

**Final report**

Economic calculation  
and strategies among  
resettled IDPs  
(SWAT) and current  
IDPS (Peshawar and  
Bannu), Pakistan

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**Economic Calculation and Strategies Among Resettled IDPs (SWAT) and Current IDPS (Peshawar and Bannu), Pakistan**

**Final Report Prepared Submitted to IGC, Pakistan  
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**November 15, 2015**

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## I. Introduction

The goal of this research project was to assess the economic conditions and activities of IDPs in Jalojai camp (Peshawar) and former IDPs in Swat, to identify interventions that would promote long term, sustainable growth. In the field, we decided that it was necessary to investigate the formal and informal camps, and the host communities and markets in Bannu, where a significant number of the IDPs from North Waziristan currently live. This added a third venue of research. We conducted a large number of interviews in Peshawar.

40 open ended interviews were conducted in Jolazai and Peshawar, 17 in Bannu; and 21 in various areas of Swat, adding up to a total of 78 interviews. Many of the interviews were in the form of focus groups, so the actual number of people we were able to hear from was much larger. We were in the Peshawar and Bannu field from 4-15 July 2015, and in Swat from July 27-August 4, 2015. Our respondents included, among other groups and individuals, IDPs, government officials, former political agents, businessmen, workers, farmers, association presidents in various sectors, journalists, local elders and *Jirga* members residing outside the camps.

Two important, but perhaps obvious observations need to be foregrounded at the outset. First, there is no such thing as FATA. FATA is a juridical category, not a socio-political reality. IDPs from different agencies had lived in societies characterized by radically divergent economic and social conditions. Moreover, even those from the same Agency were divided by tribe, economic status, sectoral specialization, and traditional cultural practices, including the structure, functions and scope of authority held by the *jirga*, and the relationship between traditional tribal leaders, quasi *Jirga* members who had been inserted into their communities by the Federal Government at various times, and the political agents. Political agents are often presented as the ultimate authority in the Agencies, and that was the intent of this office. But in fact their power was contingent on a host of factors: in some areas political agents wielded absolute power, in others they were marginalized and excluded from important decisions. The reinstatement of the Frontier Crimes Regulation in 2015, which is a carbon copy of the same regulation promulgated by the British in 1901 (mildly modified in 1997 and 2011) retained much of the 1901 law of Imperial Britain including collective punishment. The main innovation of the 2015 FCR is that the tribes have been denuded of their weapons but are tasked with the responsibility of maintaining authority in an area where ISAF failed.

Second, the Federal Government, the insurgents, and later the army repeatedly transformed the relationship between the tribes, the traditional *Jirga* structures, the Maliks (who served as a link between the state and tribes), and the political agents. In addition to this, the first thing the Taliban did when they took over an area was to kill as many of the Maliks, village elders and *Jirga* members as possible. Their goal was to destroy the traditional leadership and dispute resolution structures such that their unitary law would prevail. This is not the first time religion has been used to destroy tribal and other loyalties.

The end result of these successive experiments with governance and the murder of Maliks and *Jirga* elders has been a total decimation of the links between the state and the various (and heterogeneous) segments of society in FATA. The collapse of the link between state and the inhabitants of the Agencies bodes ill for future collaboration in the interest of peace and prosperity. The ambivalence toward the army, and confusion about the operational modalities of that institution is rife.

Attitudes towards the state and the military – indeed, questions about the historical relationship between the state and the Taliban in Swat are similar, if not more extreme. Swatis describe their "real" society as being peace-loving, rich and jubilant. They repeatedly referred to festivals where men and women danced and celebrated together. At the same time, at great risk, some of our respondents in Swat reported that they and many others in the Valley not only anticipated, but were in favor of the return of the Taliban. In the tehsils where the Taliban first took hold, almost every family had a member in the insurgent group, but revealing this would result in retribution against the entire family from either the Taliban that still exist in Swat or the military. Everyone we spoke with had a conspiracy theory about the military, the ISI, the state and the relationship of these organizations to the Taliban. Whatever the truth of the matter, the military and the state of Pakistan are viewed as enemies. The previously dysfunctional legal system in Swat now functions on two different levels, hardly a recipe for efficient disposal of outstanding cases, most of which involve land disputes.

There is a deep nostalgia for the era of the Vali, who is seen as being a just, strong developmentalist who had the goal of transforming Swat into a functioning modern state. There is strong antipathy toward the KPK government. The current leader of the ruling party in KPK was often referred to as "*Aazab Khan*." Everyone we met felt they had been deceived and abandoned by the government of KPK, and the Federal government. PATA is directly administered by the KPK government.

The two basic facts I have highlighted above have serious implications for any developmental work that the state might initiate in these areas; they limit the nodes of cooperation that can be expected from the local population in government projects to promote sustainable growth, should those ever be pursued in earnest and with the long term interests of Swat and FATA in mind. On the other hand, the respondents uniformly complained that the government was not doing enough in rebuilding infrastructure and homes, or in providing assistance to them. In Swat, in particular, there are clear and significant possibilities for economic growth and diversification that can be easily solved if there was a will to do so, such as laying roads, and repairing those that have been damaged or eroded by the 2010 floods and by the military operation.

The case material in this report is divided into four segments that reflect my strong impression that FATA, the IDPs and certainly Swat are not of a piece. The first two present empirical findings for Jolazai (and Peshawar) and Bannu. The third segment focuses on Swat, a rich region about which one can make clear and precise policy recommendations. This format reflects my efforts to capture the numerous

facets of diversity in these three research sites, a diversity that bears on the issue of promoting growth.

## II. *Methodology: Jalozai, Peshawar and Bannu*

Interviews were conducted using the “snowball” method. All interviews were unstructured although we were clear on what we wanted to learn. Many of them were in the form of focus groups, which sometimes formed spontaneously. Adnan Khan, our local guide, was enormously helpful in identifying relevant officials, journalists, labor unions, worker associations, psychologists, academics, researchers, NGOs and formal associations in Peshawar. By virtue of its status as the capital of KPK, these respondents were able to impart information that was both specific to the IDPs in and around Peshawar, but also the entire province. All of us were present at 8 interviews in Peshawar. The rest, I conducted myself in the company of Adnan Khan. Two research assistants conducted interviews in Bannu, based on the fact that I would attract unwanted attention from the military.

Once in Jolozai camp, we started by interviewing the camp management and security officials, and then spread out: I interviewed women and families, my two assistants from LUMS interviewed men. Both assistants are from FATA, which gave them an edge. I worked with a female translator who was an employee at the camp. This choice, made of necessity, no doubt tempered the women's responses.

