utilise the tin smelter purchased from the government in over 15 years, leading the government to revoke its license in 2017. RIG (already a private investment group with high proximity to the state) had to sell a large number of CIMERWA shares to the Development Bank of Rwanda (BRD), and Building Material Investments Limited (BMI) (a joint venture

of the pension fund, Horizon, and Crystal).⁹⁴

Furthermore, several new state or party-owned firms were started during this period, particularly to invest army savings. In 2007, Military Medical Insurance (MMI) and the main finance institution (Zigama Credit & Savings Society/ZCSS) pooled funds to establish Horizon Group, operating mostly in construction. This was followed by Ngali Holdings (2010) (focused on high-tech engineering solutions) and the Agro-Processing Trust Corporation (of which CSS and MMI assumed control in 2011).

These firms are required to turn a profit, providing finance to uphold military benefits and thus morale. Firms directly owned by state institutions or the party also, typically, have resultant mandates to contribute to the national agenda – particularly breaking into sectors that are new for domestic firms,⁹⁵ revitalising under-performing sectors,⁹⁶ or partnering with foreign investors to ‘bring them in’.

⁹⁷

The government in this period also directly exercised some functions that would be conducted by the private sector in other contexts (such as establishing agro-processing units, like the Mukamira dairy factory; running the Rwanda Convention Bureau – a form of logistics agent; delivering fertiliser; and building houses).

The domestic business elite are encouraged to pool their finances in private investment groups (such as Petrocom and the Rwanda Investment Group). These and more independent business elites are expected to show support for the RPF⁹⁸ and to contribute to extra-tax fundraising, like the Agaciro Development Fund. The domestic business elite do receive some support in return, however. Rwanda’s largest tax-compliant firms are offered personal tax advice by the RRA, can be awarded Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) status to make trading easier, and are celebrated on taxpayers’ day.

Firms face both benefits and regulations. It is something of a ‘catch 22’ that regulation and ‘soft’ demands by the state, plus the higher likelihood of competing entry by state-affiliated or state-supported firms, can deter potential private investors, despite the state’s intention of supporting the sector (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2011). On the other hand, firms in those priority sectors enjoy better political and institutional access to advocate for their needs and gain information on policy shifts.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ For example, Ngali Holdings pursues high-tech engineering and aerospace; NPD-Cotraco (a Crystal construction firm) focuses on technically challenging, major, infrastructure in competition with foreign firms, compared to easier construction markets dominated by domestic firms, such as middle class housing. Some state or party-affiliated firms do continue to operate independently in some well-developed sectors where more independent private sector operators could arguably take over, such as dairy, private security, and furniture.

⁹⁶ As seen in the cases of pyrethrum and mining.

⁹⁷ As seen, for example, in the case of MTN Rwanda, Rutongo and Gatumba mines, the Serena hotels, Rwanda Mountain Tea, several coffee washing stations, and so on.

⁹⁸ Some of the largest domestic investors (e.g. Assinapol Rwigara, Tribert Rujugiro) have eventually faced asset seizures, legal challenges, and even personal flight or disappearance, following political disagreements.

⁹⁹ For example, the Rwanda Development Board (RDB) prevented the planned removal of VAT-exemption for a good used intensively by firms in the Kigali Special Economic Zone, after the firms raised this concern in investor meetings. See Steenbergen, Victor and Javorcik, Beata S. (2017).

Support for SMEs

Efforts to support a domestic private sector that is independent of the state have often placed a focus on small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). Efforts have included:

- an easier corporate and personal tax regime for SMEs (including mobile tax payments and no audit risks);
- an export growth facility, providing cheaper credit and loan guarantees for SMEs with export potential;
- value added tax (VAT) exemption for firms with low turnover;
- a simplified visa and small traders regime with DRC and Burundi (operated by the Rwanda Directorate General of Immigration and Emigration/CEPGL);
- the proliferation of government-directed microfinance banks (savings and credit cooperatives/SACCOs);
- and the construction of modern marketplaces for informal traders.

These strategies have accompanied certain successes, particularly in the flourishing SME cross-border trade, focused on the DRC, which reached 11% of export value in 2015 – as much as minerals, or tea and coffee.¹⁰⁰

However, Rwanda's MSMEs also suffer the burden of stringent standards, which are particularly hard for typical small firms, with low skills and low incomes, to meet. Examples include:

- requirements for much more expensive modern buildings or marketplaces for traders;
- bans on selling on streets, in bus stations, or informal marketplaces (where consumers are concentrated);
- food standards (such as the transition to formal milk bars, a ban on street food, and proposed closure of local butcheries);
- and mandatory licensing for firms in the tourism sector.

