Taxation and Family Firms\textsuperscript{1}

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Abstract

We propose a framework for analyzing tax policy in a context when firms employ relatives (or other trusted individuals) to reduce agency costs. Our focus is on implications for the design of the tax base. We show that, if feasible, pure profit tax is optimal under natural assumptions. However, the key feature of agency costs is that they need not be observable and hence pure profit tax may not be feasible. Decisions that mitigate agency costs also interact with tax evasion. For example, reliance on cash is likely to increase agency costs by making it more difficult to monitor stealing by employees and at the same time facilitate tax evasion. On the other hand, while relying on trusted individuals may make it easier to engage in tax evasion, it also makes agency costs smaller overall and thus brings tax policy that relies on observable information more in line with “ideal” profit taxation. We characterize the optimal policy implications, focusing on the intuition and the relationship to established results from the literature on optimal taxation of income. Our framework allows for considering comparative statics of our results with respect to a number of parameters that are likely to vary across countries with different levels of development such as inefficiency for employing relatives, the extent of trust, supply of trusted labor and magnitude of monitoring problems.
1 Introduction

Family firms play a prominent role in developing economies, arguably in part because trust between family members fills an institutional vacuum. For related reasons, most developing countries find it difficult to mobilize resources for critical public expenditures, and the trust that binds together family firms makes them impenetrable to the tax authority. In this paper we extend tax theory to the inherent problems of enforcement that arise with family firms and the type of economic environment that is conducive to the flourishing of family firms.

We proceed as follows. First, we construct a formal model of family firms, stressing their role in overcoming agency problems in a low-trust environment. Second, we formalize the problems this business structure poses for tax collection and enforcement and the ways that governments can effectively collect revenue in the presence of such business structures. We embed our framework in the optimal income tax problem and show that (nonlinear) pure profit taxation is optimal under natural assumptions related to the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) theorem. The presence of partially unobservable agency costs makes pure profit taxation infeasible and we analyze the deviations implied by this unobservability. In particular, family structure closely interacts with agency costs and we analyze the extent to which reliance on family should be distorted relative to reliance on other types of labor.

The analysis in this paper focuses on setting up the framework for analyzing agency and enforcement issues in the context with family firms substituting for good contract enforcements. We provide rigorous framework but heuristic arguments and focus on developing intuition for the results. We summarize the key aspects of the model and results in the final section that also highlights gaps in this paper and directions for extensions that we either currently pursue or consider following up on.
2 Related Literature

2.1 Family Firms

Several theories, outlined in Bertrand and Schoar (2006), explain why family firms may have a comparative advantage over traditional firms in developing countries. First, in countries where institutions are relatively weak, trust among family members is a substitute for the benefits that strong institutions would typically provide, such as investor protections (Burkart et al., 2003). Second, if capital markets are imperfect or it is difficult to start a firm, families can act as “capital pooling devices” (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Bhattacharya and Ravikumar, 2001, 2004).\footnote{Indeed, powerful family firms may prefer a weak financial system because it imposes a barrier for new firms that may compete with family firms (Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung 2000).} Third, family firms may provide political connections resulting in government contracts, transfers, or favorable legislation (Fisman, 2001).

As the foundational paper of Ben-Porath (1980) argued, family firms can overcome agency problems because the family is able to provide long-term benefits to its members, is characterized by loyalty, and can effectively monitor its members. Altruistic bequest motives are sometimes noted as a way to overcome the agency problem, although Schulze et al. (2002) identify altruism toward family members as inducing moral hazard or free-riding – inducing its own possible agency problem (an effect that’s akin to the Samaritan’s dilemma discussed elsewhere in the literature). Alternatively, family members have motives, and interpersonal issues, of their own that may reduce gains from trust within the family and create agency problems. Trust does not have to be limited to family. For example, Jackson and Schneider (2011) show that taxi drivers in New York City exhibit significantly reduced moral hazard when leasing from members of their country of birth community.

The consequences of family firm predominance for economic performance are controversial within the development literature. One side of the debate views family firms as an efficient response to market conditions in a particular economy, while the other side sees family firms as a result of a culture that places emphasis on family, at a cost of economic inefficiency. The
large empirical literature, which cannot be adequately summarized here\(^2\), is not dispositive. On average, countries that value family have lower levels of GDP, smaller firms, and fewer publicly traded firms (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). Further, Claessens et al. (2000) find that family firms “underperform” relative to traditional firms in Asian countries. However, Khanna and Palepu (2000) find that business groups that are primarily family managed perform better than traditional groups in India. Pérez-González (2006), Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and examines data from CEO successions and finds that firms relatively underperform when the incoming CEO is related to the departing CEO or a large shareholder. La Porta et al. (1997) note that, across countries, reported trust in families is negatively correlated with firm size – possibly implying that strong reliance on family trust is harmful for the growth of firms.

### 2.2 Taxation and Firms in Developing Countries

Business firms play a central role in modern tax systems, especially but not only in developing countries. The report of the influential U.K. Meade Committee (1978, p. 20) noted this, and remarked that in many cases the cheapest method of tax collection makes use of private individuals or businesses as “agents for the collection of tax.” The impetus behind the central role of business in tax remittance has been elegantly stated in Bird (2002): “The key to effective taxation is information, and the key to information in the modern economy is the corporation. The corporation is thus the modern fiscal state’s equivalent of the customs barrier at the border.” Collecting taxes from businesses makes use of the economy of scale of the tax authority dealing with a smaller number of larger units, many of which for other purposes have already developed sophisticated systems of recordkeeping and accounting.

One measure of the importance of collection of taxes from business is the percentage of taxes remitted by business firms. For the U.S., Christensen et al. (2001) have calculated that in 1999 at all levels of government, businesses “paid, collected, and remitted” 83.8% of total taxes. Of the 83.8%, they label 31.3% as “tax liability of business,” 8.1% as the “business

\(^2\)But see Bertrand and Schoar (2006).
as tax collector,” and 44.4% as “business as withholding agent.” Strikingly, Shaw, Slemrod, and Whiting (2010) find that the percentage of all taxes remitted by business in the U.K. is also about 84. Anecdotal evidence suggests that collection of taxes from businesses is even more important in developing countries.

Notably, though, dealing with small businesses is not generally cost-efficient, and many tax systems either entirely exempt small businesses from remittance responsibility, or else feature special tax regimes for small businesses that simplify the tax compliance process and thereby change the base on which tax liability is based. In many countries the exemption of small firms is de facto, due to lax enforcement. One implication of these policies is that the collection of taxes is highly concentrated among relatively large firms. A recent report asserts that the typical distribution of tax collections by firm size for African and Mid-Eastern countries features less than one percent of taxpayers remitting over 70 percent of revenues, and the report gives specific examples of highly concentrated patterns: in Argentina, 0.1 percent of enterprise taxpayers remit 49 percent of revenue; and in Kenya, 0.4 percent remit 61 percent.³ There is no data on the distribution of tax collections by the family nature of firms.

Until fairly recently modern tax theory has had little to say about the role of firms in tax systems, in part because of the simplifying assumption adopted in the early modern optimal tax literature, most prominently in Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), that production functions exhibited constant returns to scale, rendering firm size irrelevant for aggregate production. Recently, though, a literature has addressed tax design and enforcement in environments of scarce enforcement resources. Kopczuk and Slemrod (2006) stress the role of firms in collecting revenue and the information relevant to establishing tax liability. Dharmapala, Slemrod, and Wilson (2009) show that the Diamond-Mirrlees prescription that optimal tax policy preserve production efficiency need not apply in a setting with per-taxed-firm administrative costs, and that exempting firms below a certain size may be part of an optimal tax system. Gordon and Li (2009) stress the role of financial institutions in tax enforcement in environ-

ments where firms can successfully evade taxes by conducting all business in cash, and argue that many observed policies of developing countries can be understood as an appropriate response to this problem.

