

Kinship pressure and firm-worker matching

Nicholas Swanson



DIRECTED BY



FUNDED BY



CONTENTS

Table of Contents

<i>Executive Summary</i>	3
<i>Introduction</i>	5
<i>Literature Review</i>	6
<i>Methodology</i>	7
Context	7
Experiment Design	8
<i>Results</i>	10
Family pressure increases family hiring	10
Employers and family disagree about the productivity of related workers.....	11
Related workers perform worse than unrelated workers	12
Lower performance stems from a negative match effect	13
<i>Conclusion</i>	15
<i>References</i>	16

Executive Summary

This report investigates why it is that so many businesses in low-and-middle income countries hire employees from family networks. While many economists assume this practice is simply due to difficulties in contract enforcement or information gaps about the abilities of related versus unrelated hires, this report propose and tests a different explanation. The hypothesis of this report is that employers feel social pressure from their families to hire relatives, which can ultimately lead to less effective hiring decisions and lower overall business productivity. By unpacking this phenomenon, the report sheds light on how familial obligations affect not just individual businesses, but also the broader economic landscape.

To investigate this issue, the report utilises two distinct experimental approaches with small enterprises in Zambia. The first study takes place among small urban enterprises, where employers are offered financial support to hire new employees. To understand the impact of social pressure, the businesses are randomised into two groups. In the treatment group, before choosing who to hire, businesses receive a poster stating that in the study, not all businesses have ability to choose who to hire with the subsidy they are given. This poster gives these businesses some “plausible deniability” that they can use to hire outside of the family network without being sanctioned for choosing to do so. The second study occurs in a rural setting and randomises agricultural employers to receive a subsidy either for a related or unrelated worker, to then measure the productivity effects of hiring related as opposed to unrelated workers.

The report has several key findings. The first is that familial pressure matters for hiring choices: in urban areas, when treated employers who have an excuse for hiring outside the family are more likely to do so. Meanwhile, in the rural context, the quantity and quality of work decreases when relatives are hired, suggesting that family ties can lead to performance drawbacks. These results highlight the negative implications of prioritising family for jobs, which not only affects the individual employers but also the overall efficiency and productivity of the workforce in these regions.

This report has several important implications for policy. Frequently promoted active labour market policies are often designed with the assumption that network-based hiring occurs due to a lack of access to external candidates. However, this report presents an alternative perspective, highlighting how familial obligations and social pressures can also drive employers to hire within their networks. This interconnectedness of labour and insurance markets illustrates how family dynamics influence employment decisions. Consequently, this suggests pathways for other policies aimed at enhancing firm productivity. For instance, implementing cash transfers or social insurance programmes that provide a minimal level of support for individuals related to business owners could alleviate social pressure, enabling firms to hire based on merit rather than

familial ties. Such measures could improve hiring practices and strengthen the overall efficiency and resilience of the economy in low- and middle-income countries.

Introduction

In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), hiring practices frequently favour relatives over potentially more productive non-related candidates, a trend that potentially has implications for firm productivity and economic growth. Economists frequently attribute the hiring of unrelated employees to information asymmetries in the labour market or contracting frictions that make it desirable to utilise networks for hiring. Instead, this report suggests that this common practice may also have roots in deeper social dynamics, particularly “kinship pressure”.

Kinship pressure refers to the social expectations and obligations that compel employers to prioritise family members for job opportunities, even when non-relatives may be better qualified. Kinship pressure has been shown to matter meaningfully in other domains, including savings and investment decisions (Squires 2018; Riley 2022) as well as worker labour supply. However, no work has explored yet whether pressure from the family also distorts the hiring decisions of businesses, as well as whether this matters for firm productivity.

Understanding the drivers of such hiring practices are important for determining optimal policies for firm growth. Often, active labour market policies are often designed with the assumption that network-based hiring occurs due to a lack of access to external candidates. However, this report presents an alternative perspective, highlighting how familial obligations and social pressures can also drive employers to hire within their networks. This interconnectedness of labour and insurance markets illustrates how family dynamics influence employment decisions.

Consequently, this suggests pathways for other policies aimed at enhancing firm productivity. For instance, implementing cash transfers or social insurance programmes that provide a minimal level of support for individuals related to business owners could alleviate social pressure, enabling firms to hire based on merit rather than familial ties. Such measures could improve hiring practices and strengthen the overall efficiency and resilience of the economy in low- and middle-income countries.

