

Working paper

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# Analysing the Impact of Overseas Migration and Workers' Remittances in Khyber Pakhtunkhaw

Suggested Measures  
for Maximizing  
Development Benefits

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**(STUDY CONDUCTED FOR IGC PAKISTAN)**

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# **ANALYSING THE IMPACT OF OVERSEAS MIGRATION AND WORKERS' REMITTANCES IN KHYBER PAKHTUNKHAW (KP): SUGGESTED MEASURES FOR MAXIMISING DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS**

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## **1. Introduction**

Since the mid-1970s, when the dramatic increase in oil prices and resulting economic boom induced large scale temporary and circular labour migration to the Middle East region, Pakistan has been actively participating in sending its workers to the region as well as to other parts of the world particularly the UK, North America and Europe as new job opportunities also opened up in these countries. In turn Pakistan has been recipient of remittances from these workers including many now permanently settled abroad to their families staying back home as well as for themselves in building up their assets and savings in a country with which they still feel deeply associated. In 2012-13, Pakistan received an estimated US\$ 13 billion as workers' remittances through the formal (banking) channels which were almost 60 per cent of its total export earnings and over 5 percent of its GDP (GOP, 2013).

During the last three decades, a considerable body of literature has examined in the context of Pakistan the effects of overseas labour migration and remittances on domestic economic growth, employment generation and poverty reduction as well as its broader socio-economic consequences for the society. However, there is a dearth of regional or province-level studies, mainly because the data on emigration and remittances are managed at the national level. Khyber Pakhtunkhaw (KP) is no exception in this regard, though its contribution in emigration of workers is well documented. Also given the security and conflict situation existing in many parts of the province, which are also areas of high migration. recent studies have also focused on the role of remittances in developing coping strategies, community resilience and human security as well as in rebuilding of assets destroyed in the conflict. A common perception is that every third household in KP has a family member working abroad, and most probably these household receive remittances from their members.

Some of the important questions which have not been adequately addressed relate to: (i) what is the stock and flow of migrants from KP to different parts of the world and the proportion of annual remittance to Pakistan which is transferred by these migrants to KP? How are these remittances used by the receiving households of KP and its impact on the provincial and local economy including in conflict-stricken areas? What are the future prospects of overseas migration from KP and how is the demand for skilled and educated migrants changing in different parts of the world? What measures can be taken to increase the flow of migration from KP to better paid and higher skilled jobs overseas and to create an enabling environment which results in the remittances being sent back to KP having a favorable impact on the provincial economy as well as on the families left behind? This study examines these issues within the limitations of available data.

## 2. Data Sources

Statistics on the inflows of annual remittances, as produced by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), are arranged by source countries, with no information on end recipients. The share of KP in these flows can thus be only indirectly estimated by the stock of overseas workers from KP and the amount transferred home by them. But data on the stock of overseas Pakistanis by province or region are not available. With this major constraint, the present study has used data from different sources to estimate the share of KP in the stock of overseas Pakistanis and to determine its share in annual flows of remittances. For the stock estimation, the study has used emigration statistics produced regularly by the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE) and the stock data as reported by different official agencies. The micro-data files of two household surveys, the 2010-11 Pakistan Socio-economic Living Standard Measurement (PSLM) and 2010 Pakistan Panel Household Survey (PPHS), have also been used to estimate average remittances sent home by workers from KP. In addition to the 2010 PPHS, the study has used the micro-data of 2009 Household Survey on Overseas Migration and Remittances (HSOMR) carried out by Arif (2009) for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to understand the uses of remittances and the preferences of household for their utilization. It is worth noting that none of these data sources, except the PSLM, is representative at the national or province level. But, in the absence of such representative surveys, these data sources have provided adequate information to accomplish the objectives of this study. A brief field visit of a rural area in Mardan district, which has a large share of migrants in its population, was also undertaken to understand better and get a feel for the migration dynamics in KP.

## 3. Estimating the Share of KP in Stock of Overseas Pakistanis


The BEOE maintains record of those Pakistanis who go abroad for temporary employment since their registration with the Bureau is mandatory. The statistics on annual placement of Pakistanis in overseas labour markets are available by country of their destinations, occupation and districts of origin. Table 1 shows such data for 1981-2013 periods by province of origin, computed from the available district-level statistics. An interesting feature of the data presented in this table is that KP has consistently maintained its share of around 25 percent in the annual placement throughout the 1981-2013 periods. In other words, every fourth Pakistani who went abroad through the BEOE or Protector of Emigrants belongs to KP. This share is almost double of the KPK share in total population of the country (Appendix Table 1).

KP is the only province that has a much larger share in the annual outflows of workers than its share in the total population (Figure 1). The BEOE data show that several districts of KP are among the high-emigration districts of Pakistan including Dir, Swat, Mardan, Peshawar, Swabi and Mansehra being on the list of these districts (Appendix Tables 2 and 3). Both Sindh and Baluchistan have much lower shares in emigration than their shares in total population. The Punjab share in migration is almost equal to its share in total population (Figure 1). The situation of FATA in terms of its share in the annual placement of workers appears to be similar to KP (Figure 1).

**Table-1: Distribution (%) of Overseas Pakistani Workers by Province Region of Origin, 1981-2013.**

Province/region	Punjab	Sindh	KP	Balochistan	AJK	G&B	FATA	Total (%)	Total (No.)
1981-2003	51.25	9.99	25.4	1.23	6.49	0.07	5.57	100	2763314
2004	55.83	6.85	24.71	1.84	6.38	0.16	4.23	100	173824
2005	54.5	9.26	24.7	2.18	6.30	0.26	3.79	100	142135
2006	54.69	8.1	24.5	1.85	6.54	0.2	4.18	100	183191
2007	53.76	7.12	26.73	1.29	6.80	0.13	4.18	100	287033
2008	47.94	7.37	30.54	1.58	7.41	0.09	5.07	100	430314
2009	49.88	7.63	28.41	1.11	7.76	0.13	5.09	100	403528
2010	52.51	8.77	27.08	0.86	6.21	0.13	4.46	100	362904
2011	50.06	8.79	28.48	1.15	7.25	0.16	4.11	10	456893
2012	53.54	7.3	27.62	0.80	6.08	0.12	4.54	100	638587
2013	53.59	8.46	24.5	1.45	6.41	0.18	5.41	100	473563
Total %	51.74	8.81	26.42	1.25	6.63	0.11	5.04	100	
(1981-2013) Nos	3267750	556088	1668244	78938	418835	7029	318403		6315286

*Source:* BEOE, 2013



*Source:* BEOE, 2013; GOP, 2013


However, based on these statistics on the annual placement of workers abroad, it is not possible to estimate the flows of remittances to KP for two reasons. First, temporary employments abroad of Pakistanis are not limited to the Middle East region. But, the annual placement data of BEOE aggregated by countries or regions of destinations show that almost all Pakistani workers (98%) processed by the Bureau during the 1981-2013 period were placed in the Middle East (Table 2). Thus, the earlier shown 25 percent share of KP in emigration (Figure 1) reflects almost entirely the Middle East labour market situation only.