The government has no inherent bias against MSMEs – and indeed often tries to help MSMEs overcome hurdles. Regulation stems from a high quality across the board, which is deemed important for Rwandans' self-image and national branding. This consideration is often prioritised over more near-term job creation


¹⁰⁰ Lalui, Armin (2016). Trademark East Africa: "Cross-Border Trade in Services, in MINEACOM (with support from the International Growth Centre/IGC, 2017, Trade and Export Promotion Rwanda, Workshop Report, 14 December 2016, Serena Hotel, Kigali. Accessible: https://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Trade-Workshop-Report_13-01-2017-1.pdf Lalui, A.,

and ensuring access to affordable goods and services for the population, however. If regulations make it too hard for the majority to operate small businesses and afford basic goods and services, this may become a fragility risk, particularly in a context of rapid urbanisation with low formal job creation.

Job creation

Rwanda is facing an unprecedented demographic proportion of young people (a ‘youth bulge’) that will soon graduate to the labour market. This can represent an opportunity or a challenge. In Rwanda, it increasingly resembles a challenge for state fragility, due to the risk of widespread youth unemployment.

Figure 14. Rwanda’s youth bulge¹⁰¹



World Bank, 2014

Mass education has raised hopes for off farm work, but underinvestment in quality mass education means that actual skills and learning¹⁰² fail to prepare most students for anything other than very low-skill off-farm work. For example, students learn and are examined in English from Primary Grade 4, and comprehension tests suggest that at least 80% of students at this level understand effectively nothing they are taught (Figure 15). With Rwanda’s vision of becoming a services-led economy with a low informal sector, basic education is arguably a key aspect of industrial policy under the government’s direct control that has been overlooked.¹⁰³


¹⁰¹ World Bank, ‘Rwanda Economic Update: Harnessing the Demographic Dividend’ (2014).

¹⁰² For example, Education Development Centre/EDC (2016).), Literacy, Language, and Learning Initiative FY13 - Year Two Annual Report, .”USAID. Accessible: https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00JJ8S.pdf.


¹⁰³ The switch to English as the language of instruction was not accompanied by the enormous language training investment required for students and teachers to handle the transition. Rwanda spends 12.5% of its budget on education – low by international standards – and teacher training to support the transition to English has been deprioritised. The latter is emphasised by DfID’s 2017 Annual Review of their ‘Learning for All’ Programme, which notes that UK aid will be cut by £3.5m in 2018, to account for earlier UK aid earmarked for primary education (especially teacher training) that was instead allocated by the government to other sectors.

Figure 15. Reading comprehension questions correctly answered by Rwandan grade 4 primary students (Out of 5).¹⁰⁴

P4 Kinyarwanda



P4 English



Rwanda is also not on a trajectory to deliver the mass low-skilled jobs needed through formal channels, despite efforts. A larger and less constrained informal and MSME sector would normally play a substantial role in delivering the flexible low-skilled jobs now required in rural and urban areas. Unfortunately, as discussed above, there is reticence to fully enable MSMEs to the extent of condoning less orderly, development.

Institutionalising security

Security has continued to provide the foundation for other achievements and serve as a necessary component for the government's domestic legitimization. Building on earlier policies to stabilise the country and extinguish external threats, since 2000 the government has:

- expanded ethnic incorporation,
- strengthened its security architecture,
- upheld the centralisation of political resources and coercive limits on political freedoms (albeit with some signs of relaxation),
- and shifted the army away from interventions in the DRC, towards domestic development activities and foreign peacekeeping.

¹⁰⁴ Education Development Centre/EDC (2016).

Ethnic incorporation

Ethnic incorporation continued in the new millennium. Since the end of the Arusha transition period in 2003, the RPF has been continuously in coalition with several smaller parties. Rwandan cabinets are assiduously ethnically balanced, and there have almost always been senior Hutu military figures in place (e.g. Marcel Gatsinzi, Paul Rwarakabije) (though none currently hold the most important offices).

The local elections of 2001 were explicitly cast as about identifying and incorporating a generation of 'Hutu wise men', and recruited over 100,000 people into positions. This was important for legitimisation in two respects: it continued to demonstrate that limited, but not meaningless, advancement within RPF Rwanda was possible, even for rural Hutus who had served under the previous regime; and it created a party with deep links across the country and Rwanda's sociological divides.

This mass incorporation did not, usually, entail a dilution of the centralised, technocratic, elite control of the development agenda (as discussed above). Elites immediately below the very top of the Constitutional hierarchy (i.e. Cabinet, the Military High Command) are the most visible, and it has therefore been vital that they are visibly representative. However, they do not always represent the core of power.¹⁰⁵

At the local level, strong efforts have been made to improve ties and trust within communities, from a low basis in 1995. Prime examples are found in the village-level initiatives discussed above under *agaciro*. In particular, the monthly community service, *umuganda*, is arguably as much about building trust and community through neighbours working and talking together, and communicating with local leaders, as about the actual infrastructure improvements achieved.