Literature Review

This report extends the literature in development related to the role of redistributive pressure in distorting investment, savings, and labour supply decisions. A substantial body of experimental research shows that individuals often take costly actions to disguise their income, while heterogeneity in field experiments suggests that new savings technologies have particularly significant effects for those facing redistributive pressure (Dupas & Robinson, 2013; Jakiela & Ozier, 2016; Goldberg, 2017; Squires, 2018; Di Falco et al., 2018; Fiala, 2018; Di Falco et al., 2019; Riley, 2022). However, there is limited field evidence regarding the effects of kinship pressure on dimensions beyond savings and investment, with the exception of a recent study that documents impacts on labour supply (Carranza et al., 2022). This report contributes to this literature by highlighting a new and economically important margin through which such pressure may manifest: hiring choices. It also enacts a field experiment to quantify this pressure and provide an explanation for how such pressure might persist.

This report also engages with the literature on the functioning of labour markets in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) and the existence and microfoundations of frictions within these markets (Breza et al., 2019; Kaur, 2019; Breza et al., 2021). It builds on two recent contributions that emphasise the social and redistributive purposes of work (Hussam et al., 2022; Macchi & Stalder, 2023). This report extends these studies by proposing an alternative mechanism for redistribution through employment and documenting the productivity losses associated with work-related transfers.

Additionally, this report draws from a substantial body of behavioural literature that explores the influence of social pressure and signalling motivations on economic behaviour across various domains (Bursztyn & Jensen, 2015; Bursztyn et al., 2017; DellaVigna et al., 2012; Karing, 2018). It also contributes to the related literature documenting how ambiguity in mappings from actions to outcomes can lead to significant changes in behaviour (Dana et al., 2007). This report applies these insights to an important area and estimates the productivity losses associated with social pressure.

Finally, this report advances a robust behavioural literature that documents how social ties among workers may distort workplace effort and team selection (Bandiera et al., 2005, 2009, 2013). It extends the focus from ties among workers to ties between employers and employees, introducing a potential distortion arising from social ties that has been explored in the context of network-based hiring (Beaman & Magruder, 2012; Beaman, 2016; Pallais & Sands, 2016; Heath, 2018; Chandrasekhar et al., 2020). By integrating these two bodies of literature, this report provides a complementary explanation for certain instances of hiring based on social ties, suggesting that such hiring reflects prevailing social norms, as previously argued by Bertrand and Schoar (2006).

Methodology

Context

This paper investigates both rural and urban employers based in Eastern province Zambia. Some context about both samples is provided below.

Urban Samples

The urban experiments focus on the owners of microenterprises, small, and medium enterprises located in Chipata and Katete, two urban centres in Eastern Province, Zambia.

In these urban settings, worker-firm attachments tend to be relatively short-term. Most employees have a tenure of less than three years, with a significant number staying with a firm for only six months to two years. On average, employees receive a monthly wage of about 600 ZMW (roughly 30 USD at the time of the study).

Interestingly, the cost does not seem to be a major factor in the decision to hire family members versus non-family members; the wages for relatives and non-relatives are generally comparable. However, a notable proportion of relative employees work unpaid, whereas this is less common among non-relatives.

Consistent with prior literature, relatives are particularly likely to be hired for roles that require significant trust. For instance, they are more often employed in management positions, roles involving money, or other trusted capacities. Yet, relatives are also hired for less trust-intensive jobs, suggesting that other factors might influence these hiring decisions.

The most common relatives employed are not immediate family but more extended kin: nephews and cousins are frequently hired, followed by children, brothers, and sisters of the business owners. The types of jobs held by relatives do not significantly vary based on their degree of relation to the employer.

Rural Sample

The rural experiment is centred around farmers in villages near the Chipata district who employ workers for post-harvest tasks, particularly maize shelling.

Maize shelling is a widespread task in these villages, where farmers hire workers to process their maize after harvest. This manual labour involves several steps: dehusking (if necessary), shelling (usually by beating the maize to separate grains from the cob), and cleaning (sifting out debris from the maize).