Second, also large inflows of remittances to Pakistan come from outside the Middle East, namely the USA, UK and other countries. The study by Amjad et al. (2012) has documented, based on the State Bank of Pakistan data, that about half of the annual flows of workers' remittances are from countries in North America, particularly USA and Canada, and Europe mainly UK. A large number of Pakistanis are living and working in these countries (or regions). Thus, unless the share of KP in the total stock of Pakistanis including non-Middle East regions is estimated, it is not possible to determine its share in total remittances. This estimation is not straightforward because half of the total stock of overseas Pakistanis is found in regions other than the Middle East (Figure 2), and there is no information about the share of workers from KP in North American, Europe and other regions of the World.

**Table-2: Distribution (%) of Pakistanis who went abroad through BEOE during 1981-2013 period by country of destination**

United Arab Emirates	30.8
Saudi Arabia	51.2
Oman	8.0
Kuwait	2.6
Bahrain	1.8
Qatar	1.5
Others countries of the Middle East	2.5
Rest of the world	1.6
All	100

*Source:* BEOE, 2013.



Based on certain assumptions, an attempt has been made to estimate the share of KP in the total 6.7 million stock of overseas Pakistanis estimated in Amjad et.al. (2012). Table 3 presents three scenarios. Under the first high-scenario, the KP share of 25 percent in the Middle East is also assumed for other parts of the world; accounting for the stock of KP migrants 1.675 million. However, it is difficult to accept this assumption of 25 percent for two reasons. First, it is well documented that in UK, where more than a million Pakistanis are settled, migrants are primarily from AJK (Mirpur) and North Punjab (Jhelum and Rawalpindi). Second, no concentration of KP workers has been identified in North America, where another million Pakistanis are settled. However, available statistics show that about 11% of Pakistani-origin in UK are Pushto speaking. This percentage is close to the 13% share of KP in total population of Pakistan. During our brief field visit of a rural area of Mardan district, undertaken as part of this study, we found few families of the area have their members working in UK and USA. Migration to Italy from *Jahangira* in Hazara district of KP and some other towns in KP is well known. Thus, under the second scenario, it is assumed that the share of KP workers in countries other than Middle East is according to its share of 13 percent in the total population. This assumption, however, may overestimate the KP share among overseas Pakistanis migrants. So under the third scenario, the assumed share of KP in regions other than Middle East has reduced from 13 percent to 10 percent.

The stock of KP workers among the total overseas Pakistanis is calculated as 1.675 million, 1.273 million, and 1.177 million under the high, medium and low scenarios respectively, with a share varying between 17.5 percent and 25 percent. In short, KP is likely to have more than a million migrants abroad and could be as high as almost 2 million.

**Table-3: Estimating the Share of KP in the Stock of Overseas Pakistan**

Region	Stock of Overseas Pakistanis (million)	Assumed % share of KPK in the stock	Stock of KP migrants abroad (million)
<b>Scenario One – high</b>			
Middle East	3.35	25%	0.8375
North America	1.20	25%	0.3000
United Kingdom	1.20	25%	0.3000
Other countries	0.95	25%	0.2375
All	6.70	(25%)	1.6750
<b>Scenario Two – medium</b>			
Middle East	3.35	25%	0.8375
North America	1.20	13%	0.1560
United Kingdom	1.20	13%	0.1560
Other countries	0.95	13%	0.1235
All	6.70	(19%)	1.2730
<b>Scenario Three – low</b>			
Middle East	3.35	25%	0.8375
North American	1.20	10%	0.1200
United Kingdom	1.20	10%	0.1200
Other Countries	0.95	10%	0.0950
All	6.70	(17.5%)	1.1725

**Source:** Authors' calculation

#### 4. Estimating the Share of KP in Official Remittances

Based on the earlier HIES and more recent PSLM data we find that the share of KP in the total remittances received by the sampled households has gradually increased to 27.5 percent in 2010-11 (Table 4). However, this estimate cannot be used to calculate the share of KP in total official remittances to Pakistan and hence in its contribution to KP's GDP. This is because Irfan (2011) has empirically shown the widening gap between the HIES and official SBP data on remittances as reported in the Pakistan Economic Surveys. It would appear that HIES/PSLM type surveys have not been designed for the estimation of remittances and that remittances from the non-Middle East regions, predominantly North America and Europe (UK), where Pakistanis have settled permanently, are hardly reflected in these surveys.

The flow of remittances to KP in this study has therefore been estimated by using the data on the stock of KP workers abroad, as shown in Table 3, information on average remittances as provided by different household surveys such as PPHS,2010, HSOMR,2009 and PSLM, 2010-1011, and share of remittances coming through official sources. After the estimation of a stock, a critical information required for this estimation of remittances to KP is how much money



migrant workers send home per year. We have relied on three data sources to come up with a robust estimate. According to the HIES micro-data analysis, workers from KP sent home Rs. 191,645 per household during 2010-11; this average has gradually increased from Rs. 113,147 in 2005-06 to this current level (Table 5).

The PPHS-2010, which was conducted only in 16 districts of the country and three of them were from KP, including high-migration districts of Dir and Mardan, shows the average remittances per household as Rs. 248,436 for the year preceding the survey (Table 6). A recent study carried out in Peshawar district by Awan et. al. (2013) has shown the average monthly remittances as Rs. 37,444 (Table 7). These three data sources give a range of average annual remittances per household in KP from Rs. 200,000 to Rs. 440,000. Based on these estimates, for the present study, we used as average remittance of Rs. 300,000 sent home by KP workers in the year 2010-11.

Following the methodology adopted in Amjad et.al. and drawing on recent studies on remittances three other assumptions are made in our calculation as follows: (i) the share of workers in the stock of KPK migrants abroad is 80 percent, (ii) 80 percent of the workers send home remittances, and (iii) 70 percent of remittances are channeled through the formal or banking system.

**Table-4: Percentage Distribution of Foreign Remittance by Provinces 1996-97–2010-11**

Year	Punjab	Sindh	KPK	Balochistan
1996-97	62.5	11.5	20.4	2.6
2001-02	61.8	7.3	28.1	2.7
2005-06	68.0	4.5	26.4	1.1
2007-08	67.6	2.5	28.6	1.3
2010-11	69.9	1.5	27.5	1.1

*Source:* Estimate till 2007-08 based as Amjad et. al. (2012) and PSLM 2010-11 (based on household data using weighting factor based on sample as proportion of total households.)

