Collective selling can improve prices and market access for cashew producers in Mozambique

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- Between 2021-2025, collective sales delivered prices 12-20% above producers' reported outside-sales alternative.
- Within the same producer organisation, stronger price margins were associated with more sellers, larger volumes, and higher collective sales revenue.
- Structured buyers were not associated with a stable average premium, but they were associated with relatively better price performance in weak market conditions.
- Policy should therefore support aggregation, price transparency, and reliable buyer relationships, while measuring success by participation, marketed volume, and price.

This brief draws on new evidence from Mozambique's cashew sector to show how collective selling can create value in fragmented agricultural markets.

POLICY BRIEF MOZ-23126

JULY 2026

This project was funded by the IGC

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Why this matters for policy

Cashew markets in northern and central Mozambique are fragmented. Many producers sell individually to local traders, often with limited price information, high transport costs, and little bargaining power. In that setting, collective selling may help producers negotiate better prices and reach buyers who would otherwise avoid many small transactions.

What this research covers

The brief summarises evidence from an unbalanced panel of 191 producer organisations and 386 organisation-year observations in the NITIDAE– Apoio à Cadeia de Valor do Caju em Moçambique (ACAMOZ) joint-selling network in Zambezia between 2020-2025 (Cavalcante & Álvarez-Pereira, 2026). The analysis compares each organisation's collective selling price with its own reported outside-sales benchmark and tracks participation, marketed quantities, revenue, and buyer type.

- The network expanded quickly, from 30 active producer organisations in 2020 to 97 in 2025, while market conditions moved from the 2022 downturn to a strong recovery in 2024 and 2025.
- Because the outside-sales benchmark is reported by the organisation itself, it reflects the most relevant comparison point available in the monitoring data rather than an unrelated market average.

The evidence is strongest on the value of collective selling itself. The structured-buyer results are more tentative because organisations entering that channel were already different before adoption, so those estimates should be read as descriptive rather than causal.

What the study finds

Collective selling consistently outperformed the relevant outside option. In every observed campaign from 2021-2025, the collective-selling price remained above the reported outside-sale price. The premium was not confined to one exceptional year; it remained positive during the 2022 downturn and throughout the subsequent recovery.

> **From 2021-2025, collective-selling prices stayed 12-20% above the reported outside-sales benchmark.**

Collective selling created value through organisation as well as price. Within the same producer organisation, years with larger premiums were also years with more sellers, larger marketed quantities, and higher collective-sales revenue. This means the gains did not come from price alone; they were linked to assembling larger collective transactions.

Structured buyers tell a more qualified story. They were not associated with a stable average premium once common year effects were taken into account. However, they were associated with relatively better price performance in weak market conditions, especially during the 2022 downturn. This pattern is consistent with greater reliability or liquidity, but it should not be interpreted as a clean causal effect.

Policy priorities

Support collective transactions at the point of sale, not only formal group registration. The evidence suggests that value is created when producer groups can mobilise sellers, compare offers, aggregate lots, and complete commercially meaningful transactions.

Use structured buyers strategically. They may be especially useful in weak market conditions, but policy should not assume they deliver a constant premium every year. Buyer linkages should therefore complement competition, prompt payment, and local price transparency rather than replace them.

Implementation will still be challenging. Producers often need quick cash, remoteness raises transport costs, and final participants can include non-members or opportunistic sellers. Monitoring systems should therefore distinguish formal membership from actual sale participation and track outside-sale conditions, participation, marketed volume, and payment timing together.

Figure 1: Collective selling consistently delivered a premium over outside sales



Note: Bars show the average percentage premium of collective-selling prices over the producer organisations reported outside-sale price in each campaign. Labels inside bars report the corresponding absolute premium in MZN/kg. Source: NITIDAE–ACAMOZ monitoring data and the authors' calculations.

Table 1: Practical actions for strengthening collective sales

Policy priority	Why it matters	Immediate action	Key implementation issue
Support aggregation and negotiation	Higher price margins and stronger sales outcomes move together.	Invest in aggregation points, transparent weighing, price comparison, and negotiation support.	Requires local coordination capacity and trust.
Improve liquidity and prompt payment.	Outside sales remain attractive when producers need cash quickly.	Support working capital, faster payment systems, and clear payment rules.	Can unintentionally favour a single buyer if competition is weak.
Track participation as well as price	Revenue growth is driven largely by seller mobilisation and volume.	Monitor participants, volumes, revenue, and outside-sales conditions together.	Administrative data must distinguish members from opportunistic sellers.

Note: The table translates the main empirical findings into operational priorities for policy and programme design.

The findings point to a practical shift in emphasis. In fragmented agricultural markets, success should be judged not only by whether a programme secures a better price in one season, but also by whether it helps producers organise larger, more reliable, and more competitive transactions over time.

Producer meeting during project fieldwork in Mozambique. Image credit: Research team.

References

Cavalcante, V., & Ávarez-Pereira, B. (2026). How collective selling creates value: Evidence from cashew producer organisations in Mozambique. IGC FINAL REPORT MOZ-23126.