While it was easy to identify and interview the relevant official bodies, associations, etc. in Peshawar, conducting field work in uncertain and fluid conditions, such as the Camp was, of necessity, spontaneous. We had identified merchants as key respondents from the outset. Our goal in interviewing the IDPs was to acquire information on their skill set, their experience in gaining training and education in the camps, their past economic activities and future plans.

I do not worry about the extent to which our work did not conform to standard behaviorist methods. In fact, I believe that we learned much more than a formal questionnaire and a random sample would have revealed, even if such an enterprise were possible under the circumstances. Rather, the main limitation of the study's method is that many of the interviews were conducted through an interpreter. Thus, I, but not my assistants, (two from FATA; two whose mother tongue was Pushto) must surely have missed out on nuances of language and culture. In addition, being a female researcher in the Pushtun environment, and one who, despite my fluent Urdu, was seen as a foreigner and despite efforts to conform to the sartorial customs of the region, I attracted more attention than I would have liked. The assumption at the Camp was that all foreigners come bearing gifts and bounty. It was difficult for some of my respondents to understand why I was there.

Swat was an entirely different environment where historical memories of foreign tourists were still vivid and I did not face the same sense of alterity.

### III. *Overview: Jalozai Camp (Khyber and Momand Agencies)*

Jalozai Camp is located on the outskirts of Peshawar. It is one of the oldest refugee and IDP camps in Pakistan that housed successive waves of displaced persons, starting with the Afghans in the 1980s and 1990s, another wave of 200,000 Afghan refugees fled during the US military operation in Afghanistan, leading to the creation of New Jalozai Camp adjacent to the old camp. The Camp also intermittently hosted populations displaced due to natural disasters. Military operations against insurgents in FATA brought another large influx of IDPs in 2012, mostly from Khyber Agency, but also from Momand and Bajaur.<sup>1</sup>

Most families from the 2012 exodus of 47,860 families from Bara chose not to stay in the camp. The total population of the camp at that time was 11,350.

The 2014 exodus from Khyber created another 503,559 IDPs, 4/5<sup>th</sup> of these were women and children.<sup>2</sup>

The exact number of IDPs is impossible to calculate since only a fraction of them came to the Camp, and many soon found other places to live, in schools, with relatives, or in rented houses. In addition, many remained undocumented, often due to difficulties acquiring national identity cards. According to Shah Nasir, the Deputy Program Manager in PDMA, initially (2012-14) there were 310,729 families displaced from Khyber Agencies, 40,000 of whom had returned by July 2015. According to the UNHCR there was a new influx of 35,000 IDPs from Bara in Khyber Agency in 2014.<sup>3</sup> The level of confusion about basic facts is reflected in the following discrepancy of officials directly connected to the administration of the Camp: According to the head of security in the camp, 2,700 families remained in the camp; but Raina Shah of PDMA, also working in the Camp, put the number of families at 5,000. According to the same source only 3 per cent of the IDPs lived in camps, and Peshawar itself hosted 100,767 families, living off-camp. In short, data on the number of IDPs from Khyber, Momand and Bajour cannot even be estimated, it can only be guessed at.<sup>4</sup> Suffice it to say that the total number of IDPs from these agencies fluctuated and at times probably topped 900,000.

At the time of our research, Jolazai was a dying camp. New Jolazai camp had already been razed, creating a large swath of attractive real estate. According to the director of PDMA, old Jolazai is slated to close at the end of October. The camp was in shambles. Tents were in various stages of disintegration, The number of schools had been reduced from 16 to 8, teacher and student attendance was intermittent and teachers were often changed on a daily basis. The Camp hospital had been closed, and MERLIN, a US NGO associated with an organization called Patriotism

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<sup>1</sup> A review of the Camp in 2012 can be found here:

[http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/\\_assets/files/field\\_protection\\_clusters/Pakistan/files/PAK\\_PC\\_CE\\_Assessment\\_JalozaiCamp\\_2012\\_EN.pdf](http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Pakistan/files/PAK_PC_CE_Assessment_JalozaiCamp_2012_EN.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.asiadespatch.org/2014/12/12/the-plight-of-idps-at-jalozai/>

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e487016.html>

<sup>4</sup> These figures do not include the North Waziristan IDPs, who will be discussed in the next section.

Without Borders, provides rudimentary medical assistance through a clinic. Upon checking the medications provided for particular ailments reported by specific IDPs, I found that the drugs had nothing to do with the medical problem. I was told that there were pre-packaged bags of pills that were given to anyone who went to the clinic. I was shown one of these packages.

The two remaining groups in the camp were from Bara in Khyber Agency, and a small number of families (350) from Bajour who were 'de-commissioned', namely, they were ordered to return to Bajour, which, according to the military, had been cleansed of insurgents. They no longer got rations, but refused to leave the camp. The Bara IDPs still got rations, with the result that there were intense antagonisms between the two groups that often erupted into violent encounters.

The reasons the Bajour IDPs refused to leave reflects the diversity of FATA. Bajour is the only Agency where there is what many in Pakistan call "feudal" relationships. Land is cultivable and owned by a few families (Khans) who had long term tenancy relationships with tenants who have lived on the land for generations, essentially assuming the guise of squatters with historical claims.

The landed elite took the opportunity of the insurgency and the evacuation to destroy the tenants' homes and replaced the tenants with Afghan laborers who could not make claims to land in Pakistan. In addition, the landed elite appropriated the government funds that were intended to help the IDPs rebuild their homes. The elite has threatened these economically marginal Bajour IDPs with violence if they return. The authorities know this reality but have decided to ignore it. PDMA officials intend to forcibly remove the Bajour IDPs when the camp closes. Those from Bara will presumably be relocated as the military operation there is on-going.

#### **IV. *Economic Activity in and Around Jolazai Camp***

PDMA officials paint a rosy picture of the facilities and training they provide and the role of camp-life in bettering the lives and skills of the IDPs. The reality, at least in 2015, belies this narrative. Initially there were training programs in wiring, computing, driving, tailoring, fixing generators and driving for men; and women were taught sewing and embroidery. We found no evidence of the existence of these centers, although it was Ramzan and it is possible that the Camp official's claim that the centers were closed due to this reason.

Initially, financial incentives were given to acquire these skills (just as children and young adults were given stipends if they attended school). However, according to those running the Camp, the IDPs who acquired training preferred to remain idle. The women were given sewing machines, which they subsequently sold, not unlike the men, who sold the tools they had been given to start working in various trades. The reluctance to work is the result of many factors, which I will discuss in the last section, below. Our observations and interviews revealed that there was a strong sense of entitlement among the IDPs, coupled with a learned proclivity to expect and passively wait for assistance and a learned reluctance to labor. The IDPs in Jolazai camp had been there for a long period that appeared indefinite to them.

