What Explains Gender Gap in Private School Enrolment?

Recent Evidence from India[1]

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Abstract: The paper provides new evidence that there is significant gender gap in private school enrolment in India and that the gender gap is greater than the national average among children residing in northern and north-western states. Our best estimates come from the household fixed effects model with selection that exploits the within household variation in private school enrolment among 7 – 18 year old boys and girls born to the same parents, after correcting for the possible selection bias arising from any school enrolment. A further investigation into the causes of gender gap in private school enrolment does not identify any significant positive effect of perceived ability of children, but possible negative effect of child health. Further, mother's education is an important household characteristic that significantly boosts private school attendance among girls. We also identify interesting variation of our central results across primary and secondary age groups and also across regions and argue that these results highlight a rational choice of parents aiming to maximise future earnings prospects.

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1. Introduction

Securing universal education is a key element of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 2000 – 15 and beyond. While there is an implicit understanding that the state has the primary responsibility to ensure that this MDG goal is attained, as budgets and resources in developing countries are stretched thin, states, including those in many low-income and emerging economies, are increasingly looking towards the private sector to fill in the holes. This has led to the worldwide growth of the private schools, which has, not surprisingly, also initiated a policy debate as to whether private schools can foster ``education for all''. In this context, the present paper examines the role of gender on private school enrolment.

There is now a general consensus in the literature that private schools are more efficient than states schools in that it may deliver greater test scores and/or higher earnings (Bedi and Garg (2000); Muralidharan and Kremer (2006); Kingdon (2007); Goyal and Pandey (2009); Wadhwa (2009); and Tooley *et al.* (2010)).[2] While there is a growing number of studies on the effect of school choice on student performance, we know very little about the gender dimension of growing private school enrolment around the world. This is despite the fact that it is now widely accepted that gender discrimination in educational opportunities hinders growth and economic development (see Duflo (2012)). While parents choosing private schools are likely to be more motivated and altruistic and hence, may treat their boys and girls more equally than others, there is no denial of the fact that private schools are fee-paying schools. Hence there is scope for gender discrimination in parental private school choice unless the expected returns from private schooling far exceed the underlying costs for all. Accordingly, we test the nature and extent of the gender gap in private school enrolment, if any, and also how it varies across the Indian regions.

The 2005 India Human Development Survey (IHDS2) data for 7 – 18 year old children highlight the extent of female disadvantage in private school enrolment in Indian's

[2] There are some exceptions too, e.g., see Beegle and Newhouse (2006), Chudgar and Quin (2012).

emerging economy. A comparison with any school enrolment suggests that the female disadvantage is higher for private school enrolment (6 percent as against 2 percent for 7 – 9 year olds and 7 percent as against 5 percent for 10 – 14 year olds; see Table 2). We explore the role of individual, household and community characteristics in explaining this gender gap in private school enrolment. This is an important exercise: if the private school growth is associated with growing gender gap in school enrolment, the target of universal literacy would remain unfulfilled, especially if authorities continue to ignore the increasing importance of the private sector in the provision of basic schooling.

Since the early 1990s, India has experienced a tremendous growth of private schools around the country: while about 16 percent of the villages surveyed in PROBE data used by Dreze and Kingdon (2001) had access to private schools, the corresponding figure rose to about 28 percent in 2003 (see Muralidharan and Kremer (2006)). Despite the absence of school fees, dismal state of the state schools has induced many households, even some poorer ones, to take advantage of the newly emerging private unaided schools in India to meet their educational needs. To a large extent, the latter has been facilitated by the modest private school fees in India (Tooley and Dixon (2003)).[3]

While there is a large literature on child schooling in low-income countries (see Glewwe (2002) for a survey), there is still a relatively limited literature on private schools growth and their performance around the world, especially in emerging economies. Most of the existing literature focuses on the relative efficiency of public and private schools as measured by the effect of school type on various student test scores. Many studies find a significantly positive private school premium (selectivity corrected or otherwise) in most countries, developed as well as developing (see Jimenez *et al.* (1988); Jimenez and Lockheed (1991); Jimenez and Lockheed (1995) and Kingdon (1996)). Beegle and Newhouse (2006) is an important exception; they find that junior secondary (grades 7 – 9) students in public

[3] Despite significant success in improving its primary school enrolment over the last two decades (see Kingdon (2007)), there are worrying statistics showing that the Gender Inequality Index (GII) for India has worsened between 2008 and 2011. India now ranks 129 out of 146 countries on the GII, better only than Afghanistan in South Asia (Times of India). It is therefore imperative to address the gender gap in school enrolment, since education is central to redressing gender inequality.

schools in Indonesia out-perform their counterparts in private schools, which they attribute to unobserved higher quality of inputs used in public schools. Building on the case of greater efficiency of private schools, there have been several attempts by policy makers to explore the scope of private sector in delivering basic education in India (see Tooley and Dixon (2003) for a discussion). Muralidharan and Kremer (2006) argue that the single most distinguishing feature of the private schools in rural India is that they pay much lower salaries to teachers than the government schools. This allows the private schools to hire more teachers, thus ensuring a lower pupil-teacher ratio than state schools and hence better performance. Finally, Kingdon and Pal (2014) exploited the variation in the growth of new private schools across Indian districts over 1992 – 2002 to identify a causal effect of private school growth on aggregate district-level literacy and enrolment among 10 – 19 year olds. They find that generally districts in the larger north-Indian states had seen growth of new private schools during the first decade of Indian economic reforms and these treated districts tend to have significantly lower aggregate literacy and enrolment rates relative to the control districts located in the southern, western and eastern states.

Our study makes an important departure from the existing literature in that we focus on the demand for private schooling at the individual student level as reflected in their school choice. In particular, we examine the extent and causes of gender gap in private school enrolment, assuming a given schooling market characterised by the co-existence of private and government schools.[4] We also explore the role of individual, household and community characteristics to explain the gender gap. Our best estimates come from the household fixed effects model after controlling for the selection bias arising from any enrolment (27% of 7-18 year olds in our sample were never enrolled). We use the Semykina and Wooldridge (2013) method to estimate the binary private school enrolment outcome in a panel fixed effects model with selection. This allows us to identify the effect of gender on private school enrolment by exploiting the intra-household variation private school enrolment. After

[4] While we acknowledge that test scores depend not only on the individual/household characteristics, but also on various school inputs contributing to the education production function, in this paper we focus only on the demand side factors.

controlling for various observable and unobservable characteristics that may influence private school enrolment, we find evidence of significant gender bias against girls in private school enrolment, which varies across the Indian regions: there is significantly higher gender gap in private school enrolment among children residing in northern and north-western states relative to those in the south and the east.

A further investigation into the causes of gender gap in private school enrolment does not identify any positive effect of perceived ability of children, but possible negative effect of child health; further, mother's education is an important household characteristic that significantly boosts private school attendance among girls. We also identify interesting variation in the central results across primary and secondary age groups and also across regions and argue that these results highlight a rational choice of parents aiming to maximise future earnings prospects (see further discussion in section 3.3). These results are robust to alternative specifications[5] and thus generalize and complement the study by Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) for a specific community in Mumbai where girls are sent to private schools to boost their marriage prospects while boys attend government schools in an effort to encourage them in household caste occupations.

2. Background, Data and Selected Descriptive Statistics

There are three broad types of recognized schools in India, namely government schools, private aided schools and private unaided schools. Government and private aided schools are typically government recognized, i.e., they have the government stamp of approval. They are similar in many respects since private aided schools are almost entirely financed by the government and have little control over staffing (hiring/firing decisions) and fees, despite being nominally privately managed. In our analysis we do not distinguish between government and private aided schools, instead we combine them under the broad umbrella of

[5] Central results remain unchanged irrespective of whether we include private aided schools in the sample, for 7-11 and 12-18 year olds and also when we distinguish between low and high fee private schools.

government schools.[6] Private unaided schools (whether recognized or not), in contrast, enjoy more autonomy compared to private aided schools and are typically self-funded out of fee income. Thus the private unaided schools are the truly private schools in India.[7] Table 1 compares selected characteristics of private and government schools over the period 1992 and 2002. The biggest difference between private and government schools is in terms of infrastructure and pupil-teacher ratios. As of 2002, 71 percent of the private schools have a toilet, compared to 41 percent of government schools; 91 percent of private school have drinking water facilities compared to 78 percent of government schools. The pupil-teacher ratio in government schools is often twice that in private schools. All of this suggests that private schools offer better facilities than government schools in India. Further compared to government schools, a greater proportion of teachers in private schools are women and are likely to be of a higher caste. This is possibly because as of 2002, the private educational sector was not constrained by caste based affirmative action (reservation) policies operative in India.

This paper uses data from the 2005 Indian Human Development Survey (IHDS2). This is a nationally representative, multi-topic survey of 41,554 households in 1,503 villages and 971 urban neighbourhoods across India collected by the National Council of Applied Economic Research and the University of Maryland. The survey collected information on health, education, employment, economic status, marriage, fertility, gender relations, and social capital. The survey was conducted between November 2004 and October 2005 with a response rate of more than 90 percent.

Figure 1 presents the enrolment rates by age and gender for the estimating sample. Two observations are worth noting. First, the enrolment rates are very high (more than 80 percent) for children aged 7 – 11; they start falling beyond the age of 11, going down to 25 percent for boys and 20 percent for girls by age 18. This drop in the later years is possibly a

[6] We re-estimated our regressions by excluding the private aided schools from our estimation sample. The results on gender bias remain unchanged. These results are available on request.

[7] Private unaided schools can be further categorized into religious and non-religious schools, though for the purposes of this paper we do not make this distinction as few children in our sample attend religion schools.

reflection of boys leaving schools in search of employment and girls leaving school because they have attained marriageable age. Second, the enrolment rates for girls are consistently lower compared to that of boys and this difference persists over the entire age range.

Figure 2 presents the average enrolment in private schools by age and gender, conditional on enrolment. For children aged 7 – 15 (but not so for those aged more than 15), the private school enrolment rate for boys is consistently higher than that of girls; beyond age 15 however the gender gap appears to reverse in favour of girls. This (conditional) private school enrolment rate is generally significantly higher for boys aged 7 – 14 and the difference is no longer statistically significant for those aged 15 or higher.

Table 2 presents both overall school enrolment rates and private school enrolment rates (conditional on enrolment) by gender for different sub-samples of the population. On average 75 percent of males aged 7 – 18 are enrolled in school, compared to 70 percent of females in the same age group. When we separate this across different age groups, we see that the pro-male bias is small for the 7 – 9 year olds (2.3 percentage points) and increases substantially for the 10 – 14 and the 15 – 18 year olds (6.2 and 17.5 percentage points respectively). Notice that there is a large drop in the overall rate of enrolment (from 83 percent to 44 percent) as we move from the 10 – 14 year olds to the 15 – 18 year olds. The pattern of pro-male bias in private school enrolment is somewhat different. For the sample as a whole, 31 percent of males are enrolled in a private school, compared to 25 percent of enrolled females. There is a systematic pro-male bias of about 6 percentage points for private school enrolment for the whole sample. The gender gap is high for the 7 – 9 and 10 – 14 year olds (23 percentage points and 29 percentage points respectively), but appears to vanish for the 15 – 18 year olds in our sample.

This pro-male bias in private school enrolment exists for all population sub-groups; though they are lower for certain subgroups like Muslims. While children belonging to backward castes are not particularly less likely to be enrolled in school (compared to the overall sample average), private school enrolment rates of children who belong to backwards castes is significantly lower. This is possibly a reflection of income constraints – households

belonging to backward castes are typically poorer and more resource constrained. Second, both total enrolment rates and private school enrolment rates are monotonically increasing over expenditure quantiles and this is true for both boys and girls; unfortunately pro-male bias in private school enrolment increases monotonically as we move up from the lowest to the highest expenditure quartile.

Table 3 presents the sample averages for the variables used in the analysis. 48 percent of children in the sample are girls. Mothers are on average about half as educated as fathers; 30 percent of the sample resides in urban areas; 79 percent of children are Hindus and 30 percent belong to lower castes; 73 percent belong to mixed gender households. Overall, 73 percent of children are enrolled in school, and conditional on enrolment, 28 percent are enrolled in private school.

3. Methodology and Results

3.1 Pooled Probit with Selection

The primary focus of this paper is on school choice and in particular private school enrolment of Indian children. Define S_{ij}^* as the propensity of the i^{th} child from the j^{th} household is enrolled in a private unaided (henceforth private) school at the time of the survey. This propensity is determined by the following equation:

$$S_{ij}^* = \beta' X_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

Now S_{ij}^* (the propensity of the child attending private school) is not observed; what we observe instead is a binary variable $S_{ij} = 1$ if the i^{th} child from the j^{th} household is enrolled in a private school at the time of the survey and 0 otherwise.

School choice is however conditional on school enrolment. This selection issue is important as more than 27 percent of children aged 7 – 18 are not enrolled in school at the time of the survey. So school choice (S_{ij}) is observed only if the i^{th} child from the j^{th} household is enrolled in school at the time of the survey $(E_{ij} = 1)$. In estimating equation (1)

we therefore have to account for a selection problem where the selection equation is defined by:

$$E_{ij}^{*} = \gamma' W_{ij} + u_{ij} \quad (2)$$

where E_{ij}^{*} (the propensity to attend school) is not observable. We only observe E_{ij} where $E_{ij} = 1$ if $E_{ij}^{*} > 0$; $E_{ij} = 0$ otherwise.

Given the binary nature of both the enrolment (E) and private school choice (S) variables, we use a bivariate probit model with selection correction to estimate equation (1). X and W are the two sets of explanatory variables in equations (1) and (2) respectively and ε and u are IID error terms. The set of explanatory variables X and W in equations (1) and (2) include some common variables like age categories, gender of the child, age of the household head, whether the household head reads newspapers regularly, years of schooling of the mother and father, religion (Hindu, Muslim, Christian) and expenditure quartiles, urban/rural residence and state of residence to capture all other unobserved characteristics including policy effects. We also retain some exclusion restrictions to identify private school enrolment from any enrolment. Following the recent literature on network and peer group effects on learning (Helmers and Patnam 2011), we use the presence of a family acquaintance who is a teacher (this is measured by a binary indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the household has friend or acquaintance who teaches in a school and 0 otherwise.) as an identifying restriction for any school enrolment at the first instance, arguing that having a teacher in the social circle of the family may increase the likelihood of school enrolment. We do not include this variable in the determination of private school enrolment; in the latter case we include the selection correction term λ. We also compare the uncorrected private school enrolment equation with the corrected ones to see the extent of the bias, if we do not correct for the potential selection bias.