There are two primary methods for shelling maize: using a bag to beat the maize, which is faster but risks damaging the grains, leading to potential post-harvest losses and lower market prices; and shelling by hand, which is more labour-intensive but tends to yield higher quality maize.

Labour markets for maize shelling operate on short-term contracts, typically lasting only a few days. Hiring relatives is common in this context, with the majority of employers having hired at least one family member for maize shelling tasks in the previous year. Contracts are often arranged a day or two in advance, and the work is typically conducted on the employer's premises.

Most contracts are for half a day, with workers starting in the morning and finishing by lunchtime. Workers are paid either for the duration of the contract or based on the volume of maize shelled, with terms usually negotiated between the employer and the worker, as there is no standard prevailing wage in these villages.

Experiment Design

Treatment Overview - Family Pressure and Hiring Choices

The central hypothesis of this research is that employers face significant social pressure when deciding whom to hire, and that this pressure influences their hiring decisions. To test this, an intervention was designed to offer some employers plausible deniability for not hiring a particular person. The objective was to examine how this ability to make excuses for not hiring someone affects employers' hiring choices.

In the context of this study, employers reported that they would expect to face sanctions from their family if they hired an unrelated candidate when a family member wanted the job. However, if employers could justify their decision by claiming that they had no other choice (e.g., no family members were interested or eligible for the job), they anticipated facing fewer sanctions. Leveraging this norm, some employers were given the ability to tell others that they had "no choice" but to hire someone. The goal was to observe changes in hiring decisions when employers could use this plausible deniability.

In all experiments, the information signaled to others about why a new employee was hired was varied. In the control condition, employers knew that others would learn they had selected the new hire. In the treatment condition, employers could signal that the hired employee might not have been their first choice. To avoid deception, employers in both conditions were sometimes offered the subsidy for their chosen employee, and sometimes not.

Treatment Implementation - Urban Mechanism Experiment

The protocol for the urban experiment was as follows. During the baseline survey, a listing of the employer's relatives was compiled. Employers were informed that they might receive a subsidy to hire either a relative or an unrelated employee and were asked to identify both candidates before a second visit. To verify the relationships, any subsidy implementation required checking the new hire against the initial list of relatives.

During the second visit, employers were told that they would be assigned the subsidy either for their relative, their non-relative, or given the option to choose between the two. Prior to making a decision, employers were assigned to one of two conditions:

- **Control Poster:** This poster stated that the employer received a subsidy for their business and was involved in selecting the hired employee.
- **Plausible Deniability Poster:** This poster conveyed the same information as the Control Poster but added that in many cases, business owners received subsidies for employees chosen by the programme, not necessarily their first choice.

Enumerators explained to businesses how this poster could be used to justify hiring someone and then telling others that this employee was not their choice. Employers' preferences between the related and unrelated employees were then elicited at different subsidy levels to determine a compensating differential. Finally, employers were probabilistically assigned to either the relative subsidy, non-relative subsidy, or allowed to choose at a randomly determined subsidy level.

Treatment Interpretation

In all three experiments, the study aimed to make it easier for some employers to tell others later that they had no choice but to hire the subsidised person. This plausible deniability was designed to reduce social pressure from others, and the study measured how this affected hiring decisions.

Each experiment had its own set of trade-offs. The Urban Field Experiment incorporated a light-touch intervention without mentioning family or relatives, capturing choices in the most naturalistic hiring conditions but without quantifying the associated costs. The Urban Mechanism Experiment provided more detailed information on preferences, albeit through a potentially artificial hiring process. Finally, the Rural Mechanism Experiment measured the returns to hiring, even though the setting's specifics might amplify the artificiality of the plausible deniability conditions compared to natural hiring scenarios.

Treatment Implementation - Rural Mechanism Experiment

In the Rural Mechanism Experiment, a similar implementation was done. After this, many employers were randomly assigned to receive a subsidy for either a related employee or unrelated employee. This randomisation enables a comparison of the average effects of hiring a related or unrelated worker.

The key outcome measure in the urban field experiment is the choice of who to hire at different subsidy levels. In the rural experiment, it is this as well as the measure of worker productivity in maize shelling (quantity shelled and quality of shelling).

