Integrating rural migrants

Mapping of the city of Quelimane, Mozambique

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IGC

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In brief

The current rapid urbanization of Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to lead to both economic development and political change. How can local leaders integrate rural migrants into labour markets with minimal harm to existing residents? And how does rural-urban migration change political incentives? Using a survey app (*Survey CTO*) and *QGIS* platform, we built a map of the blocks and the living place of internal migrants in the city of Quelimane, Mozambique as part of a larger project aiming to help the city government design policies for the integration of rural migrants.

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1 Introduction

The current rapid urbanization of Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to lead to both economic development and political change. As we observe an increasing inflow of people from rural environments to more developed urban settings, several new challenges arise policy-wise. How can local leaders integrate rural migrants into labour markets with minimal harm to existing residents? And how does rural-urban migration change the political incentives and behaviour of local leaders, existing residents, and migrants themselves? In this project, we built a map of the blocks and the migrants in the city of Quelimane, Mozambique, as part of a larger project aiming at helping the city government design policies and initiatives which facilitate the integration of rural migrants into the city of Quelimane with minimal harm to existing residents.

Quelimane is the capital city of Zambezia's province, experiencing large population growth in recent years, with approximately 440.000 inhabitants in 2021, compared to 390.000 in 2019. The city is divided into 54 neighbourhoods, each composed of around 10 blocks (slightly below 600 in total). Working with the municipality, we collected survey and administrative data on local chiefs, long-term residents, recent migrants, and their still-rural relatives. The maps designed throughout this project will be helpful as a broad organizational tool for administering the city. Indeed, not only did we build a map of the city's blocks – until now inexistent - but we also tracked a large sample of rural migrants (about 2540 households) and residents (about 1127 households) in the city. We also surveyed the city's block leaders (about 540 chiefs). The insights from our broader study will help the local government target social programs, plan infrastructure, and perform other vital tasks to meet the citizens' needs.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the literature on internal migration and urbanization; Section 3 describes the design of our mapping activities; Section 4 describes our first conclusions from our baseline survey; Section 5 concludes.

2 Literature

Africa is currently experiencing a phenomenon unprecedented in world history: rapid urbanization without rapid economic growth ((Gollin, Jedwab, & Vollrath, 2016)). Despite its many challenges, urbanization most likely reduces poverty in the longer term, as agricultural productivity is still particularly low in Sub-Saharan Africa, even relative to other sectors ((Gollin, Lagakos, & Waugh, 2014)). Therefore, small decreases in the costs of migration to rural environments could lead to substantial efficiency improvements in sector allocation and productivity.

Within developing countries, there appear to be large benefits to migrating from the country to the city, both to migrants themselves (Lagakos, 2020; Banerjee, Duflo, & Sharma, 2021; Hamory, Kleemans, Li, & Miguel, 2021); and to future generations (Alesina, Hohmann, Michalopoulos, & Papaioannou, 2021). Growing up in cities appears to increase children's education and earnings in adulthood (Van Maarseveen, 2022b, 2022a, 2021). Why more people don't migrate internally is a puzzle.

Previous studies have examined the role of transportation (Bryan, Chowdhury, & Mobarak, 2014; Ardington, Case, & Hosegood, 2009) and information frictions (Baseler, 2021). In a recent study, ((Batista, Vicente, et al., 2021)), this proposal's PI found that the introduction of mobile money in rural Mozambique increased migration to cities and improved risk-sharing by facilitating remittances. But the literature has typically focused on "push" factors, i.e., providing a migration-inducing intervention at potential migrants' point of origin.[1]

To truly realize the gains from internal migration, it's vital to understand what can be done by city governments themselves – and whether they have incentives to do so.

On the bright side, agglomeration effects appear to be at least as high in the developing world as in the developed world (Chauvin, Glaeser, Ma, & Tobio, 2017; Bryan, Glaeser, & Tsivanidis, 2020) and FDI appears to be attracted to agglomeration (Guimaraes, Figueiredo, & Woodward, 2000). But at the same time, federal contests over political power may also create barriers to urban migration, as authoritarian states may view dense cities as threats to their rule. Cities can lower the cost of collective action, and increase the demand for democracy (Glaeser & Steinberg, 2017; Wallace, 2014), which is especially relevant in flawed democracies, like many in the developing world.