Reforming national security

The RPF completely overhauled the police force with the creation of the Rwandan National Police force in 2000. Much of the overhaul mirrored reforms of more civilian government institutions (like the case of the Rwanda Revenue Authority, discussed below):

- the centralisation of hiring and management,
- the introduction of professional management techniques,
- mandatory training at a national police training school.

However, the police force remained extremely small by international standards – with just 5,800 police officers in Rwanda by 2006.¹⁰⁶

The military was renamed the Rwanda Defence Force/RDF, from the

¹⁰⁵ Within the military, all but three of the top thirty posts in the army in 2010 were occupied by Ugandan-born liberation movement figures – though one of those three exceptions was a highly visible 'top three' general. Post 2010, there was a significant purge of perceived military threats (largely supporters of Kayumba and Karegaya). Source: Fieldnotes. On file with author.

¹⁰⁶ Baker, Bruce, p. 344-366 (2007).

Rwanda Patriotic Army/RPA) in 2003, “to reflect a more corporate and national institution”,¹⁰⁷ and is highly present in Rwandan society:

- soldiers’ work on development projects (particularly during ‘Army Week’),
- the mandatory itorerero military service for school leavers,
- the igando placements of new recruits in their home communities,¹⁰⁸
- military-backed companies like Horizon Group,
- and soldiers’ wider peacetime deployment.

With respect to the latter, soldiers operate regular patrols throughout the country, with many living in camps or their homes in civilian neighbourhoods. This raises the visibility of security structures (a deterrence), while also demonstrating the military’s general good discipline and representativeness. It also means that Rwanda does not have huge garrisons insulated from wider society (in contrast to the standard post-colonial pattern), which precludes the formation of the distinctive military sociology behind almost every African coup of the post-colonial era.¹⁰⁹

The government has also ensured its military are paid on time and receive adequate salaries and perks. All military personnel must have accounts with the dedicated CSS Zigama bank, to which their salaries are paid automatically. MMI was founded in 2005, because many military salaries were too low to qualify for the general civil service health insurance. CSS and MMI finance was pooled and invested in three holding companies, with a wide range of subsidiary companies. Profits fund the insurance and loans offered to military personnel through CSS and MMI.

Therefore, state-affiliated firms have been used to finance essential security structures in a resource-poor environment. Senior military officers are allowed to own firms, approved on a case-by-case basis, and all staff levels can enjoy substantial salary boosts from partaking in peacekeeping operations (discussed below). Finally, promotion within the military is fairly meritocratic, boosting morale and motivation.¹¹⁰

Peacekeeping

Rwanda has arguably used peace-keeping missions to develop and sustain the professionalism (and camaraderie) of the army during peacetime. This is no marginal strategy for the RDF: despite being one of the world’s smallest

¹⁰⁷ Jowell, Marco (2014). “Cohesion through socialization: liberation, tradition and modernity in the forging of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF)”, *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 8.2: 278-293.

¹⁰⁸ Mgbako, Chi (2005).. “Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda”, *Harvard Human Rights Journal* 18. Accessible: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/377/

¹⁰⁹ First, Ruth (1970). *The barrel of a gun : political power in Africa and the coup d’état*, London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press. Accessible: <http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/3622/>

¹¹⁰ Jowell, Marco (2014).

countries, Rwanda is the 6th biggest contributor to UN peace operations – behind only India, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Egypt; in 2017, approximately one in eight Rwandan soldiers (4,200 of 33,000) were assigned to overseas peace operations. This reflects a steady increase in Rwanda's contribution to peacekeeping missions.

Rwanda's peacekeepers have been widely praised for their effectiveness, professionalism, ability to build positive relations with the communities in which they are embedded, and their attention to aspects of peacebuilding beyond conventional military actions (e.g. acting proactively to mainstream gender concerns and address sexual violence). This demonstrates how effectively the army has been professionalised, and is also an important international spill-over of Rwanda's domestic reforms.

Decentralised security structures

With limited resources and a stretched legal infrastructure, the government has mobilised and emphasised local, semi-informal, mechanisms to deal with criminality and other disputes. Citizens are encouraged to first take problems (from theft to land disputes) to village-level security structures.

The most famous has been the gacaca courts. Faced with over 120,000 genocide suspects (and 30,000 prison places) by 2000, a system was devised (implemented from 2004) for the majority of genocide suspects to be 'tried' and assigned penalties by their communities, before re-integration into their villages. After the close of gacaca, annually elected abunzi continue to facilitate mediation and preside over disputes within the village.

Night security patrols are kept by the irondo, lower income members of each village who patrol in return for a set fee from each resident. Such mass mobilisation of civilians to deliver security is testament to the government's high levels of infrastructural power, as well as their capacity to devise innovative solutions to resource constraints.