The key variables for explaining gender gap in private school enrolment (especially within household fixed effects model) at the second stage pertain to some individual characteristics. The underlying intuition is that parent choose a particular school type (private

or state controlled) for a child in a bid to maximise returns (net of costs) from investment in private schooling. In this respect, we consider parental perceived ability of the child which we use as a proxy for returns from investment in private schooling. This is because we cannot include hourly male/female wage rates as female wage rates are missing for a large proportion of the sample; further its inclusion could be rendered as endogeneous. So we assume that children with greater perceived ability are expected to fetch greater returns from labour market participation. An important component of costs could be coming from poor health of the child. In the absence of a better measure, we use the number of days a child has missed schools because of illness as the relevant health indicator (see discussion in section 3.2). Further cost considerations may arise from adolescent girls' school participation in an environment where there can be possibility bullying and harassment (especially of sexual nature) of adolescent girls while travelling to and from schools (UN, 2000) and also within the school premise (especially if the teacher is absent). This may generate a differentiated demand for girls' private schooling especially at the secondary level, after controlling for all other factors. To this end, we include age dummies for ages 8-18 for the sample of children 7-18 year olds.

The first stage results on school enrolment (see Appendix Table A2) show that, there is evidence of significant gender bias in school enrolment: GIRLs are significantly less likely to be enrolled in school. The likelihood of school enrolment is significantly lower for children belonging to Muslim and Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe households and for children more than 12 years of age. On the other hand, children belonging to wealthier households, to more educated and more liberal parents are significantly more likely to be enrolled in school.

Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 present the baseline results for private school enrolment. These are the marginal effects from probit regression of private school enrolment – the results in column 2 explicitly correct for selection into school enrolment, while those in column 1 do not. The set of explanatory variables include a range of individual and household level characteristics, which are likely to affect private school enrolment. In addition to the individual characteristics (including gender, ability, and age), we include household

characteristics like parental educational attainment, religion, caste, women's exposure to media, women's views on girls schooling and also household expenditure quartiles. We also control for communities as defined by the primary sampling unit and also rural/urban location. Our discussion will focus on the selectivity corrected estimates of private school enrolment as the Inverse Mill's Ratio (λ) is statistically significant.

After controlling for all other factors, the GIRL dummy is negative and statistically significant and the selection corrected marginal probit results show that girls are almost 7 percentage points less likely to attend private school compared to boys. The likelihood of the child attending private school is significantly higher if the child is of greater than average ability (self-reported by parents), if the mother and the father are more educated (measured by years of schooling attained) – though it is interesting to note that the effect of father's education has a significantly stronger effect on private school attendance than mother education and this is net of the overall household resource availability effect. Children belonging to the 2nd, 3rd and 4th expenditure quantiles are significantly more likely to attend private school and the effect is monotonic – for example, compared to children belonging to the poorest households, measured by those in the lowest expenditure quantile, those belonging to the 2nd quantile are 4 percentage point more likely to attend private school and this increases to 18.4 percentage points for children belonging to the highest expenditure quantile. For non-primary school children (aged 12 and higher), there is a monotonic age effect – the likelihood of attending private school falls monotonically as children grow older. There is a strong religion and caste effect – Hindu, Muslim and Christian children are all significantly less likely to attend private school compared to children from households who belong to other religions. Children belonging to Scheduled caste and Scheduled Tribe households are significantly less likely to attend private school. Parental exposure to media and television significantly affects private school enrolment. Finally the likelihood of a child attending private school is 18 percentage points higher for urban households compared to rural households. Given that these are estimates from a cross-section data, it could suffer from omitted variable bias.

Do the individual and household variables have differential impacts on differential private school enrolment of boys and girls? To examine this, we interact the GIRL dummy with the individual and household level variables. The corresponding results are presented in column 3. Several results stand out. First, with minor exceptions, at every age, girls are significantly less likely to attend private school compared to boys. Second, while father's educational attainment does not have a differential impact on the private school attendance of boys and girls (overall an increase in the years of schooling attained by the father increases the likelihood of private school attendance for both boys and girls), an increase in mother's educational attainment has a strong effect on private school enrolment of girls but not that of boys – the non-interacted term is not statistically different from zero indicating that an increase in the years of schooling attained by the mother does not have any effect on the private school enrolment of boys; the interaction term is positive and statistically significant and the marginal effect implies that an additional year of schooling attained by the mother increases the likelihood of private school attendance by 0.5 percentage points for girls. Given that on average 25% of girls (who are enrolled in school) attend school, this implies a 2 percent increase in private school attendance for girls for a year increase in schooling of the mother.

What about the effect of community characteristics? Column 4 augments the results that we present in column 3 by including two community level variables. The first is the distance to the nearest private school relative to the nearest government, which is likely to affect the cost of attending private school. Long journeys, to and from school, put girls at additional risk regardless of age, race, class, caste or location because of the potential threat of rape, sexual harassment, intimidation and teasing (see for example UN (2000), Mirsky (2003)). The fact that somebody might need to accompany a girl on her walk to and from school creates a larger burden for girls' schooling.[8] In other words, access to local private schools with less travelling time may enhance the likelihood of girls' private schooling.

[8] This issue has been discussed in detail in the context of Pakistan and Afghanistan. See for example Alderman *et al.* (1997), Andrabi *et al.* (2008), Burde and Linden (2013) and Qureshi (2013).

Accordingly, a greater distance to private (relative to government) schools is likely to increase the cost of attending private school for girls (relative to boys), which in turn may explain a female disadvantage in private school enrolment. In other words, access to local private schools for girls might reverse the gender gap in private school enrolment. To capture the effect of distance to school, we construct a dummy variable ($Dis\_Prtv\_Gov\_Q4$), which the variable takes the value of 1 if the ratio of the distance between the nearest private to government school in the community is in the 4^{th} quantile – i.e., the nearest private school is further away, relative to the government school(s) in the community. We interact the binary variable with the GIRL dummy to identify the differential effect of distance to schools among female children in the family. The second variable captures the potential returns from schooling. There is a general consensus in the literature that parental decision about whether and how much to invest in their children's human capital depends on the child's potential future earnings. In particular, Duraisamy (2002) documents the presence and persistence of gender differences in returns to schooling in India. Further Kingdon and Theopold (2006) show that lower female school participation in India is significantly linked to lower returns to female schooling. If returns to schooling are higher for boys, ceteris paribus, parents may choose fee-paying private schools only for boys with a view to boost expected earnings. In other words, one can expect a reversal of gender discrimination against girls in private school enrolment only when relative returns to girls schooling is higher. Empirically, we generate female to male hourly wage rate for those who have ever attended a school in the primary sampling unit, which we consider as the immediate community. We prefer this to individual level wage earnings as the latter is likely to suffer from potential endogeneity. We then generate a binary variable FM_wage_1 that takes the value of 1 if the ratio of female to male market hourly wage rate in the community exceeds 1, i.e., when labour market returns for women are higher than that for men. The variable takes a value 0 otherwise. While the value of the binary variable is the same for everyone in the primary sampling unit, we exploit its variation across gender as we particularly focus on its interaction with the GIRL dummy.

The regression results presented in column 4 show that not surprisingly an increase in the relative distance of the nearest private school reduces the likelihood of private school enrolment. However there is no evidence of a differential gender effect in this respect. On the other hand and surprisingly, if local labour market returns to women exceeds that to men that increases the likelihood of private school attendance for both boys and girls and the differential effect is not statistically significant. As argued above, these results may suffer from omitted variable bias and we shall consider household fixed effects estimates as an alternative.

Region Specific Effects

Inter-state variation in human development in India is striking. Gender inequity continues to remain a serious problem in all the states, though the heterogeneity is striking – for example the gender gap in private schooling is only about 7% in Kerala while it is more than four times (30%) in Rajasthan and Bihar. The situation is even worse among the SC/ST population and especially their women. Thus it is important to explore if the gender gap in private school enrolment varies across the regions in India.

Table 5 presents evidence (using administrative and census data) on the regional variation in the share of private school and also on literacy rates. Clearly there is considerable variation across regions. The share of primary school students attending private schools varies from 12 percent in the North to 0.3 percent in the East. At the secondary school level, this share varies from 35 percent in the North to 10 percent in the East (see Panel A). Panel B shows a similarly large heterogeneity in literacy rates by region and by gender at the different age groups. In general the Eastern states perform quite poorly, while the Western and Southern states do considerably better than average.

Table 6 presents the marginal effect for the GIRL dummy from pooled (selection corrected) probit regression, separately for the different regions of the country. There is indeed a great deal of variation across the different regions of India. While there is evidence of gender bias all over India, there is a large variation in the coefficient estimate of the GIRL

dummy across the different regions: it is lowest in the while in the Western region (here girls are 2.37 percentage points less likely to attend private school compared to boys) and the highest in the Northern (here girls are 11 percentage points less likely to attend private school compared to boys) and North-Western (gender gap of about 10 percentage points) regions. In comparison moderate levels of gender gap is observed in Eastern and Western and Southern regions.[9] The results for the region specific effects are summarized in Figure 3.

Table 6 also presents the corresponding effects for the eastern state of West Bengal. First, the gender bias against girls is considerably lower in West Bengal relative to the rest of the country – in West Bengal GIRLs have a 1.7 percentage points lower probability of attending private school. Compare this to 6.84 percentage points for the country as a whole and 3.53 percentage points for the Eastern region.

In an attempt to explain the regional variation in the gender gap in private school enrolment, we then run the fully gender interacted model for various individual and household characteristics. The regression results presented in column 3 include interaction of the GIRL dummy with the individual and household characteristics. These results, presented in Table 6, again reveal considerable regional variation in private school enrolment of girls in our sample.

3.2 Household Fixed Effects Approach

Even the best surveys cannot guarantee that one has all the necessary observable information. As such a common problem in many empirical analyses pertains to the fact that some relevant variables, e.g., school admission criteria, parental support/motivation, child health information or past performance may not be observable. More importantly, estimation bias arises if some of these unobservables are correlated with the residual error term, which is particularly difficult to tackle in cross-sectional or pooled data.

[9] East: Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, West Bengal; West: Gujarat and Maharashtra; North: Chhatisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal; North-West: Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir and, Punjab; South: Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu. We get very similar estimates for the northwest region even when we drop households from Jammu and Kashmir.

The first is the potential estimation bias generated from unobserved household characteristics and the second is the potential endogeneity of gender of the child arising from the quantity-quality trade-off in Beckerian set-up – the gender composition of children within the household is not necessarily random and parental preferences can have an important role to play. The same unobserved parental characteristics that affect child gender can also systematically affect educational opportunities of children of different gender differently, thus causing significant endogeneity bias. While some use gender of the first child on the ground that it is random, thereby restricting the analysis to the first-born (see Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000)), we consider a household fixed effects approach[10] because it not only addresses the endogeneity of gender of the child but also the issue of omitted variable bias that we are concerned about. In particular, we consider households with 2 or more children aged 7 – 18 years, which allows us to exploit the intra-household variation in gender to identify the causal effect of gender on private school enrolment, after controlling for the relevant and observable child, household and community characteristics in our sample.

Second, one has to account for the fact that private school enrolment is conditional on whether a child is enrolled in any school. Given that almost 27 percent of 7 – 18 year olds in our sample are not enrolled in school, it is important to correct for the potential selectivity bias. Since standard Heckman type selection model is not sufficient here, we follow Wooldridge (1995) and Semykina and Wooldridge (2013) to obtain the private school enrolment equation with control selection within a household fixed effects model. This is explained below.

To reiterate the selection problem: suppose S_{ij}^{*} as the propensity of the i^{th} child from the j^{th} household is enrolled in a private unaided (henceforth private) school at the time of the survey. This propensity is determined by the following equation:

$$S_{ij}^{*} = \beta' X_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

[10] Note that it is unlikely that true panel data can help us in this respect as propensity to change schools for a given child over the years is rather few and far between, if at all, thus limiting the extent of time variation in the private school enrolment.

We observe instead the binary variable $S_{ij} = 1$ if the i^{th} child from the j^{th} household is enrolled in a private school at the time of the survey and 0 otherwise. Private school enrolment S_{ij} is observed only if the i^{th} child from the j^{th} household is enrolled in school at the time of the survey $(E_{ij} = 1)$. In estimating equation (1) we therefore have to account for the binary selection problem:

$$E_{ij}^{*} = \gamma' Z_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

where E_{ij}^{*} (the propensity to attend school) is not observable and we only observe a binary variable E_{ij} defined as follows, i = 1, 2, N:

$$E_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } E_{ij}^{*} > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The error terms in the two equations (ε_{ij} and ϵ_{ij}) each comprise of a component common across all children belonging to the same household j and an IID random component, so that

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon_{ij} &= \eta_j + v_{ij} \\ \epsilon_{ij} &= \xi_j + u_{ij} \end{aligned}$$

where $(v_{ij}|X_{ij}, \eta_j) \sim N(0,1)$ and $(u_{ij}|Z_{ij}, \xi_j) \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$. The selection bias arises because of the fact that η_j potentially correlated with ξ_j. Specifically the same unobserved household/parental characteristics – for example parental enlightenment – that affect the likelihood of enrolment can also affect the likelihood of private school enrolment. Given the joint normality of the error terms, v_{ij} and u_{ij} are linked as: $v_{ij} = \gamma u_{ij} + e_{ij}; i = 1,2, \cdots, N$ where $\gamma = \rho/\sigma$ and ρ is the correlation between v_{ij} and u_{ij}.

The relevant fixed effects estimates of private school enrolment decision S_{ij} would be consistent and asymmetrically normal as $N \to \infty$ only if $E(v_{ij}|\eta_j, X_{ij}, E_{ij}) = 0$ for $i = 1,2, \cdots, N$ (see Wooldridge (1995) and Semykina and Wooldridge (2013)). Further, for the usual fixed effects variance-covariance matrix and inference to be valid, a sufficient additional assumption is $Var(v_{ij}|\eta_j, X_{ij}, E_{ij}) = \sigma_v^2$=1. Finally assuming that the household fixed effects η_j depend on the time averages of X_{ij}, i.e., $\bar{x}_i$, over $i = 1,2 \cdots N$, the simplest

consistent estimate of private school enrolment decision S_{ij} is a pooled probit (Semykina and Wooldridge (2013)).

The estimation procedure is as follows:

(1) Estimate N different selection probits, one for each of N children of ascending birth order and estimate the inverse Mill's ratio λ_{ij} in each case; we also generate the household-level averages of individual child characteristics X_{ij} or $\bar{x}_j$.

(2) For $E_{ij} = 1$, use the maximum likelihood method to obtain the selection corrected private school enrolment regression using pooled probit model to determine S as follows:

$$S_{ij}^{*} = \beta' X_{ij} + \gamma' \bar{x}_j + \theta' \lambda_{ij} + \sum_i t_i T_i + \sum_i l_i (\lambda_{ij} \times T_i) + \eta_j + v_{ij}$$

where T_i is a dummy that takes value 1 for the i^{th} child of a given order and 0 otherwise. We also include the interaction terms $\lambda_{ij} \times T_i$ to control for the variation of individual Inverse Mills Ratio's across I children of different birth orders. For the estimates to be consistent, we need to consider balanced panel. We then check the statistical significance of the lambda coefficient for the selectivity bias.