They, like the IDPs in Bannu, were a traumatized population with severe psychological ailments, who were also living in limbo. The secrecy of the authorities, lack of information and reliance of chatter and gossip exacerbated this sense of insecurity and helplessness.

Sources of income are irregular and eclectic. Almost every family in the camp had a family member who worked in the Gulf. Remittances are a vital source of income. Teenagers from Bara are allegedly involved in dealing drugs in Peshawar. These resources are not invested in productive enterprises, but in daily supplies, buying land and building houses in the surrounding area. During the summers, many IDPs rent their tents out and move to Afghanistan to escape the heat. Girls are another source of income. Bride prices range between 30,000-50,000 PKR. This source of income results in early marriages for girls. This, in turn, prolongs the period in which they can have children in a society where the number of progeny is a vital aspect of security, not to mention pride. Needless to say, these population growth rates bear no resemblance to the resources families have to provide the children with nourishment, let alone education outside the camp.

An unknown but small proportion of young men seek jobs as day laborers in Peshawar and the nearby market area, whose shops are owned by locals. Others take intermittent jobs as truck drivers.

#### ***V. The Market and Entrepreneurship***

There are two markets that are directly connected to the camp. One is on the roadside, where shops sell largely unwanted items that had clearly been part of aid packages. There appeared to be very little demand for these goods and there was virtually no activity in this market. A second market is at the entry to the camp. This is a vibrant space of exchange, where shops selling food, beverages, cell phones and services such as tailoring, barbers and so on are located. Unlike the market alongside the road, these merchants and service providers are located in brick structures that have electricity and for which they pay rent. This group of merchants and service providers had marketable skills, few if any of which were learned at the camp.

The sources of start-up capital were eclectic, ranging from borrowing from relatives, to savings accumulated while working in the Gulf. Daily earnings ranged from 200-6000 PKR a day. The most lucrative business was a shop that sold freshly cooked snacks.

#### ***Potential Interventions***

Given that Jolazai camp is closing, it is not possible to make concrete policy recommendations concerning skill development. Most IDPs interviewed did not intend to return, but this datum must be contextualized by recalling that most of the camp's inhabitants had already left. Those who decide to stay, along with hundreds of thousands of others displaced during the military operation will simply enter the maelstrom of Pakistan's economy. When asked what they would do, it appeared that only a minuscule proportion had any plans for the future at

all. I address the possible reasons for this state of affairs and potential interventions below.

For those who reported that they would return, rebuilding their homes and their pre-displacement businesses was the first priority. This could suggest that the IDPs are unlikely to use skills acquired at the camp once they return, at least immediately. The most important aspect of understanding why this may be so has to do with uncertainty. The IDPs have no idea what their future will be, what their communities will look like when they return, or how they will reconstitute. PDMA officials and publications make sweeping claims about their achievements in this regard, but the IDPs themselves report the lack of any effective assistance. It was clear that a very significant portion of the aid that was intended for the IDPs had been either embezzled at various levels of the organization, or had been spent on creating an elaborate administrative apparatus. Rebuilding schools is a priority.

The following interventions should be considered by NGOs or the Federal Government and KPK governor under whose jurisdiction FATA falls.

- Provide the Bajour residents with legal representation to investigate the claims of the tenant farmers to their land. At a minimum, work to retrieve the rebuilding funds that the Khans have confiscated. Although it is true that land records do not exist, locals inevitably know which land belonged to whom. A savvy investigative team should be able to discover the true ownership of land confiscated by the elite. Retrieving and returning the land and government stipend to the peasants is more a matter of political will than logistics.
- Provide safe transportation for those IDPs that wish to return, free of charge.
- Provide *temporary* shelter to IDPs while they rebuild their houses in their home villages.
- Provide employment to IDPs by involving them in public rebuilding projects in their respective agencies. Labor should be compensated on a daily basis and in cash. There should be strict oversight on the payment of wages because reports of not being paid for labor were frequent. Such oversight would be relatively labor intensive, with registers of payment being checked with workers. The local government to be put into place shortly should shoulder the main responsibility.
- Provide grants to businesses that are re-locating to cover start-up costs.
- Subsidize building materials.
- Continue to provide training after repatriation.
- Require investors in agriculture and mining to hire as many suitable locals as possible, including training them for more complex tasks.

#### ***VI. Bannu: Baka Khel Camp, Alkhidmat Foundation Camp, Shahbaz Azmatkhel (hosting community)***

According to PDMA more than 106,000 families were displaced from North Waziristan (NW) as a result of an active military operation began in June 2014 and

continues to date. Each family consists of an average of 9 people. The actual number of IDPs is probably larger. In addition, more than 70,000 IDPs from North Waziristan fled to Afghanistan which was easier to reach, given the three day deadline the military gave them to evacuate. Interviews of the NW IDPs and other related respondents were conducted in four distinct sites in Banu: Baka Khel Camp (housing 21,000 IDPs); Alkidmat Foundation Camp (80 families); Village ShahbazAzmatKhel (hosting community housing 30 families) and Tehsil Bazar, the largest bazar in Bannu.

IDP respondents were from the two major tribal confederations of NW, the Dawar and the Wazirs. Socially and economically, the Dawar are disadvantaged. The Dawar live in Mir Ali, Miran Shah and Moya, a level, plain area on the bank of the river Tochi and are mostly engaged in agriculture. Wazirs live on the periphery around Data Khel, which has been the hub of militancy and completely beyond government control for more than 10 years. Being close to the border, Wazirs slipped over the Afghan border. Most of the IDPs in the formal army camp are from the Dawar confederation. Most of those who fled to Afghanistan are Uthmanzai Wazirs.

IDP respondents and our team tell a different story. The security arrangements in the camp are air tight, the medical facilities are excellent. However, schooling takes place under the open sky; students and instructors show up intermittently, and only then, because they get stipends for coming. There is a technical school, WHITE, where students complained of irregular teacher attendance and a jumbled curriculum in such subjects as computer use and programming.

The students confirmed that there was a community center for women run by Khowaindo Kor, where they were taught embroidery and sewing. The center was closed at the time of the visit. Apparently much of what the Pakistan public and the high command of the military is shown and told about the camp is theatre. When a high level officer visits, the water tanks are full, the hand-picked “elected” leaders in the camp heap praise on the administration and fear of retribution eliminates complaints. According to several sources both inside and outside the camp – one a reputable journalist – the narratives of military success and return are fraudulent.

