

Working from home in Jordan: Adoption and implications

Cevat Giray Aksoy
Nick Bloom



DIRECTED BY



FUNDED BY



Working from Home in Jordan: Adoption and Implications*

Cevat Giray Aksoy

Nick Bloom

EBRD and King's College London

Stanford University

Abstract

This report studies post-pandemic remote work in Jordan using the Jordan wave of the Global Survey of Working Arrangements, an internationally harmonized online survey of full-time, college-educated workers. Jordan records 1.3 WFH days in the survey week, slightly above the global average (1.2) and above the Asia mean (0.6). Desired WFH one year ahead is 2.9 days, implying a 1.6-day preference gap. Working from home saves 67 minutes per day on average; workers allocate 35% of this time to paid work, 24% to leisure, and 12% to caregiving. We discuss the broader implications of these patterns and highlight practical priorities for sustaining and scaling effective hybrid work.

*The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) or any other institution. We are grateful to the International Growth Centre for funding and to the IGC team, especially Ghina Kheir and Salma Shaheenm, for their support throughout the project. We also thank Aditya Pal for outstanding research assistance.

1 Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic triggered a rapid reallocation of where work is done. Within weeks, many firms moved large shares of their workforce out of offices and into remote settings, causing an unprecedented disruption across workers and occupations (Bartik et al., 2020; Aksoy et al., 2022). In the United States and several other high- and middle-income countries, survey and administrative evidence shows that working from home (WFH) surged in the early months of the pandemic and then stabilized at levels far above its pre-2020 baseline (Barrero et al., 2021; Aksoy et al., 2025a). No other episode in modern history has produced such a pronounced and widespread shift in working arrangements over such a short period. By comparison, the shift from farms and craft production to factory work during the Industrial Revolution unfolded over roughly two centuries, and the ongoing transition from manufacturing and other goods production to services has taken decades. Even when these earlier transitions implied large changes in skill requirements and business operations, their gradual pace allowed substantially more time for adjustment.

Yet despite the scale of this reallocation, we still know relatively little about how remote work has been adopted in emerging economies, including Jordan, and what it implies for their labor markets. A key reason is data: until recently, detailed and comparable cross-country evidence on remote-work adoption and preferences has been scarce. Filling this gap matters because remote work has wide-ranging consequences for workers, firms, and economies. Its productivity effects are not uniform—positive in some settings (Bloom et al., 2015; Choudhury et al., 2021; Aksoy et al., 2025b), but negative in others (Gibbs et al., 2023; Emanuel and Harrington, 2024). Remote work can also reshape who participates in the labor market and where jobs are performed by expanding access to flexibility that workers value (Mas and Pallais, 2017) and easing constraints for demographic groups that face barriers in conventional workplace arrangements, including workers with disabilities (Bloom et al., 2024) and women (Ho et al., 2024; Aksoy et al., 2025b). Beyond the workplace, remote work is altering urban economies through changes in commuting, consumption patterns, and demand for residential

and commercial real estate (Delventhal et al., 2023; Gupta et al., 2024; Ramani et al., 2024).

This report provides new evidence on remote-work adoption in Jordan. We do so by fielding the Jordan wave of the Global Survey of Working Arrangements (G-SWA), a recurring and internationally harmonized survey designed to measure remote-work adoption and preferences using a common instrument. G-SWA Jordan covers full-time, college-educated workers, with samples stratified by gender, age, and education. Using these data, we document the level and persistence of post-pandemic remote work and benchmark Jordan against a broad set of countries.

We structure the analysis around five questions. First, how prevalent is WFH in Jordan in the post-pandemic period, and where does Jordan sit in the global distribution? Second, are hybrid schedules, in which workers split time between home and the workplace, more common among parents? Third, do workers want more WFH than firms currently offer? Fourth, how much time do workers save when working from home, and how is that time reallocated across paid work, leisure, and caregiving? Fifth, what do these patterns imply for labor-market outcomes and policy priorities as remote and hybrid work become more permanent features of work in Jordan?