We consider a pseudo panel of households with 2 or more children with a view to exploit the intra-household variation in outcome (i.e., private school enrolment) to obtain the effect of gender on the outcome. Our baseline regression includes households with at least 2 children aged 7 – 18 year; since the estimation of our model requires using balanced sample, we focus our attention on households with 2, 3, 4 children; our sample becomes much smaller if we consider balanced sample with at least 5 or more children. We next re-estimate the private school enrolment decision for primary (7 – 11) and secondary (12 – 18) school age children for households with 3 children.

Our primary regression results are restricted to a sample of households with 3 children aged 7 – 18 $(T = 3)$.[11] Our main focus is on private school enrolment, conditional on any school enrolment at the first stage. In the first stage we run separate regressions for

[11] Our choice of $T = 3$ as the baseline case is driven primarily by sample size considerations. We later compare these estimates with those for $T = 2$ and $T = 4$ as robustness checks.

children of birth order 1 (eldest), 2 (middle) and 3 (youngest); these estimates are available on request. This gives us three sets of Inverse Mill's Ratios, which are used to generate the composite inverse mill's ratio lambda as additional control in the second stage regression. Table 7 presents the second stage probit estimates (note that these are not marginal effects) of private school enrolment for T = 2, 3, 4 children. Columns 2, 4 and 6 respectively show the corrected baseline estimates of private school enrolment in our sample using Semykina and Wooldridge (2013).

Column 2 in Table 8 presents the baseline selectivity corrected household fixed effects regression for $T = 3$. As with the regressions presented in column 2 of Table 4, we include only the individual and household characteristics.[12] The results are quite similar to the pooled selectivity corrected probit estimates that we present in column 2 Table 4. Of particular importance is the sign and the significance of the GIRL dummy. Controlling for a large set of individual, household and community characteristics, we find that girls are significantly less likely to attend private school. The regression results suggest that the log odds of attending private school for girls are lower by 0.265 and the effect is statistically significant. There is therefore systematic and consistent evidence of within household discrimination against girls. As before children of greater than average ability are significantly more likely to be enrolled in a private school, as are children with more educated fathers, children belonging to richer households (captured by per capita expenditure greater than the median per capita expenditure) and children residing in urban areas. On the other hand, the likelihood of attending private school decreases significantly as the child grows older (the effect is monotonic), those belonging to Hindu, Muslim and Christian households and those belonging to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe households. In general, we obtain similar results for $T = 2$ and $T = 4$ though there are some differences as well; for example, women's exposure to media is statistically significant for $T = 2$, suggesting that private school enrolment is significantly higher for households where women have some

[12] Recall that household fixed effects are controlled for by the mean values of individual characteristics per household; so we still can control for individual, household and community characteristics.

media exposure. While we obtain similar effects for $T = 3$ and $T = 4$, t-statistics are low and hence fail to be significant at 10% level. Also, greater than average ability of children is not significant for $T = 4$ cases though the estimated coefficient is still positive.

We then try to understand the determinants of gender gap in private school enrolment and to this end consider the gender interacted estimates for the case $T = 3$. Table 9 presents these results. Column 1 shows the results when we only include the gender interacted terms for the individual characteristics, namely if child is perceived to have greater than average ability and also his/her various age categories. In the results presented in column (2) we instead interact the GIRL dummy only with the household characteristics (parental education, caste/religion, expenditure quartiles) only while those in column (3) does the same for the community characteristics (residential location if urban, relative distance to private schools and relative female/male wage rate); our most complete estimates are shown in column (4) of the table where we augment the specification shown in column (2) of Table 8 by including gender interactions with the full set of individual, household and community characteristics. It is noteworthy here the only individual characteristics would vary across male and female children within the household; in contrast all the children in the household will share the same household characteristics.

Column 4 of Table 9, presents the results for the complete specification where all individual, household and community characteristics are interacted with the GIRL dummy. We are unable to identify any significant differential gender effect with respect to any of the individual characteristics: gender interactions with perceived ability of children or age of children are not significant. There is no evidence that girls with higher perceived ability are more likely to be enrolled in private schools, which may presumably reflect the lower labor market participation rates of girls and also their lower returns to schooling even in in India's emerging economy (Kingdon (1996); Bhalla and Kaur, 2008). The gender gap is however significantly lower in households where the mother has more education, in Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe households and in richer households (though for the wealthiest

households the effect is not statistically significant at any conventional level. Gender bias is significantly higher in Hindu households.

Turning to the community characteristics, relative distance to nearest school significantly reduces the likelihood of boys attending private school. What is surprising is that an increase in relative distance reduces the gender bias in private school enrolment – the difference estimate is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that the likelihood of private school enrolment of girls is significantly higher even when the relative distance is greater; the latter may highlight the importance of differentiated demand for girls schooling, e.g., need for female teacher, access to female toilet and more importantly presence of a teacher in the class who can protect girls from bullying and harassment.

Table 10 shows the household fixed effects estimates of private school enrolment across different regions. Since the pooled probit estimates by region (see Tables 6 and 7) are likely to be biased because of possible omitted factors, we focus our attention on the household fixed effects estimates by region (see Table 10). After controlling for all individual, household and community characteristics and also various gender interaction terms, the GIRL dummy is no longer significant for households residing in the North, South, Western regions while it is still negative and significant for those in the North-Western regions. Interestingly, however, the GIRL dummy turns out to be positive and significant for the Eastern region, which negates the general hypothesis of female disadvantage in private school enrolment that we have seen elsewhere (especially northern and north-western regions). While the GIRL dummy is positive, it remains insignificant for the western region (see column 2 of Table 10). Considering the contribution of individual variables, we find that e the coefficient of the gender interaction with the parental perceived ability of the child remains insignificant for most regions, while it turns out to be negative and significant for those in the Western regions, thus suggesting an aspect of adverse discrimination against girls even when they are perceived to be more able by the parents; the latter may be a reflection of lower returns to girls' schooling, especially in rural areas (see further discussion below). There is some indication that girls aged 12 are more likely to be enrolled in private schools in

the north and north-western regions, which perhaps highlights an aspect of differentiated demand for girls schooling in the region as girls approach adolescence. It may also reflect the security issues for these girls in state schools where teachers are often absent. Mother's education has a significant differential impact on girls in the Southern regions and also in West Bengal while girls from the urban regions of western states are more likely to be sent to private schools; the latter may particularly highlight the aspect of greater returns to female schooling in relatively more industrialised urban sectors of western states of Gujarat and Maharashtra.

We have also assessed the specific case of West Bengal, which has a tradition of good schooling within the eastern region and has also seen relative low growth of private schools. It follows from Table 5, that the extent of female disadvantage in private school enrolment is the lowest here compared to all other Indian regions (as the state has the lowest marginal effect for the GIRL coefficient). While the number of observations required for the household fixed effects estimates for the state is rather limited, estimates shown in Table 10 continue to suggest that the GIRL dummy is no longer significant in the fully interacted model (which contrasts the results we have seen in the pooled probit estimates presented in Table 6). There is further indication that the mother's education and women's exposure to media tend to boost private school enrolment of girls in the state. More interestingly girls from relatively disadvantaged background including SC/ST/Muslim households who are comparable on other individual/household characteristics are more likely to be enrolled in private schools, which is not evident elsewhere in the country. Clearly, these results highlight the heterogeneity across the Indian states/regions with respect to female disadvantage in private school enrolment and also identify the differential factors that may boost private school enrolment among girls across these regions we study.

In Table 11 we present the selection corrected and fully interacted results for $T = 2$ and $T = 4$. In general, these estimates support the findings obtained for the case $T = 3$. We are unable to find significance of any individual characteristics to explain the gender gap;

however, mother's education is still significant and explains the differential private school enrolment of boys and girls in our sample.

As a robustness check we re-estimate the selectivity corrected household fixed effects regressions for private school enrolment for children in households with 3 children after augmenting the specification used for the regression results presented in Table 9 by including a measure of child's illness and also its interaction with the female dummy. In the absence of a better measure, we use the days absent from school in last 30 days due to illness as a measure of illness. Note that we do not expect this measure to suffer from simultaneity bias as the timing of the enrolment in private schools and incidence of the illness are different. There are two related measures of child's health that is available in the IHDS: (i) days hospitalised in the last year and (ii) long-term illness which is a composite index of incidence of various long-term health problems including polio, epilepsy, heart problem, high bp, diabetes (limited cases though). We find that days absent from school is highly correlated with both (i) and (ii). If however, we try to include (i) or (ii), we lose a lot of observations, which is particularly problematic for the estimation of the household fixed effects case; hence we consider these augmented estimates using days absent from school due to illness which is a direct measure of the effect of illness on school attendance. The results (see Table A3) are similar qualitatively to those presented in Table 9. There is evidence of systematic discrimination against the girl child. The likelihood of the female child attending private school is negative and statistically significant. Female disadvantage persists even when girls have higher than average perceived ability. Interestingly, however illness discriminates girls against private school enrolment. Other results are generally comparable to what we have seen in Table 8. Ceteris paribus, these results highlight the cautious nature of household investment in private schooling which discriminates against girls' current health while ignoring the higher expected returns for girls with greater than average ability. .

In Table 12 we present the selection corrected estimates for children in the age group 7 – 11 and 12 – 18 respectively, which are respectively the primary and secondary age groups. The idea is to explore if there is any differential behaviour across the level of

schooling. Indeed there is confirmation of some interesting differences across these two cohorts. First, while the child's ability does not have a statistically significant effect on private school enrolment for children belonging to the older cohort, in the younger cohort boys with greater than average ability are significantly more likely to be enrolled in a private school. For girls in the younger age cohort however ability does not have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of private school enrolment (the difference effect is negative and statistically significant and quantitatively similar to the non-interacted term). Second, Hindu, Muslim and Christian girls in the older age cohort are all significantly less likely to attend private school. Third, household resource constraints benefit girls in the younger age cohort. Costs and returns to schooling too have a gender differentiated effect depending on the age cohort.

3.3. Inferences

To summarise, we exploit the intra-household variation in private school enrolment among boys and girls born to same parents and find evidence of significant gender gap in private schooling in our sample; we also find that the extent of the gender gap varies across the regions and seems to be higher in the northern and north-western states. A further investigation into the causes of gender gap fail to find some evidence of variation in the gender gap across age groups, especially in certain regions. But we do not find any evidence that gender gap in private school enrolment is less for girls with greater than average ability while there is some suggestion that it is worse for girls with poorer health. A key factor in explaining gender gap in private school enrolment would be the returns to schooling. We could not include female wage rate within the household fixed effects model partly because of endogeneity issue (instead, we proxy perceived ability of children for returns to schooling) and partly because female wage rates are missing for a large proportion of women in our

sample.[13] Using the same data-set as ours, Azam et al. (2013) find that being able to speak a little English significantly increases male hourly wages by 13% which could be taken as a returns to private schooling; this is because instructions in English appears to be a key feature of most private schools in India. As an alternative, Fulford (2012) compare consumption per capita of male and female members by schooling years and find that both men and women in India with more education live in households with greater consumption per capita. Yet in aggregate, comparing across age cohorts (which better addresses the measurement error) and states during 1983-2005, better educated male cohorts consume only about 4% more than less well educated ones. Better educated female cohorts do not live in households with higher consumption. Further Fulford (2012) show that the returns at the cohort level do not vary substantially at the state level. Taken together, we argue, without much loss of generality, that the gender gap in private school enrolment cannot be explained by parental altruism; rather it is a rational decision where parent attempt to maximise the returns (net of all costs) from investment in children's private schooling.

4. Conclusions

Since the launch of Indian economic liberalisation programme in the early 1990s, there has been an impressive growth of private schools in India, the extent of which varies across the Indian regions. Using the IHDS 2005-06 individual/household level data, the present paper tests whether private school growth has been accompanied by growing gender gap in private school enrolment, which remains little understood. On the one hand, private school growth may ameliorate the extent of the gender gap in schooling because parents who choose private schools are likely to be more motivated and altruistic; these parents may therefore not discriminate between boys and girls. On the other hand, private schools are fee-paying schools and parents choosing private schools are likely to choose them only when the returns

[13] This may explain why most existing studies of the returns to education in India (and other developing countries) consider only wage rates, which means that they apply only to a very small, almost entirely male and urban section of the population (e.g., see Azam et al. 2013).

from schooling is higher. Since, returns to girls schooling are generally lower across India, it is possible that private school growth may worsen the already existing gender gap in schooling.

We find evidence of significant female disadvantage in private school enrolment in the full sample, which is particularly higher in the large north and north western states. Our best estimates come from a household fixed effects model with correction for bias arising from selection into any school enrolment using Semykina and Wooldridge (2013) method. We thus exploit the intra-household variation in private school enrolment to identify the effect of gender on private school enrolment. We also investigate if this gender gap in private school enrolment can be explained by various observable individual, household and community characteristics and as such augment the baseline specification by various gender interaction terms. There is no evidence that individual age or perceived ability can explain this observed gender gap, but poor health may discriminate against girls' private school enrolment. Further mother's schooling can significantly enhance private school enrolment among girls. We also find that various gender interaction terms are jointly significant, thus explaining why the gender dummy turns out to be insignificant in the fully interacted model. There are also interesting variation in the nature and extent of gender gap in private school enrolment across the Indian states which highlights the role of differential institutions, culture/norms and also returns to female schooling. Our results are robust and tend to highlight a rational attempt among sample households to maximise the future earning prospects while investing in girls' private schooling.

These results pose important challenges for the policy makers attempting to secure 'education for all'. There have been various policies, e.g., training female teachers, introducing scholarship for girls (Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalaya Scheme), undertaken by the Indian government to tackle gender gap in government school enrolment. But so far both the national and state governments as well as the donors have turned a blind eye to the growth of private schooling. It is about time for the government to regulate the private sector. The 2010 Right to Education Act in India requires for the first time private schools to reserve 25

% of total seats at the primary level for the poor.[14] Our results dictate that the act needs to go beyond its current scope: there needs to be state-funded reservation of private school seats not only for the poor at the primary level, but also for the girls, especially those from poorer families and beyond primary level too.

[14] Currently, the Act puts the responsibility of ensuring enrolment, attendance and completion on the state and, as such, does not offer any choice to parents as in the school voucher schemes successfully implemented in many countries including the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh (see Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2013)). One hopes that the current UN efforts to reassess MDGs will look into these emerging issues more systematically.

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Wooldridge, J. M. (1995): "Selection corrections for panel data models under conditional mean independence assumptions", *Journal of Econometrics*, **68**(1), 115 - 132.