For example, video of “return” is created by transporting IDPs home for a day, shooting film and then bringing them back. In short, it appeared that the authorities had two main concerns: security and health. NGOs other than MERLIN and the Red Cross are not allowed in the camp. Their donations in kind and in cash are distributed by the army.

Since the IDPs in Baka Khel Camp will probably be there for an indefinite period of time, there is an opportunity to improve education services. Another aspect of the urgent needs that were not being met was psychiatric help, especially for women and children. Numerous IDPs reported that they, or their family members had severe psychosis and PTSD but there were no professionals to attend to them. Traveling to Peshawar for treatment, these patients have become heavily reliant on strong doses of anti-depressants and sedatives.

The Alkhidmat Foundation, which houses 80 families, and is utterly dysfunctional. There were no schools, training centers, the camp lacks electricity, and the entire camp had one fan and one water tank. Respondents reported severe PTSD and other psychiatric illnesses. They also reported that every family had at least one member who had extensive experience in business or a trade, but that a lack of savings and uncertainty about repatriation prevented them from starting again in Bannu.

Village ShahbazAzmatKhel, 10 km outside Bannu city is a host community to 30 families, all of which come from the Dawar tribe and used to live in Miran Shah. The village is small, and has only three shops. Here, too, the respondents reported that there was at least one skilled person who had been a functioning member of the economy in NW, but was currently unemployed. Within the camp, uncertainty of the duration of stay hindered both serious efforts to seek employment as well as student interest in schooling and training. "We never know when we are going to be sent back," said one WHITE student, "We don't know if we will finish the course."

## ***VII. The Economic Basis of Taliban Control and Economic Prospects***

In a confidential interview a two-time political agent in North Waziristan explained that there were four groups among the Taliban in North Waziristan,<sup>5</sup> one of which, the Haqqani group was supported by, and supported, the Pakistan military. He described the three anti-state groups as being common criminals, who, having escaped conviction and/or jail, took to demanding ransom, kidnapping, drug-dealing, robbery, and taxes on trucks, petrol pumps and road passage. These activities escalated with time. The inhabitants of the area were regularly terrorized through gory public executions. Businessmen were particularly targeted, while others were forced to enlist a male member of the family into the group. Contact with Indian Consulates was made through go-betweens to plan further actions against the Pakistani army and state.

The economic base of NW consists of agriculture and trans-border trade in luxury vehicles, arms, drugs and electronics. Contrary to popular perceptions, as a result of this trade, the tribes of NW had extensive networks all over Pakistan where they sold the smuggled goods. This apparent backwater was actually tightly integrated into the Pakistani economy by way of smuggling and selling a small number of specialized products.

The two main markets in NWA were in Miran Shah and Mir Ali, which had 4,500 and 3,500 shops, respectively. Miran Shah had 70 shops that dealt exclusively in heavy armaments. The advent of the Taliban and their 5,000-some foreign guests from across the Middle East and Central Asia meant a booming business for these markets. Growing demand for weapons and luxury cars not only fueled the cross-border trade, it also drove prices up. In short, the Taliban were good for business and had endless resources – all in USD, and

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<sup>5</sup> These were led by Gul Bahadur, Sadiq Nuri and Haleem Khan. The fourth was the Haqqani group, which was an ancillary of the Pakistan army.

clearly from foreign sources.

The military operation that began in 2014 resulted in the leveling of Miran Shah and Mir Ali markets. While the government has initiated some projects to protect agricultural land from flooding, a businessman who went back to see the market in Miran Shah reported that only about 100 shops had been rebuilt by the army. The three day notice to evacuate meant that goods were left behind and looted, reportedly by the army. In short, whatever the destructive nature of the trade in arms and drugs, the root source of NW's trade economy has been demolished.

Even if the shops are rebuilt, the most lucrative aspect of the trade, drugs and guns, will be prohibited. The success of such efforts is uncertain, but such restrictions must be part of the resettlement plan.

There are serious impediments to developing alternatives to the brisk trade and quick profits that were the hallmark of trade in NW. Since the Soviet-Afghan/Allies/Pakistan/Saudi war began, and until the military operation of 2014, sudden opportunities and large lump-sum profits became the norm. More, these structural conditions built on cultural and psychic ones. Resistance to authority that rests on routinized work, the lack of a work ethic compatible with industrial organization, collective property rights, and a host of other cultural factors are an impediment to involving the NWA tribes in industry. Trade is vastly more attractive, as are occupations that do not involve formal economic hierarchies, such as transportation and other jobs that are not contractual in the formal sense, such as day-labor in construction or transportation of goods.

Thus while it is true that a key aim of the Taliban was to eliminate traditional leadership and replace it with a uniform code with a singular authority structure, the irregularity, or absence of time discipline that came along with being a Talib layered on to a deeper cultural aversion to routine. The modalities of replacing the lucrative cross border trade that was the hallmark of Miran Shah and Mir Ali is not an uncomplicated question. Nor can one assume that the networks inside Pakistan and Afghanistan that facilitated and profited from the trade will quietly disband and vanish once the military operation is over.

All the Federal Government agencies that have been entrusted with 'growing' the economies of FATA have taken a 'one size fits all' approach to the issue. Riding on a tidal wave of aid, largely from the Asian Development Bank and USAID, the specific resources, endowments and social structures of any particular sector in any particular tribal configuration have been ignored. As a result, billions of dollars in aid have been wasted, embezzled and misallocated in the tangled web of the myriad organizations that have been created for the economic uplift of the region. <sup>6</sup>What is good for Bajour is *not* good for NWA. And interventions that

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<sup>6</sup> Zulfiqar Ali, *Fata an ideal case of how not to govern a region*, 2/27/2015  
[http://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=27\\_02\\_2015\\_181\\_005#top](http://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=27_02_2015_181_005#top)

might work in the marketing and potential industrial development in NWA are not appropriate for the areas that straddle the Tonchi River. Generalizing is not just intellectually disingenuous, or factually inaccurate, it is dangerous, in the literal sense of the word.

Rather than put forth a composite set of goals and modalities, it is best to think about rebuilding and growth in NWA as a series sectorally distinct phases. Clearly, the first of these will be a massive construction boom that will involve rebuilding both public spaces and private homes. Assuming this will go on for a decade, training in the Baka Khel Camp should prioritize creating skills that match this impending construction boom. The existing scholarship program for higher education of IDPs in construction and electrical engineering should be expanded to the utmost extent possible. At the lower end of the labor chain, masonry and basic electrical skills should be a priority.