Agency models seem particularly applicable to family firms, as family firms may arise in response to agency problems that may be exacerbated by weak governmental institutions. Kleven et al. (2009) develop an agency framework in which third-party enforcement of taxes is most successful in large firms, and propose that the inability to tax the informal sector is the main reason why developing countries have small governments as a share of GDP. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) and Desai et al. (2007) argue that tax avoidance and rent distribution decisions may be made simultaneously – the relation between the two being essential to how policies influence tax avoidance. Finally, as Kopczuk and Slemrod (2006) highlight, a tax code must be backed up by an administrative and enforcement structure, which may be complicated not only by the size of firms, but also by the trusted relationships between family members and the motivations for rent-seeking.

Almost no empirical research has addressed the relationship between family firms and taxes. One exception is Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin (2008), who examine data on U.S. firms and find that (generally large) family firms exhibit lower levels of tax aggressiveness than other firms. The authors suggest that this result is consistent with family firms worrying about family reputation, the perception of family benefits by outsiders, and potential agency problems between family owners and outside shareholders. It is not clear whether such results would generalize to less-developed countries where institutions and trust among firm principals may be more important. Similarly, we are aware of no empirical research that addresses the incentive to form family firms for tax reasons.

3 A Model of Family Firms

In this section we develop a model of family firms. We begin by outlining the model of an individual firm. Throughout, we are motivated by ultimately considering the tax implications
and we follow up on this theme in the following section, where we discuss the impact of various tax instruments in these stylized economies.

The models we develop are based on a framework introduced by Lucas (1978), in which there is no taxation and one good produced in a single period by many firms. Each person is endowed with an ability level $A$, which varies across people but is known to the individual. When considering equilibrium consequences, we will allow an individual to decide whether to become an entrepreneur or a worker, with $A$ measuring ability in both occupations as in Murphy et al. (1991). Otherwise, we will consider an exogenously given population of workers and entrepreneurs. When an individual is a worker, she earns the wage rate $w \cdot A$ per unit of effort (where $w$ is the economy-wide wage rate per unit of labor). The total utility is given by

$$u(C, E) = C - v(E)$$

where $C$ is consumption. Absent taxation, for employees, consumption is given by $w \cdot A \cdot E$. For entrepreneurs, consumption is equal to profits that we specify in what follows. We also allow for the possibility of an outside option (informality in the subsistence sector) with value of 0 so that individuals who are employees or entrepreneurs necessarily need to satisfy

$$u(C, E) \geq 0 \quad (1)$$

An entrepreneur of a particular ability ($A$) uses entrepreneurial effort ($E$), effective labor employed ($L$) and inputs observable to the government ($M$) and inputs unobservable to the government ($N$) to produce the final output

$$F(E, L, M, N; A)$$

We will sometimes denote all inputs other than effort by $X = (L, M, N)$ and write $F(E, X; A)$; we will also consider special cases of this production function. The cost per unit of input $M$

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is given (exogenously) by $c$ and the cost per unit of input $N$ is given (exogenously) by $d$.

It is not possible for the authorities to have full information about the firm, because some aspects of the production process may be hard to observe. The standard input of that kind considered in the optimal income taxation literature is effort. We do introduce entrepreneurial effort (and later, employee’s labor supply) in such a standard way. We assume that government cannot observe $E$.

However, there may be particular inputs that may be relatively easy to measure. We think of $M$ as such an input. An example would be activity associated with the financial sector - the channel that has recently been highlighted by Gordon and Li (2009) in their attempt to explain apparently “inefficient” tax policy in developing countries as a rational effort to utilize the information provided by transactions with financial institutions. Another example could be inventories that may be relatively easily observable. Yet another would be physical infrastructure such as the number of tables in a restaurant.$^{45}$

Additionally, there may be other inputs that may be impossible for the government to measure and we denote them by $N$. One special case is when $N$ is an empty set so that government can observe all inputs other than entrepreneurial effort. Alternatively, we will consider that some inputs of that kind may be present and, in particular, we will be interested in understanding substitution between inputs that are observable — $M$ — and those that are hard to observe — $N$. One natural example is substitution between bank accounts (which are one of our examples of an observable input) and cash holdings that may be impossible to observe by the government at any cost. Another would be substitution between (potentially observable to government) inventories and input sharing arrangements in informal networks. Since $N$ is unobservable, in special cases it may be a pure tax avoidance/evasion activity (in which case, $F(\cdot)$ would not depend on it).

Regarding labor, we will assume that an entrepreneur can employ either outside employees ($O$) or “relatives” ($R$). Outside employees are assumed to be more productive: they provide

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$^4$This and other examples are discussed in Yitzhaki (2007).

$^5$An extension, that would impose more structure, would be to model the inputs more directly by, for example, considering a Baumol-style model of optimal inventory or cash holdings rather than allowing $M$ to enter flexibly in the production function.
one unit of effective labor while a relative provides $\alpha$ units where $0 < \alpha < 1$, so that the total effective amount of labor is given by $L = O + \alpha R$. This assumption can be micro-founded as follows. Consider that there is a large number of possible, and identical, sectors. Every entrepreneur and every individual belongs (i.e., is suited for) to just one of the sectors. We assume that an employee working for a firm in her own sector is fully productive while an employee assigned to the wrong sector has a productivity of $\alpha$. Imagine further that the number of sectors is large and relatives are randomly distributed across them so that the number of relatives in the entrepreneur’s own sector is negligible (mass of zero). Because each sector is identical, in equilibrium hiring of outside employees from a different sector never happens. This is because a firm is willing to pay at most $\alpha w$ to an employee from the wrong sector (actually, in our model, strictly less due to the presence of other costs per employee), where $w$ is the wage rate for a correctly assigned employee but, given symmetry, the wage rate in employee’s own sector is also equal to $w$ and hence exceeds the benefit of working elsewhere. The same applies to relatives: a relative can obtain a wage rate of $w$ in her own sector and hence, should an entrepreneur want to employ a relative, he has to offer a wage of at least $w$ despite the lower productivity of relatives.

The total wage bill for a firm is given by $w \cdot (O + R)$. Absent additional considerations, an entrepreneur prefers outside employees. We will later consider the role of taxation and the possibility that wages paid to related employees need not to be accounted for as correctly as those paid to the outside employees. For now, the additional consideration that we introduce is the possibility of a loss that is associated with the behavior of each employee. Because employers cannot costlessly observe worker behavior, entrepreneurs face problems when taking on workers, examples being shirking and stealing. A variety of schemes can be utilized to minimize the negative consequences of these behaviors, including monitoring, observed-output-dependent compensation and efficiency wages; these are nicely surveyed in Rebitzer and Taylor (2010). Yet another way to minimize agency costs is to hire relatives (or other people one may trust), which can be effective because the family is able to provide long-term benefits to its members, is characterized by loyalty, and can effectively monitor its
We denote employer’s effort in reducing the damaging behavior by and assume that it occurs with fixed likelihood \( p(F) \) for an outside employee so that the total frequency is \( p(F) \cdot O \), while damaging behavior for the \( r \)-th relative occurs with the likelihood \( g(r)p \), where \( g(r) < 1 \) reflects either the reduced cost of monitoring a relative or the lowered damages. The baseline case is when \( p \) is independent of employer’s effort, \( p(F) = p \). We assume that the damages related to each employee accumulate so that the total frequency is \( p(F) \cdot \left( O + \int_0^R g(r) \, dr \right) \).