Figure 1: Proportion Enrolled in School, by Age and Gender



Figure 2: Proportion Enrolled in Private School, by Age and Gender



Notes:
Enrolment in Private School is conditional on school enrolment.

Figure 3: Gender Bias and associated 95% Confidence Interval



Notes:
The bars represent the marginal effects of GIRL from a probit regression of conditional private school attendance by region. The associated 95% confidence intervals are presented by the bold lines.

Table 1. A comparison of government and private unaided schools, 1992 – 2002

	Private schools		Government schools	
	1992	2002	1992	2002
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Percentage of female teachers in total				
Primary	0.55 (0.26)	0.55 (0.24)	0.35 (0.23)	0.38 (0.15)
Upper primary	0.50 (0.27)	0.50 (0.24)	0.30 (0.21)	0.32 (0.17)
Secondary	0.45 (0.26)	0.44 (0.22)	0.28 (0.20)	0.24 (0.19)
Percentage of low caste teachers				
Primary	0.09 (0.13)	0.11 (0.13)	0.22 (0.19)	0.24 (0.19)
Upper primary	0.08 (0.13)	0.10 (0.12)	0.17 (0.14)	0.23 (0.17)
Secondary	0.07 (0.11)	0.08 (0.08	0.15 (0.13)	0.17 (0.12)
Percentage of schools with:				
Pucca building	0.78 (0.17)	0.77 (0.39)	0.66 (0.24)	0.79 (0.34)
Lavatory	0.66 (0.23)	0.71 (0.22)	0.33(0.26)	0.41 (0.27)
Drinking water	0.84 (0.17)	0.91 (0.13)	0.58 (0.24)	0.78 (0.17)
Pupils per teacher				
Primary	30.7 (12.5)	34.3 (31.6)	39.1 (16.2)	67.1 (70.5)
Upper Primary	30.8 (11.2)	20.6 (50.0)	31.5 (11.5)	35.3 (58.3)
Secondary	29.1 (10.9)	13.7 (23.0)	28.1 (8.4)	29.7 (19.1)

Notes:
Source: Kingdon and Pal (2014). Government schools do not include private aided schools.

Table 2. Enrolment and Private school enrolment rates

	Enrolment			Private School Enrolment♠		
	All	Females	Males	All	Females	Males
Sample Average	0.73	0.70	0.75	0.28	0.25	0.31
Rural	0.71	0.68	0.74	0.19	0.15	0.21
Urban	0.76	0.75	0.77	0.50	0.47	0.53
Hindu	0.76	0.73	0.78	0.27	0.24	0.29
Muslim	0.56	0.53	0.58	0.36	0.35	0.37
SC/ST	0.68	0.66	0.70	0.17	0.14	0.19
Father's Education (Q1)	0.54	0.50	0.56	0.16	0.13	0.18
Father's Education (Q2)	0.67	0.65	0.69	0.29	0.26	0.32
Father's Education (Q3)	0.77	0.75	0.79	0.28	0.24	0.34
Father's Education (Q4)	0.87	0.85	0.89	0.40	0.37	0.42
Mother's Education (Q1)	0.60	0.57	0.63	0.20	0.16	0.23
Mother's Education (Q2)	0.74	0.73	0.74	0.43	0.39	0.46
Mother's Education (Q3)	0.78	0.75	0.80	0.32	0.31	0.34
Mother's Education (Q4)	0.90	0.89	0.90	0.38	0.35	0.41
Q1 (Poorest Households)	0.61	0.59	0.63	0.15	0.13	0.18
Q2	0.68	0.65	0.70	0.21	0.19	0.23
Q3	0.75	0.73	0.77	0.28	0.26	0.29
Q4 (Richest Households)	0.85	0.83	0.86	0.43	0.40	0.46
Age 7 – 9	0.88	0.87	0.89	0.29	0.26	0.32
Age 10 – 14	0.83	0.80	0.85	0.28	0.24	0.31
Age 15 – 18	0.44	0.40	0.47	0.28	0.28	0.28

Notes:

♠: Private School Enrolment, conditional on Enrolment; source: IHDS data

Table 3. Selected Sample Characteristics

	Mean	Std. Dev.
Panel A: Individual Characteristics		
Female	0.48	0.50
Household Size	7.04	3.00
Number of Children	2.90	1.81
Number of Adults	2.94	1.56
Per Capita HH Consumption Expenditure	721.64	609.32
Per Capita HH Income	7671.31	9656.27
Age	12.37	3.24
Years of Schooling Father	5.30	4.67
Years of Schooling Mother	2.79	4.02
Urban	0.30	0.46
Hindu	0.79	0.41
Muslim	0.15	0.36
SC/ST	0.29	0.46
Head: Reads newspaper regularly	0.60	0.76
Head Age	46.08	10.99
Enrolled	0.73	0.45
Enrolled in Private School	0.28	0.45

Table 4. Regional variation in literacy and private school share: Means and standard deviations for the (1992 and 2002) pooled data

Level	East	West	North-west	North	South	All
			Mean share (sd) of recognised private schools (in total schools)			
Primary	0.003(0.007)	0.084 (0.11)	0.05 (0.07)	0.12 (0.09)	0.047 (0.07)	0.07 (0.09)
Upper primary	0.023 (0.04)	0.058 (0.08)	0.16 (0.17)	0.28 (0.15)	0.096 (0.11)	0.15 (0.16)
Secondary	0.10 (0.12)	0.22 (0.12)	0.18 (0.15)	0.35 (0.23)	0.22 (0.15)	0.22 (0.20)
			Mean literacy (sd) rates			
Female 10-14	0.53 (0.17)	0.82 (0.12)	0.81 (0.11)	0.55 (0.20)	0.80 (0.17)	0.66 (0.21)
Male 10-14	0.71 (0.13)	0.910.05)	0.89 (0.06)	0.78 (0.13)	0.89 (0.09)	0.81 (0.13)
Female 15-19	0.47 (0.17)	0.74 (0.14)	0.73 (0.14)	0.46 (0.19)	0.72 (0.20)	0.59 (0.21)
Male 15-19	0.70 (0.12)	0.88 (0.07)	0.85 (0.08)	0.76 (0.12)	0.84 (0.12)	0.79 (0.13)
Female 10-19	0.54(0.17)	0.78 (0.13)	0.77 (0.13)	0.51 (0.19)	0.76 (0.18)	0.63 (0.21)
Male 10-19	0.72 (0.12)	0.89 (0.06)	0.87 (0.07)	0.77 (0.13)	0.86 (0.11)	0.80 (0.13)

Source: 6th and 7th AISES data and 1991 and 2001 Census data. Source: Kingdon and Pal (2014)
Note: Indian regions: south-Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka; West- Gujarat, Maharashtra; East-Assam, Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal;
North-west-Punjab, Haryana; North-Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh.

Table 5.Pooled probit marginal effects estimates of private school enrolment with gender interactions – with/without selection correction Full Sample

	Uncorrected		Corrected estimates	
GIRL	-0.0611***	-0.0684***	-0.0632**	-0.0603**
	(0.00509)	(0.00528)	(0.0246)	(0.0263)
Ability Greater than Average	0.0419***	0.0378***	0.0377***	0.0351***
	(0.00956)	(0.00969)	(0.00787)	(0.00822)
GIRL × Ability Greater than Average			-0.000617	0.000377
			(0.0181)	(0.0193)
Age 8	-0.00334	0.00453	0.0187	0.0162
	(0.0103)	(0.0109)	(0.0122)	(0.0118)
Age 9	-0.00324	-0.00247	0.0108	0.00840
	(0.00779)	(0.00779)	(0.0127)	(0.0124)
Age 10	-0.0122	-0.00763	0.0124	0.0115
	(0.00951)	(0.00963)	(0.0148)	(0.0141)
Age 12	-0.0416***	-0.0551***	-0.0485***	-0.0485***
	(0.00682)	(0.00722)	(0.00851)	(0.00884)
Age 13	-0.0428***	-0.0617***	-0.0440***	-0.0433***
	(0.0111)	(0.0109)	(0.0137)	(0.0141)
Age 14	-0.0512***	-0.0785***	-0.0610***	-0.0628***
	(0.0100)	(0.00951)	(0.0127)	(0.0121)
Age 15	-0.0509***	-0.101***	-0.0973***	-0.0961***
	(0.00994)	(0.00967)	(0.0144)	(0.0149)
Age 16	-0.0769***	-0.144***	-0.150***	-0.149***
	(0.00913)	(0.00756)	(0.00888)	(0.00895)
Age 17	-0.104***	-0.169***	-0.156***	-0.153***
	(0.00945)	(0.00757)	(0.0117)	(0.0119)
Age 18	-0.147***	-0.217***	-0.211***	-0.208***
	(0.0136)	(0.00589)	(0.00712)	(0.00714)
GIRL × Age 8			-0.0284	-0.0260
			(0.0181)	(0.0182)
GIRL × Age 9			-0.0277	-0.0279
			(0.0179)	(0.0178)
GIRL × Age 10			-0.0414**	-0.0389**
			(0.0186)	(0.0178)
GIRL × Age 12			-0.0164	-0.0185

			(0.0152)	(0.0157)
GIRL × Age 13			-0.0443**	-0.0429**
			(0.0186)	(0.0186)
GIRL × Age 14			-0.0488***	-0.0463***
			(0.0155)	(0.0155)
GIRL × Age 15			-0.0185	-0.0142
			(0.0243)	(0.0255)
GIRL × Age 16			0.00884	0.00782
			(0.0275)	(0.0263)
GIRL × Age 17			-0.0676**	-0.0664**
			(0.0282)	(0.0285)
GIRL × Age 18			-0.0694	-0.0697
			(0.0462)	(0.0461)
Father's schooling years	0.0117***	0.0131***	0.0129***	0.0124***
	(0.00108)	(0.00114)	(0.00119)	(0.00117)
GIRL × fed5			0.000574	0.000770
			(0.000941)	(0.000982)
Mother's schooling years	0.000686	0.00203**	-7.86e-05	1.45e-05
	(0.000835)	(0.000883)	(0.00114)	(0.00116)
GIRL × Mother's schooling years			0.00480***	0.00491***
			(0.00117)	(0.00121)
Hindu	-0.131***	-0.136***	-0.128***	-0.130***
	(0.0209)	(0.0204)	(0.0210)	(0.0211)
GIRL × Hindu			-0.0153	-0.0184
			(0.0199)	(0.0202)
Muslim	-0.107***	-0.121***	-0.131***	-0.137***
	(0.0162)	(0.0162)	(0.0185)	(0.0169)
GIRL × Muslim			0.0282	0.0263
			(0.0274)	(0.0278)
Christian	-0.0749***	-0.0809***	-0.0611**	-0.0717**
	(0.0218)	(0.0207)	(0.0309)	(0.0300)
GIRL × Christian			-0.0516	-0.0525
			(0.0371)	(0.0351)
Media exposure women	0.0298***	0.0323***	0.0293***	0.0289***
	(0.00622)	(0.00625)	(0.00676)	(0.00673)

GIRL × Media exposure women			0.00677	0.00634
			(0.00632)	(0.00620)
SC/ST households	-0.0927***	-0.0986***	-0.0979***	-0.0959***
	(0.00823)	(0.00962)	(0.00771)	(0.00796)
GIRL × SC/ST households			-0.00306	-0.00364
			(0.0107)	(0.0108)
Expenditure quartile 2	0.0367***	0.0468***	0.0406***	0.0417***
	(0.0118)	(0.0119)	(0.0142)	(0.0143)
GIRL × Expenditure quartile 2			0.0159	0.0151
			(0.0177)	(0.0175)
Expenditure quartile 3	0.0775***	0.0956***	0.103***	0.102***
	(0.0146)	(0.0136)	(0.0147)	(0.0149)
GIRL × Expenditure quartile 3			-0.0120	-0.0149
			(0.0140)	(0.0141)
Expenditure quartile 4	0.165***	0.191***	0.188***	0.188***
	(0.0134)	(0.0121)	(0.0137)	(0.0142)
GIRL × Expenditure quartile 4			0.00868	0.00546
			(0.0207)	(0.0209)
Urban	0.179***	0.182***	0.179***	0.151***
	(0.0118)	(0.0112)	(0.0124)	(0.0110)
GIRL × Urban			0.00574	0.00641
			(0.0101)	(0.0104)
Distance Private/Government School Q3				-0.0966***
				(0.0103)
GIRL × Distance Private/Government School Q3				-0.0120
				(0.0148)
Female/male wage ratio >=1 (fmwager_ge1)				0.0309***
				(0.0117)
GIRL × Female/male wage ratio >=1				0.00110
				(0.0128)
λ (IMR)		0.319***	0.337***	0.325***
		(0.0293)	(0.0309)	(0.0314)
PSU control	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Observations	28,542	26,761	26,761	26,768

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6. Pooled probit corrected marginal effects estimates of private school enrolment by region

	(1) Full Sample	(2) East	(3) West	(4) North	(5) North West	(6) North West excluding Jammu and Kashmir	(7) South	(8) West Bengal
GIRL	-0.0684***	-0.0332***	-0.0237**	-0.111***	-0.102***	-0.106***	-0.0596***	-0.0168***
	(0.00528)	(0.00715)	(0.0104)	(0.0146)	(0.0149)	(0.0177)	(0.0103)	(0.00544)
λ (IMR)	0.319***	0.258***	0.325***	0.556***	0.337***	0.405***	0.363***	-0.0965***
	(0.0293)	(0.0355)	(0.0811)	(0.0804)	(0.115)	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.0302)
Other variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PSU control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	26,761	4,444	3,427	7,706	4,379	3,730	4,950	1,114

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Other variables are as in Table 4, Column 2.
East: Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, West Bengal; **West**: Gujarat and Maharashtra; **North**: Chhatisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal; **North West**: Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab; **South**: AP, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu.