Second, in light of our findings when WHITE students were interviewed, the future value of acquiring a particular skill was not part of the discursive terrain to which the students were exposed. Save the two students who had an MA and a BA degree, coming to school was simply a way of receiving a stipend. *There needs to be a sustained discussion, in the camp, about the immediate economic future of NWA that involves collective thinking about the economic future. This would impart a sense of purpose to the IDPs and mitigate their inability to imagine and plan for their economic future. Everyone knows that rebuilding is their first priority, but collective thinking about what it would mean to acquire a particular skill that has lasting value has not occurred. I return to the psychic benefits of this undertaking below.*

A second sector that is vital and viable for the medium and long term development of the NWA's economy, and FATA in general, is mining. Consider the following information.

#### MINERALS POTENTIAL OF FATA<sup>7</sup>

Agency/FR	Minerals (Reserves in Million Tons)
Bajaur	Marble (5850), Manganese (0.120), Chromite(1.00) Garnet, Emerald and Nephrite
Mohmand	Marble(845), Chromite(1.00), Silica sand(537), dolomite(11.0), Manganese(1.8), Quartz, Feldspar, Emerald and Nephrite
Khyber	Marble(345), Barite, Graphite, Soapstone(0.3), Limestone(In exhaustible) , Oil & Gas
Orakzai	Coal (8.0) , Iron ore (0.050), oil & gas
Kurram	Soapstone (3.2), Coal (2.0), Marble, Magnesite, Iron Ore, Lead, oil & gas

<sup>7</sup> <http://fatada.gov.pk/minerals-sector-projects/> (Web-site of FATA Development Authority).

N.Wazirista	Copper (35.0), Manganese (0.050), Chromite (1.00), Magnesite, Granite (in exhaustible) and oil & gas
S.Waziristan	Copper, Gold, Chromite, Marble, Granite, oil & gas (Reserves not yet
F.R. Kohat	Coal (2.0), Limestone (In exhaustible) and oil & gas
F.R. Peshawar	Bentonite (0.050), Limestone (In exhaustible) and oil & gas
F.R. Tank	Bentonite (0.050) and oil & gas
F.R. D.I.Khan	Gypsum (137), Marl (10.0), Cement grade (460) Limestone and oil & gas

Unfortunately, the Fata Development Authority's extensive reports on the exploitation of minerals makes no mention of integrating the local population into the unearthing of these resources. The sub-text in these documents exposes a mind-set that is in favor of outsourcing to private corporations and multinational companies, a pattern already in full swing in Afghanistan. Much more thought needs to be given to preparing a cadre of young people from the agencies who will be in positions other than unskilled labor. Investing in the training of a cadre of mining and geological engineers, locals who know accounting and business practices, including law, would not only begin to transform the labor force, it would also instill a sense of ownership. In positions of authority, this cadre would have a proclivity to hire people from their kinship networks, which would create a cultural basis for involving locals in mining enterprises. At the lower end, the operation of mining machinery requires special expertise that should be the focus of technical training at the camp.

Finally, although it will never be the leading sector in the revival of NWA's economy, agriculture is a mainstay of the economy and a stabilizing, grounding force. Quite a bit of work has been successfully completed on small dams and protective structures to prevent the devastation regularly caused by floods. Training in agriculture, water use and conservation and horticulture is a long term investment in NWA that should be actively pursued. Agricultural interventions should account for the diverse endowments of regions within NWA.

### *Swat: Introduction*

Until 1960, Swat was among three princely states governed by a Vali. In 1960, Swat, Dir and Chitral formally became part of Pakistan and were governed by the political agent system and in 1969 they became part of NWFP (now KPK) and the political agent was replaced by a district commissioner and attendant bureaucratic structures. The history of changes in Swat's legal system are well known: in 1975 judicial power was vested with the DC, although the Jirgas, chaired by a *tehsildar* (tax official) continued to apply a mixture of *rawaj* (customary law) and shari'a.

Building on General Zia's support for shari'a law, experimentation with Swat's legal system continued, with each successive party in power at the Federal level, and the military government of Musharraf extending the authority of shari'a law in 1991, 1994, 2003, and finally in 2009, when the PPP government made a short-lived truce with the militants.

The PPP promulgated the *Nizam e Adl* regulation in which legal cases were to be decided through consultation with religious scholars and ulema. In short, if from 1994-1999 the modalities of legal redress were multiplying, from 1999-2009 Swat had three distinct and parallel legal systems: the national, the *Nizam e Adl* and ad hoc spontaneous, informal venues of judgement presided over by the militants.<sup>8</sup> These changes in law had an extremely detrimental effect on business, agriculture and horticulture in the Valley.

The prelude above was necessary because a common explanation for the rise of the Taliban, broadly speaking, has more often than not been attributed to a public demand for "swift justice" and relief from a sluggish legal system where defendants could easily draw cases out over as long as 20-25 years. The proliferation of parallel legal systems prior to the complete take over of the Valley by the militants offered additional ways to prolong cases, most of which concerned land, property and inheritance. In short, the demand for "swift justice" was based on prior policies that had created a complex web of multiple juridical authorities.

With the commercialization of agriculture, the landed elite, or Khans, had taken to appropriating land; and the common land used largely by the Gujjar baradari for grazing was one important target. Ironically, the Khans were originally allotted large tracks of land to administer by the Vali, who himself was a Gujjar, since armed conflicts between various branches of the Yusufzai Pushtun prevented them from agreeing on a leader from within their tribe. Over time, private property rights were consolidated over these lands.<sup>9</sup> The Khan's annexation of adjacent land created legal disputes that progressively highlighted a deep class divide between them and the economically disadvantaged groups – Gujjars, businessmen (largely Malik and Awan) and craftsmen/service providers (kammis).

The rise of Sufi Mohammad and later Mullah Fazlullah occurred in the context of administrative experiments that were successively conducted in Swat, in which this economic divide was growing and in the context of an utterly dysfunctional legal system. The power of the DCO and attendant bureaucrats was eroded but at the height of his power, the DCO and other bureaucrats regularly attended sermons and prayers at Fazlullah's stronghold. The conclusive consolidation of the power and control by the PTT and its leader Fazlullah was, in fact, the result of

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<sup>8</sup> This account draws heavily on a very well researched paper: Pakistan: Countering Militancy in PATA, Asia Report N°242 | 15 January 2013, International Crisis Group, Brussels.

<sup>9</sup> Smaller castes include Awans and Maliks, who are predominantly businessmen.

collaboration between the DCO, the PTT and, according to all of our respondents, the military itself.