We find that full-time workers in Jordan averages 1.3 WFH days in the survey week, which is slightly above the global mean (1.2) and far above the Asia mean (0.6). At the same time, a large minority do no remote work at all: 42.6–47.0% report zero WFH days, depending on parenting status. Parenting is associated more with hybrid schedules than fully remote work: compared with non-parents, parents are more concentrated at 2–3 WFH days (22.1% vs 18.9% at 2 days; 11.3% vs 7.6% at 3 days) but less likely to be fully remote (3.4% vs 7.6% at 5+ days). Gender differences in current WFH levels are modest (men 1.17 vs women 1.38; $p=0.132$), but among women, those without children report substantially more WFH than mothers (1.82 vs 1.26; $p=0.044$). Looking one year ahead, desired WFH in Jordan is 2.9 days (global 2.6), implying a large preference gap of 1.6 days relative to current WFH. Finally, WFH yields sizable commute-time savings in Jordan (67 minutes per WFH day, near

the global average of 68), and these minutes are reallocated primarily to paid work (35%) and leisure (24%), with a meaningful share to caregiving (12%); finally, having children is associated with about 5.2 additional minutes of caregiving time from the saved commute.

The survey is administered online, which raises familiar representativeness concerns. Participation in online surveys is not random: it tends to skew toward people with reliable internet access, greater digital familiarity, and more time or willingness to complete web-based questionnaires (attributes that are correlated with education, income, occupation, and, importantly, the feasibility of working remotely). In addition, most online panels are built from opt-in recruitment rather than probability-based sampling, so selection into the panel can differ systematically from selection into the broader population ([Stantcheva, 2021](#); [Aksoy et al., 2022, 2025c](#)). At the same time, because remote work itself typically requires stable connectivity and basic digital skills, an online instrument may still provide informative coverage of the segment of workers most directly relevant for measuring remote-work adoption. Overall, our estimates are most informative about full-time, relatively digitally connected workers rather than the entire workforce in Jordan or elsewhere.

The remainder of the report describes the G-SWA design and measurement, presents evidence on remote-work adoption and preferences with a focus on Jordan, and concludes by discussing labor-market implications in light of our own research and related findings from the broader literature.

2 The Global Survey of Working Arrangements (G-SWA)

The Global Survey of Working Arrangements (G-SWA) is an online, internationally harmonized survey that measures work-from-home practices and preferences using a common questionnaire across countries. The core G-SWA sample covers full-time workers ages 20–59 who have completed primary school and spans a range of high- and middle-income economies.

Alongside standard information on demographics, employment, earnings, industry and occupation, and household circumstances (including marital status and living arrangements), the survey collects detailed measures of: (i) current WFH intensity, (ii) perceptions and experiences of remote work, (iii) willingness to pay for the option to work remotely, and (iv) commuting time, among other outcomes. The questionnaire is adapted from the U.S. Survey of Working Arrangements and Attitudes (SWAA) developed by [Barrero et al. \(2021\)](#).

To maximize comparability across settings, we field a standardized English-language questionnaire that is professionally translated into the major languages of each country. Translations are then independently reviewed by a third party familiar with the instrument, and revised as needed.¹

Fielding and recruitment. We field the survey in partnership with a professional survey firm and external platforms. Respondents are recruited through multiple channels (including online panels, affiliate networks, online advertising, and referrals), with panels continuously refreshed to maintain coverage. Prospective participants receive an invitation that states the expected completion time and compensation, but the survey topic is not disclosed at the outset. Respondents who complete the questionnaire are compensated according to the provider’s standard scheme (e.g., cash, vouchers, or points that can be redeemed or donated).²

Survey waves and sample construction. The survey was fielded in 2025. Before analysis, we apply standard data-quality screens. In particular, we drop “speeders” (respondents in the bottom 5% of the country-specific completion-time distribution) and respondents who fail an attention-check question embedded in the questionnaire.

Although the survey firm aims for broad balance on basic dimensions (such as age, gender, education and income), the resulting G-SWA samples are not designed to be nationally

¹The baseline G-SWA survey instruments used in the early waves are available at https://wfhresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/G-SWA_Wave1.pdf and https://wfhresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/G-SWA_Wave2.pdf.

