

Votes and Violence:

Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigeria

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Motivation

This election is a do or die affair.

Feb. 10th 2007, President Obasanjo

Elections could further destabilise the violent, oil-rich Delta region.

Mar. 15th , 2007, The Economist, headline

Election breeds fear in Nigeria's Muslim north.

Apr. 12th , 2007, The Financial Times, headline

After rigged and violent local polls, the opposition threatens a boycott of the presidential race.

Apr. 18th , 2007, The Economist, headline

Violence and fraud tarnish Nigerian elections.

Apr. 22nd , 2007, The Financial Times, headline

Rigging, violence and intimidation were so pervasive and on such naked display that they made a mockery of the electoral process. [...] Where voting did take place, many voters stayed away from the polls. [...] By the time voting ended, the body count had surpassed 300.

May 15th , 2007, Human Rights Watch

Research questions

- Can a NGO-conducted campaign against electoral violence help in undermining it?
- Effects on violence perceptions?
- Effects on empowerment to counteract violence?
- Effects on voter turnout?
- Effects on voting for parties/candidates?
- Spillover effects within treatment locations?

Preview of main results

- The anti-violence campaign increased the sense of security to the general population; as an example, perceived local electoral violence induced by politicians decreased by 0.23 standard deviation units
- The campaign increased empowerment to counteract electoral violence (behavioral measure)
- The campaign increased voter turnout by 7-11 pp (presidential-gubernatorial) and benefited incumbents
- The campaign decreased the intensity of violence as reported by journalists
- Some spillovers of the campaign, particularly for perceptions of violence

Outline

1. Literature
2. Background
3. Experimental design
 - a. Treatment
 - b. Sampling
 - c. Measurement
 - d. Estimation strategy
4. Econometric results
5. Concluding remarks

1. Literature

- **Field experiments in elections of developing countries:**
 - Wantchekon (2003): clientelism in Benin
 - Vicente (2009): priming against vote-buying in Sao Tome and Principe
 - Wantchekon (2009): information about public policy options in Benin
 - Banerjee, Green, Green, and Pande (2010): priming against ethnic voting and corruption in India
 - Banerjee, Kumar, Pande, and Su (2010): information about politicians in India
 - Aker, Collier, and Vicente (2010): information through cell phones in Mozambique
 - Gine and Mansuri (2011): women's turnout in Pakistan
- **Electoral violence in developing countries:**
 - Theory: Ellman and Wantchekon (2000); Chaturvedi (2005); Collier and Vicente (2012). Empirics: Wilkinson (2004); Chaves, Fergusson, and Robinson (2009)

2. Background

- Political history of Nigeria:
 - Independence in 1960; post-independence period dominated by military rule and instability (with numerous coups and internal conflicts)
 - From 1999, civilian rule under democratic elections
 - Elections in 1999, 2003, and 2007 marked by widespread violence and fraud



- The Elections of April 2007

- Four elections (president, federal assembly and senate, governor, state assembly)

- Presidential Election:

- Obasanjo not running for a third term but appointing a protégé (Yar'Adua) through the ruling party (PDP)
- Opposition by Buhari (ANPP) – second in 2003, and Abubakar (AC), former vice-president, in conflict with Obasanjo, and facing various accusations of corruption

- Focus on Presidential/Gubernatorial



3. Experimental design

a. Treatment

- Treatment provided by campaign against political violence by NGO ActionAid International Nigeria (AAIN)
- Campaign designed to lower the perceived threat to individual voters through collective action; campaign also emphasized the lack of legitimacy in the use of intimidation
- Expected impact of the campaign was to reduce effectiveness of violence and intimidation as an electoral strategy, possibly leading to a decrease in its use
- Theories of protest – mechanism of the experiment:
 - Kuran (1989): slight surge in the opposition's apparent size may undermine the support of a government; AAIN's campaign was analogous

- **Anti-Violence Campaign:**


- Main message, uniform countrywide:

- Main: ‘NO TO ELECTION VIOLENCE’
- ‘Vote Against Violent Politicians’

- Means:

- Distribution of materials targeted primarily at panel-surveyed households:

- T-shirts (3,000), Caps (3,000), Hijabs (1,000)
- Posters (3,000), Stickers (3,000), Leaflets (5,000)
- Road shows (using jingles in 3 languages, Yoruba, Hausa, Pidgin English)
- At least one Community Meeting at each of the 12 locations
- At least one Popular Theatre representation at each of the 12 treated locations (same script, available upon request, used in all)



No! *to*



ELECTION VIOLENCE

VOTE AGAINST VIOLENT POLITICIANS.