Table 7. Corrected pooled probit marginal effects estimates for private school enrolment (with gender interactions) by region

	(1) Full Sample	(2) East	(3) West	(4) North	(5) North West	(6) North West excluding Jammu and Kashmir	(7) South	(8) West Bengal
GIRL	-0.0632**	0.0213	-0.00355	0.0620	-0.121	-0.0947	-0.0443***	-0.0697***
	(0.0246)	(0.0457)	(0.0737)	(0.0606)	(0.102)	(0.0901)	(0.0122)	(0.00425)
Ability Greater than Average	0.0377***	0.0270	0.113***	0.00879	0.0503	0.0511	-0.00932	0.0105
	(0.00787)	(0.0292)	(0.0302)	(0.0340)	(0.0335)	(0.0369)	(0.0270)	(0.0195)
GIRL × Ability Greater than Average	-0.000617	-0.0134	-0.0515**	0.0342	0.0346	0.0268	-0.00631	-0.0146*
	(0.0181)	(0.0293)	(0.0263)	(0.0423)	(0.0458)	(0.0464)	(0.0372)	(0.00771)
Age 8	0.0187	0.00597	-0.0311*	0.0184	0.00342	0.00328	0.0113	0.0427
	(0.0122)	(0.0168)	(0.0167)	(0.0171)	(0.0311)	(0.0352)	(0.0239)	(0.0331)
Age 9	0.0108	-0.00661	-0.0313	0.0159	0.00456	0.00336	0.0232	0.0474
	(0.0127)	(0.0245)	(0.0265)	(0.0265)	(0.0307)	(0.0315)	(0.0270)	(0.0395)
Age 10	0.0124	0.0230	-0.0255	0.0513**	-0.0412	-0.0322	0.00412	0.0217
	(0.0148)	(0.0264)	(0.0224)	(0.0227)	(0.0351)	(0.0352)	(0.0234)	(0.0221)
Age 12	-0.0485***	-0.0279	-0.0306	-0.0658***	-0.0592*	-0.0758*	-0.0695***	-0.0193**
	(0.00851)	(0.0205)	(0.0243)	(0.0220)	(0.0359)	(0.0415)	(0.0209)	(0.00925)
Age 13	-0.0440***	-0.0382***	0.0250	-0.0718***	-0.0542	-0.0773*	-0.0375	0.00571
	(0.0137)	(0.0137)	(0.0346)	(0.0235)	(0.0403)	(0.0396)	(0.0273)	(0.0228)
Age 14	-0.0610***	-0.0571***	0.0761**	-0.105***	-0.0947**	-0.0925**	-0.0664**	-0.0116
	(0.0127)	(0.0137)	(0.0361)	(0.0251)	(0.0396)	(0.0423)	(0.0317)	(0.0101)
Age 15	-0.0973***	-0.0878***	-0.0472	-0.185***	-0.158***	-0.166***	-0.0323	-0.00953
	(0.0144)	(0.0134)	(0.0334)	(0.0271)	(0.0393)	(0.0331)	(0.0322)	(0.0172)
Age 16	-0.150***	-0.0886***	-0.0454	-0.246***	-0.248***	-0.216***	-0.0982***	0.0146
	(0.00888)	(0.00948)	(0.0368)	(0.0225)	(0.0319)	(0.0338)	(0.0268)	(0.0342)
Age 17	-0.156***	-0.0978***	-0.0885***	-0.265***	-0.195***	-0.184***	-0.114***	0.229
	(0.0117)	(0.00802)	(0.0208)	(0.0190)	(0.0473)	(0.0500)	(0.0384)	(0.184)
Age 18	-0.211***	-0.105***	-0.114***	-0.302***	-0.292***	-0.264***	-0.190***	0.171
	(0.00712)	(0.00819)	(0.0155)	(0.00990)	(0.0286)	(0.0293)	(0.0157)	(0.164)
GIRL × Age 9	-0.0277	-0.00266	0.0360	0.00914	0.0144	0.00158	-0.0643**	-0.0198***

	(0.0179)	(0.0347)	(0.0492)	(0.0378)	(0.0487)	(0.0547)	(0.0277)	(0.00597)
GIRL × Age 10	-0.0414**	-0.00673	0.0335	-0.0699**	0.0372	0.00327	-0.0543**	-0.00434
	(0.0186)	(0.0300)	(0.0480)	(0.0287)	(0.0568)	(0.0580)	(0.0263)	(0.0157)
GIRL × Age 12	-0.0164	0.000783	0.0180	-0.0316	0.0149	0.0120	0.0209	0.0319
	(0.0152)	(0.0305)	(0.0468)	(0.0359)	(0.0594)	(0.0655)	(0.0409)	(0.0615)
GIRL × Age 13	-0.0443**	-0.0383*	-0.0239	-0.0388	-0.0179	-0.0225	-0.0687**	-0.00989
	(0.0186)	(0.0221)	(0.0386)	(0.0408)	(0.0498)	(0.0520)	(0.0295)	(0.0157)
GIRL × Age 14	-0.0488***	-0.0561***	-0.0390	-0.0320	-0.0730	-0.0837	-0.0300	
	(0.0155)	(0.0183)	(0.0335)	(0.0494)	(0.0494)	(0.0565)	(0.0366)	
GIRL × Age 15	-0.0185	0.0607	0.0461	-0.0149	-0.0548	-0.0423	-0.0411	-0.00933
	(0.0243)	(0.0530)	(0.0740)	(0.0461)	(0.0518)	(0.0500)	(0.0429)	(0.0201)
GIRL × Age 16	0.00884	0.00852	0.00545	0.0921	0.0709	0.0338	-0.0441	-0.0163**
	(0.0275)	(0.0379)	(0.0660)	(0.0692)	(0.0779)	(0.0721)	(0.0506)	(0.00750)
GIRL × Age 17	-0.0676**	-0.0126	-0.0154	-0.0310	-0.131***	-0.142***	-0.0475	
	(0.0282)	(0.0424)	(0.0758)	(0.0683)	(0.0501)	(0.0546)	(0.0662)	
GIRL × Age 18	-0.0694	-0.0899***	-0.0332	-0.0210	-0.128	-0.156**	-0.0415	
	(0.0462)	(0.0197)	(0.0848)	(0.0779)	(0.0853)	(0.0670)	(0.0781)	
Father’s schooling years	0.0129***	0.00903***	0.00740***	0.0164***	0.00379	0.00288	0.0102***	-0.000179
	(0.00119)	(0.00234)	(0.00189)	(0.00179)	(0.00389)	(0.00425)	(0.00221)	(0.00107)
GIRL × fed5	0.000574	0.00143	-0.00208	-0.00281	0.00550	0.00623*	0.00254	0.00290*
	(0.000941)	(0.00240)	(0.00338)	(0.00221)	(0.00379)	(0.00356)	(0.00307)	(0.00160)
Mother’s schooling years	-7.86e-05	-0.00166	0.0110***	0.00140	0.0117***	0.0127***	0.00447	0.00138
	(0.00114)	(0.00180)	(0.00247)	(0.00276)	(0.00399)	(0.00421)	(0.00373)	(0.00127)
GIRL × Mother’s schooling years	0.00480***	0.00247	0.00213	0.00417	-0.000900	-0.00629	0.0118***	-0.00263
	(0.00117)	(0.00252)	(0.00373)	(0.00289)	(0.00481)	(0.00560)	(0.00377)	(0.00239)
Hindu	-0.128***	-0.0250	0.0408	0.0930	-0.144***	-0.150***	0.0173	-0.0751
	(0.0210)	(0.0312)	(0.0368)	(0.0789)	(0.0467)	(0.0435)	(0.137)	(0.0705)
GIRL × Hindu	-0.0153	-0.0522	-0.0368	-0.130**	-0.0303	-0.0348	0.286**	0.919***
	(0.0199)	(0.0337)	(0.0474)	(0.0536)	(0.0437)	(0.0408)	(0.138)	(0.0565)
Muslim	-0.131***	-0.0664***	0.0419	0.0351	-0.140***	-0.196***	-0.0620	-0.0296
	(0.0185)	(0.0250)	(0.0651)	(0.107)	(0.0442)	(0.0567)	(0.127)	(0.0197)
GIRL × Muslim	0.0282	-0.0224	-0.00488	-0.0953*	0.00896	0.0878	0.456***	0.995***
	(0.0274)	(0.0372)	(0.0716)	(0.0514)	(0.0600)	(0.132)	(0.174)	(0.00390)
Christian	-0.0611**	0.117	-0.135***		0.140	0.183	0.0258	0.0843

	(0.0309)	(0.0875)	(0.00736)		(0.123)	(0.128)	(0.157)	(0.210)
GIRL × Christian	-0.0516	-0.0408	0.876***		-0.203	-0.220**	0.316*	
	(0.0371)	(0.0627)	(0.00686)		(0.128)	(0.0999)	(0.164)	
Media exposure women	0.0293***	0.0422***	0.00564	0.0483***	0.0544***	0.0521***	0.0410***	0.00536
	(0.00676)	(0.00972)	(0.0134)	(0.0117)	(0.0194)	(0.0197)	(0.0102)	(0.00753)
GIRL × Media exposure women	0.00677	0.00401	-0.00229	0.0296**	-0.0203	-0.00236	-0.0166	0.0126
	(0.00632)	(0.0135)	(0.0162)	(0.0131)	(0.0226)	(0.0251)	(0.0152)	(0.00945)
SC/ST households	-0.0979***	-0.0315*	-0.0113	-0.123***	-0.195***	-0.203***	-0.0726***	-0.00444
	(0.00771)	(0.0178)	(0.0213)	(0.0147)	(0.0241)	(0.0259)	(0.0209)	(0.0109)
GIRL × SC/ST households	-0.00306	-0.0157	-0.0211	-0.0437	0.0152	0.0112	0.0426	0.00263
	(0.0107)	(0.0234)	(0.0282)	(0.0326)	(0.0351)	(0.0363)	(0.0410)	(0.0130)
Expenditure quartile 2	0.0406***	0.0279	-0.0337	0.0584**	0.152*	0.106	-0.0144	-0.0101
	(0.0142)	(0.0243)	(0.0277)	(0.0252)	(0.0872)	(0.0835)	(0.0290)	(0.00813)
GIRL × Expenditure quartile 2	0.0159	0.00313	0.0278	0.00866	-0.00330	0.0264	0.105*	0.0428
	(0.0177)	(0.0285)	(0.0465)	(0.0321)	(0.0619)	(0.0503)	(0.0634)	(0.0512)
Expenditure quartile 3	0.103***	0.0599**	-0.0275	0.172***	0.203***	0.193***	0.0850*	0.0121
	(0.0147)	(0.0262)	(0.0263)	(0.0316)	(0.0764)	(0.0744)	(0.0484)	(0.0118)
GIRL × Expenditure quartile 3	-0.0120	-0.0294	0.0169	-0.0244	-0.00766	-0.0121	0.0828	0.00280
	(0.0140)	(0.0217)	(0.0404)	(0.0335)	(0.0783)	(0.0730)	(0.0589)	(0.0334)
Expenditure quartile 4	0.188***	0.0923***	0.0613*	0.203***	0.362***	0.352***	0.184***	0.0547**
	(0.0137)	(0.0272)	(0.0363)	(0.0431)	(0.0695)	(0.0670)	(0.0478)	(0.0267)
GIRL × Expenditure quartile 4	0.00868	0.00676	0.0279	-0.0316	-0.0129	-0.0242	0.0800	0.00699
	(0.0207)	(0.0250)	(0.0480)	(0.0471)	(0.0832)	(0.0712)	(0.0609)	(0.0251)
Urban	0.179***	0.151***	0.174***	0.265***	0.221***	0.193***	0.204***	0.00347
	(0.0124)	(0.0236)	(0.0246)	(0.0245)	(0.0419)	(0.0491)	(0.0253)	(0.00948)
GIRL × Urban	0.00574	-0.0183	0.00948	0.00445	0.0818	0.107	-0.0122	0.0147
	(0.0101)	(0.0217)	(0.0200)	(0.0312)	(0.0536)	(0.0736)	(0.0230)	(0.0229)
λ (IMR)	0.337***	0.259***	0.325***	0.554***	0.400***	0.459***	0.381***	-0.115***
	(0.0309)	(0.0384)	(0.0906)	(0.0875)	(0.109)	(0.121)	(0.128)	(0.0363)
PSU control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	26,761	4,444	3,427	7,706	4,379	3,730	4,950	1,054

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

East: Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, West Bengal; **West**: Gujarat and Maharashtra; **North**: Chhatisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Uttaranchal; **North West**: Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab; **South**: AP, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu.

Table 8. Household FE estimates: Baseline regressions coefficients: evidence of gender gap in private school enrolment

	(1) T=3 Uncorrected	(2) T=3 Corrected	(3) T=2 Uncorrected	(4) T=2 Corrected	(5) T=4 Uncorrected	(6) T=4 Corrected
GIRL	-0.214***	-0.256***	-0.188***	-0.187***	-0.265***	-0.300***
	(0.0331)	(0.0381)	(0.0435)	(0.0577)	(0.0471)	(0.0467)
Greater than Average Ability	0.203***	0.202***	0.157**	0.158**	0.100	0.0829
	(0.0703)	(0.0722)	(0.0704)	(0.0756)	(0.115)	(0.113)
Age 8	-0.107*	-0.0590	-0.0828	-0.0530	-0.130	-0.0902
	(0.0575)	(0.0626)	(0.0651)	(0.0789)	(0.143)	(0.161)
Age 9	-0.206**	-0.158*	-0.119*	-0.0540	0.231*	0.240**
	(0.0846)	(0.0820)	(0.0621)	(0.102)	(0.123)	(0.122)
Age 10	-0.0748	-0.0186	-0.140**	-0.0440	-0.0285	0.00514
	(0.0507)	(0.0490)	(0.0682)	(0.128)	(0.0799)	(0.111)
Age 12	-0.280***	-0.273***	-0.325***	-0.291***	0.152	0.152
	(0.0563)	(0.0563)	(0.0567)	(0.0584)	(0.0966)	(0.112)
Age 13	-0.237***	-0.256***	-0.406***	-0.449***	0.0403	0.0315
	(0.0685)	(0.0726)	(0.0613)	(0.0765)	(0.0888)	(0.0969)
Age 14	-0.213***	-0.261***	-0.422***	-0.469***	-0.103	-0.159
	(0.0812)	(0.0830)	(0.0648)	(0.108)	(0.0878)	(0.102)
Age 15	-0.175***	-0.313***	-0.563***	-0.672***	-0.0488	-0.178
	(0.0647)	(0.0856)	(0.0706)	(0.138)	(0.130)	(0.118)
Age 16	-0.356***	-0.534***	-0.755***	-0.998***	-0.238***	-0.420***
	(0.0739)	(0.0934)	(0.0730)	(0.179)	(0.0851)	(0.0982)
Age 17	-0.318***	-0.531***	-0.714***	-1.263***	-0.381***	-0.626***
	(0.0956)	(0.113)	(0.121)	(0.309)	(0.142)	(0.166)
Age 18	-0.843***	-1.141***	-1.249***	-0.774*	-0.564**	-0.876***
	(0.146)	(0.144)	(0.0853)	(0.468)	(0.247)	(0.276)
Father's schooling years	0.0395***	0.0514***	0.0382***	0.0380***	0.0497***	0.0583***
	(0.00840)	(0.00926)	(0.00371)	(0.00650)	(0.00976)	(0.0114)
Mother's schooling years	0.00117	0.00754	0.00233	0.00817	-0.00350	0.00364
	(0.00693)	(0.00747)	(0.00524)	(0.00623)	(0.0110)	(0.0113)
Media exposure women	0.0346	0.0420	0.129***	0.137***	0.0428	0.0450
	(0.0283)	(0.0280)	(0.0289)	(0.0316)	(0.0332)	(0.0345)
Hindu	-0.492***	-0.484***	-0.496***	-0.545***	-0.523***	-0.497***