**Table-5: Average Remittances/Recipient Households-Rural-Urban and Provinces**

(Pak Rs Per Year)

Years	2005-06	2007-08	2010-11
Pakistan	132626	151794	213816
Urban	137242	177336	239282
Rural	118901	143910	179519
Punjab	131477	167104	188450
Sindh	107836	172165	188450
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	113147	123084	191645
Balochistan	101165	176503	146090

*Source:* HIES and PSLMS for relevant years.

*Note:* Figures in parenthesis denote the percentage distribution of foreign remittances.

**Table-6: Average Remittances sent by International Migrants by Provinces**

Provinces	Remittances sent during last one year	Remittances last 12 years	Remittances last 5 years
Punjab	18748	33541	545390
Sindh	123333	203714	228667
KPK	248436	483636	1014833
Total	222678	426976	846039

*Source:* Authors' calculation from the 2010-PPHS micro-data.

**Table-7: Distribution of Overseas Workers' Households in Peshawar by Average Monthly Remittances Received by Them**

Remittances (Pak Rupee)	Households		Share in total amount received %	Average monthly receipts
	No	%		Rs.
Up to 250000	183	45.75	22.88	18728
25000-50000	157	39.25	39.39	37581
50000-75000	25	6.25	10.72	64200
75000-100000	24	6	13.79	86042
Over 100000	11	2.75	13.22	180000
All groups	400	100	100	37444

*Source:* Based on survey as reported in Awan et. al. (2013)

Based on these assumptions, estimates of remittances to KPK under three scenarios are presented in Table 8. In low scenario, the stock of KP emigrants is assumed as 1.1725 million while in the medium and high scenarios it is assumed as 1.273 million and 1.675 million respectively. Under these three scenarios the estimated volumes of remittances for 2010-11 are US\$ 1576 million, US\$ 1711 million and US\$ 2251 million respectively. The estimated share of KP in official remittances is 14 percent in low scenario, 15 percent in medium scenario and 20 percent in high scenario.

These estimates therefore point to a somewhat lower figure than the 27.5 percent estimated as the share of KP in total remittances in the HIES/PSLM for 2010-11. Using an average of between the medium and high scenario we estimate that based on official remittance flows into Pakistan in 2011-12 that those accruing to KP were around US \$ 2.5 billion. This would work out to be around 10 percent of the GDP of KP (based on KP's share as 11 percent of Pakistan's GDP). This share is almost double that for Pakistan. Also this figure appears to be in line with the estimate of the KP government that remittances from rest of Pakistan and abroad come to around 18 per cent of its GDP (Planning and Development Department, 2010).

**Table-8: Estimates of Flows of Workers' Remittances to KP**

<b>Assumptions for estimation of remittances to KP in 2010-11</b>	<b>Low scenario</b>	<b>Medium scenario</b>	<b>High scenario</b>
Stock of KP migrants abroad (million)	1.1725	1.2730	1.6750
Share of workers in the stock	80%	80%	80%
Percentage of workers sending remittances home	80%	80%	80%
Average annual remittances (Rs.)	300000	300000	300000
Total remittances to KP in 2010-11 (Rs. Million)	225120	244416	321600
Total remittances to KP in 2010-11 (US\$)	2251.20	2444.16	3216.00
Remittances to KP through banking (70%) (US\$ million)	1575.8	1710.9	2251.2
Total official remittances to Pakistan in 2010-11	11201	11201	11201
Share of KP (%) in total official remittances to Pakistan	14.1%	15.2%	20.1%

### 5. Uses of Remittances in KP

Three data sources have been used to examine the pattern of remittance use in KP. First, Awan et al. (2013) in their recent study in Peshawar district have shown that migrant households have used 51 percent of the total household income on consumption expenditure which includes food, health, education, housing and transport while the remaining half is used for repayment of loans, income generation (business), better quality of life (consumer durables) and asset formation (real estate, savings etc.). They termed this pattern of remittance-use in KPK (Peshawar) as rational. However, the major limitation of their analysis is that they have not separated remittances from the other sources of household income while analyzing the uses of remittances.

To overcome this limitation, the present study has used the micro-data of PPHS-2010 where migrant households were asked to give their preferences for the use of foreign remittances. The preference data has commonly been used in migration studies as a proxy for the uses of remittances. Table 9 shows three preferences of migrant households from KP. As expected, food is the first preference for the use of remittances-money while health and education are shown as the second and third preferences of these households. Housing and repayment of loan are also reported by a considerable number of households as their third preference. Savings or investment could not take a place in these preferences.

**Table-9: International Migrant Households' Preferences for the USs of Remittance Many in KP Province**

Use of Remittances	1 <sup>st</sup> Preference	2 <sup>nd</sup> Preference	3 <sup>rd</sup> Preference
	Percent	Percent	Percent
Food	81.31	1.87	0.93
Health	1.87	77.57	1.87
Education	0.00	2.80	47.66
Housing	0.00	2.80	10.28
Purchase of Land	0.00	0.00	0.93
Savings	0.00	0.93	0.93
Business	0.00	0.00	0.00
Marriages	0.00	0.00	0.00
Loan Return	0.93	1.87	8.41
Others	0.00	0.00	20.56
No Information	15.89	12.15	8.41
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00

**Source:** Authors' calculations from the PPHS-2010 micro-data files.

However, the actual uses of remittances could be different from the reported preferences of remittance-receiving households. The HSOMR-2009 has explored the uses of remittances from households having a member working in Saudi Arabia at the time of survey. The remittance-use pattern for the KPK sample is reported in Table 10, which shows that food has taken around 40 percent of remittances while 28 percent of them are used for the purchase of real estate and agriculture machinery. Consumer durables, marriages, savings, health and education are other important uses of remittances in KPK migrant households.

**Table-10: Use of total remittance Received (%) by the KP sample of Migrants working in Saudi Arabia**

Food	39.03
Health	3.64
Education	3.93
Real Estate and Agricultural Machinery	27.60
Durable Good	7.97
Marriage	8.52
Loan repayment	2.99
Saving	5.22
Donations	1.10
Total	100.00

**Source:** Authors' calculations from the HSOMR-2009 micro-data files.

It is worth noting that several factors play a role in the uses of remittances. The duration of stay of a worker probably plays a key role - income of workers earned during first couple of years is generally used for repayment of loan and meeting household basic needs. A stay of workers abroad longer than 2-3 years enables respective households to make some investment. Similarly, dependence of households on remittances in terms of meeting daily household needs during the migration period restricts the ability of households to free money for savings and investment. Education and skill levels of workers also influence the uses of remittances through their earnings and savings while abroad. Finally, investment opportunities at the place of origin and awareness about these opportunities induce households to use remittances productively.

