This study seeks to analyse whether affirmative action, through political reservation of village council headships for women, impacts on corruption levels and the quality of project implementation in Andhra Pradesh, India.

Results show that there program inefficiencies and leakages are more common in village councils reserved for women heads, as political and administrative inexperience makes these councils vulnerable to bureaucratic capture.

Female political leadership does generate governance gains, but only with a time lag.

Women heads performance improves after their initial year, and surpasses performance of male council heads over the entire period of tenure.

In councils with female reservation:
- Households are more likely to have been asked to pay to receive the MGNREGA job card which is meant to be free
- Beneficiary households are more likely to have been asked to verify muster roll entries
- Wage payments take longer to reach recipients (though not statistically significant)
- Women heads are less educated and have less prior political experience.

We find evidence of a strengthening of women’s political voice through greater reporting of NREGA malfeasance by women.
**Policy Motivation**

We study how affirmative action through randomized political reservation of village council (gram panchayat or GP) headships for women impact on corruption and on the quality of implementation of projects under MG-NREGA (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act) in the state of Andhra Pradesh (AP), India.

**Policy Impact**

Using primary survey data, we find more program inefficiencies and leakages in village councils reserved for women heads: political and administrative inexperience make such councils more vulnerable to bureaucratic capture. When using a panel of audit reports, governance improves as women leaders learn and accumulate experience. Our results show that female political leadership generates governance gains but only with a time lag and after initial, gendered disadvantages recede. While women heads perform poorly in the initial year of their tenure, their performance improves in subsequent years and surpasses that of male heads over the entire period of tenure.

Political reservations need initial back up in the form of preparatory training: women in power have less education and often have no prior political experience and require assistance in the day-to-day execution of duties.

**Audience**

Scholars and policy makers working on (i) affirmative action as a tool for women’s empowerment (ii) implementation of MGNREGA in Andhra Pradesh and other states of India.

**Policy Implications**

Our research draws on primary data from surveys of 100 block level bureaucrats, 300 village council heads (sarpanchs) and 1500 MGNREGA beneficiary households in eight districts of Andhra Pradesh. We have also translated and extracted information from a panel of official social audit reports.

Our analysis of the primary data shows the following:

- In GPs with female reservation, households are more likely to have been asked to pay to receive the MGNREGA job card which is meant to be free. This effect is large. We also find that job card provision is marginally, but significantly, higher in female reserved GPs and job-cards are near-ubiquitous: irrespective of GP reservation status. Paradoxically, only about 20 per cent of these job cards have entries.
• In female reserved GPs, beneficiary households are more likely to have been asked to verify muster roll entries. Conditional on such verification, households are more likely to discover discrepancies between actual and official wage payment records.

• Wage payments also take longer to reach and although not statistically significant, payments received are more often below what they should have been for households in female reserved GPs. Finally, and also not significant, households in reserved GPs are also more likely to be paid in cash rather than through the appropriate channels of postal accounts, bank accounts or smart-cards.

• Women GP heads in reserved seats are less educated and have less prior political experience, on average. Female reserved village council heads (about 73%), far more often than unreserved village council heads (around 13%) are assisted by a relative in the execution of daily duties.

For the social audit panel data, we find the following:

• Although the number of irregularities in MNREGA implementation – in both labour and materials related component of the programme – were significantly higher in female reserved village councils at the onset of the programme, these decline with the duration of the tenure of the head (sarpanch).

• Over time these governance improvements in women reserved councils more than compensate for the initial, gendered disadvantage.

• We find evidence of a strengthening of women’s political voice through greater reporting of NREGA malfeasance by women, individually or in groups, in female reserved GPs.

• Contrary to the pessimism that often surrounds political commentary in the sub-continent, more experience does not necessarily make politicians more conniving - for women political leaders experience translates into vital governance gains.

**Implementation**

Training programs, for women political leaders, may be critical for strengthening affirmative action policies and for grass-roots institutions. Existing training programs can be strengthened and modules for financial literacy and for specific (and ambitious) public programs (like MGNREGA) incorporated within them.

**Dissemination**


**Further Readings**

About the authors

Farzana Afridi is an Assistant Professor in the Economics and Planning Unit at the Indian Statistical Institute in Delhi. Her areas of interest are education, health, gender, and political economy.

Vegard Iversen is a microeconomist with an anthropological streak. He holds a Phd in Economics from University of Cambridge and is currently based in New Delhi where he is a visitor at Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit (Economics Department). Before a brief stint as Research Fellow in the International Food Policy Research Institute’s New Delhi office, he spent six years as a member of Faculty and co-Director of the MA in Development Economics at School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia. He has previously held research positions at the Agricultural University of Norway and been a Junior Programme Officer in UNDP’s New Delhi office.

M. R. Sharan is a research associate who has worked on questions centred around the MNREGS, previously on a research paper in Andhra Pradesh and subsequently in Patna, Bihar with J-PAL. He hopes to work on research and policy issues related to health in the near future.
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