	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.0980)	(0.131)	(0.130)	(0.130)
Muslim	-0.611***	-0.676***	-0.529***	-0.569***	-0.315*	-0.331**
	(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.130)	(0.146)	(0.175)	(0.167)
Christian	-0.457**	-0.417**	-0.349**	-0.436**	-0.184	-0.140
	(0.187)	(0.185)	(0.140)	(0.201)	(0.275)	(0.271)
SC/ST households	-0.302***	-0.309***	-0.322***	-0.338***	-0.350***	-0.372***
	(0.0610)	(0.0633)	(0.0555)	(0.0500)	(0.0689)	(0.0681)
Age of Household Head	-0.00346	-0.00395	0.00325*	0.00216	0.00600	0.00531
	(0.00288)	(0.00287)	(0.00197)	(0.00328)	(0.00411)	(0.00394)
Expenditure quartile 2	0.115	0.134	0.189**	0.253***	0.0965	0.115
	(0.0901)	(0.0927)	(0.0767)	(0.0874)	(0.105)	(0.106)
Expenditure quartile 3	0.257***	0.296***	0.299***	0.448***	0.0580	0.0945
	(0.0766)	(0.0840)	(0.0620)	(0.0875)	(0.0921)	(0.0976)
Expenditure quartile 4	0.599***	0.654***	0.480***	0.586***	0.371***	0.415***
	(0.0857)	(0.0967)	(0.0702)	(0.0891)	(0.108)	(0.113)
Urban	0.615***	0.621***	0.617***	0.655***	0.483***	0.491***
	(0.0378)	(0.0372)	(0.0479)	(0.0465)	(0.0547)	(0.0568)
T2	0.00562	-0.0586	-0.195***		-0.0275	0.110
	(0.0715)	(0.104)	(0.0520)		(0.0996)	(0.134)
T3	-0.0224	-0.0435			-0.0250	0.0832
	(0.0776)	(0.107)			(0.0949)	(0.132)
T4					0.127	0.238
					(0.0804)	(0.157)
λ (IMR)		0.461**		0.442**		0.668***
		(0.196)		(0.209)		(0.193)
λ × T2		0.245				-0.388*
		(0.199)				(0.209)
λ × T3		-0.0372				-0.382
		(0.231)				(0.287)
λ × T4						-0.416
						(0.352)
Constant	-0.417	-0.689	0.924	15.33**	-2.177**	-2.474***
	(0.422)	(0.420)	(0.849)	(6.957)	(0.932)	(0.935)
PSU control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Household FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Observations	23839	23550	29911	15371	13542	13364

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. This table shows the pooled probit estimates of private school enrolment with household fixed effects. Note that unlike Tables 4-6, these estimates are not the marginal effects and as such we can only compare the signs and significance of the variables across the tables and not their marginal effects. Media exposure women is a composite index of women's regular exposure to radio, tv and newspapers.

Table 9. Household fixed-effects estimates of private school enrolment (fully gender-interacted): Case of T=3

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
GIRL	-0.278***	-0.0664	-0.186	-0.0211
	(0.0691)	(0.240)	(0.120)	(0.243)
Ability Greater than Average	0.260**	0.206***	0.223***	0.303**
	(0.114)	(0.0712)	(0.0752)	(0.125)
GIRL × Ability Greater than Average	-0.133			-0.171
	(0.167)			(0.178)
Age 8	-0.0589	-0.0546	-0.0790	-0.0849
	(0.0989)	(0.0622)	(0.0652)	(0.102)
Age 9	-0.140	-0.154*	-0.158**	-0.0924
	(0.119)	(0.0822)	(0.0795)	(0.111)
Age 10	-0.0303	-0.0166	-0.0312	-0.0254
	(0.0721)	(0.0495)	(0.0474)	(0.0674)
Age 12	-0.371***	-0.275***	-0.248***	-0.320***
	(0.0952)	(0.0562)	(0.0598)	(0.0956)
Age 13	-0.261***	-0.262***	-0.220***	-0.198**
	(0.0930)	(0.0734)	(0.0750)	(0.0902)
Age 14	-0.220*	-0.258***	-0.221**	-0.152
	(0.122)	(0.0839)	(0.0867)	(0.130)
Age 15	-0.339***	-0.325***	-0.271***	-0.290***
	(0.0920)	(0.0852)	(0.0911)	(0.101)
Age 16	-0.555***	-0.554***	-0.482***	-0.484***
	(0.0831)	(0.0936)	(0.0926)	(0.0878)
Age 17	-0.535***	-0.547***	-0.449***	-0.414**
	(0.161)	(0.119)	(0.117)	(0.175)
Age 18	-1.237***	-1.162***	-1.045***	-1.085***
	(0.162)	(0.140)	(0.143)	(0.162)
GIRL × Age 8	0.00117			0.0160
	(0.153)			(0.156)
GIRL × Age 9	-0.0398			-0.140
	(0.139)			(0.135)
GIRL × Age 10	0.0259			-0.0123

	(0.119)			(0.119)
GIRL × Age 12	0.219			0.151
	(0.140)			(0.135)
GIRL × Age 13	0.0131			-0.0611
	(0.132)			(0.129)
GIRL × Age 14	-0.0958			-0.153
	(0.151)			(0.163)
GIRL × Age 15	0.0676			0.0165
	(0.146)			(0.154)
GIRL × Age 16	0.0621			-0.0399
	(0.132)			(0.117)
GIRL × Age 17	0.0261			-0.0999
	(0.275)			(0.299)
GIRL × Age 18	0.242			0.0638
	(0.220)			(0.215)
Father's schooling years	0.0514***	0.0503***	0.0513***	0.0477***
	(0.00926)	(0.00897)	(0.00948)	(0.00936)
GIRL × fed5		0.00461		0.0105
		(0.00901)		(0.00947)
Mother's schooling years	0.00690	0.000193	0.0111	0.00246
	(0.00742)	(0.00741)	(0.00808)	(0.00773)
GIRL × Mother's schooling years		0.0170*		0.0189*
		(0.0100)		(0.0104)
Media exposure women	0.0418	0.0432	0.0433	0.0499
	(0.0282)	(0.0382)	(0.0274)	(0.0379)
GIRL × Media exposure women		-0.00640		-0.0202
		(0.0633)		(0.0615)
Hindu	-0.482***	-0.303**	-0.488***	-0.298**
	(0.107)	(0.130)	(0.106)	(0.133)
GIRL × Hindu		-0.379***		-0.402***
		(0.122)		(0.123)
Muslim	-0.674***	-0.554***	-0.703***	-0.609***
	(0.107)	(0.127)	(0.108)	(0.131)
GIRL × Muslim		-0.255		-0.202
		(0.199)		(0.202)

Christian	-0.409**	-0.132	-0.397**	-0.114
	(0.188)	(0.230)	(0.200)	(0.240)
GIRL × Christian		-0.622**		-0.600**
		(0.252)		(0.246)
SC/ST households	-0.312***	-0.362***	-0.309***	-0.389***
	(0.0638)	(0.0728)	(0.0624)	(0.0717)
GIRL × SC/ST households		0.124		0.178**
		(0.0829)		(0.0835)
Age of household head	-0.00399	-0.00257	-0.00328	-0.00182
	(0.00283)	(0.00338)	(0.00278)	(0.00324)
GIRL × Age of household head		-0.00332		-0.00342
		(0.00254)		(0.00258)
Expenditure quartile 2	0.132	0.0597	0.150*	0.0336
	(0.0932)	(0.116)	(0.0867)	(0.113)
GIRL × Expenditure quartile 2		0.186		0.277*
		(0.165)		(0.168)
Expenditure quartile 3	0.291***	0.221*	0.316***	0.204*
	(0.0847)	(0.120)	(0.0754)	(0.115)
GIRL × Expenditure quartile 3		0.204		0.279*
		(0.163)		(0.168)
Expenditure quartile 4	0.651***	0.593***	0.663***	0.573***
	(0.0954)	(0.119)	(0.0894)	(0.116)
GIRL × Expenditure quartile 4		0.169		0.229
		(0.156)		(0.163)
Urban	0.624***	0.626***	0.541***	0.575***
	(0.0382)	(0.0382)	(0.0432)	(0.0501)
GIRL × Urban			0.0377	-0.0165
			(0.0584)	(0.0679)
Distance Private/Government School Q3			-0.689***	-0.692***
			(0.0434)	(0.0436)
GIRL × Distance Private/Government School Q3			0.163***	0.148**
			(0.0612)	(0.0600)
Female/male wage ratio >=1 (fmwager_ge1)			0.215*	0.239**
			(0.114)	(0.110)
GIRL × Female/male wage ratio >=1			-0.138	-0.179

			(0.119)	(0.120)
Constant	-0.650	-0.816**	-0.752*	-0.856**
	(0.419)	(0.400)	(0.410)	(0.391)
λ (IMR)	0.439**	0.481**	0.454**	0.463**
	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.189)	(0.200)
Household FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PSU control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	23550	23550	23550	23550

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 10. Household FE estimates of private school enrolment by regions, T=3

	(1) East	(2) West	(3) North	(4) North West	(5) North West excluding Jammu and Kashmir	(6) South	(6) WB
GIRL	1.345***	7.311	-0.922*	-1.091**	-1.397	-0.447	-0.559
	(0.519)	(0)	(0.480)	(0.429)	(0)	(0.944)	(0.0033)
Greater than Average Ability	0.334	1.260***	0.167	0.00168	-0.0587	0.438*	0.334***
	(0.281)	(0.256)	(0.210)	(0.247)	(0.270)	(0.231)	(0.026)
GIRL × Greater than Average Ability	-0.255	-0.702*	0.0201	0.0693	0.287	0.327	Dropped
	(0.293)	(0.375)	(0.321)	(0.256)	(0.253)	(0.304)	
Age 8	-0.105	-0.353	-0.0735	-0.254	-0.332	0.253	0.312***
	(0.295)	(0.288)	(0.107)	(0.207)	(0.214)	(0.191)	(0.065)
Age 9	-0.299	-1.000***	-0.138	-0.321	-0.355*	0.590***	0.466**
	(0.237)	(0.339)	(0.218)	(0.197)	(0.212)	(0.184)	(0.1834)
Age 10	-0.0528	-0.196	0.146	-0.0302	-0.196	0.0600	-0.485***
	(0.242)	(0.212)	(0.176)	(0.185)	(0.194)	(0.247)	(0.0413)
Age 12	-0.0321	0.229	-0.506***	-0.652***	-0.882***	-0.260	-0.109***
	(0.203)	(0.307)	(0.157)	(0.177)	(0.256)	(0.160)	(0.028)
Age 13	-0.329	0.440	-0.448***	-0.258	-0.393	0.0183	0.407***
	(0.222)	(0.299)	(0.158)	(0.233)	(0.243)	(0.237)	(0.099)
Age 14	-0.0845	0.836***	-0.530***	-0.454*	-0.563**	0.192	
	(0.236)	(0.218)	(0.178)	(0.236)	(0.247)	(0.304)	
Age 15	-0.537	0.172	-0.719***	-0.488*	-0.595**	0.180	-0.178
	(0.383)	(0.355)	(0.224)	(0.281)	(0.297)	(0.214)	(0.001)
Age 16	0.115	0.353	-1.156***	-1.164***	-1.242***	-0.212	0.111***
	(0.345)	(0.320)	(0.320)	(0.310)	(0.341)	(0.258)	(0.05)
Age 17	-6.422***	0.158	-1.161***	-0.565	-0.711	-0.367	
	(0.570)	(0.583)	(0.381)	(0.421)	(0.461)	(0.288)	
Age 18	-0.701	-0.0247	-2.088***	-1.595***	-1.567***	-7.672***	
	(0.686)	(0.621)	(0.346)	(0.426)	(0.441)	(0.578)	
GIRL × Age 8	0.737*						
	(0.413)						
GIRL × Age9	0.435	1.001***	-0.0876	0.0339	0.0462	-0.814**	

	(0.381)	(0.348)	(0.266)	(0.345)	(0.356)	(0.347)	
GIRL × Age10	0.278	-0.117	0.194	-0.390	-0.259	-0.250	0.786
	(0.401)	(0.236)	(0.253)	(0.274)	(0.295)	(0.225)	(0)
GIRL × Age12	-0.121	-0.869*	0.388*	0.711**	0.903***	0.0692	0.228***
	(0.354)	(0.469)	(0.222)	(0.279)	(0.329)	(0.198)	(0.04.666)
GIRL × Age13	-0.558	-0.595	-0.0451	0.120	0.319	-0.216	-6.969
	(0.427)	(0.463)	(0.278)	(0.258)	(0.262)	(0.332)	(0)
GIRL × Age14	-0.869**	-0.368	-0.0660	-0.0209	0.0287	-0.485	
	(0.441)	(0.363)	(0.253)	(0.344)	(0.358)	(0.392)	
GIRL × Age15	0.242	-0.0610	0.123	-0.111	-0.0892	-0.360	0.484
	(0.442)	(0.384)	(0.321)	(0.325)	(0.269)	(0.399)	(0)
GIRL × Age16	-0.754	-0.236	0.596*	0.274	0.395	-0.634	
	(0.470)	(0.516)	(0.348)	(0.369)	(0.349)	(0.441)	
GIRL × Age17	5.066	-0.329	0.185	-0.393	-0.0466	-0.525	
	(0)	(0.672)	(0.415)	(0.499)	(0.520)	(0.422)	
GIRL × Age18	-0.755	-0.369	0.759	-0.613	-0.368	6.397	
	(0.647)	(0.689)	(0.474)	(0.470)	(0.530)	(0)	
Father’s schooling years	0.0623**	-0.00294	0.0470***	0.0500**	0.0489*	0.0664**	0.586***
	(0.0249)	(0.0207)	(0.0152)	(0.0229)	(0.0290)	(0.0260)	(0.0081)
GIRL × Father’s schooling years	-0.0335	0.0379	0.00831	0.00757	0.0206	0.0126	-0.937***
	(0.0328)	(0.0263)	(0.0140)	(0.0261)	(0.0243)	(0.0194)	(0.0012)
Mother’s schooling years	-0.0261	0.0633**	0.0372**	0.0248	0.0230	-0.00453	0.349***
	(0.0213)	(0.0268)	(0.0185)	(0.0250)	(0.0278)	(0.0298)	(0.00250)
GIRL × Mother’s schooling years	-0.0171	0.0239	-0.0249	0.0244	0.0171	0.0660**	0.474***
	(0.0296)	(0.0297)	(0.0156)	(0.0201)	(0.0218)	(0.0335)	(0.00579)
Media exposure women	0.184*	-0.00901	0.0873	0.0161	0.0356	0.198***	-0.396***
	(0.105)	(0.0823)	(0.0706)	(0.0590)	(0.0544)	(0.0701)	(0.00318)
GIRL × Media exposure women	0.0256	-0.0661	0.0288	0.0312	0.0286	-0.195	0.397***
	(0.100)	(0.128)	(0.0913)	(0.121)	(0.108)	(0.128)	(0.063)
Hindu	-0.0485	0.538**	-0.319	-0.300*	-0.354**	0.669	-0.244***
	(0.351)	(0.239)	(0.494)	(0.172)	(0.175)	(0.883)	(0.0797)
GIRL × Hindu	-0.940*	-0.379	-0.0494	-0.244	-0.212	-0.444	
	(0.504)	(0.285)	(0.545)	(0.197)	(0.201)	(0.531)	
Muslim	-0.492*	0.483	-0.645	-0.501*	-1.180	0.278	
	(0.286)	(0.330)	(0.507)	(0.273)	(0.743)	(1.032)	