We will discuss our assumptions about the magnitude of the loss below. We assume that \( 0 \leq g(0) \equiv g^* < 1, \quad g'(r) \geq 0 \) and \( \lim_{r \to \infty} g(r) = 1 \). These assumptions imply that close relatives would be hired first and they are beneficial in terms of saving on damages, but as their number grows they increasingly look like unrelated employees. To fix interpretation, we think here of family members but as \( R \) increases the individuals become more distantly related and large values of \( R \) correspond to individuals who are more loosely related to the entrepreneur. The key assumption is not that there is a familial relationship, but rather that every entrepreneur has access to a pool of individuals who can be trusted; we order them according to the level of trust and naturally expect that relatives will be more trusted than others, but the model easily fits any other type of social network such as those based on the same place of origin, educational background, friendship, ethnicity, etc.

The implications of the total costs per employee, and the difference in these costs between relatives and outside employees, are at the heart of the problem that we are interested in. First, trivially, we need a non-zero value of \( p(F) \) in order for the employee-associated losses to be of relevance. Second, the value of \( 1 - g^* \) (i.e. \( 1 - g(0) \)) measures the benefit of hiring the first relative and the overall shape of \( g(\cdot) \) influences how many should be hired. We think of the combination of these parameters as reflecting the contractual environment and imagine that they vary with time, place, institutions such as the quality of judicial system or enforceability of contracts, and the degree of social cohesion. We will treat these parameters as exogenous and will consider the implications of changes in their values, but we imagine that they themselves can be influenced by policy. However, since our ultimate interest is
taxation, we focus on the implications of the environment for the tax policy and note that the institutional investments will affect the optimal design of tax policy. The interaction of investments in the quality of institutions and tax policy is a fascinating topic that has recently begun to be addressed by Besley and Persson (2009).

Thus, one can perhaps think of a developing economy with weak institutions as corresponding to a relatively large value of $p$ and a value of $g^*$ that is fairly close to zero. A well-developed economy with a strong judicial system will correspond to lower value of $p$ (although likely not negligible because agency costs, for example, are still of relevance). Still, there is likely to be variation in the values of $g^*$ and the shape of $g()$ even among developed economies. Countries with larger families and tighter social relationships are likely to correspond to a flatter profile of $g()$ and the extent of trust is proxied by the value of $g^*$.\footnote{One could also introduce the possibility that a relative accepts a job offer from a related employee with probability $\beta \leq 1$. With that assumption, hiring $R$ relatives requires making $R/\beta$ offers so that the agency cost for a marginal employee is now given by $g(r,\beta) = g(r/\beta)$. It is easy to verify that for any value of $\beta$, $g(r,\beta)$ satisfies all the assumptions that we made about $g(r)$. We will make the strong assumption though that none of the related employees that a given employer wishes to happen has a high enough ability to consider becoming an entrepreneur.}

We assume that if an adverse event associated with the behavior of an employee occurs, the firm loses $X(M, N)$, so that the total cost to the firm is given by $p(F) \left( O + \int_0^R \tilde{g}(r) \, dr \right) X(M, N)$. For example, $M$ may be the level of inventories the firm holds (so that $X(M, N) = X(M)$) or $N$ may be the amount of cash that the firm keeps around (so that $X(M, N) = X(N)$). One possible interpretation is that an employee may steal; another one is, as before, the possibility of damaging the productivity of the input. We assume that the damage does not constitute a transfer to an employee (as might be the case when the employee steals), and instead represents a deadweight loss. Alternatively, $X(M, N)$ may represent the cost of protecting against the possibility of theft or damage. $X(M, N)$ may also be constant — this might correspond to a fixed cost associated with monitoring an employee.

We can now combine all of these model elements and write the overall profits accruing to
a profit-maximizing entrepreneur as follows

$$\Pi^*(A, w, p(\cdot), g(\cdot), c, d) \equiv \max_{E,L,R,O,M,N} \Pi(E, F, L, O, M, N; A, w, p, \tilde{g}, c) - v(E + F)$$

where

$$\Pi(.) = F(E, L, M, N; A) - w \cdot (R + O) - p(F) \cdot \left( O + \int_0^R g(r) \, dr \right) X(M, N) - cM - dN$$

(2)

and $L = O + \alpha R$

where $\Pi^*$ denotes maximized profits.

Each individual decides whether to become an entrepreneur or an employee by comparing profits to the opportunity cost, which is the wage from employment:

$$\Pi^*(A, w, p(\cdot), g(\cdot), c, d) \overset{?}{\leq} \max_{E} w \cdot A \cdot E - v(E)$$

(3)

Later we will consider the equilibrium condition that specifies that employment in firms created by individuals who choose to be entrepreneurs is equal to the number of individuals who choose to become employees.

In what follows, we will also introduce taxation that will in general affect both sides of the condition 3.

We can now characterize the decision of a firm regarding the structure of its employment. Intuitively, a firm loses by hiring relatives due to their lower productivity, but gains due to the associated lower agency costs. Hence, we would expect that relatives will be hired when agency costs are important and that their value declines when the benefits of hiring a relative decline — either when $g(\cdot)$ is relatively high or when a lot of relatives are already employed so that $g(\cdot)$ for a marginal relative is sufficiently close to 1. More formally, consider the problem of choosing $O$ and $R$, given values of $M$ and $L$, i.e. while holding the amount of productive labor $L = O + \alpha R$ constant. Denote the Lagrange multiplier on this constraint as $\lambda$. The first-order conditions when both $O$ and $R$ are non-zero are given by
\[ w + p(F)X(M) = \lambda \]  & (4) \\
\[ w + p(F)g(R)X(M) = \lambda \alpha \]  & (5)

yielding the characterization of the optimal number of related employees

\[ g(R^*) = \alpha - \frac{(1 - \alpha)w}{p(F) \cdot X(M)} \]  & (6)

The higher the value of the right-hand side, the more relatives will be employed. It’s clear that the value increases with \( \alpha \) - the more productive relatives are, the more of them will be employed. The value of \( g(R^*) \) at the optimum is less than \( \alpha \): the firm is sacrificing productivity by hiring relatives and needs to be compensated in terms of reduced costs (i.e., by enjoying \( g(R) \) sufficiently smaller than \( p \)), but because the reduction in agency costs reflects only part of the total costs, it has to be proportionally higher than the productivity loss (i.e., \( g(R) < \alpha \)). When either the wage or the productivity differential \( (1 - \alpha) \) is high, employing relatives is relatively unattractive; when potential losses and/or agency costs \( (p(F)X(M,N)) \) are high, hiring relatives is more beneficial.

This discussion has assumed that both relatives and outside employees are hired. However, this need not be the case because a firm can instead choose to hire just one of the types. From equation 6, it is clear that the right-hand side can be negative or that it can exceed the value of \( \tilde{g}^* = \tilde{g}(0) \). In these cases, no relatives will be employed. On the other hand, it is also possible that a firm may choose to hire only relatives. This will be the case when equation 6 implies \( R^* \geq L \). This discussion can be summarized as follows:
Remark. Given the total level of employment \( L \) and an input level \( M \), firms choose
\[
R = \begin{cases} 
0, & \text{when } g(0) \leq \alpha - \frac{(1-\alpha)w}{p(F)X(M,N)} \\
g^{-1} \left( \alpha - \frac{(1-\alpha)w}{pX(M)} \right), & \text{when } g(0) > \alpha - \frac{(1-\alpha)w}{p(F)X(M,N)} \text{ and } g^{-1} \left( \alpha - \frac{(1-\alpha)w}{p(F)X(M,N)} \right) < L \\
L, & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]

Thus, when wages are low, \( \alpha \) is high or potential losses \( p(F)X(M,N) \) are high, firms employ more relatives. Holding these factors constant, the number of relatives employed does not change with employment \( L \), so that smaller firms (presumably those with smaller \( A \)) are going to consist only of related individuals while larger firms will employ both types. In the extreme case, it is also possible that no firms employ relatives.