²This approach reflects two practical realities. First, online panels are now widely used in academic research to measure preferences, attitudes, and perceptions, and to run survey experiments. Second, the commercial market for panel-based online surveying has expanded rapidly in recent years, enabling the collection of comparable data at scale.

representative of country workforces or working-age populations. As discussed above, participation requires access to an internet-connected device and the ability to complete an online questionnaire, and online panels often tilt toward more educated respondents, particularly in Jordan and other emerging countries.

3 Main Findings

Levels: WFH in Jordan vs. the world

Figure 1 reports the mean number of days worked from home in the survey week among college-educated, full-time workers in all countries. Jordan stands slightly above the full-sample average: it records 1.3 WFH days per week versus an overall average of 1.2. Within regions, Jordan is markedly higher than the Asia regional mean of 0.6, and it is comparable to (or higher than) many European values clustered around 1–1.5 days.

The figure also illustrates the broader cross-country dispersion emphasized in [Aksoy et al. \(2022\)](#): even within a relatively comparable group (college-educated full-time workers), WFH varies widely. Within Asia, for example, Jordan’s 1.3 days is well above China (0.6) and South Korea (0.5), close to Singapore (1.2) and Thailand (1.1), and below India (1.6).

Figure 2 asks whether family responsibilities map into different WFH patterns, a core theme in the remote-work literature given the value of flexibility and the uneven incidence of caregiving ([Mas and Pallais, 2017](#); [Wiswall and Zafar, 2018](#); [He et al., 2021](#)).

Globally, average WFH levels differ only modestly by parenting status: for men, WFH averages 1.33 (no children) vs. 1.27 (has children), with $p = 0.119$; for women, 1.31 vs. 1.28, with $p = 0.484$.

In Jordan, the share reporting zero WFH days is 47.0% among those without children and 42.6% among those with children. Parents are relatively more concentrated in hybrid values: for example, 2 WFH days is 18.9% (no children) versus 22.1% (has children), and 3 WFH

days is 7.6% versus 11.3%. At the top end, fully-remote work (5+ days) is 7.6% for those without children but only 3.4% for those with children. This distributional decomposition matters because mean differences can mask offsetting movements across the margin of “some WFH” versus “fully remote.” Here, parenting status in Jordan is associated with a shift toward intermediate (hybrid) schedules rather than an increased likelihood of fully remote work.

Figure 3 evaluates whether men and women differ systematically in WFH intensity. For Jordan, men average 1.17 WFH days and women 1.38, with a reported $p = 0.132$. This implies a 0.21 day gap in levels, but the figure indicates it is not statistically distinguishable at conventional thresholds.

Cross-region comparisons show that gender gaps are not uniform. Europe, for instance, shows men at 1.25 and women at 1.16 ($p = 0.025$), while Asia shows a small reverse pattern (men 1.06, women 1.11; $p = 0.305$). Including this figure serves two purposes: it clarifies whether Jordan’s WFH level is “balanced” across genders and it situates Jordan’s gender gap relative to regional patterns that may reflect institutional, occupational, or cultural differences.

Preferences: desired WFH in Jordan vs. the world

A recurring finding in the broader G-SWA work is that preferences often exceed realized remote-work levels, implying scope for continued adjustment in employer policies and worker sorting (Aksoy et al., 2022; Barrero et al., 2021).

Looking at Figure 4, desired WFH is high for both genders and differs more clearly for women by parenting status in the global sample. For men, desired WFH is 2.61 days (no children) versus 2.57 (has children), with $p = 0.297$. For women, desired WFH rises from 2.53 (no children) to 2.64 (has children), and the difference is statistically significant ($p = 0.009$).

In Jordan, desired WFH levels are higher overall than the global values shown in the

top panel. Men report 2.88 days (no children) vs. 2.77 (has children), $p = 0.606$; women report 2.82 (no children) vs. 3.07 (has children), $p = 0.390$. Thus, the Jordan point estimates suggest higher desired WFH for mothers (a 0.25 day difference), but the figure indicates this gap is not statistically distinguishable in the Jordan sample.