YARAC



act:onaid
international nigeria



No! *to* ELECTION VIOLENCE!

VOTE AGAINST VIOLENT POLITICIANS.

YARAC



act:onaid
international nigeria



Distribution of materials and roadshows



Town meetings and popular theatres

- **Much more on the campaign at:**

<http://www.iig.ox.ac.uk>

b. Sampling

- **24 enumeration areas in 6 states of Nigeria**
 - Lagos/Oyo (southwest); Kaduna/Plateau (north); Delta/Rivers (southeast)
 - States were chosen to have a record of political violence
 - EAs chosen randomly within Afrobarometer's representative sample of each of the states (301 in total)
- **Campaign (February-March)**
 - The 24 EAs were paired on geographical terms
 - 12 EAs were randomly chosen to receive the campaign


- **Pre-election survey (January)**

- Households/respondents selected in a representative manner (nth house and random draw of adults within the household)
- Responded by 1200 individuals/households (50 per EA)
- These individuals became the main target of the campaign

- **Post-election survey (May-June)**

- Responded by 1149 **targeted** individuals/households (i.e., 96% re-surveyed)
- 300 additional respondents in treatment locations were surveyed (25 per EA) – representative of the **untargeted**

Nigeria - Sampled Enumeration Areas



Legend: **Treatment Area**, **Control Area**; LU: Large Urban; SU: Small Urban; R: Rural

SOUTHWEST REGION	NORTH REGION	SOUTHEAST REGION
Oyo: 5. Atiba – Ajagba SU 6. Ogbomosho North – Jagun Oke. SU 7. Ibadan Southwest – Jericho LU 8. Ibadan Southwest – Ring Road LU	Kaduna: 9. Zaria – Zaria (150) LU 10. Zaria – Zaria (151) LU 11. Kaura – Amawa Tudun Wada R 12. Lere – Abadawa Laga Akwai R	Delta: 17. Oshimili North – Oko Anala R 18. Ika South – Obi Anyima R 19. Warri South – Warri (290) LU 20. Warri South – Warri (289) LU
Lagos: 1. Alimosho – Akwonjo LU 2. Alimosho – Ikotun LU 3. Lagos Mainland – Ebute Met. LU 4. Lagos Island – Lagos Island LU	Plateau: 13. Jos North – Jos (78) LU 14. Jos North – Jos (77) LU 15. Quan-Pan – Piya R 16. Quan-Pan – Pandam R	Rivers: 21. Andoni – Agama R 22. Eleme – Sime-Tai R 23. Obio/Akpor – Rukpakwolusi R 24. Gokana – Nugbe-Yeghe R

c. Measurement

- **Violence-related survey outcomes (four indices composed from 17 survey-variables)**


- General political freedom, perceived fairness of elections, and general measures of conflict at the local level
- Perceptions of politically motivated violence as induced by politicians (from the top)
- Empowerment against violence at the bottom
- Perceptions and experience about local crime
 - All variables and indices were normalized as z-scores