The optimal choice of total labor \( L \) is characterized by
\[
Af_L = \lambda \quad (7)
\]
where \( \lambda \) is the cost of marginal employee obtained from equation 5 (if outside workers are employed), from equation 6 (if relatives are employed) or from both of these equations when both types of workers are employed, i.e. \( \lambda = \min \left\{ w + p(F)X(M,N), \frac{w}{\alpha} + \frac{p(F)q(R)X(M,N)}{\alpha} \right\} \).

Intuitively, otherwise employing an extra outside employee or an extra relative would be beneficial. Clearly, \( \lambda > w \) and hence \( Af_L > w \) — labor is under-employed relative to its marginal productivity, reflecting the presence of agency costs. The agency costs for outside employees are equal to \( p(F)X(M,N) \), but when firms employ solely relatives, they are able to push the shadow price of labor below \( w + p(F)X(M,N) \). In this sense, firms with only relatives employed are more efficient producers on the margin.

### 3.1 Equilibrium

In equilibrium, the number of employees employed by entrepreneurs has to be equal to the number of people who choose to be employees. The wage adjusts to equate demand and supply. Let’s denote the cumulative distribution function of ability as \( H(A) \).

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In the first-best case with no agency costs, i.e. when $p = 0$, firms employ only outside labor, the optimum for an entrepreneur of entrepreneurial talent $A$ is characterized by $Af_L = w$ and $Af_M = c$, which implies the corresponding optimal values $L(A, w, c)$ and $M(A, w, c)$ and the level of profits $\pi(A, w, c)$. The occupational choice decision is determined by comparing $\pi(A, w, c)$ to the wage rate $w$. Because profits are increasing in the value of $A$, there is a threshold value of $A^*$ above which individuals are entrepreneurs and below which they are employees. This in turn determines the overall labor supply and labor demand. Higher $w$ reduces the demand for labor by reducing the number of viable firms, and analogously it increases the labor supply. The wage rate adjusts to equate the two values.

When $p$ is non-zero, the analysis proceeds in essentially the same way. There is a threshold $A^*$ above which individuals are entrepreneurs and below which individuals are employees. Now, however, there are two types of labor that are employed, $R$ and $O$. The one complication that we have ignored so far has to with the entrepreneurial abilities of relatives. A relative of an entrepreneur could in principle be an entrepreneur herself. To simplify the analysis, we rule out that possibility by assumption.\footnote{It is a strong and perhaps unrealistic assumption, but it simplifies the analysis greatly.} Formally, the equilibrium is defined by two equations in two unknowns $A^*$ and $w$:

\begin{equation}
\Pi^*(A^*, w, p(), g(), c, d) = \max_E A^* w E - v(E) \tag{8}
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
\int_0^{\infty} E \, dH(A) = \int_{A^*} O(A, w, p(), g(), c, d) + R(A, w, p(), g(), c, d) \, dH(A) \tag{9}
\end{equation}

Equation 8 defines $A^*$ — the marginal entrepreneur given $w$ and other parameters. Equation 9 specifies that labor supply (left-hand side) should be equal to labor demand (the right-hand side) that consists of the sum of outside employees ($O(\cdot)$) and relatives ($R(\cdot)$) offered jobs by entrepreneurs with skills exceeding $A^*$. Wage adjusts to guarantee that labor market is in equilibrium.

For a given $w$, an increase in $p(\cdot)$ leads to a higher shadow cost of labor $f_L$ and (under natural but to be specified assumptions of how $M$ enters) reduces the amount of effective
labor hired, $L = O + \alpha R$. For firms that continue to employ no relatives, the overall number of employees then has to fall. For firms that do employ relatives, the effect on overall labor $O + \alpha R$ and the effect on the number of employees $O + R$ is not the same, but it is possible to show that while the number of relatives employed increases, the number of overall employees $O + R$ has to fall. Naturally, an increase in $p$, holding other things constant, reduces profits as well. Thus, given the wage, the number of entrepreneurs has to fall and the number of employees has to increase. Given these shifts in supply and demand of labor, there is a further adjustment: more individuals are willing to work for their relatives which acts to partially mitigate the decline in labor and the decline in profits. The wage needs to adjust downwards to establish an equilibrium.

3.2 Summary of the undistorted model

The baseline model contains many moving elements and in what follows we will consider its substantial simplifications. Before proceeding with the analysis of tax policy, it is worth noting a number of its properties and summarize the important elements.

First, the production technology allows for many different inputs:

1. entrepreneurial effort devoted to running the firm, $E$

2. entrepreneurial effort devoted to monitoring employees activity, $F$

3. overall labor employed $L = O + \alpha R$
   (a) that consists of outside employees $O$
   (b) and related employees $R$

4. two additional inputs — $M$ and $N$ — that influence agency costs; absent taxation, there is no qualitative difference between $M$ and $N$, but in what follows we will allow for differing observability assumptions about the two inputs: we will assume that $M$ may be observed by the tax authorities but $N$ is not. In particular and previewing later discussion, $N$ is an avenue for tax evasion. In fact, one one special case of this
framework is when $M$ and $N$ are substitutes in production — $F(\cdot, M + N, \cdot)$ — and, in the simplest case have the same cost $c = d$, but $X(M, N) = X(N)$ so that $N$ is dominated by $M$ absent additional considerations. In the presence of taxation though, relying on unobservable $N$ may turn out to be optimal. In that case, $N$ can be thought as precisely representing tax evasion with $p(F)(O + \int_0^R g(r))X(N)$ representing the cost of tax evasion in the spirit of the cost-of-sheltering technology considered eg. by Slemrod (2001). More generally, $N$ may be mixing “real” and “avoidance” aspects.

Given all these inputs, the firm employs technology given by $F(E, O + \alpha R, M, N, A) - p(F)(O + \int g(r))X(M, N))$ - this is a technology that has multiple inputs and is complicated due to allowance for the agency costs but otherwise standard. Beyond that, the cost of inputs is $O, R, M$ and $N$ is linear (with the cost of $M$ and $N$ given exogenously and the cost of labor inputs determined in equilibrium), while the cost of inputs $E$ and $F$ stems from disutility of effort by the entrepreneur $v(E + F)$.

All individuals vary by the level of their ability $A$. Ability for individuals who choose to be entrepreneurs influences the productivity of a firm. For employees, the ability is standard as in the Mirrlees framework, with $A$ denoting the efficiency per hour of labor supply so that the wage per hour that an individual with ability $A$ receives is given by $wA$.

The economy is efficient given the values of parameters. Some of the parameters that were already introduced can be thought of as reflecting policy or the quality of institutions. For example, function $g()$ reflects availability of relatives and hence the social fabric of the society. Schedule $p(\cdot)$ reflects the importance of monitoring costs — possibly, in societies with better contract enforcement $p(\cdot)$ is lower than otherwise. Also, prices of inputs may be to some extent reflect institutions and policy. In particular, consider the case when $M$ are visible monetary inputs (bank accounts) while $N$ is unreported cash. The value of $d$ (and the extent to which it exceeds $c$) may reflect government’s investment in the quality of the financial sector — in this sense, this parameter can measure the value of attachment to the financial sector that is key to the analysis of Gordon and Li (2009). We will consider comparative statics with respect to these parameters but will not model their optimal setting. Instead, in
the next section we will clarify how to think about tax policy in the current context and, in particular, we will focus on observability assumptions.