### *Role of Remittances in Conflict or Post-Conflict Areas*

The role migrant remittances play in sustaining local livelihood during conflict as well as in rehabilitating social and physical infrastructure is now being increasingly realized. Given that a number of districts in the KP (eg. Swat, Malakand and Dir) with a large concentration of migrant households are facing such a situation the role remittances are playing in these districts in providing food and income security as well as rebuilding destroyed homes, dwellings and basic infrastructure is now being recognized and investigated.

A study conducted by Gioli et.al. (2013) based on qualitative and quantitative research in October 2012 in conflicted-affected villages with a high number of households having members working abroad in the Swat and Lower Dir districts of KP found the following:

- (i) The great majority of the workers were working in the Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia, almost all males, and working as unskilled workers (43 percent), semi-skilled (25 percent) and skilled (25 percent) and a small percentage as professionals. *Hundi* and *Hawala* were the most common way of sending remittances back home (59 percent), followed by bank transfers (26 percent) and fellow workers (8 percent).
- (ii) The major use of these remittances were in investing in real estate and construction (35 percent), business (28 percent), social ceremonies (17 percent), pilgrimage (9 percent and transport (7 percent).
- (iii) Remittances have played a critical role in ensuring survival of these households during the conflict with as high as 74 percent of the respondents (in the sample of 602 households) reported to have avoided starvation due to remittances as all normal activity came to a standstill due to prolonged curfews and on-going violence.
- (iv) In the aftermath of the conflict remittances provided the major source for reconstruction of livelihoods in 23 percent of the people surveyed. Remittances also play an important role in the rebuilding of the local economy.

A similar kind of situation arose in the aftermath of the 2010 floods and remittances similarly played an important role in the rebuilding of infrastructure while sustaining livelihoods during and immediately after the floods which had also destroyed standing crops and washed away roads, shops and destroyed other economic activities and means of livelihood.

Sadly, KP is increasingly becoming prone to such conflict and natural disasters and the role of remittances in coping with this situation becomes exceedingly important.

## 6. An Analysis of Skill Composition of Pakistani Workers Abroad

Skill level of a worker is closely associated with his/her earnings, savings and ability to remit home. It may also affect the use pattern of remittances. It is rather complicated to review the skill composition of workers placed in three regions - Middle East, North America and Europe, mainly in UK. The nature of movements of Pakistanis to each of these three regions is different. For example, migration to the Middle East is temporary in nature since workers have to return home when they complete their contracts. The types of work for which Pakistanis or migrants from other labour-exporting countries are employed depend on demand in the region. Migration of Pakistanis to UK is permanent in nature. They have settled there since 1960s. It is their second generation which is presently active in the UK labour market. Migration of Pakistanis to North America is relatively new, but it is permanent as well.

A review of literature on movements of Pakistanis to UK and USA does not provide sufficient information about their skill level. It, however, enables to understand the nature of their jobs. In UK, British Pakistanis are found in the highest ranking business and professional occupations: over 7,000 Pakistani doctors and a further 8,000 dentists currently work for the national health system of UK. However, the majority of British Pakistanis is likely to be self-employed than any other ethnic group in UK. Pakistani men are most likely to work in the transport and logistics industry, most as cab drivers and taxi drivers. One in seven British Pakistanis works as a taxi driver, cab driver or chauffeur. In 2004, 31 percent of working-age British Pakistani women were economically active, with a high unemployment rate of 20 percent. Many of the employed Pakistani women work as packers, bottlers, canners, fillers, or sewing machinists. The literature also shows that the present generation of Pakistanis in UK has improved its education and skill level and they are placed better in UK labour market than the first generation of migrants.

Oda (2009) has examined some important dimensions of Pakistanis in USA, and shows that:

The 2005 *American Community Survey* undertaken by the US Census Bureau shows that among the male Pakistani population aged 25 years and over, 60.9 percent had bachelor's degree or higher while the American average for the same category was 28.5 percent. Among female Pakistani residents aged 25 years and over, the figure was 45.0 percent while the US female average was 26.0 percent...This gap in educational levels probably explains differences in the levels of earnings. In 2005, the mean and median incomes for Pakistani male full-time workers in the United States were US\$59,310 and US\$42,718 respectively, while those for American male full-time workers were US\$56,724 and US\$41,965. Similarly, the figures for Pakistani female full-time workers are also higher than those of American female workers. From these figures, it can be said that Pakistani workers earn more because of their relatively high educational levels. But the difference seems rather small compared to the difference in educational levels between the American average figures and those for the Pakistani immigrants.

All these findings of Oda show the ability of Pakistanis to remit home large sums. Pakistan needs to harness this potential.

For the present study, skill composition of workers in the Middle East is more relevant than workers in other regions of the world because of temporary nature of migration in the former. Table 11 presents the skill composition of Pakistani workers in the Middle East for the period 1981-2013, based on the BEOE data. The professional and semi-professional category includes professionals with high levels of education, such as doctors, engineers and, teachers. The jobs that require some training, formal or informal, are included in the “skilled” and “semi-skilled” categories, including technicians, electricians, drivers, masons, carpenters, cook, tailors, etc. Labourers and agriculture workers are included in the “unskilled” category.

**Table-11: Distribution (%) of Migrant Workers in the Middle East by Occupation**

<b>Year of Migration</b>	<b>Professional Workers</b>	<b>Skilled Workers</b>	<b>Semi-Skilled Workers</b>	<b>Unskilled Workers</b>	<b>All</b>
1971-2003	4.91	30.22	21.66	43.21	100
2004	4.49	34.23	18.65	42.63	100
2005	5.57	31.25	19.23	43.95	100
2006	6.01	29.01	18.11	46.88	100
2007	4.80	27.55	17.59	50.06	100
2008	4.41	34.06	13.78	47.74	100
2009	3.42	35.59	16.40.	44.59	100
2010	3.68.	35.73	18.36.	42.23	100
2011	4.23	32.70	18.86	44.21	100
2012	4.11	33.40	21.88	40.61	100
2013	5.18	35.64	21.62	37.57	100
<b>1971-2013</b>	<b>4.65</b>	<b>31.87</b>	<b>20.13</b>	<b>43.34</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source:* BEOE, 2013

Table 11 shows unskilled workers as the dominant category, followed by skilled/semi-skilled and professional workers. The proportion of unskilled workers leaving the country rose from 42 percent in 2004 to 50 percent in 2008, and then declined to 41 percent in 2012. These workers are less educated and more vulnerable to exploitative recruitment practices. The proportion of skilled workers leaving the country declined from more than 34 per cent in early 2004 to 28 percent by 2007. For more recent period, this proportion has fluctuated between 33 percent and 36 percent (Table 11). Since the 1990s, there has been a general tendency in the Middle East to hire more professionals and skilled workers as opposed to unskilled and semi-skilled workers. The skill composition of other Asian workers, such as Indians, has changed due to this shift in

demand (Srivastava and Sasikumar, 2005); the composition of Pakistani workers, however, has not witnessed a shift towards more skilled workers (Table 11).