Results

Family pressure increases family hiring

Figure 1 shows in the Urban Mechanism experiment how the composition of hiring related workers changes if employers have “plausible deniability” for their hiring decisions. Employers who received the poster giving them an “excuse” for not hiring from the family become 16 percentage points less likely to do so.

Employers in each treatment also change their justifications for hiring workers. With one sample of urban employers, these employers were asked after making their decision why they chose to hire who they did. I then use text analysis tools to extract words from these justifications, and then look at how justifications change depending on whether employers have plausible deniability for their decision.




Figure 1: Treatment effects of plausible deniability on the likelihood of hiring a related employee. Data for this figure comes from the results of the Urban experiment.

Plausible deniability appears to crowd out employees who are hired for redistributive purposes. The likelihood of hiring a worker to “help” them decreases with plausible deniability. By contrast, hiring workers who are “reliable” or “hard(-working)” increases when employers have plausible deniability. To summarize, what this suggests is that some redistributive hiring is not driven by pure altruism, but instead by signalling considerations that change depending on the nature of the signal sent.




Figure 2: Treatment effects of plausible deniability on the likelihood of a particular word being used to justify a hiring decision. Data for this figure comes from the results of the Urban experiment (in Katete, rather than Chipata).

Employers and family disagree about the productivity of related workers

Employers often exhibit reluctance to hire family members as can be seen in Figure 1. One key reason for this hesitance is the belief that related employees might not work as hard as non-relatives because they cannot be easily fired. This concern is evident when eliciting employers' beliefs about whether family members will exert more or less effort compared to unrelated employees. Employers frequently anticipate that family members, secure in their job due to their relationship, will feel less pressure to perform optimally (see Figure 3).

If this is the case why is it that the broader family network pressure relatives to hire unproductive family hires? Partially, it appears that this might be because the family does not recognise that their may not be such a negative match effect between related workers and employers. Figure 3 shows the second order beliefs of employers about the beliefs of their family about the

performance of related workers, and employers tend to believe that their family assumes related workers will work diligently for them. This expectation from the family can create pressure on the employer to hire relatives despite recognising the potential drawbacks in terms of work performance.




Figure 3: Employers’ beliefs about whether related workers work harder, or less for for related versus unrelated employers. The blue bars are employers’ beliefs. The beige bars are the employers’ beliefs about the beliefs of their family. This data is elicited from employers in the urban experiment.

Related workers perform worse than unrelated workers

The second experiment that I run, the rural experiment, enables measurement of the returns to hiring related versus unrelated workers. In this experiment, I randomize employers to a subsidy for either a related or unrelated worker. This design enables measurement of the returns to hiring relatives versus non-relatives.

Overall, Table 1 shows that on average employers who hire relatives appear to receive lower returns compared to those who hire non-relatives. The output produced by relatives is notably lower, and the quality of their work is also inferior. Specifically, relatives on average produce 6.7% less output over the course of the contract period. Additionally, the maize shelled by relatives shows more defects; only 82% of the maize processed by relatives is defect-free compared to 88% for non-relatives.

	Output (kg) (1)	Output (kg) (2)	Wage (ZMW) (3)	Quality (4)
Relative Subsidy	-27.7 (13.9) [0.05]	-26.4 (13.1) [0.04]	0.3 (1.6) [0.84]	-0.06 (0.03) [0.06]
Control Mean	389	389	39	0.88
N	588	588	576	582
Subsidy Day FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Subsidy Amount FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes


Table 1: Performance of related as opposed to unrelated workers in maize shelling. The first two columns measures the amount of maize they shelled The third column is the wage that was paid. The final column is the quality of shelled maize.

Lower performance stems from a negative match effect

This disparity in performance might stem from differences in baseline abilities of the employees or from the dynamics of working for a relative. Analysis of observable characteristics (e.g., education level, age) shows few significant differences, and these characteristics do not explain the differences in returns when incorporated into regression models.

To explore potential unobserved heterogeneity, an additional incentivised shelling task was conducted. Employees were paid based on the amount of maize they shelled, independent of their relationship to the employer. This task revealed no average difference in performance between relatives and non-relatives, suggesting similar baseline productivity levels. The regression analysis confirms no statistically significant difference in productivity under these conditions.