4 Observability and tax distortions

The model we have laid out so far has not allowed for taxation. In what follows, we introduce tax policy in this context. As noted before, individuals are characterized by ability level \( A \). We assume throughout that the ability is not observable by tax authorities. As the result, the framework we consider is akin to the optimal income tax model. Beyond the specifics of the utility and production function employed by the entrepreneurs, the difference relative to the textbook optimal income taxation model is allowance for both entrepreneurs and employees so that welfare objective of the government consists of the sum of welfare in both of these groups:

\[
\int_{0}^{A^*} w(u^W(A)) dH(A) + \int_{A^*}^{\infty} w(u^E(A)) dH(A)
\]  

where \( u^W() \) represents the utility of a worker with ability \( A \) while \( u^E \) represents the utility of an entrepreneur with ability \( A \) and \( w(\cdot) \) is a welfare function. We assume that the government is interested in maximizing the weighted sum of welfare and revenue and that it places the relative weight \( \lambda \) on the revenue:

\[
\int_{0}^{A^*} w(u^W(A)) dH(A) + \int_{A^*}^{\infty} w(u^E(A)) dH(A) + \lambda [R^W + R^E]
\]  

where \( R^W \) and \( R^E \) is the revenue collected from workers and entrepreneurs, respectively. Naturally, maximization is subject to resource, incentive and equilibrium constraints that we will specify in what follows. The equilibrium constraints are given by conditions analogous to equations 8-9, now specified slightly more generally to allow for the possibility of taxation:
We assume that the government can tell apart entrepreneurs from employees so that it will design separate tax schedules for the two groups, subject to the equilibrium and revenue constraints. In particular, the two weak inequalities signified by equation 12 serve as “participation” condition for being in either sector (or, formally, terminal/transversality conditions for end-points of the two population present in either sector). The two sectors are linked through the equilibrium conditions that in turn require values of $A^*$ and $w$ to adjust. We will characterize the optimal policy in each sector, for any value of $w$ and $A^*$; with the full optimum additionally corresponding to the specific values of $w$ and $A^*$ that satisfy the two equilibrium conditions.

We will pursue the standard optimal control approach to characterizing the optimal policy, characterizing the optimal allocation first with the corresponding marginal tax rates implicitly characterized. Beginning first with the (much simpler) employee sector and recalling that the utility is simply given by $C - v(E)$ or, equivalently $C - v\left(\frac{y}{A}\right)$, the planner’s problem can be set up in the standard way by leveraging the revelation principle. Government proposes the schedule $(u(A), c(A), y(A))$ that satisfies $u(A) = c(A) - v\left(\frac{y(A)}{A}\right)$, the incentive constraint (envelope condition) $\dot{u} = -\frac{w}{A^2} v'\left(\frac{y}{A}\right)$. Correspondingly, the tax liability (contribution to the overall revenue) is given by $wy(A) - c(A)$. This is a standard optimal income tax Mirrlees model with quasi-linear preferences (as consider by, for example, Weymark, 1987; Werning, 2007), complicated only by the fact that the equilibrium conditions potentially modify the allocation at the top of the distribution (thereby shifting the whole corresponding tax schedule up or down) and because the presence of an endogenous wage might (but do not have to) give rise to a uniform adjustment of the whole tax schedule reflecting a potential redistributive externality as in Naito (1999). This problem has built into it observability assumptions: it
is assumed that the government is able to observe income of employees. This assumption can be reconsidered. For example, given the family structure, it might be interesting to consider instead the situation where income of unrelated might be observed but income of related employees is not or is observed only to a limited extent (e.g., the total payroll may be observed or payments are only partially visible). This is left for the future analysis.

More interesting is the entrepreneurial sector. Here, it is helpful to write the allocation as consisting of multiple schedules, some of which will be redundant and some of which will correspond to additional constraints. To begin, recall the structure of production

$$
\pi(E, F, O, R, M, N; A) = F(E, O + \alpha R, M, N; A) - cM - dN - w(O + R) - p(F)(O + \int_0^R g(r)dr)X(M, N)
$$

The entrepreneur maximizes the utility $u(C, E + F) = C - v(E + F)$ where

$$
C = \pi(E, F, O, R, M, N; A) - T(\cdot)
$$

where $T$ is the tax liability with arguments reflecting observability assumptions. We will assume that $A$ cannot be observed and furthermore that effort (neither $E$ nor $F$) cannot be observed either. As mentioned before, the parameter $N$ was introduced with the sole purpose of analyzing implications of its non-observability. We assume for now that the government can observe $M, R, O$ and output $F(E, O + \alpha R, M, N; A)$.

Government proposes a path of utility, $u(A)$, profits $\pi(A)$, consumption $C(A)$ and input variables $M(A), N(A), R(A), O(A), E(A)$ and $F(A)$. Because $E$ and $A$ are not observable (and so is $N$ and $F$, but we want to be very flexible about how it enters), observing the level of output does not in general allow for recovering the value of $A$. As the result, individuals may misreport their type. The unobservable variables can be selected freely though — individuals are not bound to select values of $E$, $F$ and $N$ that correspond to their reported type. Two of these variables — $E$ and $N$ — influence tax liability only through their effect on output (which
is assumed to be observed) while $F$ has no impact on any observable quantity. Denoting the derivative of the tax schedule with respect to the level of output by $T_Y$, the unobservability gives rise to the three first-order conditions that the planner has to respect:

\begin{align*}
F_E(1 - T_Y) &= v'(E + F) \\ 
p'(F)(O + \int_0^R g(r) \, dr)X(M, N) &= v'(E + F) \\ 
F_N(1 - T_Y) &= d + p(F)(O + \int_0^R g(r) \, dr)X_N(M, N)
\end{align*}

These constraints involve the derivative of the unknown tax function. Equation 14 can be used as the definition of this wedge and the last constraint may be modified to obtain

\begin{equation}
\frac{v'(E + F)}{F_E(E, F, O, R, M, N, A)} = \frac{d + p(F)(O + \int_0^R g(r) \, dr)X_N(M, N)}{F_N(E, F, O, R, M, N; A)}
\end{equation}

— now expressed in the primary form. Writing the constraint in this form is useful for an additional reason. The left-hand side represents the tax wedge $1 - T_Y$ while the right-hand side reflects the trade-off between costs and benefits of modifying $N$. A potential policy modification that manipulates the left-hand side (marginal tax rate on output) must involve an adjustment of $N$ to balance this condition. Hence, this condition is about responsiveness of $N$ to tax incentives and it will be a useful exercise for building the intuition to clarify it further.

Finally, in the standard way, the revelation principle implies the incentive constraint

\begin{equation}
\dot{u} = F_A(E, F, O, R, M, N; A) \cdot (1 - T_Y)
\end{equation}

As before, this constraint involves the derivative of the unknown tax function and can be rewritten as
Putting pieces together, government optimization is subject to the incentive constraint 19 and two non-observability constraints 15 and 17. Clearly, this is a complicated set of constraints and it is useful to consider its simplified cases. A very useful special case is when production function is given by

Assumption 1. *Multiplicative technology given by* \( F(AE, F, O, R, M, N) \).