Increased migration may also provoke opposition from certain incumbent city residents (Feler & Henderson, 2011), which dovetails with salient anecdotes about residents opposing new migrants.[2]

Surprisingly, there is very little research on the political economy of urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa. (Davis & Henderson, 2003) associate urbanization with democracy in cross-country regressions. More recent contributions look at urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa from the perspective of pervasive regional and ethnic favouritism ((Hodler & Raschky, 2014; Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel, Morjaria, & Padró i Miquel, 2015)). The typical political impediment to internal migration and urbanization has been the informal structure of land rights in the rural areas of the continent, despite clear opposition of international institutions (see the World Bank report authored by (Byamugisha, 2013)).

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[1]See (?, ?) and (?, ?) for examples of a similar information friction at play in the context of international migration.
[2]There is evidence of Mozambican international migrants in South Africa experiencing discrimination and abuse, for example, (?, ?)

Little is also known in the economics literature about whether and how political preferences of rural migrants change with the experience of migration to cities. Evidence of changes in political preferences due to migration in developing countries focuses on the effects of international migration ((Batista & Vicente, 2011; Docquier, Lodigiani, Rapoport, & Schiff, 2016)). Also, there is little evidence on how local leaders relate to migrants and long-term residents, either inside or outside of urban areas. We expect our broader project to bring important contributions to this matter. The use of intimidation and clientelism is entrenched in many African countries, specifically during election periods ((Collier & Vicente, 2014; Wantchekon, 2003).

Since our migrant integration program will include job matching and professional training, our work also relates to the literature on labour market interventions (at the micro-level) in developing countries (see (McKenzie, 2017) for a review). Helping young job-seekers signal their skills to employers ((Abebe et al., 2021)) or attending a job fair ((Beam, 2016)) has been shown to generate large and persistent improvements in labour market outcomes.

On a final note, measurement of behaviour, specifically, that of citizens and local leaders is often difficult to capture in surveys, where self-reports and perceptions are easily biased, particularly in what comes to political dimensions. Behavioural measurements have been increasingly employed in the context of field experiments: (Casey, Glennerster, & Miguel, 2012) are the first to employ a range of so-called structured community activities, aiming at measuring leader corruption and community mobilization. (Armand, Coutts, Vicente, & Vilela, 2020) extend this range of measurements to include favouritism of local leaders. This proposal takes inspiration from these contributions and includes behavioural measures of leaders on effort, corruption, clientelism and favouritism.

3 Design

As each city block has its local leader, we first had to request their help (and permission) to run this mapping activity. To map the city's blocks, our field team walked around the blocks' perimeter with tablets collecting geo-location points of its' delimitations using a survey app *Survey CTO*. These were later uploaded into *QGIS* to set up the exact maps. This activity was conducted in collaboration with another IGC financed project, authored by Stefan Leeffers and its result is depicted below (Figure 1).

Next, we intended to track where recent migrants live within the city. As recent migrants, we con-

Figure 1: Map of Quelimane's blocks

sidered people born in other Mozambican districts that moved to the city of Quelimane up to eighteen months previous to the beginning of our study. To find them we used our blocks' maps, randomly selecting geo-location coordinates inside each as departing points. Enumerators departed from these points and, following a random walk process, knocked on existing houses and looked for up to eight migrants and two residents. The goal was to get a precise idea of migrant density or, specifically, concentration within each neighbourhood as we took the geo-location of each respondent's house. Then once again, these coordinates were uploaded into *QGIS* and layered on top of the previous map. The final result is depicted below in Figure 2.

This activity allowed us to get a precise image of whether there are accumulation points of migrants - as in many blocks we were not able to find eight people and in others we found more - and, if so, understand the main characteristics of these settlement places. This was core as a baseline activity for our main project, in which we will design and deliver a package with the intent to promote integration of these recently arrived people into the city.

Figure 2: Map of Quelimane's rural migrants

4 Results

This project aims at providing information and analysis on government policies which promote and facilitate the integration of rural migrants into the city. Initial analysis of our baseline data showed that these are mostly young men – 62% of our sample with an average age of 24 years old –, single (60%) and with no children (around 50%). Most were born in Zambezia's province (84%) and moved alone (77.5), in search of a job (about 50%) or to study (approximately 22%), planning to stay for more than a year (around 88%) (3).

Even though most know how to read (64%) (6), about 42% of the sample claim to have only some primary education. Yet, average education was higher than expected, as 21% of the sample reported having completed high school and 2.5% attended university. Surprisingly, approximately 17% of our recently arrived migrants are students. (7).