Violent deterrence

Normative legitimisation strategies ('hearts and mind') have been used in cohort with violent force. From the 1990s to the 2000s, a transition in the use of violence by state structures was orchestrated, highly significant for state fragility. The less controlled, larger-scale, acts of retributational violence against citizens in the post-genocide period brought a substantial risk of continuing the cycle of ethnic violence (as was seen in the popular support to the North West's insurgents). In the 2000s as compared to the immediate post-conflict period, domestic state violence reduced considerably, and became less the result of indiscipline, harder to portray in an ethnic light, and more strategically employed to deter behaviours seen as destabilising to the state project.

All states employ violent force to uphold security and other public goods, and there is serious normative and objective disagreement regarding which forms and degrees of state violence are proportionate, useful, and consistent with proper respect and care for citizens. Aspects of Rwanda's use of violence have received criticism from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and others for lack of due process (such as extrajudicial killings) and/or amounting to torture.

Severe punishments are primarily used to deter deeper existential threats to the government's rule (discussed below). Violent contestation of the state has, in other developing countries, often arisen from the military. Rwanda has taken pains to control risks from within the army, with the use of carrots to raise motivation and commitment (cheap loans, reliable salaries, meritocratic promotion, pride in the military's professionalism, allowing senior officers to own businesses, etc), sticks, and more neutral organisational reforms (like the avoidance of large barracks isolated from society, as discussed above). On 'sticks', Marco Jowell writes:¹¹¹



"Some violations of conduct within the RPA during the 1990s were punished, even with death... Mass integration of former combatants, coupled with the fact that some... may have participated in genocide, meant that establishing draconian monitoring and control measures was essential for the RPF. Even today [2014], the government monitors its military closely for acts of dissent, and reacts mercilessly to those it perceives to be a threat."

Severe punishments have also been used to deter more petty criminality, in a way criticised by human rights advocates.¹¹² As discussed above, resource constraints have precluded implementation of a comprehensive professional police and justice system to deal with criminality, and the low-cost local solutions resorted to (noted above) often entail low-punishment (the obvious case being genocide perpetrators remaining in their communities, doing community service for neighbours whose relatives they killed). More extreme punishment for criminality is deployed narrowly versus informal community justice and diplomacy, but is apparently employed intentionally and semi-publicly, to ensure a meaningful deterrence is nonetheless provided. In some cases, the extent to which more extreme punitive measures have been centrally directed, or result from continued indiscipline, is unclear. The use of more extreme violent force to paper cracks in the ill-resourced justice system indicates that this may be rendered redundant, and averted, given adequate resources to develop a modern justice system to detect and prosecute crime.

Limiting political competition

Political opposition parties were allowed by the 2003 Constitution,¹¹³ and Rwanda runs (multi-party) elections promptly, efficiently, and with levels of insecurity that would be the envy of most African states. This may lay ground for secure more open elections in the future. However, serious political contestation (for example, free competition between political parties or for the presidency)

¹¹¹ Jowell, Marco (2014).

¹¹² Human Rights Watch, 2017. "All Thieves Must be Killed: Extrajudicial killings in Western Rwanda." Human Rights Watch

¹¹³ Which took over at the 2003 expiry of the Arusha Accords, which themselves mandated power sharing.

has not yet been permitted.¹¹⁴

Although by the 2000s, the line between civilians and combatants was far less blurred and the government's legitimacy more secured, experiences from other contexts show that wounds of resentment and mistrust from civil war and genocide can take decades to heal. One risk of open political competition and 'free' speech is that opportunists would again mobilise ethnic divisions to pit a Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority to gain political power – easily leading to renewed violence, a literal 'tyranny of the majority'.

In addition, it remains challenging for the RPF to acknowledge aspects of the historical use of violence (either accidental decentralised, or intentional centralised, cases of violence): on the one hand, this offers a vent to release tensions below the surface, particularly as the government's legitimacy becomes more firmly secured), however, the countervailing risks include that this reignites divisive public discourse, erodes the potency of their rhetoric for domestic legitimation, or raises barriers to donors' support.

