Constructing electricity as entitlement: Energy politics in Lahore, Pakistan

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I. Introduction

This study explores the provision of local public goods and their resultant impact on candidate-voter linkages and civic trust in Lahore, Pakistan. The study implements a household survey of over 2000 households in urban Lahore, Kasur and Sheikhupura.

First, this study explores how voters in key constituencies construct the provision of services such as electricity. To what extent does the continued provision of highly subsidized energy determine political support? Using Lahore’s politically competitive landscape, we examine whether protecting energy entitlements results in voters rewarding politicians with favorable ratings. Second, we look at a common impetus for utility reform – the middle class. To what extent are Lahore’s middle and upper-middle classes tolerant of forms of non-payment and electricity theft?

Developing countries engage in utility reforms, including privatization, in response to pressure from middle-income consumers (Weitz-Shapiro 2014, Herrera 2018); they might also be subject to external pressure by international lenders. Alternately, states may seek to implement privatization as a means of seeking patronage from commercial and business elite (Mitchell 2012). Previous work (Haider 2020) has traced the history of privatization in Karachi, Pakistan, as an example of the latter. They have demonstrated the political impacts of this transition to privatized utilities, most prominent the decline in reliance on state institutions, and shifts in engagement with political parties. Pakistan’s other major city, Lahore, provides an important test case for whether citizens continue to make claims to the state for utility provision, and if this model of state-owned service delivery engenders trust in the state and in fellow citizens.

A rich literature on public goods provision suggests that cities like Lahore, that are ethnically homogenous but politically competitive, should receive greater attention from the state vis a vis public goods (Habyarimana et al. 2007). It is less clear whether the state continues to rationalize electricity at the micro-level, prioritizing those who can pay over those who can’t, or whether electoral politics continues to guide service delivery. Second, the role of emerging middle-class constituents in this context is under-theorized; this study aims to examine their preferences and attitudes towards the state and its political and bureaucratic representatives, and towards lower-income groups.

II. Methodology

This project relies on a multi-method approach including qualitative interviews, focus groups, secondary sources, and a representative household survey in Lahore, Pakistan. Qualitative interviews were conducted among journalists, political party representatives, as well as members of the Lahore Electricity Supply Corporation (LESCO).

Focus groups took place in August 2021 in Lahore among 20 residents of Lahore. Focus group locations were chosen based on high and low income localities in Lahore, and one male and one female focus group was engaged. Focus groups were moderated by both one of the authors of this study (Haider) as well as a moderator hired and trained by the Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion (an affiliate of Gallup International in Pakistan, hereafter Gallup).
Qualitative interviews in Lahore took place between December 2021 and May 2022, conducted by an RA hired and trained by Dr. Umair Javed and Dr. Erum Haider. Over 30 interviews were conducted across four representative field sites in the city. The interview subjects included LESCO officials, subdivision officers, linemen and technicians, individuals resident in each of these communities, political party activists and elected representatives at the Union Council level.

Finally, a representative, household survey was administered among 2000 respondents, including a 200 sample pilot and pretest in Lahore. Two embedded experiments were also included in the survey. The survey was carried out by the Pakistan Institute of Public Opinion (an affiliate of Gallup International in Pakistan), a public opinion and research firm. The survey was conducted in Urdu and took approximately 20 minutes to complete. The survey was carried out in the 3 districts of Lahore city in Punjab province. All population estimates used were based on the 2017 Census by PIPO/Gallup Pakistan. 205 sampling locations of census blocks were randomly chosen across the three districts (according to population size). Within each census circle, Gallup selected a random starting point and then conducted a random walk to select the first household. Within each of these sampling units/enumeration areas, ten households were randomly selected. Within each household, the Kish grid method will be used to identify individuals above the age of 18 to interview, making sure to interview an equal number of men and women across the sample. The final dataset was submitted to IGC on October 28th 2022.

III. Background: Theoretical Framework and Survey development

States outsource public service delivery to private actors for a multitude of reasons. These include efficiency gains in revenue collection (Burgess et al. 2020) and an overall improvement in quality of services (McRae 2015, Jordana and Levi-Faur 2005). From the demand side, privatization can be prompted by citizen demands for less political intervention in the provision of goods such as water and electricity (Herrera 2017, Post 2017, Weitz-Shapiro 2014). A competing strand of research suggests that middle income citizens continue to benefit from state patronage at the expense of lower income groups (Holzner 2010).