These results imply that the lower returns from hiring relatives are not due to inherent lower abilities but may instead reflect a negative match-specific effect between employees and employers. This effect could be influenced by relational dynamics that undermine productivity when working with kin, highlighting the complex interplay between familial relationships and economic efficiency in hiring practices.



(a) Related and Unrelated Employee Productivity




Figure 4: Performance of related as opposed to unrelated workers in maize shelling. The first column shows the CDF of maize produced when related versus unrelated workers shell in an incentivized task at baseline. The second panel shows output when shelling for the employer during the experiment.

Conclusion

This report investigates whether employers in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) hire family members due to redistributive pressures. This issue is significant as it touches on the core dynamics of labour markets in LMICs, where hiring practices influenced by social and familial obligations can impact productivity and economic growth.

Through several experiments, the report explores how redistributive pressures influence employers' decisions to hire family members. The experiments demonstrate that when employers have plausible deniability for their hiring decisions, they are less likely to choose relatives, indicating that they perceive familial pressure as costly. Additionally, by randomising subsidies for related and unrelated employees, the findings show that hiring relatives leads to lower productivity. This suggests that social pressures associated with familial hiring result in less effective business outcomes.

These findings have important implications for understanding labour markets in LMICs. Active labour market policies aimed at promoting firm growth often assume that network-based hiring occurs due to difficulties in finding external candidates. However, this report highlights that familial obligations play a significant role. Policies designed to address these social pressures could include targeted training programmes, cash transfers, or social insurance schemes providing minimal support for individuals related to business owners. Such measures could reduce the necessity for familial hiring, enabling employers to hire based on productivity, thus improving productivity and economic efficiency.

References

- Akyeampong, E., Bates, R. H., Nunn, N., & Robinson, J. (2014). *Africa's development in historical perspective*. Cambridge University Press.
- Alfonsi, L., Bandiera, O., Bassi, V., Burgess, R., Rasul, I., Sulaiman, M., & Vitali, A. (2020). Tackling youth unemployment: Evidence from a labor market experiment in Uganda. *Econometrica*, 88(6), 2369–2414.
- Ashraf, N., Delfino, A., & Glaeser, E. L. (2019). Rule of law and female entrepreneurship. Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., & Rasul, I. (2005). Social preferences and the response to incentives: Evidence from personnel data. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(3), 917–962.
- Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., & Rasul, I. (2009). Social connections and incentives in the workplace: Evidence from personnel data. *Econometrica*, 77(4), 1047–1094.
- Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., & Rasul, I. (2013). Team incentives: Evidence from a firm level experiment. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 11(5), 1079–1114.
- Beaman, L. (2016). Social networks and the labor market.
- Beaman, L., & Magruder, J. (2012). Who gets the job referral? Evidence from a social networks experiment. *American Economic Review*, 102(7), 3574–3593.
- Beekman, G., Gatto, M., & Nillesen, E. (2015). Family networks and income hiding: Evidence from lab-in-the-field experiments in rural Liberia. *Journal of African Economies*, 24(3), 453–469.
- Bertrand, M., & Schoar, A. (2006). The role of family in family firms. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 20(2), 73–96.
- Bloom, N., Eifert, B., Mahajan, A., McKenzie, D., & Roberts, J. (2013). Does management matter? Evidence from India. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 128(1), 1–51.
- Bold, T., Ghisolfi, S., Nsonzi, F., & Svensson, J. (2022). Market access and quality upgrading: Evidence from four field experiments. *American Economic Review*, 112(8), 2518–2552.
- Boltz, M., Marazyan, K., & Villar, P. (2019). Income hiding and informal redistribution: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Senegal. *Journal of Development Economics*, 137, 78–92.
- Breza, E., Kaur, S., & Krishnaswamy, N. (2019). Coordination without organization: Collective labor supply in decentralized spot markets. Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research.