Awan et al. (2013) has recently examined the skill composition of 421 emigrants from Peshawar district of KPK before migration and while abroad. They have shown that more than 70 percent of these workers had some skills before migration, and these skills were obtained through some training, formal or informal. Table 12 compares occupations of these 421 workers from KP before migration and while abroad. Some interesting observations are as follows. First, it appears that many skilled and semi-skilled workers have accepted the job of labourers in the Middle East, particularly electricians, welders and drivers. Their skill level could be low or in fact there was no demand for the skill they learned in Pakistan before migration. Second, these are the professionals, engineers, doctors and computer operators, who were able to get a job in the Middle East according to their education or skill level before migration. Interestingly, the category of carpenters has not lost its share in the Middle East labour market (Table 12).

**Table-12: Skill Composition of Current Emigrants before Migration and While abroad Peshawar KP**

Occupation	Before Migration	While Abroad
Drivers	25.2	34.6
Computer Operators	2.6	3.4
Welders	3.8	0
Labourers	27.6	41.7
Factory/Construction Workers	14.8	0
Electricians	10.5	4.9
Technicians	1.4	1.1
Carpenters	6.0	6.0
Accountants	0.7	1.1
Engineers	5.0	5.6
Teachers	1.9	1.1
Doctors	0.5	0.4
All	100	100
(N)	(421)	(421)

*Source:* Awan et al. (2013)

From this brief description, it is not possible to show the skills for which the demand is relatively higher in the Middle East. However, it reveals the fact that skill does matter in finding a better job in the region. In Pakistan, there are several programmes for enhancing the skills of workers, but their scope and coverage remain low. The country has technical,



vocational and apprenticeship training centres and programmes. The Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority was recently established. The national Training Board works under the Ministry of Labour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis, which has set up five skill development councils, one each in Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and Quetta. In 2006, the National Vocational and Technical Education Commission was established. There is a need to evaluate all these programs to make them relevant for domestic as well as overseas labour markets' demand.

## **7. Changing Global Demand for Migrants and Possibilities for Increasing Overseas Migration from KP.**

We examine current and future trends in demand for labour primarily in the Middle-East and industrialized countries as well as the changing skill composition and higher educational qualifications needed from prospective migrants. This analysis should assist in putting in place suitable educational and skills development policies and programmes that could equip migrants from KP to find employment in these markets as well as result in higher remittances.

### *Changing Skills demand in the Middle-East*

The major destination of migrants from the KP starting in the 1970s has been the Middle-East mainly the GCC countries namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The model adopted by these countries since the late 1970s in relying on migrant workers to drive economic growth mainly through the use of their oil revenues has delivered considerable benefits to the region in terms of substantial improvements in living standards over several decades. It also resulted in low inflation despite high economic growth as well as overcoming the "Dutch Disease" of overvalued exchange rates which inflicts economies driven by very high dependence on natural resource in this case oil. This growth and recourse to migrant workers has also had a major positive impact on improving incomes of migrants and their families left behind as well as in reducing poverty in the labour sending countries through remittances as most of these workers were either semi skilled or unskilled and came from low income groups.

Pakistan was one of the countries that benefited considerably from this boom in the Middle-East in terms of overseas migration and remittances. KP has shown in the earlier section benefited more than the other provinces of Pakistan in terms of its share of migrants going abroad in relation to its population as well as the proportion of households receiving remittances mainly from the Middle-East.

Most of the workers from Pakistan as well as KP were unskilled workers. As shown in Table 11 of the workers going abroad (of whom around 97 percent were to the Middle-East) around 44 percent were unskilled, 20 percent semi-skilled, 32 percent in the skilled category and just under 5 percent as professional workers.

While the earlier phase of development in the GCC countries was dominated by construction activities the skill mix has overtime changed with new sectors emerging of which services was

the major sector. As Table 13 shows the current occupational distribution of citizens and foreigners for latest available years in three countries namely Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (which would be fairly well representative of all GCC countries including UAE) the largest category of foreign workers are in sales and services, almost 42 per cent, followed by professional and technical categories at 12 percent. Also the share of services in total employment has increased over recent years and this share is expected to go up further as these countries diversify their pattern of economic growth.

**Table-13: Occupational distribution of citizens and foreigners (latest available year)**

Occupation	Bahrain (2008) <sup>a</sup>		Kuwait (2010) <sup>b</sup>		KSA (2008) <sup>a</sup>	
	Citizen	Foreigners	Citizen	Foreigners	Citizen	Foreigners
Professional/Technical	13.5	8.8	26.8	8.8	27.9	11.9
Administrative	17.4	3.2	1.7	1.5	7.2	1.7
Clerical/related	23.5	1.3	61.5	10.8	13.8	2.4
Sales workers	6.3	4.7	0.9	5.8	5.2	13.5
Services	7.0	12.8	5.0	28.0	36.1	28.8
Agricultural, Animal Husbandry, Fishing & Hunting	0.4	0.6	0.0	1.5	2.6	6.3
Production workers & Laborers	3.18	68.5	4.2	43.6	7.4	35.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>79,193</b>	<b>352,812</b>	<b>340,227</b>	<b>1,605,199</b>	<b>3,678,600</b>	<b>4,278.232</b>

*Source:* Shah (2013)

If we compare Pakistan's skill pattern in the GCC countries with the Philippines as shown in Table 14 we find that around 45 percent of its workers in the Middle-East are in services and around 12 percent are professionals though it should be kept in mind that a significant number of these are female migrants.