The ability of politicians to redistribute public goods, by virtue of either their formal power while in office (Chandra 2007) or informal and extra-legal networks (Banerjee et al. 2014), is considered an important dimension of their electoral success. Other studies find that parties retain links with the informal sector to subvert the process of reform and redirect it to their constituents (Murillo 2001, Mahadevan 2020) – in the form of everyday goods and services, or as public sector jobs. In Lahore, mid-level bureaucracies have expanded in the last decade, and postings are important sources of power and leverage for parties (Ali 2018). Parties stand to gain electoral benefits by increasing employment for special interest groups, particularly where margins for victory are narrow (Nooruddin and Simmons 2017). However, there are instances of non-partisan gains, where parties stand to benefit by simply ‘being useful,’ regardless of whether it is to their own voters, or non-loyalists (Bussell 2019, Auerbach 2016, Kruks-Wisner 2018).

Two broad themes emerge from this literature. First, while middle-class segments in certain contexts can push for service delivery reforms that include privatization, elsewhere this same segment continues to resist reforms, despite low quality service delivery. This study will examine whether middle income citizens in Lahore capitalize on their unique position as important voters and constituents, and highly motivated claim-makers, to demand access to bureaucrats and politicians for solutions to quotidian service delivery issues. Second, from the parties’ perspective, while credit claiming for services becomes increasingly difficult, and often is not guarantee of electoral success, it is nevertheless the default option – to back down from widespread provision
would simply be too unpopular. The latter results in a phenomenon of parties coordinating over the rules of engagement in a policy space, since neither the incumbent nor the rival party stand to benefit if electricity is privatized in Punjab. Yet the idea that patronage can enable non-partisan benefits to parties is in principle different to the claim that patronage diminishes voters’ ability to hold leadership accountable.

A recent framing of this phenomenon by Burgess et al. (2020) suggests that the construction of public utilities such as electricity as a right should make society more tolerant of theft. Their study on electricity provision in Bihar, India, suggests that tolerance of non-payment by citizens leads to utility companies under-supplying services. What is less clear is why higher-income citizens continue to tolerate an under-supply of electricity, despite being willing and able to pay for better service, and whether the tolerance of non-payments extends to voters who are not of their income class. Feierherd et al. (2017) examine a case of increased tariffs on the elite in Buenos Aires and suggest that intra-elite levels of payment outweigh concerns for cross-class subsidies. Wealthier individuals should therefore tolerate some increase in cost in favor of redistribution, if it is applied “fairly.” These studies add important dimensions to our understanding of wealth and political patronage in the context of urban service delivery. Pakistan’s highly unequal economic structure provides an opportunity to examine this phenomenon in a low-middle income country where patronage continues to be entrenched, and the middle class continues to rely on the state for access to public goods.

This study examines whether voters prioritize candidates who are pro-reform over those who promise to keep energy provision public, despite its shortcomings. Second, it examines citizen tolerance for theft and non-payment by other citizens. Lahore, Pakistan is an ideal site for exploring this question—unlike Karachi, the largest city in the country, it is relatively ethnically and religiously homogenous. It also is electorally competitive, and receives considerable attention from political parties hoping to control the center electorally. The next section expands on the context of Lahore, and provides details on the provision of the main public good of interest: electricity.

IV. The Context of Service Delivery and Political Preferences in Lahore

Lahore is the provincial capital of Punjab, and the largest urban center in the north of Pakistan. Its proximity to Islamabad by road ensures outsized political influence: many politicians maintain residences in Lahore. The two largest parties in the country currently, the PTI and the PMLN, have their base in Lahore. Politics in Lahore is marked by efforts on behalf of both parties to demonstrate commitments to service delivery; whether it is through road-building, youth programs, or access to electricity and water. An emerging literature on the city notes frequent engagement with voters in between elections (Liaqat, Cheema and Mohmand, 2020), suggesting robust networks of claim-making. In particular, low- and medium-income neighborhoods have dense party worker networks, and individuals frequently call on party workers to address day to day problems of service delivery (Cheema Mohmand Liaqat, 2017). The importance of knowing local Union Council members, politicians and candidates comes up frequently in qualitative interviews: one woman in Chungi Amr Sidhu noted that she and her neighbors show up at a local MNA’s house, often located far from their residence, to demand redressal for prolonged outages, or frequent unscheduled faults in electricity supply.1 For their part, MNAs often hold kutcheris or open forums at their place of residence for precisely this reason – to appear approachable and open to solving voter’s needs (Liaqat, Cheema and Mohmand, 2020).

