THE WEAKER SEX? WOMEN, POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND MG-NREGA IMPLEMENTATION IN ANDHRA PRADESH

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Recent extension of the focus on women as agents of change from the economic (e.g. Sen, 1998; literature on intra-household allocations) to the political sphere: ‘the potential of presence’ (Agarwal, 2010)

Randomized political reservations prevent confusing correlation with causality, a problem encountered in early studies (e.g. Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001)
Chattopadhyay & Duflo (2004) find that public good investments in GPs with a female sarpanch more strongly reflect the preferences of female voters.

Beaman et al. (2009) find that in female-headed GPs, people were less likely to have paid a bribe to receive a BPL card or to get a water connection. Duflo and Topalova (2005) report better quality and availability of public goods in such GPs.

The early signs, thus, are not only of improvements in equity but also, crucially, of governance gains.
Alolo (2006) finds that among public officials in Ghana, women are less likely to endorse corrupt behavior, but may be more inclined to use public office to promote family interests.

Focusing on SC and ST reservations, Khosla (2011) suggests that contextual factors like bureaucratic control and political fragmentation creates variation in the effectiveness of mandatory political reservations within Andhra Pradesh.

Johnson (2009) found no impact of gender (of sarpanch) on NREGA performance in AP.
Why MG-NREGA?

- The overall national importance and scale of the scheme
- Complex legislation with demand-driven job creation
- Focus on processes and beneficiary rights or entitlements to 100 days of work per household
- Social audit process with local stakeholder participation envisaged to tackle accountability and implementation problems
Background

Administration of MG-NREGA in Andhra Pradesh
FA verifies and closes labour records once every week.

Records submitted to MPDO.

MPDO verifies records.

Labour records entered into data bank by CO.

Cheques issued to suppliers of materials by MPDO.

Payorder generated.

Payment deposited into account of beneficiary.

Payorder issued to post office or bank by MPDO.

Withdrawal from bank/post office account by beneficiary.

FA, TA and AE verify expenditure on materials for each project.
Society for Social Audit, Accountability and Transparency (SSAAT) responsible for training and facilitating social audits

STEP 1
quarterly schedule of social audits at mandal or block level

STEP 2
Intimation letters to District Collector and MPDO

STEP 3
Formation of social audit teams – SRP, DRP and VSAs

STEP 4
Training of VSAs

STEP 5
Door to door verification of records, focus group meetings, site visits for verifications

STEP 6
Public hearing of findings

STEP 7
Decision taken report for action

STEP 8
Action taken report

Source: SSAAT website
Data

- **Three surveys** across 8 districts of Andhra Pradesh in April-July, 2011:
  - Current MPDOs (100 mandals)
  - Sarpanchs (300 GPs in sampled mandals) elected in 2006 for a fixed term of 5 years
  - Beneficiary households (1500 in sampled GPs)

- In contrast to other research (e.g. Johnson 2009), we extract social audit information from **original social audit reports** and abridged reports from 2006 to 2011 (rather than relying on data available purely on government websites).

- We present preliminary ‘observations’, mainly descriptive statistics.
**Table 1: Characteristics of sarpanchs by GP reservation status**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Male (N=164)</th>
<th>Female (N=134)</th>
<th>Difference (1) - (2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age (years)</strong></td>
<td>44.81</td>
<td>42.25</td>
<td>2.56**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion with high school or more education</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political or other leadership experience (proportion)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>own prior experience</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family member with experience</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spouse with above experience</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>-0.48***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parent with above experience</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.36***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant at 10%, ** 5% and ***1%
Table 1: Characteristics of sarpanchs by GP reservation status (contd.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=164)</td>
<td>(N=134)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(1) - (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance with day to day sarpanch work (proportion)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any family member</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>-0.63***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>-0.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offspring</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Households’ perceptions of effectiveness of elected sarpanch (1=highest and 4 = lowest)

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant at 10%, ** 5% and ***1%
Household survey

Figure 1: Awareness of NREGA entitlements by GP reservation status (score out of five)

Male: 3.577
Female: 3.52
Diff: 0.057

(* significant at 10%, **5% and ***1%)
Household survey – Wage payments

**Figure 2: Beneficiary asked to pay to receive jobcard? (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Diff**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.1465</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.0456</td>
<td>0.0456</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**(significant at 10%, **5% and ***1%)**

**Figure 3: Amount paid to receive jobcard (Rs.)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Diff*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7.64</td>
<td>7.64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* significant at 10%, **5% and ***1%)
Household survey – Wage payments

Figure 4: Beneficiary asked to pay to receive NREGA wages? (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Diff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diff</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* significant at 10%, **5% and ***1%)

Figure 5: Amount paid to receive NREGA wages (Rs.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Diff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>140.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>158.55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* significant at 10%, **5% and ***1%)
Household survey – Wage payments

Figure 6: Beneficiary paid less than entitlement for completed work? (%)

(* significant at 10%, **5% and ***1%)

0.111

0.141

0.03

(* significant at 10%, **5% and ***1%)
Household survey – MG-NREGA Administration

Figure 7: Daily muster roll entry at worksite? (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Diff**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.926</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.952</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diff**</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* significant at 10%, **5% and ***1%)

Figure 8: Beneficiary participated in social audit? (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Diff**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diff**</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Social audit data - Complaints

Figure 1: Labour expenditure related complaints as a proportion of all complaints by reservation status (%)
Figure 2: Material expenditure related complaints as a proportion of all complaints by reservation status (%)
Social audit data - Complaints

Figure 3: Nature of labor expenditure related complaints by reservation status (%)
Social audit data - Complaints

Figure 4: Nature of material expenditure related complaints by reservation status (%)
Figure 5: Median amount per complaint type by reservation status (Rs.)

- Labour
- Materials
- All

Male
Female
All
Social audit data – Decisions taken

Figure 6: Proportion of irregularities for which person held responsible by reservation status (%)

GP level functionary

Mandal level functionary
Social audit data - Panel

Figure 7: Change in number of complaints between audit rounds 2 and 3 by reservation status
Figure 8: Change in average amount per complaint type between rounds 2 and 3 by reservation status (Rs.)
Summary

- Significant differences in characteristics of male and female reserved sarpanchs but no difference in perceived effectiveness.
- Labour expenditure irregularities higher in female reserved GPs while material expenditure irregularities higher in male reserved GPs.
- Median amount of material expenditure related complaints significantly higher.
- FAs significantly less likely to be responsible for complaints in female reserved GPs.
- Potentially larger effects of social audits in female reserved GPs.