In that case, the incentive constraint simplifies dramatically to

\[
\dot{u} = \frac{E}{A} v'(E + F) \tag{20}
\]

or, with substitution of variables as \( Y = AE \), to

\[
\dot{u} = \frac{Y}{A^2} v'(\frac{Y}{A} + F) \tag{21}
\]

In this special case, the incentive constraint does not depend on variables other than effort. This situation is akin to the weak-separability assumption underlying the celebrated Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) role that finds no role for commodity distortions. Here, the effect of ability works its way on firm behavior through \( Y = AE \) so that, hypothetically, if \( Y \) was observable, no other variable would contain useful information about productivity beyond what is contained in \( Y \). While \( Y \) itself is not observable, a monotone function of \( Y \) (output) is, and by analogy one expects that there is no additional information about productivity from observing inputs beyond what is embedded in output. We will show shortly that implications are similar to the Atkinson-Stiglitz result.

The contribution of an individual with ability \( A \) to the revenue collected from entrepreneurs can be expressed as

\[
\dot{R}^E = (\pi(A) - C(A))h(A) \tag{22}
\]
Finally, the equilibrium constraint 13 involves overall labor demand by entrepreneurs, 
\[ Z = \int_{A^*}^{\infty} O + RdH(A) \] and the corresponding differential equation is simply

\[ \dot{Z} = (O + R)h(A) \] (23)

Thus, the objective of the government is given by formula 11 (with revenue from the
marginal individual spelled out as in 22) and is subject to the incentive constraint 19 (or, under simplifying assumptions, constraint 21) as well as the non-observability constraints 15 and 17. Optimization is also subject to the equilibrium condition 13 that yields the law of motion for the aggregate labor demand given by equation 23. There are additionally terminal/initial conditions: the restriction on the value of \( A^* \) (equation 12), the labor equilibrium condition itself that translates in a restriction on the terminal value of \( Z \) and zero restriction for the initial value of revenue. Beyond aggregate/equilibrium variables \( (R^E, Z) \), optimization is subject to a number of variables: \( u, \pi, C \), and the choice variables of the individual (with \( \pi \) and \( u \) explicitly defined in terms of other variables) with the explicit law of motion for \( u \) alone stemming from the incentive constraint. While this may seem like a complicated problem, it has very similar to the standard optimal income tax problem with multiple goods, with non-observability and equilibrium constraints providing additional wrinkles and the production function imposing structure.

In what follows, we ignore terminal/initial conditions that pin down the path of all variables and instead focus on marginal distortions that can be characterized without adding these constraints. The objective and all the constraints have been expressed in terms of real variables so that putting these together to apply the maximization principle, the corresponding Hamiltonian may be written as
\[ \mathcal{H} = w(u) \cdot h(A) + \lambda(\pi - C)h(A) + \mu \dot{u} + \psi \cdot (O + R)h(A) \\
+ \rho \cdot [C - v(F + E) - u] \\
+ \nu \cdot \left[ F(E, O + \alpha R, M, N; A) - cM - dN - w(O + R) - p(F)(O + \int_0^R g(r)dr)X(M, N) - \pi \right] \\
+ \eta_N \cdot \left[ \frac{d + p(F)(O + \int_0^R g(r)dr)X_N(M, N)}{F_N} - \frac{v'(F + E)}{F_E} \right] \\
+ \eta_F \cdot \left[ p'(F)(O + \int_0^R g(r)dr)X(M, N) - v'(E + F) \right] \]

(24)

Unless otherwise specified, for now we will pursue by ignoring the last constraint, which amounts to assuming that \( p(F) = p \), i.e. that it is constant.

There are a few immediate simplifications. First-order conditions with respect to \( C \) and \( \pi \) imply \( \rho = \nu = \lambda h(A) \) (recall that \( \lambda \) is the weight on government revenue) — this simply corresponds to substituting away for \( C \) and \( \pi \) from the formulas that define them. Because aggregate demand \( Z \) is not an argument to the Hamiltonian, \( \dot{\psi} = 0 \) so that \( \psi \) is constant — it is the multiplier on equilibrium labor market constraint. Whether this multiplier is non-zero is an interesting question that we leave aside for now — it might be if distorting the relative wages of employees and entrepreneurs is optimal as in the case considered by Naito (1999).

The only dynamic condition is the law of motion for \( \mu \) — the multiplier on the incentive constraint:

\[ -\dot{\mu} = \frac{\partial \mathcal{H}}{\partial u} = (w'(u) - \lambda)h(A) \]

(25)

that simply reflects the trade-off between the two uses of resources: utility and revenue.

More interestingly, the first-order conditions with respect to the choice variables characterize the structure of the optimal distortions. We will begin by briefly characterizing the first-order
condition corresponding to $E$. It is given by

$$\mu \frac{d\hat{u}}{dE} - \lambda h(A)v'(E + F) + \lambda F_E h(A) + \cdots = 0$$

The omitted terms on the right hand side correspond to the non-observability constraints. It is instructive to consider the situation when they are not present ($F$ and $N$ are not part of the problem or are observable). Then, the condition reduces to

$$\frac{v'(E + F)}{F_E} - 1 = \frac{\mu}{\lambda h(A) F_E} \frac{d\hat{u}}{dE}$$

The left-hand side is the distortion to the choice of $E$ (the wedge that the planner imposes) — the undistorted outcome is $v'(E + F) = F_E$. The whole formula is analogous to the basic formula for the optimal income tax rate. The solution for $\mu$ may be directly derived by straightforwardly integrating equation 25, $\lambda$ is constant and known and $h(A)$ is given. The more complicated term $\frac{d\hat{u}}{dE}$ potentially depends on many inputs when the incentive constraint is given by 19. Recall though that effort (or, derived from $tY = AE$) is not observable. We did assume though that output can be observed. Hence, recalling the constraint 14, these formulas define the optimal marginal tax rate imposed on the output level, $T_Y$:

$$T_Y = -\frac{\mu}{\lambda h(A) F_E} \frac{d\hat{u}}{dE}$$

In the special case corresponding to assumption 1 and the corresponding incentive constraint 21, the optimal wedge is given by

$$T_Y = 1 - \frac{v'(\frac{Y}{A} + F)}{AF_Y} = -\frac{\mu v'(\frac{Y}{A} + F)}{\lambda h(A) AF_Y} \left[ 1 + \frac{\nu''(\frac{Y}{A} + F) \cdot Y}{v'(\frac{Y}{A} + F)} \right] Y$$

The additively separable structure of the utility that would correspond to setting $F = 0$ ($p(F) = p$) corresponds to a natural special case that has been extensively analyzed in the literature on optimal income taxation. Assuming isoelastic structure of $v(\cdot)$ would yield further simplifications.
To gain additional insight consider the first-order condition with respect to \( M \), again considering the case without the non-observability constraints:

\[
\mu \frac{d\hat{u}}{dM} + \lambda h(A) \left[ F_M - c - p(F)(O + \int_0^R g(r) \, dr)X_M \right] = 0
\] (26)

Again, as before consider the multiplicative case given by assumption 1. In that case, \( \frac{d\hat{u}}{dM} = 0 \) and the above first-order condition implies that the choice of \( M \) should not be distorted. In the presence of taxation, the choice of \( M \) is given by

\[
F_M - c - p(F)(O + \int_0^R g(r) \, dr)X_M - T_Y \cdot F_M - T_M = 0
\]

and we have just established that \( T_Y \neq 0 \) so that setting \( T_Y \cdot F_M + T_M = 0 \) requires \( T_M \neq 0 \). In particular, it easy to show that what is required is that the tax has the structure of \( T \left( F(\cdot, M, \cdot) - cM - p(F)(O + \int_0^R g(r) \, dr)X(M, N), \cdot \right) \) where omitted arguments do not depend on \( M \). In other words, in this special case, the system should involve pure profit taxation. An analogous argument will apply to any other input.