**Table-14: Annual outflow from selected countries of origin according to skill level (latest available year)**

Country of Origin	Year	Number	%	Receiving countries
<b>Pakistan</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>287,033</b>	<b>100.0</b>	
Highly qualified		7,232	2.5	
Highly skilled		26,601	9.3	

Skilled		103,248	35.9	GCC and others
Semi-skilled		6,253	2.2	
Unskilled		143,699	50.1	
<b>Philippines</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>340,279</b>	<b>100.00</b>	
Professional		41,835	12.3	GCC and others
Administration & managerial		1,439	0.4	
Clerical		10,706	3.1	
Sales		7,242	2.1	
Services		154,535	45.5	
Agricultural		1,122	0.3	
Production		120,647	35.5	
Others		2,753	0.8	

*Source:* Shah 92013)

There are a number of important structural changes taking place in the GCC economies which will impact on their demand for migrant labour both in terms of absolute numbers as well as their skill composition. The most important of these is the rapid growth of working-age population in these countries as well as high levels of unemployment in the existing labour force especially among the women and the young. Also at present a large proportion of nationals in these countries are working in the public sector but here too in terms of costs and functions a limit is being reached.

A number of labour market reform measures are therefore being taken to facilitate entry of nationals into private sector jobs with a major focus on quality improvements in education and training. Quotas are also being put in place and more forcefully implemented than earlier for private sector firms to fill in positions with nationals. Other measures suggested include liberalizing the domestic mobility of the large foreign work force which is at present considerably restricting through the strict enforcement of a sponsoring system for a particular job. With plans to diversify the economy to more non-oil sectors in manufacturing to support higher productivity jobs the focus would shift to hiring skilled-foreign workers and a lower reliance on low-skilled workers. This would result in higher wages in private sector jobs and together with less attractive emoluments in public sector employment may attract nationals to work in the private sector (IMF, 2013).

These labour market reforms could also impact unfavorably over time on remittances to the labour-sending countries. While Pakistan and KP should be fully cognizant of these structural changes in the long term a careful analysis of projected demand in the short- to medium-term suggests that dependence on migrant labour would continue but the skill composition would change. An important reason for this is the cost advantage accruing to private firms in hiring migrants with private sector wages being significantly lower for foreign labour as compared to those for nationals with similar educational levels. In Saudi Arabia for example the differential is

over four times for those with primary and below education, two and a half times for those with intermediate level education and only slightly lower for those with tertiary education (IMF, 2013a). Governments in these countries are also finding it difficult to enforce quotas in private sector firms who have pointed out the low job commitment and inadequate training of nationals. However, the trend and increased focus on hiring high skilled workers will continue.

An area of concern that always remains for the labour-sending countries is any sudden decline in demand for overseas workers which could adversely impact on current outflows as well as accelerate return migration as happened in Dubai in 2008 following the global financial meltdown.

The current economic outlook for GCC economies based on projected oil prices and their very high levels of foreign exchange reserves is that economic growth is expected to be robust over the next three years at 4.6 percent in 2014 and 4.7 percent in 2015 and 2016. While this growth will be somewhat lower than the 6.4 percent in 2011 and 5.7 percent in 2012 it would still be higher than the estimated 4.1 per cent in 2013 (World Bank, 2014). Changes in global oil prices and demand would still be important. Over the last few years oil prices have been subject to downward pressures due to an increase in unconventional oil production in the USA and weak global demand but supply uncertainties in the Middle-East have led to an upward pressure on oil prices. The IMF outlook is that in the face of both upside risk (increase in oil prices due to increased regional and global tensions) and downside risk (due to excess) supply the outlook though uncertain remains broadly balanced for oil prices and growth in GCC countries (IMF,2013).

In the medium term, till 2020, studies suggest that despite a range of efforts to encourage employment of nationals the GCC countries it will remain dependent on foreign labour and will continue to grow even though at a somewhat slower pace. There will be, however, a greater focus on manufacturing as the region moves away from low value-added commodity production of crude oil. There will be greater emphasis on producing more refined oil products as well as in setting up new employment generating industries that build up on their comparative advantage of their large oil and gas resources (EIU, 2009).

To summarise the implications for KP of expected future growth trends and structural changes in the GCC countries would be: (i) to gear up to the current and more accelerated shift into higher paid jobs in services including in the fast growing tourist sector such as hotels and shopping malls as well as airport and airline services in which large expansions are planned building on their current major occupation in these countries as drivers and unskilled workers; (ii) to prepare for and target higher wage jobs in manufacturing expected over the next five years; (iii) take advantage of major planned events such as the Dubai World Expo Trade Fair in 2020 and the soccer World Cup in 2022; and (iv) to cater to the increased demand for food imports from the region which can boost agricultural exports from KP.

#### *Despite global economic slowdown rising immigration into the Industrialised OECD Countries*

A major change which has taken place in the last decade and a half is the increasing amount of remittances into Pakistan from countries outside the Middle-East mainly the USA and UK but

also Europe, East-Asia and Australia. A major reason behind this increase is the increasing number of migrants from Pakistan to these countries.

Official estimates placed migrants from Pakistan in OECD countries at just over 800,000 in 2005/06. However, these numbers have substantially increased with officially recorded migration at 74,000 in 2007, 77,000 in 2009 and 105,000 in 2011. In missing years the numbers would be around the same (OECD, 2013). As distinct from temporary or circular migration to the Middle-East where the average stay of migrants is between 4 to 10 years these are mainly permanent migrants who are also granted nationality depending on the rules of countries where they settle. Also just over half of migrants of Pakistani origin settling in OECD countries are highly educated including women at around 40 percent.

Immigration flows into the OECD countries have been increasing in recent years though at a lower pace compared to the pre-crisis 2008 levels. In 2011 total permanent immigration overall in OECD countries was higher than 2010 at just under 4 million. Temporary labour migration was just below 2 million and a large number of students from countries around the world study in OECD countries. India and China continued to be the most important origin countries with 240, 000 immigrants into OECD in 2011 and 529,000 respectively in 2011 compared to 105,000 from Pakistan.

Nearly half the migrants from Asia are highly educated. In the USA, for example China and India each received about one in six of the First Priority Green Cards issued for those classified as extraordinary ability, outstanding researchers and top executives. Interestingly in 2010 in Denmark 73 percent of recipients of Provisional Green Cards came from Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and China. Highly educated migrants are health care professionals as well as those working science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEMS).

The top ten industries in the OECD countries and separately for the USA with the largest changes in foreign born employment between 2007-08 till 2012 are shown in Table ... below.

**Table-15: OECD/USA: Ten Industries with the Largest Changes in Foreign Born Employment**

<b>OECD</b>	<b>Change +(000)</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>Change +(000)</b>
Domestic personnel	210	Professional & Technical	235
Residential activities	206	Health care (except hospitals)	232
Education	175	Food services	139
Services to building & landscape activities	150	Personal and Laundry	126
Crop and animal prdn.	129	Educational services	119
Retail Trade	127	Food Manufacturing	90
Health Activities	117	Public Administration	74

Food & Beverage service	91	Administrative and support services	69
Accommodation	82	Agriculture	51

*Source:* OECD (2012)

Demand for migrant labour in the European Union (EU) within the OECD is primarily driven by the demographic decline in the working age population since 2010 and which is expected to profoundly effect the EU labour market till 2040. Also demographic ageing increases the dependency ratio and poses considerable challenges for sustaining economic growth. Hence the recourse to increased immigration (see Foutakis, 2003 for details).