Table 1: Violence-related survey measures - questionnaire phrasing and scales

variable		phrasing of the question	original scale
political freedom and conflict - general	change of freedom to vote freely	Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they were before aou January interview, or are they about the same? Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured. Worse-Better	1 to 5
	change of freedom from crime and insecurity	Please tell me if the following things are worse or better now than they were before our January interview, or are they about the same? Safety from crime and violence. Worse-Better	1 to 5
	free & fair 2007 elections - general	On the whole, how free and fair were April 2007 elections? Not free and fair-Free and fair	1 to 4
	conflict within local community	In your experience, how often did violent conflicts arise between people: Within the community where you live? Never-Always	0 to 4
local electoral violence - from the top	security	How secure against violence originated by politicians has been your neighbourhood or village? Insecure-Secure	1 to 7
	political intimidation	How often (if ever) has anyone threatened negative consequences to people in your neighbourhood or village in order to get them to vote a certain way? Never-Often	0 to 3
	influence of assassinations	How much influence have assassinations of politicians in Nigeria had on instilling a climate of fear/intimidation in your neighbourhood or village? Not Influential-Influential	1 to 7
	politicians advocating violence	How supportive of violence, in terms of openly advocating violence, have been political representatives in your area? Unsupportive-Supportive	1 to 7
	gang activity	How frequently have you heard about violent groups/gangs/area youths connected with politics being active in your neighbourhood or village? Infrequent-Frequent	1 to 7
local empowerment - from the bottom	support for 'do-or-die affair'	How much of a 'do or die affair' have the people of your neighbourhood or village considered the 2007 elections? No 'Do or die affair'-'Do or die affair'	1 to 7
	standing against violence	How clearly has the people in your neighbourhood or village been standing against violence originated by politicians? Unclear-Clear	1 to 7
	empowerment against violence	How much empowered to defend against violence originated by politicians has been the people feeling in your neighbourhood or village? Disempowered-Empowered	1 to 7
	knowledge of ways to counteract violence	How much knowledgeable has been the people in your neighbourhood or village on ways to resist violence originated by politicians? Not Knowledgeable-Knowledgeable	1 to 7
crime - perceptions and experience	vandalism (perception)	How frequently have you heard about purposely-made damages (vandalism) to property in your area? Infrequent-Frequent	1 to 7
	vandalism (experience)	How frequently, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Had some property purposely-damaged (vandalized)? Never-Many times	1 to 4
	physical intimidation (perception)	How frequently have you heard about physical threats/intimidation in your area? Infrequent-Frequent	1 to 7
	physical intimidation (experience)	How often, if ever have you or anyone in your family: Been physically threatened? Never-Many times	1 to 4

- **Behavioral measure of empowerment against political violence**

- A postcard was distributed to all post-election survey respondents
- Individuals asked to mail the postcard if they wanted to see covered in the media the issue of political violence



- **Actual political violence happenings compiled by local journalists**

- Compiled by independent local journalists at the surveyed locations
- Included descriptions of political violence happenings (sources: town meetings, police)
- Before and after AAIN's campaign (2nd semester 2006 to two weeks after last April elections)

d. Estimation strategy

$$Outcome_{il1} = a + bY_l + cX_i + fT_l + \varepsilon_{il1}$$

$$Outcome_{ilt} = a + bY_l + cX_i + dt + eT_l + ft * T_l + \varepsilon_{ilt}$$

where:

- i, l, t are subscripts for individuals, locations, and time (before / after)
- T is a binary variable with value 1 for treated locations,
- X is a vector of individual controls
- Y is a vector of state dummies and location controls.

- **Standard errors:**

- Clustered at the EA level
- Note however that a practical limitation of inference with cluster-robust standard errors is that the asymptotic justification assumes that the number of clusters goes to infinity
- Bertrand et al (2004) show that with a small number of clusters (like in our case) the cluster-robust standard errors are likely to be downward biased

- Two solutions for calculating p-values that account for a small number of clusters:

- **Wild bootstrap** of Cameron et al (2008)
- **Randomization inference** of Rosenbaum (2002)

4. Econometric Results

Table 2a: Differences across treatment and control groups - location characteristics, individual demographics, and attrition

		control	level	treatment difference (to control)
location characteristics	post office	0.250	0.167	-0.083
				0.172
	school	0.917	0.917	0.000
				0.118
	police	0.417	0.333	-0.083
				0.206
	electricity	0.750	0.833	0.083
basic demographics				0.172
	health clinic	0.833	0.667	-0.167
				0.181
	town hall	0.333	0.417	0.083
				0.206
	female	0.500	0.500	-0.000
				0.002
ethnicity	age	32.955	32.695	-0.260
				1.005
	household size	6.430	6.463	0.033
				0.736
	married	0.581	0.552	-0.029
				0.044
	secondary school completed	0.237	0.316	0.079
religion				0.057
	yoruba	0.318	0.277	-0.042
				0.167
	hausa	0.157	0.100	-0.057
				0.114
	igbo	0.072	0.159	0.087
				0.088
religion	christian	0.621	0.737	0.116
				0.126
	muslim	0.344	0.253	-0.091
				0.132
	religious intensity (1-6)	4.764	5.078	0.314
				0.204