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1 Haider interview, January 2019. Chungi Amr Sidhu, Lahore.
Despite this seeming open channel of communication between voters and political elite, politicians may not have a good idea of what voters value, especially women (Liaqat et al 2020). Pakistan’s highly unequal economic landscape and strict patriarchal norms frequently result in the very poor and women being marginalized. Political patronage disproportionately favors voters with wealth and access, rewarding petitioners with highly subsidized utilities, jobs in government departments and the ability to navigate a circuitous bureaucracy. For the very poor, relying on political patronage for basic needs erodes any ability to hold parties accountable, or implement meaningful reform (Mohmand, 2019). Even in urban and relatively educated Lahore, women are generally disconnected from politics, with men are gatekeepers (Khan et al, 2022). Women are also disproportionately impacted by electricity outage (Khan 2020).

Voters consider politician’s connections important (Liaqat et al 2019), and members of the National Assembly and Parliamentary Assembly play an important role in providing electricity. At the lowest tier of government, Union Councillors are valued for their connections to parties, and MNA/MPAs are a strong predictor of voter support. One woman described her support for a politician based on the “pull” he had with the incumbent political party.2 The next sections describe electricity provision in Lahore, and the role of political parties and actors.

V. Electricity provision in Lahore – Background and Qualitative Evidence

Electricity in Lahore is provided by the Lahore Electric Supply Corporation (Lesco), a distribution company that purchases electricity from the national grid. Lesco is tasked with distributing electricity to domestic and industrial users in Lahore and surrounding areas. Lesco faces governance challenges with recovering bills from government offices; it also faces up to 6% in commercial losses from non-payments and theft (Lesco Operational Audit Report, 2011). Naqvi (2022) notes a critical contradiction in service delivery in Lahore: despite the distribution company’s relatively low commercial losses, it regularly fails to provide effective services to low-income consumers. Lesco’s neglect of its poorest customers points to a “de facto neoliberalization of the state” (ibid. p. 95).

Electricity in Punjab, and in Lahore, has considerable political salience (Cheema and Liaqat 2017; Javed, Hussain, and Aziz 2021). Lesco has faced the threat of privatization for decades3 and is under considerable pressure to improve bill payments from the national regulator and international lenders. Despite this, the province’s dominant party, the PML-N, has resisted. Over 642 incidences of protests around fuel and energy were documented in Pakistan between 2007 and 2017 (Hossain et al. 2018), with most of the events taking place in Punjab among traders and business owners. Several such protests even took place in Chungi Amr Sidhu, most recently in 2017, when women and men from the neighborhood blocked a major artery in Lahore. Interviews with residents at the time and in 2020 suggests that after their transformer blew out in the summer, Lesco was slow to respond with repairs, leaving the neighborhood without power for days. Party officials from both PML-N and PTI were engaged, the police and Lesco employees were reportedly sympathetic to the protesters. Ultimately, a PML-N politician elected to the Provincial Assembly, Naseer Ahmed, resolved the issue by funding a new transformer for the neighborhood - ‘he paid for it out of his own pocket.’4

The PTI and PMLN are considerably aligned on energy policy. While the PTI recently took to blaming its rival for high electricity costs, it continued to sign agreements with Independent Power

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2 Haider interview, January 2019. Chungi Amr Sidhu, Lahore
3 Reuters, Oct 9th 2019. https://reut.rs/3a7sKzV
4 Haider Interview, Chungi Amr Sidhu, Lahore. February 20th 2020.
Producers (IPPs) during its tenure. Both parties officially operate on platforms of improving state-owned distribution companies, and have resisted calls to privatize the distribution of electricity, even from within their own party. There is little reason to believe that ex-ante, voters of either party would be pro-privatization. This study instead utilizes a “costly” measure of reward or punishment for pro-privatization politicians: voting for someone who is not a preferred candidate.