Figure 5 places Jordan’s desired WFH intensity into the full cross-country distribution. The overall average desired level is 2.6 days, while Jordan is at 2.9—above the global mean and well above the Asia regional mean of 2.3. Jordan’s 2.9 is comparable to the United States (2.9) and Ireland (2.9), slightly above the United Kingdom (2.8), and below the highest values such as Brazil (3.4) and the Philippines (3.4).

Taken together with Figure 1, the findings imply a large “preference gap” in Jordan: current WFH is 1.3 days, while desired WFH is 2.9 days, a difference of 1.6 days. The analogous global gap is 1.4 days. This gap signals latent demand for additional remote work and helps motivate later discussion of organizational constraints, job design, and the potential role of policy in easing frictions.

Commute time savings and how they are used

The time-savings margin is central in the the context of remote work as daily time savings from WFH can be large on and reallocated across market work, leisure, and caregiving. Tables 1–3 present detailed analysis on commute time savings with cross-country benchmarking and Jordan-specific detail.

Table 1 reports *country-level conditional means* for daily time savings when working from home and the percentage allocation of those savings, controlling for gender, age groups, and education (and treating the raw U.S. mean as the baseline). Jordan’s daily time savings is 67 minutes, essentially at the cross-country average of 68 minutes. This places Jordan below very high-commute settings such as India (102) and Nigeria (97), but above low-commute settings such as Vietnam (45) and Greece (53).

In terms of allocation, Jordan devotes 35% of time savings to primary/secondary jobs, 24% to leisure, and 12% to caregiving. The corresponding cross-country averages are 35% (jobs), 24% (leisure), and 10% (caregiving). Thus, Jordan looks close to the global profile, with a slightly higher caregiving share than the pooled average. This pattern is consistent with the idea that avoided commuting can ease time constraints for households with caregiving demands (Aksoy et al., 2023).

Table 2 focuses on Jordan and reports unconditional mean daily commute time savings (in minutes) for full-time workers who worked mainly from home at some point during the pandemic (baseline is 2019 commute). For the full sample, men save 70 minutes per WFH day, compared to 58 minutes for women. Savings rise with education: among men with tertiary education, savings are 79 minutes (women: 62), while among those with primary/secondary education they are 59 (women: 53).

There is also meaningful variation across age groups. For example, men aged 40–49 save 81 minutes while women aged 40–49 save 57 minutes. Marital status and children are associated with relatively small differences in mean savings: men with children save 69 minutes (women: 58), compared to 72 minutes for men without children (women: 59). These patterns suggest that (i) the commute-time mechanism is quantitatively important in Jordan and (ii) its magnitude is heterogeneous across groups, which helps interpret differences in WFH preferences and the welfare relevance of remote-work policies.

Table 3 estimates how the allocation of time savings varies with observable characteristics in Jordan. The dependent variables are minutes of saved time devoted to (1) jobs, (2) leisure, and (3) caregiving. The dependent-variable means are 23.70 minutes (jobs), 14.69 (leisure), and 8.00 (caregiving).

Education is strongly related to allocating more saved time to market work and leisure. Relative to the lower education group, tertiary education is associated with +8.38 minutes to jobs and +4.90 minutes to leisure, with no statistically clear difference for caregiving. Gender is sharply related to caregiving and leisure: the “Men” indicator is associated with +8.33

minutes to leisure and -2.32 minutes to caregiving. Having children increases caregiving time by $+5.21$ minutes, which is large relative to the caregiving mean of 8 minutes. Finally, the interaction between being a man and having children is not statistically distinguishable from zero across outcomes, suggesting that (in this specification) the additional caregiving time associated with children is not meaningfully different for men than for women.

The value of Table 3 is that it turns the descriptive allocation shares in Table 1 into interpretable heterogeneity patterns for Jordan. In particular, it quantifies a clear caregiving margin (children) and a clear gender margin (men reallocating more to leisure and less to caregiving), which helps connect the Jordan evidence to broader discussions of flexibility, household time constraints, and the distributional implications of WFH.