GIRL × Muslim	-0.124	-0.221	-0.304	-0.459	0.865	0.00868	0.312***
	(0.544)	(0.340)	(0.668)	(0.354)	(1.046)	(0.597)	(0.103)
Christian	1.167**			1.627***	1.656***	0.995	
	(0.524)			(0.214)	(0.226)	(0.996)	
GIRL × Christian	-0.896			-1.818**	-1.859**	-1.133	
	(0.804)			(0.913)	(0.853)	(0.709)	
SC/ST households	-0.0730	0.111	-0.506***	-0.600***	-0.668***	-0.370**	0.366***
	(0.212)	(0.191)	(0.107)	(0.178)	(0.170)	(0.165)	(0.0852)
GIRL × SC/ST households	-0.0872	0.162	-0.121	0.233	0.262	0.341*	0.270***
	(0.259)	(0.233)	(0.174)	(0.208)	(0.190)	(0.195)	(0.0226)
Age of household head	-0.00849	0.00196	-0.000920	-0.0121*	-0.0152**	-0.0168**	-0.164***
	(0.00869)	(0.0102)	(0.00482)	(0.00719)	(0.00745)	(0.00681)	(0.000557)
GIRL × Age of household head	0.0153**	-0.0295***	-0.00403	0.0118**	0.00963	0.00522	0.223***
	(0.00728)	(0.00935)	(0.00511)	(0.00538)	(0.00612)	(0.00963)	(0.0019)
Expenditure quartile 2	-0.316	5.455***	0.0974	5.490***	5.467***	-1.005**	-0.308***
	(0.311)	(0.724)	(0.156)	(1.109)	(1.221)	(0.414)	(0.0381)
GIRL × Expenditure quartile 2	-0.0834	-5.855***	0.674***	-0.0266	0.189	0.190	0.247***
	(0.359)	(0.414)	(0.242)	(0.250)	(0.461)	(0.443)	(0.0225)
Expenditure quartile 3	-0.250	5.071***	0.425*	5.587***	5.674***	-0.726*	-0.717***
	(0.273)	(0.747)	(0.219)	(1.071)	(1.187)	(0.405)	(0.0109)
GIRL × Expenditure quartile 3	0.144	-5.407***	0.333	0.187	0.305	0.519	-0.326***
	(0.371)	(0.401)	(0.253)	(0)	(0.503)	(0.473)	(0.118)
Expenditure quartile 4	0.0859	5.929***	0.612***	6.041***	6.160***	-0.250	0.378***
	(0.314)	(0.723)	(0.210)	(1.045)	(1.147)	(0.428)	(0.0698)
GIRL × Expenditure quartile 24	0.329	-5.819***	0.422*	0.152	0.277	0.105	-0.102***
	(0.432)	(0.324)	(0.223)	(0.175)	(0.505)	(0.540)	(0.0209)
Urban	1.266***	0.483*	0.750***	0.822***	0.756***	0.912***	0.323***
	(0.169)	(0.271)	(0.107)	(0.155)	(0.198)	(0.133)	(0.0279)
GIRL × Urban	-0.601**	0.394*	0.173	0.0375	0.0192	-0.422**	-0.819***
	(0.287)	(0.209)	(0.127)	(0.151)	(0.175)	(0.188)	(0.0859)
T2	0.284	0.264	-0.137	-0.122	-0.183	0.155	-0.693***
	(0.307)	(0.262)	(0.157)	(0.169)	(0.174)	(0.176)	(0.063)
T3	0.597**	0.613**	-0.00539	-0.253	-0.395**	0.253	-0.854***
	(0.254)	(0.284)	(0.188)	(0.165)	(0.174)	(0.160)	(0.0479)
GIRL × T2	-0.927***	-0.277	0.212	0.0705	0.0921	0.219	

	(0.319)	(0.344)	(0.192)	(0.195)	(0.208)	(0.255)	
GIRL × T3	-1.142***	-0.527	0.292	0.124	0.162	0.0599	-0.171
	(0.322)	(0.367)	(0.206)	(0.269)	(0.271)	(0.216)	(0)
λ (IMR)	0.479	0.354	0.784*	0.942**	0.932*	1.121***	-1.004***
	(0.419)	(0.532)	(0.454)	(0.461)	(0.548)	(0.407)	(0.0098)
λ × T2	-0.466	-0.367	0.693**	0.283	0.483	-0.533	2.492***
	(0.439)	(0.485)	(0.277)	(0.363)	(0.367)	(0.406)	(0.0349)
λ × T3	-0.789*	0.427	-0.0377	-0.976**	-0.851	-0.0377	1.211
	(0.477)	(0.710)	(0.360)	(0.416)	(0.522)	(0.485)	(0)
Constant	-15.19***	-0.332	0.580	-6.057	-5.612	-4.668**	3.552***
	(1.523)	(1.364)	(1.472)	(0)	(0)	(1.869)	(0.7203)
Household FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
PSU control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	3,744	3,021	7,040	4,039	3,518	4022	600

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 11. Household fixed-effects estimates of private school enrolment (fully gender-interacted): Cases of T=2 and T=4

	(1) T=2 pvtsch	(1) T=2 pvtsch	(3) T=4 pvtsch	(2) T=4 pvtsch
GIRL	-0.0665	-0.0181	-0.287	-0.375
	(0.375)	(0.374)	(0.366)	(0.381)
Ability Greater than Average	0.0992	0.0816	0.135	0.138
	(0.113)	(0.108)	(0.133)	(0.128)
GIRL × Ability Greater than Average	0.165	0.203	-0.134	-0.145
	(0.210)	(0.204)	(0.225)	(0.223)
Age 8	-0.171*	-0.178*	0.0547	0.0389
	(0.0943)	(0.0925)	(0.171)	(0.174)
Age 9	0.000658	-0.00383	0.366**	0.338*
	(0.101)	(0.105)	(0.186)	(0.173)
Age 10	0.00672	0.00347	0.0782	0.0676
	(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.152)	(0.146)
Age 12	-0.332***	-0.352***	0.306*	0.315*
	(0.0937)	(0.0963)	(0.159)	(0.161)
Age 13	-0.475***	-0.511***	0.142	0.133
	(0.0982)	(0.0985)	(0.177)	(0.175)
Age 14	-0.542***	-0.566***	0.0133	-0.0181
	(0.118)	(0.115)	(0.162)	(0.162)
Age 15	-0.780***	-0.809***	-0.175	-0.159
	(0.167)	(0.175)	(0.175)	(0.175)
Age 16	-0.974***	-1.042***	-0.383**	-0.399**
	(0.184)	(0.193)	(0.151)	(0.162)
Age 17	-1.229***	-1.327***	-0.389	-0.418
	(0.345)	(0.337)	(0.287)	(0.280)
Age 18	-0.917*	-1.024**	-0.589*	-0.582*
	(0.490)	(0.514)	(0.313)	(0.329)
GIRL × Age 8	0.313**	0.326***	-0.366	-0.365*
	(0.122)	(0.127)	(0.226)	(0.219)
GIRL × Age 9	-0.0283	-0.0183	-0.282	-0.253
	(0.138)	(0.144)	(0.241)	(0.234)
GIRL × Age 10	-0.120	-0.105	-0.193	-0.169

	(0.243)	(0.248)	(0.179)	(0.183)
GIRL × Age 12	-0.0369	-0.0299	-0.273	-0.265
	(0.198)	(0.199)	(0.211)	(0.209)
GIRL × Age 13	-0.0271	0.0625	-0.254	-0.238
	(0.179)	(0.181)	(0.245)	(0.251)
GIRL × Age 14	0.0825	0.101	-0.420**	-0.365*
	(0.206)	(0.206)	(0.214)	(0.217)
GIRL × Age 15	0.243	0.230	-0.105	-0.0955
	(0.244)	(0.258)	(0.301)	(0.301)
GIRL × Age 16	-0.0257	-0.0530	-0.130	-0.0882
	(0.241)	(0.247)	(0.228)	(0.245)
GIRL × Age 17	-0.0911	-0.0606	-0.487	-0.471
	(0.420)	(0.419)	(0.413)	(0.402)
GIRL × Age 18	0.865	0.819	*-0.826***	*-0.782***
	(0.792)	(0.837)	*(0.323)*	*(0.333)*
Father's schooling years	0.0403***	0.0422***	0.0519***	0.0512***
	(0.00859)	(0.00760)	(0.0129)	(0.0134)
GIRL × Father's schooling years	-0.00847	-0.00793	0.0101	0.0118
	(0.0140)	(0.0126)	(0.0120)	(0.0119)
Mother's schooling years	-0.00630	-0.00451	0.00411	0.00469
	(0.00957)	(0.00949)	(0.0131)	(0.0136)
GIRL × Mother's schooling years	*0.0308****	*0.0294****	0.0532***	0.0109
	(0.0113)	*(0.0112)*	(0.0152)	(0.0141)
Media exposure women	0.165***	0.165***	0.0426	0.0382
	(0.0382)	(0.0388)	(0.0468)	(0.0464)
GIRL × Media exposure women	-0.0824	-0.0689	0.0354	0.0313
	(0.0591)	(0.0607)	(0.0668)	(0.0690)
Hindu	-0.626***	-0.631***	-0.464**	-0.463**
	(0.161)	(0.165)	(0.209)	(0.209)
GIRL × Hindu	0.0726	0.0507	-0.280**	-0.290**
	(0.271)	(0.274)	(0.149)	(0.120)
Muslim	-0.796***	-0.808***	-0.500**	-0.495**
	(0.178)	(0.179)	(0.252)	(0.245)
GIRL × Muslim	0.396	0.353	0.133	0.150
	(0.265)	(0.270)	(0.261)	(0.266)
Christian	-0.512	-0.520*	0.221	0.214

	(0.318)	(0.308)	(0.328)	(0.304)
GIRL × Christian	0.0867	0.0595	-1.353***	-1.330***
	(0.356)	(0.358)	(0.331)	(0.341)
SC/ST households	-0.354***	-0.346***	-0.341***	-0.351***
	(0.0784)	(0.0814)	(0.0774)	(0.0775)
GIRL × SC/ST households	0.0268	0.0139	-0.0748	-0.0863
	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.113)	(0.109)
Age of household head	0.00153	0.00224	0.00462	0.00431
	(0.00397)	(0.00403)	(0.00461)	(0.00449)
GIRL × Age of household head	0.000703	0.000198	0.00272	0.00347
	(0.00558)	(0.00556)	(0.00449)	(0.00452)
Expenditure Quartile 2	0.340***	0.343***	0.125	0.119
	(0.0948)	(0.0987)	(0.111)	(0.110)
GIRL × Expenditure Quartile 2	-0.243*	-0.235	0.0437	0.0503
	(0.145)	(0.148)	(0.179)	(0.173)
Expenditure Quartile 3	0.485***	0.503***	0.156	0.139
	(0.0941)	(0.0979)	(0.113)	(0.118)
GIRL × Expenditure Quartile 3	-0.105	-0.100	-0.102	-0.0817
	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.183)	(0.188)
Expenditure Quartile 4	0.651***	0.674***	0.503***	0.495***
	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.128)	(0.130)
GIRL × Expenditure Quartile 4	-0.170	-0.186	-0.0555	-0.0470
	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.155)	(0.152)
Urban	0.541***	0.583***	0.336***	0.364***
	(0.0707)	(0.0731)	(0.0889)	(0.0865)
GIRL × Urban	0.125	0.109	0.227*	0.248**
	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.127)	(0.122)
Distance Private/Government School Q3	-0.274***	-0.289***	-0.640***	-0.637***
	(0.0699)	(0.0641)	(0.0684)	(0.0706)
GIRL × Distance Private/Government School Q3	-0.0285	-0.0360	0.119	0.112
	(0.0722)	(0.0708)	(0.105)	(0.108)
Female/Male wage ratio >= 1	0.0147	0.0163	0.0771	0.0812
	(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.0897)	(0.0905)
GIRL × Female/Male wage ratio >= 1	-0.340***	-0.346**	-0.000137	-0.00458
	(0.131)	(0.137)	(0.190)	(0.187)
λ (IMR)	0.339	0.468	0.772***	0.764***

	(0.344)	(0.354)	(0.178)	(0.199)
T2			0.170	0.192
			(0.139)	(0.137)
T3			0.103	0.132
			(0.149)	(0.147)
T4			0.335**	0.338**
			(0.163)	(0.162)
λ × T2			-0.409*	-0.457**
			(0.232)	(0.225)
λ × T3			-0.192	-0.293
			(0.352)	(0.334)
λ × T4			-0.472	-0.501
			(0.340)	(0.327)
Constant	15.24**	15.99**	-2.362**	-2.286**
	(7.312)	(6.961)	(0.936)	(0.915)
Household FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
PSU control	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	15408	15371	13427	13364

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 12. Household fixed-effects estimates of private school enrolment for T=3 by age groups

	(1) 7-11 years	(2) 12-18 years
GIRL	-0.449	0.518
	(0.434)	(0.474)
Ability Greater than Average	0.455***	-0.0489
	(0.0996)	(0.208)
GIRL × Ability Greater than Average	-0.188	-0.109
	(0.176)	(0.280)
Age 8	-0.0636	
	(0.110)	
Age 9	-0.102	
	(0.105)	
Age 10	-0.0491	
	(0.0760)	
Age 12		0.563***
		(0.197)
Age 13		0.698***
		(0.209)
Age 14		0.768***
		(0.195)
Age 15		0.653***
		(0.140)
Age 16		0.496***
		(0.152)
Age 17		0.612***
		(0.168)
Age 18		
GIRL × Age 8	-0.0465	
	(0.166)	
GIRL × Age 9	-0.147	
	(0.162)	
GIRL × Age 10	-0.0504	
	(0.134)	
GIRL × Age 12		0.0882
		(0.206)
GIRL × Age 13		-0.107
		(0.198)
GIRL × Age 14		-0.215
		(0.210)
GIRL × Age 15		-0.0532
		(0.194)
GIRL × Age 16		-0.0691
		(0.220)
GIRL × Age 17		-0.141
		(0.300)
Father's schooling years	0.0421***	0.0413***
	(0.0104)	(0.0139)
GIRL × fed5	0.0189	-2.46e-05
	(0.0144)	(0.0125)
Mother's schooling years	0.00995	-0.00811
	(0.0120)	(0.00863)
GIRL × Mother's schooling years	0.0938***	0.0294*
	(0.0147)	(0.0177)
Media exposure women	0.0495	0.0360
	(0.0642)	(0.0370)
GIRL × Media exposure women	-0.0763	0.0127
	(0.0759)	(0.0597)