- Breza, E., Kaur, S., & Shamdasani, Y. (2021). Labor rationing. *American Economic Review*, 111(10), 3184–3224.
- Bursztyn, L., & Jensen, R. (2015). How does peer pressure affect educational investments? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 130(3), 1329–1367.
- Bursztyn, L., & Jensen, R. (2017). Social image and economic behavior in the field: Identifying, understanding, and shaping social pressure. *Annual Review of Economics*, 9, 131–153.
- Bursztyn, L., Fujiwara, T., & Pallais, A. (2017). "Acting wife": Marriage market incentives and labor market investments. *American Economic Review*, 107(11), 3288–3319.
- Carranza, E., Donald, A., Grosset, F., & Kaur, S. (2022). The social tax: Redistributive pressure and labor supply. Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Chandrasekhar, A. G., Morten, M., & Peter, A. (2020). Network-based hiring: Local benefits; Global costs. Technical Report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Dana, J., Weber, R. A., & Xi Kuang, J. (2007). Exploiting moral wiggle room: Experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness. *Economic Theory*, 33, 67–80.
- DellaVigna, S., List, J. A., & Malmendier, U. (2012). Testing for altruism and social pressure in charitable giving. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 127(1), 1–56.
- Dupas, P., & Robinson, J. (2013). Savings constraints and microenterprise development: Evidence from a field experiment in Kenya. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 5(1), 163–192.
- Di Falco, S., Feri, F., Pin, P., & Vollenweider, X. (2018). Ties that bind: Network redistributive pressure and economic decisions in village economies. *Journal of Development Economics*, 131, 123–131.
- Di Falco, S., Lokina, R., Martinsson, P., & Pin, P. (2019). Altruism and the pressure to share: Lab evidence from Tanzania. *Plos one*, 14(5), e0212747.
- Fiala, N. (2018). Returns to microcredit, cash grants and training for male and female microentrepreneurs in Uganda. *World Development*, 105, 189–200.
- Goldberg, J. (2017). The effect of social pressure on expenditures in Malawi. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 143, 173–185.
- Heath, R. (2018). Why do firms hire using referrals? Evidence from Bangladeshi garment factories. *Journal of Political Economy*, 126(4), 1691–1746.
- Hodges, R. J., & Chatham Maritime. (2012). Postharvest quality losses of cereal grains in Sub-Saharan Africa. *African Postharvest Losses Information System*, 22.

- Hodges, R. J., & Chatham Maritime. (2012). Postharvest weight losses of cereal grains in Sub-Saharan Africa. Natural Resources Institute, University of Greenwich, 24.
- Hussam, R., Kelley, E. M., Lane, G., & Zahra, F. (2022). The psychosocial value of employment: Evidence from a refugee camp. *American Economic Review*, 112(11), 3694–3724.
- Jakiela, P., & Ozier, O. (2016). Does Africa need a rotten kin theorem? Experimental evidence from village economies. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 83(1), 231–268.
- Jayachandran, S. (2021). Microentrepreneurship in developing countries. *Handbook of Labor, Human Resources, and Population Economics*, 1–31.
- Karing, A. (2018). Social signaling and childhood immunization: A field experiment in Sierra Leone. University of California, Berkeley, 2.
- Kaur, S. (2019). Nominal wage rigidity in village labor markets. *American Economic Review*, 109(10), 3585–3616.
- Lazear, E. P., Malmendier, U., & Weber, R. A. (2012). Sorting in experiments with application to social preferences. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 4(1), 136–163.
- Macchi, E., & Stalder, J. (2023). Work rather than just cash: Informal redistribution among employers and workers in Kampala, Uganda.
- McKenzie, D. (2017). How effective are active labor market policies in developing countries? A critical review of recent evidence. *The World Bank Research Observer*, 32(2), 127–154.
- De Mel, S., McKenzie, D., & Woodruff, C. (2019). Labor drops: Experimental evidence on the return to additional labor in microenterprises. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 11(1), 202–235.
- Nsubuga, D., Kabenge, I., Zziwa, A., Kiggundu, N., Wanyama, J., & Banadda, N. (2021). Improving maize shelling operation using motorized mobile shellers: A step towards reducing postharvest losses in low developing countries. In *Maize Genetic Resources—Breeding Strategies and Recent Advances*. IntechOpen.
- Pallais, A., & Sands, E. G. (2016). Why the referential treatment? Evidence from field experiments on referrals. *Journal of Political Economy*, 124(6), 1793–1828.
- Riley, E. (2022). Resisting social pressure in the household using mobile money: Experimental evidence on microenterprise investment in Uganda.
- Squires, M. (2018). Kinship taxation as an impediment to growth: Experimental evidence from Kenyan microenterprises. London: DfID Working Paper.

IGC

theigc.org