4 Implications and conclusion

Remote work is not a silver bullet for Jordan’s macroeconomic constraints, but it can be a practical lever to ease several binding labour-market frictions that feature prominently in the country’s growth and private-sector diagnostics. Jordan has experienced modest average growth over the past decade, falling real GDP per capita relative to its 2012 level, and persistently high unemployment (including very high youth unemployment) with private-sector job creation falling short of the annual flow of new labour-market entrants (EBRD, 2025). Against this backdrop, remote and hybrid work can (i) expand feasible job opportunities for groups facing mobility and caregiving constraints, (ii) help firms access talent beyond Amman and reduce matching frictions, and (iii) support exportable services and productivity in sectors where Jordan aims to grow (notably ICT and business services), provided complementary investments and reforms are in place (EBRD, 2025; Aksoy et al., 2022; Zarate et al., 2025).

Use flexible and remote work to expand labour supply, especially for women and youth. Jordan’s inclusion gaps are large, and they intersect directly with the frictions that remote work can relax. Female labour force participation is exceptionally low (about 14%), even though women in the labour force are highly educated (the majority hold a bachelor’s degree) (EBRD, 2025). Youth unemployment is also very high: around 40.5% among those aged 20–24 and 29.0% among those aged 25–29, reflecting weak private-sector job creation relative to roughly 100,000 new entrants per year (EBRD, 2025). Remote and hybrid work can help on both margins by widening the set of jobs that are compatible with caregiving responsibilities, safety concerns, and commuting constraints, and by enabling entry-level work in digitally deliverable tasks when paired with credible training and screening.

The key policy point is that flexible work policies need to be designed as an inclusion instrument, not just a perk for high-wage incumbents. Evidence from the broader remote-work literature shows that workers place meaningful value on flexibility and that willingness to pay for remote options rises with commuting time and caregiving responsibilities (Mas and Pallais, 2017; Wiswall and Zafar, 2018; He et al., 2021; Lewandowski et al., 2022). There is also growing evidence that flexible arrangements can act as “gateway” jobs for women in contexts where mobility and norms constrain market work (Ho et al., 2024; Aksoy et al., 2025b). In Jordan, improving childcare bylaws, expanding affordable childcare, and investing in safe public transport are central complements to women’s economic inclusion, alongside regulatory amendments that accommodate flexible work. Remote work can reduce the effective “distance to work,” but it cannot substitute for these enabling investments, it works best as part of a package.

Treat childcare, safe mobility, and household constraints as first-order complements to remote work. In Jordan, family formation and care responsibilities are tightly linked to women’s labour-market exits, and that childcare supply is extremely limited: only a small share of children under age five are enrolled in early childhood education, and formal childcare capacity is low. Commuting and safety are also salient barriers in the capital

(EBRD, 2025).

A pragmatic approach is to align flexible-work reforms with targeted investments in (i) childcare availability and quality, (ii) safe and reliable transport, and (iii) workplace protections and enforcement, especially for new entrants and lower-wage workers. From a political-economy perspective, this package also helps remote work address one of Jordan’s structural issues: strong preferences for public-sector jobs. If private-sector employment can credibly offer predictable schedules, flexibility, and worker protections, it becomes closer to the bundle that many job seekers associate with the public sector.

Invest in digital infrastructure and affordability to make remote work feasible outside Amman. Remote work is a “digital infrastructure intensive” form of labour-market participation. Jordan has high internet usage overall, but fixed broadband subscriptions remain low, and connectivity quality and affordability differ across places and households (EBRD, 2025). Continued digitalization of government services and interoperability across agencies are also important for improving the business environment and service delivery. These reforms also matter for remote work because they reduce transaction costs for firms (registration, permits, tax compliance) and enable workers to engage with the state without costly in-person processes.

For policy, two implications follow. First, infrastructure should be treated as a “place-based inclusion polic”: remote work can broaden opportunity only if reliable connectivity reaches secondary cities and rural governorates, where the public sector remains the dominant employer. Second, affordability matters as much as availability. If mobile data is the default access mode for many households, high costs can make regular remote work infeasible. A remote-work strategy therefore naturally complements reforms that expand broadband, encourage competition and investment, and improve digital public infrastructure.