Note: These results come from OLS regressions. Note that for individual survey-based variables, we include in the treatment group oversample individuals. Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table 2a: Differences across treatment and control groups - location characteristics, individual demographics, and attrition

		control	level	treatment difference (to control)
occupation	agriculture	0.158	0.117	-0.042
				0.066
	industry/services: trader	0.125	0.136	0.011
				0.031
	industry/services: artisan	0.112	0.133	0.022
				0.032
	student	0.222	0.222	0.001
property and expenditure				0.039
	housework	0.120	0.093	-0.027
				0.035
	house	0.606	0.574	-0.032
				0.110
	land	0.526	0.554	0.028
				0.116
	cattle	0.329	0.365	0.036
				0.098
	radio	0.888	0.932	0.044
				0.029
	cell phone	0.512	0.586	0.074
				0.119
	household expenditure (naira/month)	19,001.358	22,868.778	3,867.420
				4,758.596
panel re-surveying		0.967	0.948	-0.018
				0.013

Note: These results come from OLS regressions. Note that for individual survey-based variables, we include in the treatment group oversample individuals. Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

• Randomization:

- Treated and control respondents seem not to be statistically different

Table 2b: Differences across treatment and control groups - baseline outcomes

		control	level	treatment
				difference (to control)
violence (survey)	local electoral violence - from the top (zscore)	0.000	0.011	0.011
				0.081
	local empowerment - from the bottom (zscore)	0.000	0.252	0.252
				0.210
	crime - perceptions and experience (zscore)	0.000	0.114	0.114
				0.102
voting 2003 (survey)	turnout presidential	0.728	0.669	-0.058
				0.061
	turnout gubernatorial	0.737	0.673	-0.064
				0.060
	pdp presidential	0.471	0.491	0.020
				0.087
	anpp presidential	0.165	0.089	-0.076
				0.080
	ac presidential	0.027	0.043	0.016
				0.023
	pdp gubernatorial	0.473	0.450	-0.023
				0.083
anpp gubernatorial	0.134	0.113	-0.021	
			0.069	
ac gubernatorial	0.034	0.028	-0.007	
			0.023	
actual violence (journals)	physical violence (0-1)	0.462	0.657	0.194
				0.134
	violence intensity score (1-5)	2.754	2.898	0.144
				0.280

Note: These results come from OLS regressions. Note that for individual survey-based variables, we include in the treatment group oversample individuals. Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table 3: Regressions of individual violence-related survey measures

dependent variable —>		political freedom and conflict - general		local electoral violence - from the top	
treatment effect	coefficient	0.366***	0.386***	0.236**	0.233**
	standard error	(0.133)	(0.123)	(0.099)	(0.102)
	p-value wild bootstrap	0.024**	0.068*	0.026**	0.028**
	p-value randomization inference	0.050*	0.052*	0.001***	0.002***
number of observations		1,148	1,130	2,339	2,303
mean dep. variable (control)		-0.000	0.001	-0.000	-0.005
state dummies		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
controls		No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: All regressions are OLS. All dependent variables are indices of z-scores. They are scaled from high violence (low empowerment) to low violence (high empowerment). All regressions include baseline observations (difference-in-difference specifications), except for political freedom and conflict - general, and include state dummies. Controls are location controls on the existence of basic public services, and individual demographic characteristics (see Table 2a, top and middle panels). Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level. Wild bootstrap method follows Cameron et al (2008), with null hypothesis imposed, weights -1 and 1, and 1000 replications. Randomization inference uses all 4096 placebo treatment vectors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

- **Effects of the campaign on violence - survey:**
 - Clear effects on perceptions (general and local electoral violence from the top)

Table 3: Regressions of individual violence-related survey measures

dependent variable —>		local empowerment - from the bottom		crime - perceptions and experience	
treatment effect	coefficient	0.221**	0.221**	-0.034	-0.037
	standard error	(0.104)	(0.106)	(0.114)	(0.117)
	p-value wild bootstrap	0.042**	0.046**	0.766	0.746
	p-value randomization inference	0.012**	0.013**	1.000	0.983
number of observations		2,296	2,260	2,349	2,312
mean dep. variable (control)		-0.000	-0.012	0.000	-0.008
state dummies		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
controls		No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: All regressions are OLS. All dependent variables are indices of z-scores. They are scaled from high violence (low empowerment) to low violence (high empowerment). All regressions include baseline observations (difference-in-difference specifications), except for political freedom and conflict - general, and include state dummies. Controls are location controls on the existence of basic public services, and individual demographic characteristics (see Table 2a, top and middle panels). Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level. Wild bootstrap method follows Cameron et al (2008), with null hypothesis imposed, weights -1 and 1, and 1000 replications. Randomization inference uses all 4096 placebo treatment vectors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