Spill-overs: Winding down DRC activities

The Rwandan military's overt involvement in the DRC has been wound down since the early 2000s. Estimates of the size of Rwanda's force in the DRC in 2000-2001 range from 4-8,000 (a government estimate)¹¹⁵ to 25,000 (the International Crisis Group¹¹⁶ and United Nations Panel of Experts),¹¹⁷ and there is wide disagreement on the date of Rwanda's departure:

- post-conflict withdrawal after the Second Congo War. The Rwandan government claims its last military involvement was in 2001;
- 'Rwanda Metals', the key state-connected firm trading Congolese minerals, was sold in 2002;
- the Sun City peace accords were signed in 2005;

¹¹⁴ Former President Bizimungu was arrested in April 2003, after forming a new political party accused of being radically Hutu, and sentenced to fifteen years. In 2010, the deputy leader of the Democratic Green Party was decapitated (though no solid evidence ever aired regarding the killer and motive), and Victoire Ingabire (a Hutu who had organised the diaspora's opposition to the RPF, with advocacy focused on the re-writing of history to reflect 'the truth', with an apparent focus on RPF killings of Hutu) was jailed on a fifteen year sentence of genocide ideology. In 2017, the more independent aspiring candidate for Presidency, Diane Rwigara, had her candidacy rejected, and she and two family members were later arrested, first on tax avoidance charges (which were dropped), and subsequently for inciting insurrection and forgery (of signatures supporting her candidacy). The family's properties were also confiscated.

¹¹⁵ Economist Intelligence Unit (2001). Country Report: Rwanda. Accessible: <https://store.eiu.com/product/country-report/rwanda>

¹¹⁶ International Crisis Group/ICG (2000). Scramble in the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War, in Africa Report No. 26. Accessible: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/scramble-congo-anatomy-ugly-war-26> (International Crisis Group, 2000).

¹¹⁷ United Nations Security Council/UNSC (2001). UNSC Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, (S/2001/357), ReliefWeb. Accessible: [https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/report-panel-experts-illegal-exploitation-natural-resources-and-\(S/2001/357\)](https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/report-panel-experts-illegal-exploitation-natural-resources-and-(S/2001/357)).

- while claims abound that two smaller rebel groups, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and M23 (composed largely of Congolese Tutsi based in North Kivu), were still taking orders from Kigali until approximately 2005¹¹⁸ and 2012, respectively.¹¹⁹ It is a matter of some consensus amongst experts that any involvement has been reducing, and that since 2012 there has been very little direct involvement of the Rwandan military in the DRC.

International donor pressure may explain the trend towards withdrawal: the 2002 sale of Rwanda Metals is widely attributed to international pressure regarding conflict minerals, while aid was temporarily cut in 2012 due to evidence of Rwandan support to M23, to which a reduction in growth to 4.7% against the 8% period average was attributed. In addition, the ex-FAR Rwanda initially attempted to defeat were seriously crippled by the two Congo wars, reducing the need for continued Rwandan involvement, while that involvement had itself intensified anti-Rwandan sentiments among Congolese, raising the risk of more destabilising conflict should this continue.

Despite the lessons and setbacks from these interventionist regional security strategies, Rwanda does continue to face accusations of seeking to influence strategic neighbouring countries beyond formal diplomatic channels. One example is the allegation of support to military training of Burundian refugees following the recent Burundian political crisis. This was denied by the government and never proven, however, the rumours encouraged a step-up in provocations from Burundi.

On the Northern border, Uganda's President Museveni has suffered domestically for claims of acting in Rwanda's interests over Uganda's. Perceptions and resentment of Rwandan interference in the Eastern DRC will take a long time to recede.

¹¹⁸ Author Interview, Senior Belgian Diplomat.

¹¹⁹ The M23 was disbanded in 2012. Key claims regarding Rwanda's links with the M23 rebellion are made in two reports of the Panel of Experts to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)UNSC "Interim report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo," (2012); UNSC, "Addendum to the interim report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2012/348) concerning violations of the arms embargo and sanctions regime by the Government of Rwanda" (2012).

Summary: Lessons and risks

5

Rwanda's rise from extreme fragility in 1994, to one of the top performing countries in Africa for governance, welfare, growth, and security, encourages many to attempt to learn from, and replicate, its success.

Leadership and legitimacy

Rwanda's success is, however, hard to replicate without extremely strong commitment and capacity from the reforming country's senior leadership. A central worry within Rwanda is that the current effectiveness of the state is dependent, in a non-replicable way, upon a Kagame presidency. The mechanisms of state effectiveness thus far have been premised on the commitment and ability of the President to impose stringent but appropriate demands on the rest of the state.

Finding a successor with a similar astuteness of judgement would be challenging, but likely not impossible. However, it seems highly implausible that any successor could enjoy Kagame's level of authority and domestic legitimacy in the country and RPF, to impose such stringent demands on the state, and to determine the limits of acceptable speech and political contestation without greater accusations of illegitimacy.

The RPF and government have built helpful institutions to manage any transfer of leadership. Resources are centralised within the RPF and government, through a dual programme of first, combatting corruption and patronage, and second, shepherding the domestic business elite into state or party-owned holding companies, or pooled private investment groups.