Our micro-level economic anthropological research in Mutta and surrounding areas where Fazlullah and the Taliban first established their hold unveiled a deeply polarized society that had experienced a plethora of radical economic changes.

One nexus was the deep class divide and the seizure of land by the Khans; another was the dramatic upward economic mobility of an otherwise low status caste, the Gujjars. Historically the Gujjars were nomadic and involved in animal husbandry. Unlike the Pushtun, for whom land ownership was a necessary attribute, Gujjars rarely owned land. Gujjars and other economically suppressed groups migrated to the Gulf, remitted money back to this area, built houses and engaged in conspicuous consumption that rubbed up against long established social hierarchies.

At the same time, internal feuds over inheritance and property were dividing the uppermost echelon of Khan families in Mata, with the result that the first firm supporters of Fazullah were disgruntled members of these families. The demonstration effect created by this support drew others in because in the defecting Khans (often brother against brother; son against father) were viewed as leaders. Paradoxically, women were the first to follow Fazullah's pronouncements and support him by gifting him their jewelry. Part of this might have had to do with the fact that, being confined to the home, they had ample opportunity to listen to his charismatic speeches, delivered through a formally illegal FM radio, that was, nevertheless, not shut down. More convincing, however, were the reports of other respondents who believed that the support came from the fact that women were excluded from inheritance and Fazullah initially, in what came to be known as his "first/peaceful" phase, made much of the fact that in shari'a law, women were entitled to inherit. Over time, of course, the Taliban's treatment of women changed radically, as did their resort to public acts of symbolic and extreme violence designed to terrorize people into submission. Much more generally, however, the Taliban offered "wife justice" in stark contrast to the sluggish state system. In a rapidly commercializing area, this was probably the main source of their appeal.

#### *IA "The khaki wardi is a sign of danger, not a sign of peace"*

Wide-spread views of the role of the military in aiding and abetting the Taliban are important to discuss because the suspicion of the army has had, and continues to have, a very significant impact on economic activity and its potential for revival.

The overall impression of farmers, industrialists and businessmen is that the visible presence of the army is hampering business and that the bureaucracy was first firmly behind Fazullah, and is now so weak as to be non-existent. The modalities of the military's intrusion into the economy of Swat not only fuels resentment, it has also reignited pockets of support for the Taliban. This, in turn, forestalls

investment because by creating uncertainty and anxiety for potential investors.

It was impossible for us to confirm the various theories Swatis had about the role of the military and the DCO in fostering, protecting and colluding with the Taliban. However, it was easy to confirm that the military was involved in land expropriation to build various housing schemes, and a base right on the outskirts of Mingora, Swat's capital, a vivid presence that cannot but be a dampener on tourism, the mainstay of the economy. The army was also reputed in Swat to be engaged in various ways in the timber mafia's illegal activities. Similarly, the military's virtual monopoly in rebuilding public facilities – roads, schools, etc. – was vivid and verifiable. The mere (and very visible) presence of the military before, during and after the operation of 2009 has created an aura of insecurity, anxiety and distrust that was repeatedly mentioned by businessmen as the most important reason why they were unwilling to restart their businesses. On the other hand, there is a thriving business in smuggled vehicles and in taking apart and putting together vehicles such that their origins cannot be traced.

The fact that six years after the end of the military operation rebuilding has not begun in earnest also calls the legitimacy of the KPK government into question. Swat is not a Federally, but a Provincially administered area. Peshawar is directly responsible for its well-being. Roads and public buildings demolished by the Taliban, then the floods of 2010 and finally during the military offensive have not even begun to be reconstructed. The journey from Mingora to Kalam now takes upwards of 13 hours in a 4 wheel drive vehicle. Both for tourism and for agricultural transportation, roads are critical. And a secure environment is necessary for any industrialist to sink capital in tourism or industry in Swat.

There were many extant explanations for why the Taliban were allowed to flourish for so long in Swat, and why, according to most Swatis, the first two military operations were an elaborately staged farce. Almost every respondent described the personal experience of being caught between military and Taliban road and path blocks that were only 100 meters apart. Civilians would be told from one to go to the other, and vice versa. Another repetitive narrative concerned the suspicion that bombs were being dropped far from where the Taliban were, simply to create the impression that the military was fighting them. Within this overall consensus, there are divergent views.

One theory had to do with international politics. In this account Musharaf fueled the militancy to discourage the US military from trying to use Saidu Shareef Airport to withdraw their soldiers from Afghanistan. Another sees Musharaf's support of the Taliban as a way to show the West that Pakistan had its own severe problems and could not contribute more to US goals.

Under these conditions, investors do not invest, tourists do not visit, *banks do not accept land or property as collateral for loans*, up-stream agricultural projects cannot be initiated, produce gets wasted for want of storage facilities that require a steady supply of energy, and because roads are often so badly damaged as to be non-existent, employment cannot be created in any of these sectors. In addition

wealthier merchants, hotel owners and landlords are increasingly being forced to make payments to residual Taliban elements as well as state functionaries.

Swat's economy has distinct and clear sectoral endowments in tourism, agriculture, horticulture and mining. Each of these sectors was a victim of either the Taliban, or the army, or the lack of basic infrastructure and rebuilding after the operation.

Tourism in Swat was specifically targeted by the Taliban and was decimated by their active destruction of hotels, touristic venues and, obviously, by the reputational consequences of their brutality. It was in 2015, six years after the evacuation, that Pakistani tourists felt comfortable returning to Swat for holiday, only to be frustrated by the state of the hotels and the virtual non-existence of the road to Kalam, a major tourist attraction. The prospect of foreign tourists returning at any time in the near future is nil, and they were the real back-bone of the economy.

The single major industry – the processing of silk to an intermediate stage before sending it to the Punjab for finishing – was first initiated by the Vali of Swat. Silk production employed tens of thousands of workers. First, the silk industry, like others, was hit by the withdrawal of the tax exemption for imports under the Benazir government. This diminished the advantages of locating in Swat, but the silk industry did not relocate. At the onset of Taliban rule, these factories closed and relocated in the Punjab and other parts of the country. The conclusive military offensive that was undertaken in 2009 was the death-blow of this industry.

Currently the only formal sector industrial workers are in the cosmetics industry. These factories have light machinery that can easily be removed and moved and therefore the industrialists feel more secure.

Every sector of the economy was affected, and every group suffered. National level administrative changes layered on to these basic conditions to create further hardships. For example, workers who lost their jobs in the silk industry had depended on a national retirement and social security system. This meant that industries across the country had a common financial pool of capital for formal sector laborers: Swat's labor was benefitting from industrial activity in industrial hubs such as Karachi and Lahore. With the passing of the 18<sup>th</sup> Amendment, these resources dried up. Even before the advent of the Taliban, Swat's industrial base was very thin and now they can only wait for relief from a dysfunctional provincial government in a province that itself has very little industry and therefore virtually no funds to support labor.