In other OECD countries the reasons vary and are driven by the urge to tap and attract highly educated and skilled migrants to remain at the cutting-edge of new technology and increase global competitiveness as in the USA, to overcome skill shortages or because the nationals are not prepared to undertake manual or what may be considered to be “dirty or dangerous” jobs as in Japan.

Since migration to these countries is primarily of highly educated and skilled people a question often raised is whether sending countries should encourage such outmigration given their demand and need in the national economy as well as the fact that the government has invested through subsidizing their education especially in expensive engineering and medical colleges and universities. Therefore should not countries like Pakistan encourage only the migration of low skilled or unskilled workers where its comparative advantage lies?

This viewpoint has changed considerably over the years. In a fast globalizing world migration is seen as an important means for countries to take advantage of globalization and integrating themselves more closely in the global economy as well the large remittance inflows that are now at over US 400 billion in 2013 and almost four times the size of aid and loan inflows into the developing world. The term now increasingly used is of “brain-gain” rather than “brain-drain” to characterise such flows from developing to developed countries (see Haas, 2007 and Sirkeci, et. al. 2012). The more important question raised as a result of such migration is how to best tap the potential of the highly qualified and educated Pakistani diaspora including through attracting them to return for short-term assignments in educational or research institutions as well as the private and public sector or attract them to invest in Pakistan.

What has been the share of migrants to the OECD countries from KP? Unfortunately the available data is only at the national level but given the current security situation and law and order concerns this could be substantive in recent years. Has this led to a shortage of skills and professionals or entrepreneurs in KP? To answer this question would need a more in-depth analysis but such shortages have not been reported or pointed to in recent studies. The emphasis should remain on ensuring supply of educated and skilled people but in planning for this take into account demand from overseas.

## 8. **Policy Conclusions and Recommendations -Maximising the Development Benefits for KP from International Labour Migration**

The significant contribution of international labour migration to the economy of KP clearly emerges from the preceding analysis. We now examine the issue of possible steps and measures that can be undertaken to more fully realize the benefits that can accrue from this migration to both the economy of KP as well as to the migrant's family during his stay abroad as well as on his return.

Given the existing high unemployment and high growth rate of the labour force while accelerating the pace of domestic employment generation must remain the major priority of the KP government clearly in the short to medium term given the pressures on the labour market overseas migration can provide a safety valve to releasing some of this pressure as well as bringing in an increasing amount of remittances, which through their multiplier impact on the economy, can create more jobs as well as improve living standards and reduce poverty levels. Also as we have seen remittances from overseas migrants have played a critical role for families and communities in coping with the conflict and security situation by providing them income and food security as well as in rebuilding assets destroyed in the conflict.

With these benefits in mind there is need to examine policies that could lead to an increase in migration from KP to the major labour-receiving countries as well as through an up-gradation of skills and higher educational qualifications of prospective migrants that would make possible an increase in migrants earnings abroad as well as in total remittances sent back to KP. At the same time there would be need to monitor possible shortages in skills and professionals that may arise as a result of overseas migration and therefore education and skills training plans and policies would need to take these into account.

However, in identifying the specific role the KP government can play in maximizing development benefits from overseas migration a number of considerations must be kept in mind. The first is that overseas migration is still under the preview of the Federal government and a separate Ministry/Division handles this subject ( Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resources Development) including supervising a number of agencies and organisations which have been set-up to regulate, monitor and support overseas migration and migrants including through welfare schemes and other programmes. These bodies include the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE), Overseas Pakistanis Foundation (OPF) and the Overseas Employment Corporation (OEC). The Bureau of Emigration has licensed around 1200 Overseas Employment Promoters (OEPs) who monitor demand and then send people abroad through the regional offices of the Protectorate of Emigrants after completing required formalities as laid out in the Ordinance issued in 1979. Similarly the Overseas Pakistanis Foundation has set-up schools, colleges and hospitals to support migrant families as well housing schemes exclusively for migrants, including one such scheme very close to Peshawar.

The Provincial government clearly needs to be working closely with these organizations, and though there is little evidence or study to suggest that this is actually happening, it would be imprudent to suggest the setting up of parallel organisations at the provincial level without such an analysis. Such an exercise, however, needs to be urgently undertaken and full advantage taken of the resources being spent by the federal government on these organisations to work effectively

working in close collaboration and co-ordination with the respective provincial bodies and organizations.

As to the flows of foreign exchange through remittances into KP this is regulated by the State Bank of Pakistan as is the case for the rest of the country. Only the corresponding rupees are transferred to the migrant's accounts or that of his family. Policy measures to ensure that these remittances come through official channels (such as adoption of a market driven rather than an overvalued exchange rate) are also in the preview of the State Bank. Recent measures undertaken to increase flows through official channels such as the Pakistan Remittances Initiative (PRI) have been undertaken by the State Bank jointly with the Ministry of Finance and in collaboration with the commercial banks. These initiatives including the PRI have played an important role in diverting remittances earlier sent through *hundi* and other unofficial channels to official channels and are partly responsible for the 11-Fold increase in remittances since 2000/01 from around US \$ 1 billion in that year to an expected US \$ 15 billion in 2013-14 (See Amjad et.al. 2013).

While policies to regulate foreign remittances do not fall under the preview of the KP government it can play a role in encouraging flows through official channels including by creating conducive conditions for the setting up of branches by commercial banks (as well as the Bank of Khyber) where these do not exist (as some estimates suggest that more than half of remittances to KP are sent through official channels). An advantage that would accrue to the people of KP if this happens is that it would make possible an increase in available credit for local business activities as a result of higher deposits through remittance inflows.

What then are the main areas in which the KP government can play a role in helping maximize development benefits from overseas migration as well as in assisting migrants on return in finding productive employment and business opportunities?

Education and skills training is a provincial subject and it is primarily in this area that we strongly recommend that the KP government takes into account the existing and projected demand for skills and professions abroad in formulating its educational plans and training programmes and policies. The principal aim of such policies must be to move the current profile of migrants from KP who are mainly in the categories of semi-skilled and unskilled workers to higher and better paid skills and professions abroad.