Hindu	-0.476**	-0.0144
	(0.187)	(0.141)
GIRL × Hindu	-0.177	-0.665***
	(0.252)	(0.144)
Muslim	-0.728***	-0.321**
	(0.186)	(0.158)
GIRL × Muslim	0.0875	-0.549**
	(0.339)	(0.228)
Christian	-0.187	0.129
	(0.315)	(0.238)
GIRL × Christian	-0.721**	-0.661**
	(0.307)	(0.271)
SC/ST households	-0.402***	-0.364***
	(0.103)	(0.0788)
GIRL × SC/ST households	0.0508	0.316***
	(0.149)	(0.108)
Age of household head	0.00434	-0.00570
	(0.00430)	(0.00460)
GIRL × Age of household head	-0.00479	0.00136
	(0.00441)	(0.00455)
Expenditure quartile 2	-0.102	0.204
	(0.140)	(0.176)
GIRL × Expenditure quartile 2	0.600***	-0.191
	(0.198)	(0.291)
Expenditure quartile 3	0.105	0.283
	(0.141)	(0.191)
GIRL × Expenditure quartile 3	0.523***	-0.0486
	(0.153)	(0.319)
Expenditure quartile 4	0.346*	0.752***
	(0.184)	(0.171)
GIRL × Expenditure quartile 4	0.595***	-0.207
	(0.207)	(0.290)
Urban	0.631***	0.441***
	(0.0715)	(0.0739)
GIRL × Urban	-0.0324	-0.0268
	(0.0876)	(0.105)
Distance Private/Government School Q3	-0.832***	-0.531***
	(0.0696)	(0.0448)
GIRL × Distance Private/Government School Q3	0.324***	-0.0153
	(0.101)	(0.0900)
Female/male wage ratio >=1 (fmwager_ge1)	0.309*	0.236**
	(0.176)	(0.111)
GIRL × Female/male wage ratio >=1	-0.166	-0.183
	(0.162)	(0.128)
Constant	-0.657	-1.946***
	(0.799)	(0.699)
PSU control	Yes	Yes
Household FE	Yes	Yes
λ (IMR)	Yes	Yes
Observations	11950	11681

Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix table A1. Variable definitions

Variable abbreviations	Variable definitions	Mean
Female	1 if the child is a female, 0 otherwise	0.5043385
days_absent	Days absent in last 30 days because of illness	2.829079
Female*absent	GIRL × days absent	1.323592
Greater than Average Ability	1 if the parents' perceived ability of the child is greater than average, Gtaverage	0.0919508
Female*gtaverage	GIRL × average	0.0472259
age8	1 if age 8 years old	0.0410627
age9	1 if age 9 years old	0.0366987
age10	1 if age 10 years old	0.0554435
Age11	1 if age is 11 years; there is no obs. in this group	0
age12	1 if age 12 years old	0.0595396
age13	1 if age 13 years old	0.0437423
age14	1 if age 14 years old	0.0434871
age15	1 if age 15 years old	0.0369156
age16	1 if age 16 years old	0.0304078
age17	1 if age 17 years old	0.0209014
age18	1 if age 18 years old	0.0206717
Female_age8	GIRL × age8	0.019217
Female_age9	GIRL × age9	0.0177624
Female_age10	GIRL × age10	0.0266563
Female_age12	GIRL × age12	0
female_age13	GIRL × age13	0.0288255
female_age14	GIRL × age14	0.0218457
female_age15	GIRL × age15	0.0212204
female_age16	GIRL × age16	0.0184386
female_age17	GIRL × age17	0.0152231
female_age18	GIRL × age18	0.0104124
fed5	Father's years of schooling	5.897043
female_fed5	GIRL × Father's years of schooling	2.687128
med5	Mother's years of schooling	3.094151
female_med5	GIRL × Mother's years of schooling	1.454096

Hindu	1 if belongs to Hindu household	0.0236218
female_hindu	GIRL × Hindu	0.0155296
Muslim	1 if belongs to Muslim household	0.7844401
female_muslim	GIRL × Muslim	0.396667
Christian	1 if belongs to Christian household	0.1399168
female_christian	GIRL × Christian	0.0696968
media_exposure_women	If women in the household has exposure to newspapers, radio, tv	0.0269881
female_media_exposure_women	GIRL × media exposure of women in the household	0.0138194
Scst	1 if belongs to SC/ST households	0.2730834
female_scst	GIRL × Scst	0.1383218
head_age	Age of head in years	45.15516
female_headage	GIRL × head age	3.394185
q2_lpcexpm	2nd quartile of household expenditure	0.2465802
female_expq2	GIRL × 2nd quartile	0.1238771
q3_lpcexpm	3rd quartile of household expenditure	0.2539047
female_expq3	Female * 3rd quartile	0.1283304
q4_lpcexpm	4th quartile of household expenditure	0.2610121
female_expq4	GIRL × 4th quartile	0.1307677
Urban	1 if the household lives in urban area	0.3117216
female_urban	GIRL × urban	0.1570284
dis_priv_to_gov75	Relative distance of private to government schools in PSU: above 3rd quartile	0.2212893
fem_dis_priv_to_gov75	GIRL × relative distance	0.1117038
fmwager_ge1	Relative wage of female to male workers in PSU ever enrolled 25-49 years old in	0.1904874
fem_fmwager_ge1	GIRL × relative female to male wage 25-49 ever enrolled	0.0943329

Table A2. First stage probit estimates of school enrolment, various samples

VARIABLES	(1) All Enrolled	(2)T=2 enrolled	(3)T=3 enrolled	(4)T=4 enrolled
Female	-0.301***	-0.176***	-0.314***	-0.325***
	(0.0299)	(0.0267)	(0.0237)	(0.0277)
Have acquaintance with a school teacher	0.160**	0.194***	0.140***	0.0844
	(0.0652)	(0.0611)	(0.0525)	(0.0565)
Age 8	0.713***	0.280***	0.0886	0.0657
	(0.191)	(0.0960)	(0.0747)	(0.0901)
Age 9	0.518***	0.203**	0.217**	0.306***
	(0.180)	(0.0970)	(0.0844)	(0.105)
Age 10	0.418***	0.179**	0.222***	0.0781
	(0.135)	(0.0900)	(0.0722)	(0.0813)
Age 12	-0.473***	-0.242***	-0.260***	-0.456***
	(0.102)	(0.0839)	(0.0647)	(0.0732)
Age 13	-0.766***	-0.367***	-0.406***	-0.494***
	(0.101)	(0.0865)	(0.0655)	(0.0786)
Age 14	-1.080***	-0.672***	-0.641***	-0.823***
	(0.0984)	(0.0821)	(0.0650)	(0.0768)
Age 15	-1.451***	-1.160***	-1.081***	-1.285***
	(0.0977)	(0.0794)	(0.0636)	(0.0749)
Age 16	-1.813***	-1.419***	-1.391***	-1.535***
	(0.0978)	(0.0804)	(0.0634)	(0.0788)
Age 17	-2.036***	-1.661***	-1.710***	-1.739***
	(0.101)	(0.0821)	(0.0668)	(0.0833)
Age 18	-2.621***	-2.356***	-2.153***	-2.357***
	(0.101)	(0.0820)	(0.0651)	(0.0787)
Urban	-0.0486	-0.207***	-0.0643**	-0.0283
	(0.0380)	(0.0353)	(0.0315)	(0.0371)
Hindu	-0.0905	0.177***	0.0326	-0.0679
	(0.0798)	(0.0668)	(0.0559)	(0.0762)
Muslim	-0.457***	-0.0980	-0.336***	-0.376***

	(0.0876)	(0.0773)	(0.0638)	(0.0829)
Christian	-0.0721	0.177	0.131	0.225
	(0.141)	(0.122)	(0.114)	(0.176)
SC/ST	-0.0576*	-0.0466	-0.0970***	-0.283***
	(0.0338)	(0.0304)	(0.0265)	(0.0312)
girls_schooling_same	0.167***	0.179***	0.263***	0.0789**
	(0.0430)	(0.0371)	(0.0325)	(0.0392)
media_exposure_women	0.139***	0.161***	0.176***	0.141***
	(0.0203)	(0.0185)	(0.0147)	(0.0182)
Father's schooling years	0.0257***	0.0572***	0.0549***	0.0573***
	(0.00392)	(0.00354)	(0.00327)	(0.00392)
Mother's schooling years	0.0609***	0.0602***	0.0555***	0.0420***
	(0.00550)	(0.00462)	(0.00454)	(0.00552)
Monthly expenditure quartile 2	0.0946**	0.0355	0.109***	0.243***
	(0.0381)	(0.0344)	(0.0375)	(0.0361)
Monthly expenditure quartile 3	0.261***	0.157***	0.143***	0.369***
	(0.0422)	(0.0376)	(0.0423)	(0.0390)
Monthly expenditure quartile 4	0.459***	0.304***	0.334***	0.399***
	(0.0514)	(0.0467)	(0.0468)	(0.0429)
Constant	2.143***	1.278***	1.225***	1.303***
	(0.135)	(0.106)	(0.0912)	(0.110)
PSU control	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	28,785	28,002	24,585	14,857

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3. Household fixed-effects estimates of private school enrolment (fully gender interacted) with illness control, T=3

VARIABLES	(1) pvtsch	(2) pvtsch
Female	-0.346	-0.161
	(0.212)	(0.221)
Ability Greater than Average	0.285**	0.283**
	(0.117)	(0.137)
GIRL × Ability Greater than Average	-0.165	-0.155
	(0.168)	(0.194)
Days absent due to illness	0.00450	0.00298
	(0.00412)	(0.00465)
GIRL *days absent	-0.0115*	-0.00767*
	(0.00610)	(0.00441)
Age 8	-0.0537	-0.0506
	(0.108)	(0.109)
Age 9	-0.125	-0.0838
	(0.114)	(0.112)
Age 10	-0.0271	-0.0136
	(0.0765)	(0.0695)
Age 12	-0.352***	-0.267***
	(0.100)	(0.0987)
Age 13	-0.216**	-0.126
	(0.0942)	(0.0984)
Age 14	-0.194	-0.0834
	(0.126)	(0.132)
Age 15	-0.316***	-0.221**
	(0.0863)	(0.0940)
Age 16	-0.519***	-0.370***
	(0.0927)	(0.117)
Age 17	-0.375*	-0.202
	(0.202)	(0.203)
Age 18	-0.987***	-0.745***
	(0.161)	(0.119)
GIRL *age8	-0.0122	-0.0562
	(0.159)	(0.168)
GIRL *age9	-0.0806	-0.188
	(0.128)	(0.134)
GIRL *age10	0.0313	-0.0115
	(0.126)	(0.130)
GIRL *age12	0.168	0.0660
	(0.152)	(0.142)
GIRL *age13	-0.0558	-0.141
	(0.154)	(0.150)
GIRL *age14	-0.146	-0.258
	(0.172)	(0.180)
GIRL *age15	0.0193	-0.0666
	(0.118)	(0.141)
GIRL *age16	0.0419	-0.0797
	(0.156)	(0.142)
GIRL *age17	0.0270	-0.114
	(0.317)	(0.312)
GIRL *age18	0.248	-0.0158
	(0.239)	(0.204)
Father's schooling (fed5)	0.0520***	0.0489***
	(0.00928)	(0.0105)
GIRL *fed5	0.00434	0.00732
	(0.00985)	(0.00941)
Mother's schooling (med5)	-0.00709	-0.00565

	(0.0158)	(0.0201)
GIRL *med5	0.0727***	0.0754***
	(0.0222)	(0.0209)
Media exposure of women	0.0352	0.0428
	(0.0397)	(0.0410)
GIRL * media exposure of women	0.0150	0.00977
	(0.0666)	(0.0656)
Hindu	-0.365**	-0.301**
	(0.150)	(0.153)
GIRL *hindu	-0.0270	-0.111
	(0.174)	(0.172)
Muslim	-0.514***	-0.535***
	(0.191)	(0.191)
GIRL *muslim	-0.0651	-0.0180
	(0.257)	(0.266)
Christian	0.0383	0.0965
	(0.340)	(0.338)
GIRL *christian	-0.763*	-0.619
	(0.402)	(0.428)
SC/ST	-0.379***	-0.351***
	(0.0738)	(0.0765)
GIRL *scst	0.107	0.135
	(0.0875)	(0.102)
Head's age	-0.00366	-0.00409
	(0.00346)	(0.00373)
GIRL *headage	-0.00173	0.000792
	(0.00268)	(0.00266)
Expenditure quartile 2	0.0738	0.0694
	(0.124)	(0.114)
GIRL *expq2	0.180	0.149
	(0.161)	(0.162)
Expenditure quartile 3	0.219*	0.239*
	(0.128)	(0.137)
GIRL *expq3	0.202	0.137
	(0.158)	(0.184)
Expenditure quartile 4	0.604***	0.631***
	(0.127)	(0.115)
GIRL *expq4	0.144	0.0738
	(0.157)	(0.161)
Urban	0.667***	0.507***
	(0.0545)	(0.0545)
GIRL *urban	-0.0509	0.0159
	(0.0649)	(0.0773)
T2: 2nd child	-0.0886	-0.0744
	(0.117)	(0.110)
T3: 3rd child	-0.0449	-0.0247
	(0.120)	(0.118)
GIRL *T2	-0.00197	0.0207
	(0.113)	(0.104)
GIRL *T3	-0.0598	-0.0324
	(0.118)	(0.123)
Lambda	0.445**	0.383*
	(0.199)	(0.204)
Lambda*T2	0.315	0.368*
	(0.207)	(0.210)
Lambda*T3	0.0452	0.0814
	(0.236)	(0.271)
Distance Private/Government School Q3		-0.649***
		(0.0520)
GIRL × Distance Private/Government School Q3		0.112

		(0.0716)
Female/male wage ratio >=1 (fmwager_ge1)		0.282***
		(0.109)
GIRL × Female/male wage ratio >=1		-0.264**
		(0.133)
Constant	-0.642*	-0.628*
	(0.360)	(0.370)
Household FE	Yes	Yes
PSU control	Yes	No
Observations	22,287	20,846

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1