## ***IIA. Potential and Priorities for Economic Diversification and Growth***

Despite their fears and apprehensions, Swatis--including industrialists and wealthy hotel owners – do not want to leave the Valley. Only the most desperate go to the Gulf to work, and this exodus was more prominent during the Taliban era. This place-loyalty means that appropriate interventions in Swat are likely to yield good results.

Swat's potential growth sectors are crystal clear: tourism, agriculture and horticulture, and mining, particularly marble and emeralds. All these industries are highly organized into associations that meet regularly and also meet collectively. In other words, there is an existing organizational structure in place that is functional and would be very easy to work with.

The most important aspect of re-starting and diversifying growth in Swat is rebuilding the roads and making regular and reliable electricity available. One industrialist who wanted to branch out into processing fruits into jams and juice reported that he had asked the government for permission to set up a hydro-powered generator to provide for cold storage and a processing plant. KPK authorities ruled that he could set up the generator as long as he did not sell electricity to anyone, as this would undercut WAPDA's market. A commercial farmer reported that he had offered to build the road from his village to the main artery using his own funds. His request was denied by the KPK government. In short, bureaucratic red tape and interests are a serious roadblock to private initiatives for the provision of these two key infrastructural inputs. The KPK government must stop being an impediment to private investment in infrastructure that it is unwilling or unable to provide itself.

### ***III.A. Tourism***

I have already mentioned the importance of rebuilding roads, particularly the one from Mingora to Kalam. Hotels damaged or destroyed by the Taliban did not receive the compensation they were promised to rebuild their properties. The rebuilding that has taken place is largely sub-standard and there are no codes to insure the aesthetic cohesion of touristic venues.

A large, fully equipped European funded and staffed culinary institute was functioning on the outskirts of Mingora before the advent of the Taliban. At the institute, a variety of culinary cultures were taught, and there were general courses in the hospitality industry. This organization could have taken the hospitality industry to a new level. It was decimated and looted by the Taliban who took away extremely expensive imported machinery; then this large and imposing building was turned into an army barrack and finally a prison. That is the current status of this well built, large, imposing building.

Of course, the main impediment to tourism is the threat of the return of the Taliban – not an entirely unsubstantiated fear – and the removal of the ubiquitous *visual* presence of the military. There are many ways for security to be invisible. These should be pursued. The military cantonment and base that is planned should also be invisible. Advertising the presence of the military with automatic weapon totting soldiers everywhere does not give the area the aura of a relaxing touristic venue. Quite the opposite. Our respondents were unanimous in wanting the military to leave or move to places where their presence is not so obvious.

City planning in Mangora and Miandam is non-existent. But other issues are also a dampener on tourism. Most prominent among these is the amount of pollution in these two cities, caused by rickshaws. These vehicles reportedly arrived in large

numbers when they were outlawed in Islamabad. They are necessary, but these air polluters must be reined in. There are two ways to do this. One is fines. The other is public transport. Obviously the latter is preferable.

- Hotel owners should be compensated for damage from the operation.
- The institute should be re-opened as a specific and prioritized project for which funding should be sought from the EU. The KPK government should consider opening similar institutes.
- It is necessary to have a building code, especially in touristic areas. The beauty of the valley is its main asset. The buildings currently being constructed are sub-standard and unsightly, not to mention unsafe.

#### *IVA. Agriculture and Horticulture*

Because of its terrain, land parcels in Swat, save the few large landholding Khans, are small. They are appropriate for the production of fruits and horticulture. Fruits are so abundant that they fall and rot because the means to market them in Lahore or Islamabad do not exist. According to the president of the Vegetables and Fruits Association, about 20% of the fruit is wasted in this way every year. Those seeking to export fruits face prohibitive cargo charges and checking at airports is very strict, often resulting in delays and waste. And little has been done to control the floods that routinely decimate orchards.

The SRSP (Sarhad Rural Support Program) has used UNDP grants to identify train and give grants to 898 agro-businesses, encouraging diversification into horticulture, including flowers and amlook, two high profit items that had previously not been grown. They have standardized the growing and packaging of rice and had numerous training sessions to instruct farmers in the proper methods of drying fruit in an efficient fashion. This organization is a good example of what works.

The government of KPK can expand the scope of commercial agriculture in many ways:

- Build protection walls to minimize the effects of floods.
- Construct irrigation systems that utilize Swat's abundant water supply.
- Farmers need low interest rates because the Agriculture Bank reportedly does not give loans even if farmers offer to pay interest rates of up to 18%.
- The farmers are eager to move into more lucrative ventures, and seek assistance in acquiring hybrid seeds.
- There should be incentives for farmers to move into the packaging sector, such that transport is more efficient.
- Connecting roads and depots should either be built or encouraged.
- There is enormous interest in and potential for industries producing secondary products such as jams and preserves.

#### *VA. Industry*

According to Ahmed Khan, President of the Silk Industry and former president of

the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in 2008 there were 466 silk factories in Swat with nearly full employment and 10-15 transportation hubs. There were 78 cosmetics factories where both men and women worked. Currently the total labor force in industry is only 25,000.

Marble extraction is now the main industry in Swat, with 400 factories in Buner. However, power shortages are a problem for them as well.

Industrialists are eager to invest in food processing, which is the clearest industrial opportunity in Swat. Such diversification would further commercialize agriculture and take it upstream such that more of the value added would be captured locally. As it is, Swat's abundant fruits are wasted for lack of such industries. In addition, links between the farmers and industry might ignite a virtuous cycle of growth by virtue of economic linkages, the growth of intermediaries and of packaging and transport industries and employment.

- The government must encourage investment in fruit processing.
- Power provision is an absolute necessity.
- Making an industrial estate with regular supply of electricity should be a priority.
- Since banks in Swat no longer take Swati property as collateral, either they should be incentivized, or the government of KPK should guarantee loans needed by industrialists as start-up capital.

The scope for growth in Swat is enormous. The challenge is to use pre-existing organizations to create inter-sectoral linkages. None of these advantages can take place until the government of KPK invests in infrastructure. Indeed, Swat could become such an important earner of foreign exchange that the Federal Government should consider funding development in the Valley. With sectoral associations in place, the development of the Valley's extensive resources should, in my view, have a small body that has oversight responsibilities, access to government, but the mandate to function with complete autonomy in terms of policy making.