Lesco does not have an official policy of under-serving neighborhoods where collections are low. At the Federal level, the National Power Policy document issued in 2013 by the Ministry of Water and Power explicitly puts forth a goal to “focus load-shedding (outages) where collections are low” (NPP 2013: 17). One of the observational outcomes of this study is to examine the extent to which Lesco acts on pressures to rationalize service delivery – something that the privatized distribution company in Karachi has demonstrably shown preference for.

VI. Electricity provision in Lahore – Findings from the Survey

One of the key outcomes of this study is that electricity provision in Lahore operates as a state-run bureaucracy. Official reports point to significant revenue shortfalls (Naqvi 2022) and national-level policy commitments assert the need to rationalize the provision of electricity to households that pay for the service (NEPRA 2018). However, the distribution of electricity, measured by outages in the previous week, are fairly uniform across income segments in the city (Figure 1). Unlike Karachi, where significant disparities exist in the provision of electricity depending on the income clusters that consumers are allotted to (Haider 2020), in Lahore the distribution of electricity is much more uniform. For example, the average reported outage in households where income is between PKR 10-30,000 is 4.7 hours; in the highest tier of income in our sample (PKR 50-90,000) it is 4.5 hours.

As with a lot of income data, it is likely that some of the self-reporting on income is very noisy. However, similar patterns are seen when using asset data, which tends to be more accurate (Besley et al, 2005). Another key indication that the income data is relatively accurate is the fact that electricity bills do vary across income groups – intuitively, wealthier individuals consume more and therefore spend more on electricity. This reflects that self-reported income in this study is an accurate measure of wealth.

A final check on wealth and electricity distribution in future work will be to match the sample locations to outage data, which is available from Lesco. This will allow a more complete picture of how outages are targeted – or not – across the city, depending on where the distribution company experiences greater losses. Preliminary results suggest that at least as far as outages are concerned, Lesco does not prioritize high-income neighborhoods over low income ones, and that outages are evenly distributed.

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5 “PTI govt promises cheap power by 2023” Express Tribune, August 15th 2020.
6 In response to technocrats’ proposals to privatize LESCO and Islamabad’s distribution company IESCO, the PTI Prime Minister’s task force reportedly recommended “restructuring” before considering active privatization. (Shahbaz 2019)
As mentioned earlier, it is evident that higher income groups pay more for electricity, likely due to higher consumption. Low income groups report lower monthly electricity bills (Figure 2). The average bill amount amongst the lowest tier of income is Rs. 8,120. In higher income groups, it is Rs. 12,873. This significant discrepancy suggests that billing does accurately reflect the consumption of energy across different income groups. It also suggests that income data for the survey is somewhat accurately reported, with higher income groups having significantly higher levels of utility consumption.

What is worth mentioning is that in Lahore, billing and consumption data reflects progressive energy tariffs in place. The lowest income households spend 4% of their reported monthly income on electricity, whereas the wealthiest households in the sample spend about 18%. At PKR 70,000 monthly income, these households may be considered “upper middle” income, which makes their energy burden of 18% a significant one. So while energy tariffs are progressive in that they benefit very low income groups, the relative burden on upper-middle income households is an important area for future research.

Another dimension of utility payments is the frequency with which individuals can make payments. Lesco’s reported less than 2% non-technical losses in 2017 (NEPRA 2017), however this figure could be more depending on how these losses are measured. In the sample for this study, over 20% of individuals in the lowest income tier reported missing at least one to two months of payment. By comparison, the monthly payment rate was close to 90% in the highest income tiers. These gaps in collection do not seem to be reflected in Lesco’s annual reports and audits, making this study an important avenue for accountability within the service provision of the distribution.
company. Again, given the disparity in monthly payments between different income tiers, it is remarkable that outages continue to be evenly distributed.

![Figure 2: Reported electricity bill in past month by income category, September-October 2022](image)

To what extent is electricity a priority in Lahore? Overall the previous three findings suggests some degree of satisfaction with the status quo. In Karachi, by contrast, electricity is one of the most urgent policy priorities for individuals (Haider 2018). In Lahore, electricity ranks five out of eight potential policy priorities (Figure 3). While men and women have different preferences for healthcare and employment, their ranked mean for electricity is equitable. This suggests that electricity is a shared household concern. Given that this survey took place in peak summer months, it is remarkable that energy concerns in the city were not higher. Instead, given pressures of inflation and the slow recovery from Covid-19 over the past few years, employment and health seemed to feature much more prominently.