Rwandans have been incorporated into the RPF en masse, and across ethnic lines, also centralising political authority within the party. Thus, future leaders in the medium run are likely to be selected from within the RPF, and leaders put forward by either Kagame or formal RPF structures are likely to be seen as broadly legitimate. Nevertheless, their decisions and authority will inevitably invite greater contestation, which must be handled carefully to avoid either a slide into repression or a destabilising, or ethnic, politics.

Centralising resources

Rwanda's case demonstrates the security logic of keeping private sector profits centralised within state or party institutions in fragile states. In pre-genocide Rwanda, a corrupt business elite close to the first lady (the akazu) used their power to push policies that enriched themselves to the detriment of the rural poor, then to demonize the Tutsi as scapegoats for the resultant economic and social challenges, culminating in the genocide. In post-genocide Rwanda, centralisation of (domestic) private sector resources has deterred – and allowed the party to survive – defections, as defecting elites lose access to resources that might be used to challenge the state.

Keeping private sector resources centralised will be increasingly challenging for Rwanda going forwards. As the private sector grows (and needs to grow) in size and sophistication, it will be harder and less appropriate to keep domestic business elites under a few 'large tent' holding groups. The risk of crowding out more purely private investment, including foreign investment, through state and party-led investments, is also real.

Finally, if business assets and activities continue to be targeted when domestic business owners contest the state, the political-economy 'rules of the game' must be both extremely clear, and not too taxing, for this risk to not seriously reduce the levels of private investment.

Political space

Delivery of development and security, rather than liberal democratic principles and elections, have driven the legitimisation of the RPF and Rwandan state. Fully 'free and fair' elections held too early in Rwanda, before consolidation of the RPF-led process of ethnic reconciliation, could have easily instated a party that again demonised and scapegoated Tutsi. Free speech and media raised a similar risk of ethnically-charged accusations. However, lack of these freedoms has raised epistemic challenges in the government and RPF's ability to identify policy problems.

State effectiveness relies on a tricky balance of both proximity to, and autonomy from, citizens and firms.¹²⁰ A relative autonomy, particularly of the Presidency, in Rwanda has shielded policy-making from parochial interests, enabling implementation of policies with longer term gains and short term costs. On the other hand, deep contact with relevant social groups is an asset for any state to understand priorities, recognise appropriate solutions, and receive feedback to course-correct. Rwanda has attempted to provide the latter epistemic function through the vast data collection and performance evaluation exercises outlined above, often adjusting policy and dismissing officials in response.

Weaknesses in deeper evaluation procedures – to monitor policy impacts and identify solutions to recurring challenges – remain. The overwhelmingly top-down, technocratic, system continues to suffer bottlenecks for feedback, while fear of punitive responses limits the scope of feedback provided (both

¹²⁰ Evans, Peter B. (2012). *Embedded autonomy: States and industrial transformation*, Princeton University Press. Accessible: <https://press.princeton.edu/titles/5690.html>

from citizens to government, and within government 'chains of command'). Although the relative autonomy of the government has in many cases protected against elite capture of the policy agenda, several pro-poor policy priorities have arguably been excessively deprioritised, or mis-handled, as a result of reduced mass versus elite feedback channels. Businesses tend to view Rwanda's power to regulate as a double-edged sword – sometimes creating a stable environment with clear processes, but also directly raising the costs of doing business, preventing exploitation of certain profit opportunities, and changing the rules of the game after the fact of investments.

Managing state violence

One of the most important aspects of Rwanda's recovery was that the post-conflict victors 'took the first step' to break the cycle of ethnic violence. Reforms were instituted to curb and punish RPF reprisal killings, and complicit ex-combatants and civilians were re-integrated as soon as possible. After the extent of ethnic killing, this was arguably remarkable.

The risk of rebellion and the re-ignition of violence cannot be treated with complacency in a post-conflict setting. As well as motivational 'carrots' for the army and broader population, 'sticks' in the form of intelligence and penalties were used heavily in Rwanda, particularly in the army and early post-genocide period. A challenge here is that developing a justice system capable of identifying and penalising-to-deter rebellion, as well as broader criminality, is almost impossible for a resource-poor state, while the need for adequate security measures is heightened; this creates a risk of state violence without due process (or on the other hand, a failure to control the risks of rebellion and criminality).

Donor support to build professional security systems in post-conflict settings may stem both risks, while Rwanda's case underscores the importance of an early and high-level domestic commitment to limit and centralise control of state violence, particularly ending reprisal or ethnically-targeted attacks.

A post-conflict roadmap

Rwanda's immediate priority following the genocide may have been securing its borders and domestic peace, but it also took a longer-term view, with early steps to reform the macro economy and prepare a post-conflict vision of and roadmap for development. Formulation of the post-conflict development agenda was encapsulated by the Ugwiro Consultations and launch of Vision 2020, from 1998-2000.