Build management capability and performance systems that support hybrid work in a lower-trust environment. Cross-country evidence indicates that cultural forces help explain persistent differences in WFH adoption: in the latest G-SWA wave, cultural individualism explains a large share of cross-country variance in remote work, over and above industry mix and income (Zarate et al., 2025). This matters for Jordan because hybrid work requires delegation, autonomy, and evaluation based on outputs rather than physical presence. In more collectivist or hierarchy-oriented settings, managers may place greater weight on face-to-face monitoring, and employees may worry that remote work harms career progression. These frictions are addressable, but not by mandates alone.

A practical response is to pair the expansion of remote work with management training and explicit performance frameworks. In the public sector, this can be integrated into broader modernization efforts aimed at improving administrative efficiency and empowering middle management. The same logic applies in the private sector: firms that set clear goals, define measurable deliverables, provide regular feedback, and use transparent promotion criteria can reduce the perceived “trust tax” associated with remote work. Policy can support progress on this margin through (i) dissemination of best-practice toolkits, (ii) subsidized training for SMEs in digitally enabled management, and (iii) demonstration projects with rigorous measurement (productivity, retention, gender composition, and worker well-being). This approach builds on the evidence that remote work’s performance effects depend critically on management quality and task design (Bloom et al., 2015).

Use remote work to support export-led services and reduce labour-market mismatch, but align with skills reform. Jordan’s medium-run growth strategy emphasizes higher-value activities and export-led growth but skills mismatches and weak private-sector demand contribute to persistent unemployment. Remote work can help here in two ways. First, it increases the feasible market size for Jordanian firms in digitally deliverable services, by allowing teams to serve clients abroad without physical relocation. Second, it can improve matching by allowing firms to recruit nationally rather than locally, which is important in

a country with significant spatial variation in job opportunities and a large public-sector footprint in rural governorates.

However, realizing these benefits requires tighter alignment between skills policy and market demand, alongside stronger private-sector engagement in human capital development. A remote-work strategy should therefore be linked to (i) digital-skills curricula (including English and customer-facing skills for tradable services), (ii) certification and placement mechanisms that reduce employers' screening costs, and (iii) pathways for youth into ICT-adjacent roles, especially since ICT employment remains a small share of total employment despite rapid growth. In this sense, remote work is best understood as a demand-side amplifier of skills reforms: it raises the payoff to skills by expanding the set of firms and clients that workers can access.

Conclusion. Remote work has become a durable feature of labour markets globally, and the persistence of hybrid arrangements is now well documented ([Zarate et al., 2025](#)). For Jordan, the policy question is no longer whether remote work exists, but whether it can be shaped into an instrument that supports inclusion and competitiveness rather than remaining concentrated among a narrow set of workers and firms: the upside of remote work is highest when it is embedded in a broader reform package that tackles the country's binding constraints (weak private-sector job creation relative to new entrants, very high youth unemployment, exceptionally low female labour force participation, and uneven enabling infrastructure ([EBRD, 2025](#))).

A credible remote-work agenda for Jordan therefore has three pillars. First, *inclusion*: promote flexible and hybrid work alongside childcare, safe mobility, and protections that make employment feasible and attractive for women and other constrained workers. Second, *capability*: invest in digital infrastructure and management practices that allow hybrid work to function well even in settings where monitoring and trust frictions are salient. Third, *competitiveness*: connect remote work to export-oriented services and skills reforms so that it contributes to productive private-sector expansion rather than only reshuffling where existing

work is performed. If these complements are in place, remote work can help Jordan tap underutilized talent, reduce spatial mismatches, and support tradable services growth—a valuable contribution in an economy where raising employment and productivity is central to the modernization agenda.