Overall, Lahore presents a picture of a metropolitan center that is sheltered from the worst of Pakistan’s energy crisis. Despite increased national energy costs due to the cost of fossil fuel prices in the last year, persistent circular debt and increased tariffs on energy, Lahore’s residents not only report nominal levels of outage, but have also been spared any passing down of energy costs. The city can claim a privileged position in the country’s distributive priorities, by virtue of being both an economic and political hub. These findings reflect the benefit of this privilege even to its poorest citizens, who report a relatively positive relationship with the state bureaucracy.
Given the relatively well-off position of Lahore compared to other cities in the country, it is important to examine *subjective* attitudes towards service delivery and providers. While most people in the sample report going to Lesco with complaints regularly (Figure 4), the satisfaction with response varies (Figure 5). “Excessive” electricity outages and very high bills were generally the most reported complaints among respondents. Nearly sixty percent of the sample reported receiving very high bills. This suggests that individuals are resistant to increased tariffs and attempts by Lesco to stagger electricity provision by imposing rolling blackouts, or loadshedding, that is common to the rest of Pakistan.

As expected, dissatisfaction with Lesco is higher among low income households than it is for higher income households (Figure 5). Preliminary findings suggest that this might be due to low income individuals feeling the burden of higher electricity bills or outages more than higher income communities. Lower income households are less likely to have alternate means of electricity such as a UPS or generator during times of outages, making these outages more keenly felt, even if they are quantitatively the same across income groups.

It is worth noting that political parties are not a focal point for complaint when it comes to electricity issues. Most individuals reported using Lesco. The experimental component of this work, which is forthcoming, sheds light on how households across income groups might use political party representatives and elected officials to address their electricity needs. In particular, the study examines whether voters punish political parties that campaign on an “efficiency” agenda that seeks to rationalize electricity payments, versus ones that assert a “welfare” agenda which protects the use of electricity for low income individuals.
The review of political economy literature presented in previous sections suggests that an important part of policy reform in the energy sector is whether electricity is perceived as a right or a commodity. The findings presented in this study suggest that the structure of service delivery is
perceived as a right and not a commodity in Lahore. While individuals report relative satisfaction with Lesco, the satisfaction is less among low income groups. Next, perceptions of being reprimanded for illegal activities are high (Figure 6). However, when presented a vignette that described a person engaged in illegal activities to secure electricity, over 80% of individuals said that Lesco should show leniency. Unsurprisingly, bribing Lesco officials or “offering them a token” was considered the least likely to get individuals into trouble.

In order to avoid social desirability bias, these statements were framed in the context of vignettes where individuals took part in these activities because they received unfairly high bills. Future studies may explore the extent to which consumers perceive “reprimand,” ranging from an extra fine on their subsequent bill to police or other punitive action. Despite a significant portion of the sample claiming that non-payment of bills would lead to penalties or fines from Lesco, over 20% of the sample among low income residents reported skipping at least one month of bills.

![Figure 6](image.png)

**Figure 6**: “If you took the following actions, do you think you would incur any penalty, fine or additional charges from Lesco or the government?”, September-October 2022

This suggests a crucial nuance in the attitude towards service delivery in Lahore. In general, while quantitative measures of provision such as outages and bill amounts present a relatively good picture, citizens have strong views of entitlements to electricity and service delivery. This is in line with multiple theories of utility entitlements, particularly in contexts where the state has used electricity distribution as a populist instrument of welfare and creating support amongst citizens. Perceptions of electricity provision and entitlements in Lahore should therefore be viewed in contrast to other cities in the country, such as Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta, where citizen-state relations are markedly different from those in Punjab’s political and commercial capital.

As noted previously, this is a first cut of a rich and detailed survey and qualitative dataset. Future iterations of this study will focus on the spatial distribution of electricity in Lahore, using both Lesco’s own data on non-technical losses, as well as political data on electoral outcomes and
party competition. Finally, early analysis of the experimental component of this data suggests a high level of tolerance for theft and non-payment of bills. Future work will identify whether tolerance varies with income background, that is, whether individuals view poor consumers more favorably and with more tolerance than higher income ones. A second strand of experimental analysis will focus on whether politicians who support energy reform are viewed favorably. The findings presented here provide multiple areas for further research.