This process added to the legitimacy of the government, while 'current' delivery was still hampered by institutional and resource constraints. It was also critical for mobilising and effectively channelling donor finance. Once PFM systems were also brought up to speed, donors could get behind a national agenda that was coherent, sufficiently comprehensive, and accepted across much of government and society.

Annex 1:

Conceptual framework for the five dimensions of fragility

6

We frame our analysis around five dimensions of fragility: legitimacy, state effectiveness, private sector development, conflict and security, and resilience. Here we outline the conceptual framework employed for each dimension.

Legitimacy

By 'legitimacy' we are referring to the extent to which the authority of the state is accepted and regarded as legitimate by the overwhelming mass of the population. This contrasts with normative approaches, about what ought to ground state legitimacy (often focused on a social contract, or democratic or liberal principles).

This is also not the same as the popularity of a given government: citizens need not welcome their government with enthusiasm (indeed, they rarely do) to accept the legitimacy of the state's claim to the monopoly of force, and the illegitimacy of extra-systemic challenges to the state structure. This framework is adopted on the basis that 'legitimacy as assent' is the principal form of legitimacy to impact state fragility.

State effectiveness

Effectiveness refers, most simply, to the ability of the state to get things done. As a concept, it is agnostic about what effective state institutions should do: the ability of a state to prosecute a genocide is at least as much a testament to its effectiveness as its ability to deliver universal healthcare. However, a particularly important facet of state effectiveness, regardless of what the state wishes to

do, is its ability to deliver public goods, i.e. commodities or services provided to the entirety of the population without exclusion or rivalry. For example, order is a public good which most states, no matter how repressive, seek to provide.

State effectiveness encompasses the ability of the state to exert influence over society (Mann's 'despotic power' – whereby the state delivers through its own resources), but also through society (Mann's 'infrastructural power' – whereby citizens alter their behaviour in line with state objectives).¹²¹ It can rely both on autonomy and embeddedness:¹²²

- states need to be sufficiently shielded from parochial interests (autonomy) to implement policies with longer term gains and short term costs, or policies imposing costs on the politically influential;
- on the other hand, much state effectiveness relies on deep contact with relevant social groups (embeddedness), for the state to understand priorities, recognise appropriate solutions, receive feedback to course correct, and draw on 'infrastructural power' in delivery.

As such, effectiveness is a trickier concept than is obvious at first glance, encompassing both proximity to and distance from citizens, popularity and the ability to ignore. Effectiveness also needs to be contextualised with reference to the resources available to support given tasks, and the scale of the delivery challenge.

Finally, the connection of state effectiveness to state stability is also non-linear: clearly, effective state institutions are necessary to avoid many of the problems that eventuate instability. However, effective states are also capable of levels of destabilisation that would be impossible for more genteelly shambolic states.

Private sector development

By private sector development, we refer to the 'health' of private firms (such as the range and value of goods and services, and the quality and number of jobs, they create), and the quality of the environment to support this going forwards. Private sector development is important for reducing state fragility due to its capacity to reduce the burden on the state to provide for basic needs, raise the efficiency of allocation, and generate tax revenues for public expenditure.

Nevertheless, public-private sector distinctions are often not precise, whether due to the use of political positions for economic patronage, potent private sector lobbies, or interventionist industrial policy; these nuances are discussed below. Although foreign investment and large-scale production are often key to driving growth and technological upgrading, we are also concerned with informal and MSMEs, for the role these play in delivering goods and services, and creating jobs, in under-developed and low-income markets.

¹²¹ Mann, Michael (1984).. "The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results", *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie/Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie*, Vol. 25, No. 2, Tending the roots: nationalism and populism, Cambridge University Press . Accessible: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23999270>

¹²² Evans, Peter B (2012)..

Many scholars¹²³ argue that the public-private sector distinction is blurred in African states, where political elites often also constitute the business elite, using their political positions to support private investments and networks of economic patronage, which in turn reinforce their political power. In some contexts the line between the private and public sector is blurred by a 'developmental state', which employs directed industrial policy to reach into new sectors and activities, solve coordination problems, and de-risk certain investments. An example is the South Korean government's use of 'chaebols' – conglomerates controlled by politically-connected elites – to realise economic development plans.¹²⁴ Finally, even in developed 'market economies', the largest firms tend to have deep informal relationships with and influence over policy and politicians, through a combination of lobbying, monopoly power, and social networks.

Conflict and security

Our interest in conflict and security encompasses both international and domestic dimensions. Internationally, 'security' entails that the state does not have to sacrifice major interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war.¹²⁵ Domestically, we refer particularly to the monopoly of armed force held by a state within its territory, though with a secondary focus on the security of individuals from violence.¹²⁶ This is an intentionally narrow conceptualisation, in contrast to broader accounts that include societal, economic, or environmental security.¹²⁷ Although these aspects are important, in this analysis they are addressed under other dimensions.