Nevertheless, most of these migrants end up taking low-pay jobs such as housekeepers/housewives – roughly one-third - or bike taxi drivers – slightly below 10% -, and a striking 22% claim to be unemployed

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(8). On average, our sample reported earning close to 600 meticais per week (around 7.62£) and most do not have any savings (around 65%).

Most of the surveyed migrants end up renting rooms (38%) and sharing them with other people - each migrant lives, on average, with 2 other people (9). Anecdotal evidence suggests that these are usually other migrants. These rooms are mostly located in the most peripheral areas of the city (check Figure 2), where houses are poorly constructed, with low-quality building materials and oftentimes located in vulnerable areas, dramatically more exposed to climate adversities which are so common in this Mozambican city. This project's main goal is to test different measures that can improve their situation.

Despite most not feeling discriminated in the city (about 83%, see table 10) and overall feeling some connection with the city (almost 90%, see table 11), surprisingly, when asked about the greatest adversity of moving to the city approximately 15% of our sample reported it being making friends (12). This clearly illustrates the need for the design of policies that promote integration in the city by, for example, developing their social networks. Another 37% claimed that the greatest adversity is finding a job, which sheds light on the need for investment in job training and developing platforms for job matching.

Regarding politics, around 60.7% of our sample was able to identify the incumbent candidate – Manuel de Araújo – as the city Mayor and 75% claimed to trust him at least a little and 31% trust him a lot (13 and 14). This places the Mayor as a key potential driver of change in the city by improving the living standards of these rural migrants. At the province level, close to 50% of the sample reported trusting the Governor at some level, but only 9% trust him a lot. These numbers slightly increase at the national level, as 56% stated trusting the Mozambican President on some level and 10% claimed to trust him a lot (15). Bearing in mind the challenges of self-reported data, surprisingly approximately 85% of the sampled migrants claimed to have voted both in regional and national elections. Still, it is worth noting that 60% of the sample claimed to badly understand the political issues of the city (16).

5 Conclusion

Tipically, to set up maps a proper topography system is used. This project managed to map Quelimane's blocks and to track local chiefs, migrants and long term residents using a Survey app. Despite its obvious challenges, as far as our knowledge goes this is a novelty and a possible cost-efficient solution for city planning. This is especially relevant in the context of a developing country/city, where budgets and

access to tools are oftentimes limited.

For the larger project, we plan to design an integration package in order to get insights and analyze possible government policies initiatives to promote integration of rural migrants into the city. The package will include an employment matching platform, access and remmitance promotion through mobile money, and social interaction between local residents and rural migrants. Using the maps built in this project, we will randomize this program to different blocks in the city, and collect survey and administrative data up to one year after the program is implemented. We aim at testing whether the intervention improves the socio-economic conditions of migrants without harming those of existing residents, and whether political views shift toward the incumbent. Mobile money and movement data from the network operator will allow assessing the effects of the intervention on remittances and movements to and from rural areas for the migrants in our study, illuminating the wider regional impacts of the program. We will also implement behavioural measures of group resentments, anti-social behaviour, corruption, and clientelism using lab-in-the-field games. We hope this project can shed light on vital but understudied questions about the political economy of urbanization in the developing world.

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6 Tables

	Baseline Sample				
	N	**mean**	**std**	**min**	**max**
Male	2320	.3801724	.4873067	0	2
Age	2298	24.442	8.365	18	99
Children	2290	1.086	1.599	0	11
Household	2231	2.227	2.040	0	12
Weekly Income	1924	566.299	15345.105	0	50.000
Literate	2303	0.652	0.477	0	1

Figure 3: Socio-economic characteristics

	Baseline Sample	
	N	**%**
Study	499	21.509
Turism	3	58.491
Family Problems	28	0.129
Visit Family	53	2.284
Looking for a Job	596	25.690
Work	546	23.534
Stay with the family	543	23.405
War	41	0.388
Other	9	1.767
NA	2	0.862
Total	2320	100.00

Figure 4: Why did you migrate do Quelimane?

	Baseline Sample	
	N	%
Less than 1 week	2	0.086
Up to 1 month	3	0.129
2 - 3 months	5	0.216
Up to 6 months	12	0.517
Up tp 1 year	362	15.603
Up to 3 years	724	31.207
Forever	976	42.069
Doesn't know	235	10.129
Total	2319	99.957

Figure 5: How long do you plan to stay in Quelimane?