- **Effects of the campaign on violence - survey:**
 - Local empowerment against violence increases; unclear effects on general crime

Table 4: Regressions of behavioral empowerment against violence (postcard)

dependent variable ----->		postcard		postcard if Δ empowerment>0	
treatment effect	coefficient	0.060	0.078**	0.085**	0.084***
	standard error	(0.079)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.015)
	p-value wild bootstrap	0.486	0.090*	0.034**	0.002***
	p-value randomization inference	0.566	0.412	0.096*	0.087*
number of observations		1,149	1,131	1,149	1,131
mean dep. variable (control)		0.341	0.342	0.109	0.108
controls		No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: All regressions are OLS. All dependent variables are binary. The second dependent variable takes value 1 if the postcard variable takes values 1 and if empowerment against violence increased from the baseline to the post-election reports. All regressions are based on post-election observations (single-difference specifications), and include state dummies. Controls are location controls on the existence of basic public services, and individual demographic characteristics (see Table 2a, top and middle panels). Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level. Wild bootstrap method follows Cameron et al (2008), with null hypothesis imposed, weights -1 and 1, and 1000 replications. Randomization inference uses all 4096 placebo treatment vectors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

- **Effects of the campaign on violence - postcard:**
 - Behavioral empowerment against violence increases

Table 5: Regressions of voting behavior

dependent variable ———>		turnout	
		presidential	
treatment effect	coefficient	0.060*	0.073**
	standard error	(0.037)	(0.031)
	p-value wild bootstrap	0.158	0.152
	p-value randomization inference	0.096*	0.049**
number of observations		1,143	1,126
mean dep. variable (control)		0.651	0.657
dependent variable ———>		gubernatorial	
treatment effect	coefficient	0.100**	0.111***
	standard error	(0.040)	(0.036)
	p-value wild bootstrap	0.038**	0.060*
	p-value randomization inference	0.066*	0.008***
number of observations		1,143	1,125
mean dep. variable (control)		0.688	0.696
controls		No	Yes

Note: All regressions are OLS. All dependent variables are binary. All regressions are based on post-election observations (single-difference specifications), and include state dummies. Controls are location controls on the existence of basic public services, and individual demographic characteristics (see Table 2a, top and middle panels). Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level. Wild bootstrap method follows Cameron et al (2008), with null hypothesis imposed, weights -1 and 1, and 1000 replications. Randomization inference uses all 4096 placebo treatment vectors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

- **Effects of the campaign on voting behavior - turnout:**
 - Turnout increases 7-11 percentage points

Table 5: Regressions of voting behavior


dependent variable ---->		voting					
		pdp presidential		ac presidential		anpp presidential	
treatment effect	coefficient	0.093*	0.083***	-0.054*	-0.074***	0.018	0.061**
	standard error	(0.048)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.038)	(0.028)
	p-value wild bootstrap	0.114	0.080*	0.166	0.108	0.702	0.278
	p-value randomization inference	0.101	0.023**	0.116	0.028**	0.574	0.059*
number of observations		1,143	1,126	1,143	1,126	1,143	1,126
mean dep. variable (control)		0.337	0.343	0.190	0.189	0.109	0.110
dependent variable ---->		incumbent gubernatorial		second party gubernatorial		third party gubernatorial	
treatment effect	coefficient	0.103**	0.128***	-0.031	0.034	0.033	0.004
	standard error	(0.052)	(0.042)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.035)
	p-value wild bootstrap	0.084*	0.084*	0.320	0.370	0.382	0.998
	p-value randomization inference	0.146	0.054*	0.254	0.119	0.441	0.938
number of observations		1,143	1,125	1,143	1,125	1,143	1,125
mean dep. variable (control)		0.455	0.458	0.122	0.124	0.075	0.076
controls		No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: All regressions are OLS. All dependent variables are binary. All regressions are based on post-election observations (single-difference specifications), and include state dummies. Controls are location controls on the existence of basic public services, and individual demographic characteristics (see Table 2a, top and middle panels). Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level. Wild bootstrap method follows Cameron et al (2008), with null hypothesis imposed, weights -1 and 1, and 1000 replications. Randomization inference uses all 4096 placebo treatment vectors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

• Effects of the campaign on voting behavior – party/candidate choice:

- Benefiting PDP (presidential) and incumbents (gubernatorial)
- Harming Abubakar (AC) (presidential)

**Figure 4: Actual violence from journals vs. treatment
- averages per location, post-campaign data**



Note: Each datapoint represents average violence for an experimental location. Physical violence is between 0 and 1. Those occurrences where physical violence happened were coded 1; otherwise they were given value 0. The intensity score is between 1 and 5, from lowest to highest intensity.