References

- Aksoy, C. G., Barrero, J. M., Bloom, N., Davis, S. J., Dolls, M., and Zarate, P. (2022). Working from home around the world. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, (2):281–360.
- Aksoy, C. G., Barrero, J. M., Bloom, N., Davis, S. J., Dolls, M., and Zarate, P. (2023). Time savings when working from home. *AEA Papers and Proceedings*, 113:597–603.
- Aksoy, C. G., Barrero, J. M., Bloom, N., Davis, S. J., Dolls, M., and Zarate, P. (2025a). The global persistence of work from home. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 122(27):e2509892122.
- Aksoy, C. G., Bloom, N., Davis, S. J., Marino, V., and Ozguzel, C. (2025b). Remote work, employee mix, and performance. Working Paper 33851, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Aksoy, C. G., Cabrales, A., Dolls, M., Durante, R., and Windsteiger, L. (2025c). Calamities, common interests, shared identity: What shapes social cohesion in europe? *Journal of Comparative Economics*.
- Barrero, J. M., Bloom, N., and Davis, S. J. (2021). Why working from home will stick. Working Paper 28731, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
- Bartik, A. W., Cullen, Z. B., Glaeser, E. L., Luca, M., and Stanton, C. T. (2020). What jobs are being done at home during the COVID-19 crisis? evidence from firm-level surveys. Working Paper 27422, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
- Bloom, N., Dahl, G. B., and Rooth, D.-O. (2024). Work from home and disability employment. Working Paper 32943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
- Bloom, N., Liang, J., Roberts, J., and Ying, Z. J. (2015). Does working from home work? evidence from a chinese experiment. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 130(1):165–218.

- Choudhury, P., Foroughi, C., and Larson, B. (2021). Work-from-anywhere: The productivity effects of geographic flexibility. *Strategic Management Journal*, 42(4):655–683.
- Delventhal, M. J., Kwon, E., and Parkhomenko, A. (2023). Work from home and urban structure. *Built Environment*, 49(3):503–524.
- EBRD (2025). Jordan diagnostic 2025. Technical report, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Country diagnostic; report based on data available as of May 2025.
- Emanuel, N. and Harrington, E. (2024). Working remotely? selection, treatment, and the market for remote work. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 16(4):528–559.
- Gibbs, M., Mengel, F., and Siemroth, C. (2023). Work from home and productivity: Evidence from personnel and analytics data on information technology professionals. *Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics*, 1(1):7–41.
- Gupta, A., Mittal, V., and Van Nieuwerburgh, S. (2024). Work from home and the office real estate apocalypse. Working paper.
- He, H., Neumark, D., and Weng, Q. (2021). Do workers value flexible jobs? a field experiment. *Journal of Labor Economics*, 39(3):709–738.
- Ho, L., Jalota, S., and Karandikar, A. (2024). Bringing work home: Flexible arrangements as gateway jobs for women in West Bengal. Working Paper 80, Structural Transformation and Economic Growth (STEG).
- Lewandowski, P., Lipowska, K., and Smoter, M. (2022). Working from home during a pandemic: A discrete choice experiment in Poland. Discussion Paper 15251, IZA Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn.
- Mas, A. and Pallais, A. (2017). Valuing alternative work arrangements. *American Economic Review*, 107(12):3722–3759.

- Ramani, A., Alcedo, J., and Bloom, N. (2024). How working from home reshapes cities. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 121(45):e2408930121.
- Stantcheva, S. (2021). Understanding tax policy: How do people reason? *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 136(4):2309–2369.
- Wiswall, M. and Zafar, B. (2018). Preference for the workplace, investment in human capital, and gender. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 133(1):457–507.
- Zarate, P., Barrero, J. M., Bloom, N., Davis, S. J., Dolls, M., and Aksoy, C. G. (2025). Why working from home varies across countries and people. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 122(51):e2529036122.


Figure 1: Working from home is more common in North America and Europe, and less common in Asia, College-Educated Workers




Note: Responses to the question “For each day last week, did you work 6 or more hours, and if so where?”

Figure 2: Hybrid work schedules are more common for parents

(a) Global




(b) Jordan



Note: Responses to the question “Looking one year ahead, how often would you like to have paid workdays at home?”.


Figure 3: College-Educated Men and women have similar WFH levels




Note: Responses to the question “For each day last week, did you work 6 or more hours, and if so where?”.