	Baseline Sample	
	N	%
Illiterate	802	34.569
Literate	1501	64.698
NA	17	0.733
Total	2320	100.00

Figure 6: Literacy rate

	Baseline Sample		
	N	**%**	**Cum.**
No Schooling	259	11.164	11.165
Incomplete Primary Schooling	714	30.789	41.953
Complete Primary Schooling	229	9.875	51.828
Incomplete Secondary Education	473	20.397	72.225
Complete Secondary Education	503	21.690	93.915
Technical Training	72	3.105	97.02
Professional Training (includes Polytechnic Institutes or Classes for Adults)	12	0.517	97.537
Superior Education	57	2.458	100.00
Total	2319	100.00	-

Figure 7: Education

	Baseline Sample	
	N	%
Unemployed	506	21.810
Domestic Worker	511	22.026
Guard/Private Security	143	6.164
Fisherman	15	0.647
Agriculture	58	2.500
Informal Seller	65	2.802
Bicycle-Taxi Driver	181	7.802
Student	399	17.198
Housewife	232	10.000
Seller at a shop	8	0.345
Worker (Employee)	51	2.198
Worker (Self-employed)	70	3.017
Other unqualified blue-collar worker	7	0.302
Artisan or qualified blue-collar worker	3	0.129
Administration	6	0.259
Supervisor; Manager	1	0.043
Security Forces	4	0.172
Mid-level professional	9	0.388
Superior-level professional	7	0.302
Other	36	1.552
Doesn't know	2	0.086
Refuses	6	0.259
Total	2320	100.000

Figure 8: Current occupation

	Baseline Sample	
	N	%
Doesn't Know	5	0.216
Refuses	4	0.172
Doesn't sleep in Quelimane	11	0.474
Homeless	3	0.129
Owns a house	189	8.147
Rents a house	886	38.19
Lives in the house where he/she works in	12	0.517
Lives in someone else's house but doesn't pay rent	477	20.560
Other	733	31.59
Total	2320	100.00

Figure 9: Where do you live in Quelimane?

	Baseline Sample		
	N	%	Cum.
Never	1935	83.405	83.405
Once a year	38	1.638	85.043
Several times per	107	4.612	89.655
Once a month	72	3.103	92.758
Every 15 days	18	0.776	93.534
Once a week	53	2.284	95.818
Almost every day	43	1.853	97.671
Doesn't Know	50	2.155	99.826
Refuses	4	0.172	100.00
Total	2320	100.00	-

Figure 10: How often do you feel discriminated in the city?

	Baseline Sample		
	N	%	Cum.
No Connection	42	1.810	1.810
Weak Connection	211	9.095	10.905
Moderate Connection	711	30.647	41.552
Strong Connection	566	24.397	65.949
Very strong connection	773	33.319	99.268
Doesn't Know	14	0.603	99.871
Refuses	3	0.129	100.000
Total	2320	100.00	-

Figure 11: Do you feel a connection to the city?

	Baseline Sample	
	N	%
Find a job	850	36.638
Find an accommodation	321	13.836
Make friends	340	14.655
Facing discrimination	61	2.629
Dealing with bureaucracy/administrative problems	30	1.293
Have enough money	334	14.397
Missing the family and friends from home	113	4.871
Enrol children in school	12	0.517
Health Problems	40	1.724
Other	14	3.750
Doesn't Know	118	5.086
Refuses	14	0.603
Total	2320	100.00

Figure 12: What was your main difficulty when moving to the city?

	Baseline Sample	
	N	%
Doesn't Know	878	37.845
Refuses	31	1.336
Manuel de Araújo	1409	60.733
Other	2	0.086
Total	2320	100.00

Figure 13: Do you know who is the Mayor in Quelimane?

	Baseline Sample	
	N	**%**
Doesn't know	254	10.948
Refuses	64	2.759
Doesn't trust at all	238	10.259
Trusta a little	365	15.733
Trusts	677	29.181
Trusts a lot	722	31.121
Total	2320	100.00

Figure 14: Do you trust the Mayor of Quelimane?

	Baseline Sample	
	N	**%**
Doesn't know	195	8.405
Refuses	78	3.362
Doesn't trust at all	743	32.026
Trusta a little	476	20.517
Trusts	601	25.905
Trusts a lot	227	9.784
Total	2320	100.00

Figure 15: Do you trust the President of Mozambique?

	Baseline Sample	
	N	%
Doesn't Know	304	13.103
Refuses	14	0.603
Very Bad	434	18.707
Bad	655	28.233
Neither Good nor Bad	708	30.517
Good	156	6.724
Very Good	49	2.112
Total	2320	100.00

Figure 16: How well do you understand the political problems of Quelimane?