Table 6: Regressions of actual violence (journals)

dependent variable ----->		physical violence		intensity score	
treatment effect	coefficient	-0.425**	-0.468**	-0.486*	-0.558*
	standard error	(0.208)	(0.198)	(0.292)	(0.287)
	p-value wild bootstrap	0.068*	0.040**	0.092*	0.062*
	p-value randomization inference	0.022**	0.021**	0.112	0.091*
number of observations		131	131	131	131
mean dep. variable (control)		0.500	0.500	2.703	2.703
location controls		No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: All regressions are OLS. Each observation corresponds to an incident; observations are weighted in order to focus on intensity (by giving the same weight to each location). Intensity is classified on a scale between 1 and 5. First two columns consider 1-2 to be 0, and 3-5 to be 1, i.e., events involving physical confrontation take value 1. All regressions include state dummies. Location controls are indicator variables on the existence of basic public services (see top panel of Table 2). Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level. Wild bootstrap method follows Cameron et al (2008), with null hypothesis imposed, weights -1 and 1, and 1000 replications. Randomization inference uses all 4096 placebo treatment vectors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

- **Effects of the campaign on violence – journals:**
 - Campaign leads to a decrease in the intensity of violence

Table 7: Regressions of campaign spillover

dependent variable —>		political freedom and conflict - general	local electoral violence - from the top	local empowerment - from the bottom	crime - perceptions and experience	postcard
direct treatment effect	coefficient	0.386***	0.233**	0.221**	-0.037	0.078**
	coefficient	0.336***	0.260**	0.131	0.062	-0.008
spillover treatment effect	standard error	(0.110)	(0.111)	(0.142)	(0.119)	(0.059)
	p-value wild bootstrap	0.080*	0.022**	0.394	0.628	0.902
	p-value randomization inference	0.035**	0.002***	0.013**	0.982	0.950
number of observations		862	1,739	1,724	1,743	863
mean dep. variable (control)		0.001	-0.005	-0.012	-0.008	0.342

Note: All regressions are OLS. All dependent variables and specifications are as in Tables 4 and 5, with state dummies and controls. The sample is composed of the treatment oversample and control groups. Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level. Wild bootstrap method follows Cameron et al (2008), with null hypothesis imposed, weights -1 and 1, and 1000 replications. Randomization inference uses all 40% placebo treatment vectors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

- **Spillovers of the campaign on main outcomes:**
 - Comparable effects on general and local violence from the top

Table 7: Regressions of campaign spillover

dependent variable —>		turnout		voting	
		presidential	gubernatorial	pdp presidential	incumbent gubernatorial
direct treatment effect	coefficient	0.073**	0.111***	0.083***	0.128***
spillover treatment effect	coefficient	-0.034	-0.016	-0.020	0.004
	standard error	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.030)	(0.035)
	p-value wild bootstrap	0.566	0.792	0.598	0.968
	p-value randomization inference	0.647	0.878	0.713	0.953
number of observations		859	857	859	857
mean dep. variable (control)		0.657	0.696	0.343	0.458

Note: All regressions are OLS. All dependent variables and specifications are as in Tables 4 and 5, with state dummies and controls. The sample is composed of the treatment oversample and control groups. Standard errors reported; these are corrected by clustering at the location (census area) level. Wild bootstrap method follows Cameron et al (2008), with null hypothesis imposed, weights -1 and 1, and 1000 replications. Randomization inference uses all 4096 placebo treatment vectors. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

- **Spillovers of the campaign on main outcomes:**
 - No effects on empowerment or voting behavior

5. Concluding Remarks

- AAIN's campaign was effective at decreasing the intensity of real violent events, implying that the behavior of politicians who use intimidation as an electoral strategy was influenced
- We suggest that the campaign worked through increased perceptions of local safety and empowerment of the population
- It also led to boosted voter participation and electoral penalization of candidates perceived to use intimidation
- These findings indicate that:
 - Violence seems to dramatically decrease voter turnout
 - Violence seems to be coming from marginal political groups (terrorism)