**Remark 2.** Suppose that assumption 1 is satisfied, non-observability constraints are not present and the equilibrium conditions are not imposed. Then, the optimal tax system for entrepreneurs involves a non-linear profit tax.

This is the analogue of the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem in the optimal income tax case. When inputs do not provide independent information about ability over an observable quantity such as output, their relative prices should not be distorted. In particular, given production structure, the lack of distortion requires relying on profit tax.

Conversely, when assumption 1 is not satisfied and \( \frac{d\hat{u}}{dM} \neq 0 \), the optimal tax structure should deviate from profit taxation and involve distortions to the relative price of \( M \).

Note further that whether one should allow for full expensing of \( M \) does not depend on whether all inputs are observable, as long as their corresponding non-observability constraints are not affected by \( M \) — in such a case the first order condition 26 will not be affected and
the whole argument goes through.

Now consider the case of an unobservable input $N$ and a relaxed problem where non-observability condition was not imposed. The same argument as in the case of $M$ goes through — the first-order condition for $N$ should not be distorted and the optimal tax should allowing for expensing of this input. This is however no longer feasible because $N$ cannot be observed or, put differently, such a requirement violates the non-observability constraint $17$. The non-observability constraint does not correspond to undistorted first-order condition for $N$: because output is taxed, the marginal benefit of $N$ is affected by the tax but because $N$ is not observed there is no corresponding mechanism for offsetting that distortion. Hence, the non-observability constraint is binding and implications of non-observability of $N$ are non-trivial.

To begin analyzing those implications, reconsider the choice of the effort, now accounting for implications of non-observability of input $N$. The first order condition for effort is now

$$
\mu \frac{d\hat{u}}{dE} - \lambda h(A)v'(E+F) + \lambda F_E h(A) - \eta_N \frac{\partial}{\partial E} \left\{ \frac{d + p(F)(O + \int_0^R g(r) \, dr)X_N(M, N)}{F_N} - \frac{v'(F + E)}{F_E} \right\} = 0
$$

yielding the formula for the optimal wedge

$$
T_Y = 1 - \frac{v'(E + F)}{F_E} = 
- \frac{\mu}{\lambda h(A)F_E} \frac{d\hat{u}}{dE} + \frac{\eta_N}{\lambda h(A)F_E} \frac{\partial}{\partial E} \left\{ \frac{d + p(F)(O + \int_0^R g(r) \, dr)X_N(M, N)}{F_N} - \frac{v'(F + E)}{F_E} \right\}
$$

The optimal profit tax rate is affected by the presence of unobservable inputs. The additional term is additive and reflects the effect on the non-observability constraint: modifying taxation of output affects the optimal value of $N$ — the strength (elasticity) of this effect is reflected by the effect of $E$ on the non-observability constraint (the last term) and is weighted by the multiplier on that constraint $\eta_N$. One useful case for seeing the intuition here is to con-
sider the special case when the production function is additively separable between \( N \) and \( E \). Then, the last term reduces to \(-\frac{\eta_N}{\lambda h(A)F_E} \frac{\partial}{\partial E} \left\{ \frac{\nu'(F+E)}{F_E} \right\}\) and recalling that \( 1 - T_Y = \frac{\nu'(F+E)}{F_E} \), the very last term simply reflects the marginal tax rate adjustment implied by a change in effort that will stimulate an adjustment in \( N \). How important that adjustment is depends on the magnitude of the multiplier \( \eta_N \). Its value can be derived from the first-order condition for \( N \) that yields

\[
\begin{align*}
\mu \frac{d\hat{u}}{dN} + \lambda h(A) \left[ F_N - d - p(F)(O + \int_0^R g(r) dr)X_N \right] + \\
\eta_N \frac{\partial}{\partial N} \left\{ \frac{d + p(F)(O + \int_0^R g(r) dr)X_N(M,N)}{F_N} - \frac{\nu'(F + E)}{F_E} \right\} = 0 \quad (27)
\end{align*}
\]

Substituting from the 17 and limiting attention to the separable case guaranteed by assumption 1, the multiplier becomes

\[
\eta_N = -\lambda h(A) \cdot \left(1 - \frac{\nu'}{F_E} \right) F_N \cdot \left\{ \frac{d + p(F)(O + \int_0^R g(r) dr)X_N(M,N)}{F_N} - \frac{\nu'(F + E)}{F_E} \right\}^{-1}
\]

Two points are worth pointing out. First, the multiplier is zero when \( 1 - \frac{\nu'}{F_E} = 0 \), that is when there is no tax distortion. This is very intuitive: non-observability of \( N \) is not an issue when it has no tax implications. Second, the last term is closely related to the elasticity of \( N \) with respect to the tax rate (to be shown). One way to see it is to consider the case when \( E \) and \( N \) enter the production function in a separable fashion so that \( F_E \) does not depend on \( N \). Then, only the first term in the curly brackets — the ratio of marginal cost and benefits — remains. The whole term measures how strongly that ratio reacts to changes in \( N \) which is equivalent to asking how big of a response in \( N \) is expected in response to a change in tax incentives (ie. \( \frac{\nu'}{F_E} \)). More generally, a change in \( N \) may itself influence the magnitude of the tax wedge which is accounted for by the presence of \( \frac{\nu'}{F_E} \) in this formula.
Our analysis up to this point clarifies the structure of the model and its relationship to the more standard optimal income tax problem. First, assumption 1 plays the role akin to the weak separability assumption in the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) world. Under that assumption and absent additional complications such as non-observability or binding equilibrium constraints, the optimal tax structure involves a tax on profits with deductions for all inputs. In particular, there is no reason for distorting the choice between inputs, similarly as in the A-S context there is no reason to impose commodity taxes once income may be taxed. Relaxing this assumption provides a reason for taxing or subsidizing particular inputs, to the extent that they interact with the incentive constraints.

Second, adding non-observability of some inputs modifies these conclusions in some ways. It leads to the adjustment of the tax on profits to reflect the impact of this tax on hidden activity and it does so in relationship to the strength of the response of the hidden activity. Its interaction with inputs depends on whether a particular input affects the non-observability constraint. In our case, whether the conclusion that $M$ should be fully expensed is modified depends on whether $M$ affects the constraint 17. It may do so when $M$ is a production substitute or complement to either hidden input ($F_{MN} \neq 0$), effort ($F_{EM} \neq 0$) or when the agency costs interact ($X_{MN} \neq 0$). Put differently, what matters is whether that particular input influences the extent of unobservable action (in the extreme case, tax evasion).

The inputs of most interest in our context are of course family and outside labor supply. Qualitatively, many features of our discussion so far apply. If they are observable and they can be expensed, they should be because this is what is required for implementing (optimal under assumption 1) profit taxation. When there are no non-observable inputs except for effort, this conclusion applies. However, at the heart of considering the problem of taxing family firms is non-observability. The agency costs are unlikely to be observed and the mechanism for that in the model is their dependence on $N$ — without $N$ influencing agency costs, they could be recovered based on (assumed observable) values of $M$, $O$ and $R$.