Resilience

Resilience refers to the ability of the state to pre-emptively mitigate risks, and to recover from shocks that occur. It thus encompasses the flexibility of institutions to respond effectively to changing conditions, risks, and information, for the continued survival and flourishing of the state. Assessments of resilience should be contextualised by the magnitude of the state's exposure to threats.

¹²³ I.e. Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal (1999). *Africa works: disorder as political instrument*, International Africa Institute., or Van de Walle, Nicolas (2001). *African economies and the politics of permanent crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge University Press.

¹²⁴ Amsden, Alice (1992).. *Asia's next giant: South Korea and late industrialization*, Oxford University Press.

¹²⁵ Lippmann, Walter (1943).. *US foreign policy: Shield of the republic*, Atlantic/Little, Brown..

¹²⁶ United Nations Development Programme (1994). *Human Development Report 1994*. Accessible: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-1994>

¹²⁷ Buzan, Barry (1983).. *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Wheatsheaf, the University of Michigan. Accessible: https://books.google.co.za/books/about/People_States_and_Fear.html?id=RHPfAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y (1983).

Annex 2: Comparative welfare gains in East Africa

7

Table 2. Comparative development indicators (source: World Development Indicators, unless stated otherwise)

	2000	2014	2000	2014	2000	2014	2000	2014	2000	2014
Gross National Income / GNI per capita (current US\$, Atlas method)	\$240	\$700	\$270	\$670	\$130	\$290	\$300	\$920	\$420	\$1,260
Fertility rate (births per woman)	5.6	4	6.9	5.8	7	5.9	5.7	5.1	5.2	4
Multidimensional poverty (% of population) ¹²⁸	80% (2005)	54%	72% (2006)	70% (2011)	85% (2005)	81% (2010)	65% (2008)	57%	60% (2003)	40%
Poverty (% below the national poverty line)	59%	39%	34%	20% (2012)	67% (2006)	65%	-	28% (2011)	46% (2005)	-
Extreme Poverty (% below the national extreme poverty level) ¹²⁹	40%	16%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)	77%	60%	64%	35% (2012)	84% (1998)	74% (2013)	86%	49% (2011)	22% (1997)	34% (2005)
Median income (\$/day, 2011 PPP) ¹³⁰	-	\$1.6 ¹³¹	-	\$2.5 (2012)	-	\$1.3 (2013)	-	\$2 (2012)	-	\$2.6 (2005)
Gini coefficient	0.49	0.50	0.43	0.41 (2012)	0.42 (1998)	-	0.37	0.38 (2011)	0.46 (1997)	0.49 (2005)

Indicator	Rwanda		Uganda		Burundi		Tanzania		Kenya	
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)	1558	253	524	432 (2011)	620 (2005)	500 (2010)	612 (1996)	530 (2016)	743 (1998)	362
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births)	194.7	43.4	170.1	60.1	151	77.9	131.8	60.9	100.8	53.5
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)	31%	91%	36%	57% (2011)	25%	60% (2010)	36%	61% (2012)	43%	62%
Completion of final primary school grade (% of cohort)	23%	61%	61%	59%	24%	67%	50%	74% (2013)	89% (2004)	104%
Trained teachers in primary schools (% of total)	53%	94%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Youth literacy (% of population aged 15-24)	78%	82% (2012)	81% (2002)	84% (2012)	73%	80%	78% (2002)	86% (2015)	93%	87%

¹²⁸ Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative (OPHI) (2017). Global MPI Data Tables for Winter 2017-2018, Table 7, All Published MPI Results Since 2010, Global MPI Data Tables for 2017. Accessible: <http://www.ophi.org.uk/multidimensional-poverty-index/global-mpi-2017/mpi-data/> OPHI, "Table 7. All Published MPI Results Since 2010" Global MPI Data Tables for 2017 (2017) <http://www.ophi.org.uk/multidimensional-poverty-index/global-mpi-2017/mpi-data/>

¹²⁹ National Institute of Statistics Rwanda (2014). Rwanda Poverty Profile Report: Results of Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey (EICV), Integrated Household Living Conditions Survey 4 (EICV 4). Accessible: <http://www.statistics.gov.rw/publication/rwanda-poverty-profile-report-results-eicv-4>)" (2014)

¹³⁰ Diofasi, Anna and Birds, Nancy (2016). The World Bank's Poverty Statistics Lack Median Income Data, So We Filled In the Gap Ourselves, The Centre for Global Development. Accessible: <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/world-bank-poverty-statistics-lack-median-income-data-so-we-filled-gap-ourselves-download-available>

¹³¹ Author's calculation using PovcalNet. Accessible: <http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/povOnDemand.aspx>

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