Figure 4: Women with children have a stronger desire to work from home

(a) Global




(b) Jordan



Note: Responses to the question “Looking one year ahead, how often would you like to have paid workdays at home?”.

Figure 5: Desired number of days WFH



Note: Responses to the question “Looking one year ahead, how often would you like to have paid workdays at home?”.

Table 1: Commute time savings and its allocation, country-level conditional means

Country	Daily time savings when working from home, minutes	<i>Percentage of time savings devoted to:</i>		
		Primary or secondary job	Leisure	Caregiving
Argentina	71	34	24	11
Australia	73	36	27	7
Austria	71	31	32	5
Brazil	72	36	24	13
Canada	62	38	26	8
Chile	89	35	22	16
China	57	28	29	10
Czech Rep.	60	33	24	13
Denmark	66	35	30	6
Finland	62	23	39	5
France	68	36	19	13
Germany	67	32	31	9
Greece	53	35	22	12
Hungary	67	33	27	12
India	102	41	22	9
Ireland	85	29	22	12
Italy	59	30	24	12
Japan	86	30	21	8
Jordan	67	35	24	12
Malaysia	57	42	22	11
Mexico	83	34	24	12
Netherlands	69	39	24	10
New Zealand	58	39	22	9
Nigeria	97	44	21	11
Norway	64	39	27	5
Poland	54	27	30	14
Portugal	57	37	22	12
Romania	60	34	25	14
Singapore	77	38	23	7
South Africa	80	45	20	11
South Korea	71	31	28	9
Spain	64	25	30	10
Sweden	61	31	37	9
Taiwan	55	41	22	6
Thailand	57	39	22	9
The Philippines	80	40	19	12
Türkiye	71	31	25	12
UK	80	37	25	9
USA	62	38	25	9
Vietnam	45	41	20	13
Cross-country average	68	35	24	10

Notes: The table shows coefficients on country dummies in OLS regressions that control for gender, age groups (20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-64) and education (secondary, tertiary, graduate) treating the raw U.S. mean as the baseline value. We fit the regression to data for 16,948 G-SWA respondents surveyed in Wave 4 who worked mainly from home at some point during the COVID-19 pandemic and are full-time workers. The “Average” value is the simple mean of the country-level values.

Table 2: Daily commute time savings when working from home, minutes

	Men	Women
All	70	58
Primary or secondary education	59	53
Tertiary education	79	62
Graduate degree	64	54
Age 20-29	70	61
Age 30-39	68	58
Age 40-49	81	57
Age 50-64	62	65
Married	69	58
Not married	72	70
Has children	69	58
Does not have children	72	59

Notes: The table reports unconditional means of daily commute times among full-time workers who worked mainly from home at some point during the COVID-19 pandemic, based on respondents from Jordan. The education category refers to the highest level attained. We weight each individual-level observation equally in computing the means in this table.

Table 3: How the time savings allocation varies with individual characteristics

	Jobs	Leisure	Caregiving
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Tertiary education	8.38*** (2.52)	4.90*** (1.36)	-0.74 (1.34)
Graduate degree	0.86 (4.44)	4.42 (3.24)	-2.91 (1.99)
Age 30-39	3.24 (3.15)	-0.64 (1.88)	0.21 (1.38)
Age 40-49	7.25* (3.82)	2.57 (1.97)	-1.97 (1.24)
Age 50-64	0.34 (3.19)	0.92 (2.34)	-1.68 (2.10)
1 (Men)	8.04 (5.93)	8.33*** (3.13)	-2.32** (1.17)
1 (Has children)	-5.03 (3.80)	0.26 (1.52)	5.21*** (1.19)
1 (Men) X 1 (Has children)	0.59 (5.85)	-3.47 (3.30)	0.74 (1.71)
Observations	960	960	960
Dependent variable mean	23.70	14.69	8.00

Notes: The table reports OLS regression estimates for Jordan. The dependent variable is daily time savings (minutes) devoted to the indicated activity when working from home. Each column corresponds to a separate regression. Significance levels: * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust.

IGC

theigc.org