We proceed by again limiting the attention to the separable case guaranteed by assumption 1. We further assume a very special form of the production function: $F(EA, L, M, N) = \ldots$
$F_1(EA, M, N) + G_2(L)$. The first-order conditions for (assumed to have interior values) $R$ and $O$ are

$$-\psi h(A) = \lambda h(A) (F_L - w - p(F)X(M, N)) + \frac{\eta_N p(F)X_N(M, N)}{F_N}$$

(28)

$$-\psi h(A) = \lambda h(A) (\alpha F_L - w - p(F)X(M, N)g(R)) + \frac{\eta_N p(F)X_N(M, N)g(R)}{F_N}$$

(29)

The left-hand side is the multiplier on the labor market equilibrium constraint. If binding, the multiplier is non-zero and the planner may want to distort the relative benefits of employment vs entrepreneurship. We have not yet considered implications of that. A useful case for building intuition is to consider $\psi = 0$. The bracketed components of the first terms on the right hand side of the two formulas are the undistorted first order conditions for $L$ and $R$. When $\psi = 0$ and non-observability constraint is not present or not binding, we would be back to the previously considered case of full expensing the inputs and profit-like taxation. With unobservable inputs, that is not the case. It is useful to re-write these conditions more explicitly to illustrate the wedge implied for different types of labor.

$$F_L - w - p(F)X(M, N) = \frac{-\psi}{\lambda} - \frac{\eta_N p(F)X_N}{\lambda h(A) F_N}$$

(30)

$$\alpha F_L - w - p(F)X(M, N)g(R) = \frac{-\psi}{\lambda} - \frac{\eta_N p(F)X_N}{\lambda h(A) F_N}g(R)$$

(31)

The distortion to the choice of family and outside labor have very similar structure. First, they go in the same direction — the last terms differ only by the (positive) term $g(R)$. This is because any type of labor is assumed to influence the agency costs so that increasing any type of labor aggravates implications of the non-observability of some inputs. Second the distortion to family labor should be smaller than that to the outside labor (because $g(R) < 1$). This may seem paradoxical — one might expect that the family structure should be more conducive to stimulating informal activity and should be more heavily discouraged. It is true that the
family structure makes the cost of increasing $X(M, N)$ (and, therefore, changing the hidden activity) lower than otherwise. However, what this framework highlights is that this implies that unobservable agency costs are then lower holding other things constant. With lower agency costs, the optimal tax structure resembles more closely profit taxation that would be optimal if there were no hidden actions.

The discussion so far relied on the assumption that $F(EA, L, M, N) = F_1(EA, M, N) + G_2(L)$. Relaxing that assumption and considering instead $F(EA, L, M, N)$ would modify the first-order conditions 30-31 to account for the effect of changes in $O$ and $R$ on $F_E$ and $F_N$ present in constraint 17. These effects are closely related because the two types of labor influence marginal product of $E$ and $N$ jointly as labor $L = O + \alpha R$. As the result, the distortion stemming from these effects will be multiplier by the factor $\alpha$ in the case of employing relatives relative to the outside labor. More explicitly, the effect of a change in $L$ (the argument of production function) on the constraint 17 is given by

$$
\frac{\partial}{\partial L} \left\{ \frac{d + p(F)(O + \int_0^R g(r) dr)X_N(M, N)}{F_N} - \frac{v^/(F + E)}{F_E} \right\} = \frac{F_N L}{F_N} \frac{d + p(F)(O + \int_0^R g(r) dr)X_N(M, N)}{F_N} + \frac{F_E L}{F_E} \frac{v^/(F + E)}{F_E} = \left( \frac{F_E L}{F_N} - \frac{F_N L}{F_E} \right) \frac{v^/(F + E)}{F_E}
$$

where the last equality applies the constraint 17 itself to substitute and simplify. The case of $F_EL = F_NL = 0$ that we considered before makes this term zero and also a weaker case of the weakly separable production function $F(g(AE, N), L)$ would do so. The mechanism at play here has to do with the interaction of labor with effort vs unobservable inputs. In general, labor may interact with both but implications depend on which one is affected more strongly. Again, it is helpful to recall the meaning of non-observability constraint 17. A change in labor will encourage/discourage hidden activity $N$ depending on the sign of $F_NL$ but it will also simultaneously affect the incentives for effort — profit taxation, $\frac{v^’}{F_E}$ — depending on $F_EL$. Which of these effects is stronger matters so that even if hidden action (e.g., cash
transactions) is encouraged by relying on more labor, the effect on effort (and hence tax revenues) may be there to offset. In the context of this model, the strength of this additional consideration is again weaker in case of employing relatives (\( \frac{dL}{dR} \neq \alpha < 1 \neq \frac{dL}{dO} \)) because an additional relative has weaker effect on the overall labor and hence on incentives to provide effort or production benefits to the hidden activity \( N \).

5 Conclusions

Family firms mitigate the agency costs of hiring workers. But while they make intra-firm transactions more efficient, they make the extraction of tax revenues needed to finance public goods more costly, because the same family bonds that make shirking and stealing less attractive make providing information to the tax authority less attractive. The optimal tax system should seek to mitigate the social costs of opaque family firm accounting while minimally eroding the contribution of family firms to reducing intra-firm agency costs.

We analyze a model of an economy with family firms. Employers can employ two kinds of labor: outside employees and related ones. Relatives are less productive but they give rise to lower agency costs thereby allowing for a trade-off between the two kinds of labor. The relative reliance of the two depends on a number of factors: the inefficiency of hiring relatives, the strength of family relationships and the corresponding reduction in agency costs and the cost of monitoring. All these factors are likely to change with the level of development. We embed this model in the optimal taxation framework with entrepreneurs and employees that are characterized by ability level. Our analysis so far has focused on understanding taxation on the entrepreneur side. As in the standard Mirrlees model, we assume that ability and effort of entrepreneurs are unobservable but some inputs and output are. We show the relationship of this context to the Atkinson-Stiglitz framework that allows for analyzing desirability of commodity taxation when income tax is available. As in that context, we identify a special case when the conclusions are stark: a single tax on a well-defined tax base is optimal. In our context, the tax turns out to be a profit tax. We show that as long as effort and ability
are separable from other inputs, the optimal policy should feature profit taxation with full expensing of the cost of all inputs. While this is optimum if feasible to implement, our interest in analyzing firms built on trust is precisely in considering cases when pure profit tax is infeasible. To do so, we allow for hidden actions — holding money in cash for example — that are made cheaper by relying on relatives. Because such behavior is not observed by tax authorities, it is the mechanism for introducing tax avoidance/evasion in the model. Taxation of profits is naturally affected by the responsiveness of hidden actions to the tax. Distortions to relative prices of inputs arise to the extent that such inputs interact with hidden actions and reflect such impact. Interestingly though, implications of such hidden actions for treatment of family firms are somewhat unexpected. To the extent that intensity of employing labor in general affects propensity to engage in behavior unobservable by tax authorities, all types of labor should be distorted — both formal and informal. If productive benefits of holding cash or engaging in other unobservable behavior vary depending on whether one employs relatives or outside labor, this conclusion may be more nuanced but it is outside of our current model. On the other hand, relying on relatives makes unobservable agency costs smaller and hence the departure from profit taxation weaker than otherwise. This mechanism implies that the distortion to employing relatives should be weaker than the distortion to employing outside labor.

Our analysis of the model focused on providing intuition for the forces at play and we plan to build on it to provide a more careful exposition of our results. In particular, we have not yet analyzed implications of labor market equilibrium, the possibility of the overall distortions to the entrepreneur-employee choices and implications of various corner solutions such as firms that solely employ labor or that solely employ relatives. We also have not yet considered the interaction of the employee and employer side of taxation. Further discussion of the comparative statics is very interesting as well. There are many other extensions that are worth considering. Our model assumes that authorities can distinguish employing relative from employing outside labor. This is not necessarily realistic and weakening this assumption would be of interest. As is standard in the optimal income tax literature, we
focus on a one-dimensional context — ability differences. This makes the task of the social planner who wants to account for unobservable behavior easier than otherwise. Allowing for heterogeneity in agency costs is a natural extension.
References


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