VII. Policy Implications

Lahore, like other cities in Pakistan, is highly segregated by income inequality. Access to employment, transportation, health and other services varies greatly, depending on geographical residence. In previous years, Pakistan has faced a national electricity crisis, with exacerbating circular debt, increased fuel costs and fuel tariffs, and pressure to rationalize the provision of electricity to domestic consumers. This study makes an important intervention by examining access to energy across income tiers in Lahore. This section sums up the findings of this study and provides policy implications.

1. Energy costs and access are relatively evenly distributed across income groups in the city. Unlike studies done in Karachi, this survey does not indicate vast disparities on electricity distribution, outage or relative costs due to income. While future work needs to be done to explore spatial and other potential factors for variation, initial analysis suggests greater energy parity in Lahore than in other cities in Pakistan.

2. This parity is a direct result of energy providers in both these cities. In Karachi, the private firm K-Electric is responsible for energy distribution and bill collection in the city. In Lahore, Lesco is a state-run entity with professional, state-appointed bureaucrats. This study demonstrates the measurable difference in service delivery priorities for both these institutions.

3. This study shows that the private entity in Karachi is more likely to aggressively pursue pay-for-use policies where low income communities that have more defaulters are likely to get targeted with higher outages. From previous studies, very low income neighborhoods in Karachi experience over 8 hours of outage in the summer. In Lahore, this figure is closer to 5 hours. In contrast, while higher income, low revenue loss neighborhoods in Karachi experience 0-2 hours of outage, even in peak summer months, high income residents in Lahore regularly report 4.5 hours of outage.

4. Taken together, these two factors point to electricity constructed as a right, or part of a series of entitlements in Lahore, compared to a commodity in other cities. Studies conducted in India and elsewhere suggest that this will make it difficult for the state to impose service delivery reforms in cities where citizens enjoy a relatively high rate of service delivery provision. This study and its future iterations seeks to examine the contours of this dilemma: for example, how might voter attitudes towards pro-reform politicians play out in the electoral arena? Can political parties credibly commit to rationalizing electricity provision in Lahore, without facing electoral repercussions?
5. While overall satisfaction with Lesco and its employees is relatively high, low income groups in Lahore feel the burden of high bills and electricity outages more than their wealthier peers. While energy efficiency is likely to be a priority for Pakistan in the coming years, it is crucial to note the relative impact on low income communities. Other work by the PIs has noted the potential for social unrest when energy subsidies are rolled back (Hossain et al 2018). The relative sensitivity to the surveyed sample of price shocks suggests a higher propensity for civic unrest if policymaking shifts towards a pay-to-use model.

6. Another important implication of these findings is the uneven application of the 2013 National Power Policy’s recommendation, that “load-shedding (should) be focused on areas of high theft and low collections as opposed to the current structure of indiscriminate load-shedding.” This policy is much more stringently applied in some cities compared to others. Therefore a national and regional disparity in access to electricity is evident. In order to gain multi-stakeholder support for energy reform, these discrepancies need to be addressed at the national level.

7. The general satisfaction with Lesco, in spite of disparities across income, suggests that state-run bureaucracies are in general more responsive to the needs of consumers than private bureaucracies. On the one hand, Lahore’s poorest residents feel mistreated by Lesco when they seek redressal with high bills and outages. On the other hand, this points to a strong sense of felt citizenship and access to the government. While political parties likely play a part in resolving crises, the state bureaucracy is an important outlet for addressing grievances and complaints.

8. An understanding of perceptions of rights and commodities is critical to energy reform in Pakistan. However, these understandings should be coupled with commitments to environmental justice and equitable access. For example, the dual findings of relatively good provision to low income groups, and a highly mobilized sense of entitlement in Lahore, might pave the way for more diverse forms of energy provisions – decentralized grids and investments in renewable energy to support the demands of the citizens. Efforts should be made to close the national gap in access to energy across cities, and to continue to shield the most vulnerable citizens from inevitable climate and environmental shocks that could lead to social unrest and negative impacts on income and livelihoods.