### *Education Reforms*

Whether it is Pakistan or within it KP to compete effectively in the fast globalizing and an increasingly competitive world economy requires a high quality educated and skilled workforce. Not only higher skills are needed but also different types of skills. This is equally true for graduates and secondary school leavers whether they will work in Pakistan or abroad.

As important as basic numeracy, reading and writing skills is to develop social skills in the workforce as most new forms of work require working in teams and in getting along with members of the team and taking leadership of the team in specific tasks and activities. Seniority is no longer the only criteria for running an organization, setting up a system or leading a team. The education system must not only develop the capacity in students to think independently and



away from rote learning but also the capacity to unlearn what you may have learnt earlier to adapt to the rapid changes in technology changes especially in ICT.

An area of special importance as regards overseas migration for KP is developing the social and language skills (mainly English) in potential migrants and though this process must start at the earliest stage of education special short term courses can be held in collaboration with BEOE or OPF for potential and selected migrants who are going abroad. These courses may even be tailored for those with higher education and professional skills who are planning to go abroad or being interviewed for jobs abroad.

*Reforming the existing Vocational and Training System from a supply to being demand driven and meeting skill needs in a cost-effective manner for both the local economy as well as for overseas migration*

To meet demand for higher specific skills especially in services and manufacturing both in the Middle-East and the OECD countries reforming the existing vocational training system and taking new initiatives must be given high priority. To start with there is need to monitor demand overseas and one way of doing this is through encouraging collaboration between the Overseas Employment Promoters (OEPs) working in KP and local vocational training schools and bodies. This could help the OEPs to bid for and place a number of skilled workers in projects overseas.

The KP government may also consider learning from the initiative taken by the Punjab government which has set-up the Punjab Skills Training Programme initially in districts of Southern Punjab but which would eventually be spread to the rest of the province. The programme which primarily targets unemployed youth to equip them with skills for self-employment or setting up small businesses is also being geared to meet demand from overseas.

The KP government may also ask the BOEA to set-up website which would assist potential migrants not only from KP but also the rest of the country in accessing job opportunities abroad.

*Embedding Overseas Migration and Remittances in Provincial Planning and Concerned Departments*

While not suggesting the setting up of a separate department in the KP government to deal with issues of overseas migration it would still be important to develop capacity in the Planning and Development Department, Education and Vocational Training Department and Department of Industries to take into account the impact of migration and remittance on the provincial and local economy given its current size (variously estimated as being 10 to 15 percent of its GDP) and its role in reducing unemployment pressures in the local market.

Initially a study could be undertaken on how effectively this could be done and assigning responsibilities in existing departments with a few positions created for undertaking this task.

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**Appendix Table-1: Province-wise Population**

<b>Province/Region</b>	<b>1981</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>2013</b>
Pakistan	84.254 (100)	132.352 (100)	184.349 (100)
Punjab	472.92 (56.13)	73.621 (55.63)	100.174 (54.34)
Sindh	19.029 (22.59)	30.440 (23.00)	44.080 (23.91)
Khyber Pakhtunkhaw	11.061 (13.13)	17.744 (13.41)	24.788 (13.45)
Balochistan	4.332 (5.14)	6.566 (4.96)	9.495 (5.15)
FATA	2.199 (2.61)	3.176 (2.40)	4.410 (2.39)
Islamabad	0.340 (0.40)	0.805 (0.61)	1.401 (0.76)

**Source:** Pakistan Economic survey 2012-13, GoP, Finance Division, Economic Affairs Wing, 2013, Islamabad

**Appendix Table-2: Twenty High Migration Districts in Pakistan**

Ranking according to number of emigrants to the Middle East	Name of the Districts	2001-10		Population in 1998		Emigrants as % of district population	Ranking according to emigrants share in district population
		Migrants (Number)	% share in total migration	Population in million	% share in total population		
1	Rawalpindi	72252	7.31	3.36	2.6	2.15	6
2	Gujrat	54522	5.52	2.04	1.6	2.67	5
3	Dir	51490	5.21	1.29	1.0	3.99	1
4	Karachi	50929	5.15	9.86	7.5	0.52	17
5	Sialkot	50561	5.11	2.72	2.1	1.86	8
6	Swat	40518	4.10	1.26	1.0	3.22	3
7	Lahore	37438	3.79	6.31	4.8	0.59	16
8	Gujranwala	30294	3.06	3.40	2.6	0.89	15
9	Faisalabad	25061	2.54	5.42	4.2	0.46	19
10	DG Khan	21715	2.20	1.64	1.3	1.32	11
11	Swabi	20463	2.07	1.02	0.8	2.01	7
12	Peshawar	19452	1.97	2.01	1.5	0.97	14
13	Mardan	18517	1.87	1.46	1.1	1.27	12
14	Chakwal	17128	1.73	1.08	0.8	1.59	10
15	Kohat	16614	1.68	0.56	0.4	2.97	4
16	Sheikhupura	15550	1.57	3.32	2.5	-	18
17	Jhelum	15348	1.55	0.93	0.7	1.65	9
18	Attock	15098	1.53	1.27	1.0	1.19	13
19	Poonch	14879	1.51	0.41	0.3	3.63	2
20	Multan	14174	1.43	3.11	2.4	0.46	20
21	Sub-total (1020)	602003	59.9	52.55	40.2	1.15	-
22	Sub-total (Others)	386537	40.1	78.03	59.8	0.50	-
23	Total Country	988540	100	130.58	100.0	-	-

**Source:** Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment GoP (2011); Population Census Organization; Asghar et al. (2012)

**Appendix Table-3: High Migration Districts in Descending Order**

<b>2004</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2012</b>
Rawalpindi	Karachi	Sialkot
Gujrat	Sialkot	Karachi
Sialkot	Dir	Gujranwala
Karachi	Swat	Dir
Lahore	Faisalabad	Swat
Swat	Dera Ghazi Khan	Lahore
Dir	Gujrat	Faisalabad
Faisalabad	Rawalpindi	Dera Ghazi Khan
Gujranwala	Mardan	Gujrat
Dera Ghazi Khan	Swabi	Rawalpindi
Mardan	Peshawar	Mardan
Swabi	Mandi Bahauddin	Peshawar
Jhelum	Jhelum	Charsada
Peshawar	Attock	Swabi
Chakwal	Chakwal	Mandi Bahauddin
Attock	Kotli	Multan
Abbottabad	Poonch	Kotli
Kohat	Rahim Yar Khan	Chakwal
Sheikhupura	Multan	Sargodha
Multan	Narowal	Jhelum
Bannu	Shiekhpura	Nrowal
Kotli	Sargodha	Attock
Poonch	Malakand Agency	Toba Tek Sing
Muzaffarabad	Mansehra	Rahim Yar Khan

*Source:* BEOE, 2013

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