### ***VIII. Conclusion: Trauma, Memory, and Displacement: The Economic 'Fall-out'***

*"hame naya Pakistan nahi chahiay, hame purana Pakistan chahiay."*<sup>10</sup> *"They can't make any decisions, forget about economic decisions"*

--Dr. Mufti, a psychiatrist in Peshawar

Perhaps the biggest failure of scholars, policy makers and the establishment is the complete neglect of the fact that the IDPs constitute a deeply traumatized population who have lost a sense of time. If the future, past and present interpolate in one's mind, randomly; if any sound reminds one of a bomb blast; if

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<sup>10</sup> "We don't want the new Pakistan, we want the old Pakistan." — a commonly heard reference to the Imran Khan's slogan for change in all our research venues.

any hissing recalls the terror of living in fear of a drone, then economic calculation, planning, a sense of the continuity of the past with the present, and the present with the future, is lost. The signal sign of trauma is a jumbling of time; and being conscious of time is critical for making medium or long term economic decisions.

The mental state of the IDPs from Bajour, Bara and NWA is not without economic consequences. There are hundreds of families that are headed by either women, who are culturally bound to a custom of seclusion that is either forced or voluntary. There are children raising children. Trauma is ubiquitous and severe cases are dealt with by physical restraints, often in jails. While the health facilities at Baka Khel Camp were encompassing, they did not include psychiatric interventions. In both Baka Khel and in Jalozai, severely traumatized men, women and children travelled to Peshawar for help. Others seek help from faith healers or from practitioners of folk medicine.

The conspiracy theories I have already mentioned are efforts to come to grips with events that are beyond the comprehension of the IDPs and the Swatis. In particular, in Swat, which was an open, one could even say jubilant society, six years of “peace” has not mitigated the trauma, which revisits Swatis at unanticipated but frequent intervals. We heard at least five different scenarios about the reason for the rise of the Taliban and their collaboration with the authorities. Thus, even though their displacement was short and their return swift, the organization of Swati society is such that the advent of the Taliban and then the army has left permanent scars. Nevertheless, this same social history is a binding force that allows them to be optimistic about the future.

Many cultures and traditions have perished in FATA and Swat. Swati Pushtun no longer have hujras for fear of who might show up; many camp dwelling IDPs have no sense of what they are going to do or when they will be allowed to go home. The leadership and social organization of these people has been decimated; their ties to their leadership are, arguably, unlikely to be revived. Their relationship to the government has been severed. Inter and intra tribal relationships have been disrupted, creating new animosities and alliances. These are high costs to pay.

Trauma and PTSD are acute psychological states of disorientation and fear. Even more ubiquitous was nostalgia for the past. The IDPs from FATA lament the passing of the traditional *Jirga*; the Swatis mourn the era of the Vali. In both cases, direct contact with the organizations of the central state came in the form of violence in which the vast majority of these people were victims, not participants. The Federal government, the KPK government, bureaucrats, police and the military must think long and hard about the basic juridical status of FATA.

The overwhelming majority of the tribal elders and *Jirga* members and notables we interviewed wanted to return regroup in their areas and then make a collective decide whether they wanted an independent province, merger with KPK or merger with Afghanistan. The former political agents who we interviewed believed that this was the best, if not the only strategy that holds any promise of peace.

While individual therapy is out of the question, not simply by virtue of the fact that

the Pushtun do not have a confessional culture, but also because of a dearth of practitioners, nation-wide, there are solutions. One is to replace rumor and chatter with regularly deployed and accurate information by the authorities. The second is to create regular groups where even a single facilitator could lay out a realistic set of social goals that would make the importance of marketable skills crystal clear. No pen, no pencil, no notepad. Just a facilitator and source of information. Such information, disseminated in a regular, responsible manner would create trust among the IDPs and the authorities. But more importantly, it would create the opportunity for them to collectively think about the future and take them out of their solitary disorientation. There is no reason why security personnel could not attend these meetings as participants and tell their stories--afterall, they have also lost much.

Cure, As Pierre Charcot and others tell us, is always collective. We tell a story, but to make that story believable to ourselves, others must believe us. The rebuilding of community will be difficult, because the geographical organization of the camps reinforces both *parda* and tribal divisions. This can gradually be changed. Whether the inhabitants of what is called FATA decide to become an autonomous province, or merge with KPK, these are projects worth pursuing.

***Economic Calculation and Strategies Among Resettled IDPs (SWAT) and Current IDPS (Peshawar and Bannu), Pakistan***

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<b>Name</b>	<b>Place of the Interview</b>	<b>Title of the Interviewee</b>	<b>Date</b>
Two Ladies+famiiliy from Bajaur Agency	Jalozai Camp		7-Jul-15
yasmeena	Jalozai Camp		7-Jul-15
Sher Kadir (wazir tribe NW Agency)		Journalist wafa Department of Psychology University of Peshawar	7/8/15
Erum Irshad Sher Kadir (Cont'd) with Mother and Daughter		Journalist wafa Relief and rehab for Shaheed	8-Jul-15
Ikram Ullah Zakir Shah and Qaisar Khan		FDMA/UNHCR Former Political Agent NW Agency	9-Jul-15 9-Jul-15
Ikram Ullah		Former Political Agent NW Agency	9-Jul-15
Zaheer Ul Islam Dr. Abbas Dr. Mufti		Psychologist Psychologist NW Agency Jirga	9-Jul-15 11-Jul-15 11-Jul-15
Jan Faraz wazir Focus Group of NW Agency IDPs		Member NW Agency Jirga	11-Jul-15
Jan Faraz wazir (Cont'd) Saeed Khan Wazir Sobedan Shah Wazir	Jalozai Camp	Member DIG Mardan	13-Jul-15
Abdul Latif Afridi (Khyber Agency) Focus Group: Kanat Khan, Yar afzal, Shuja Khan	Jalozai Camp	Pres. Pakistan Bar Council IDPs from Khyber Agency	
Jawad Ishaq		Pres. Chamber of Commerce Peshawar Former Political Agent NW Agency	
Zaheer Ul Islam	Pearl Continental Peshawar	Pres. Pakistan Workers Federation Chief of Grand Jirga NW Agency	
Razam Khan		Pakistan Federation of Labor (Umbrella)	
Malik Khan Marjan (Dawar tribe)			
Sher Alam (Focus group)			15-Jul-15

Name of the interviewee	Organization	Date	Time	Place
Iftekharrirdous	Express Tribune Editor	5-Jul-15	9:00 PM	Peshawar
Khalid Aziz	Former PA North Waziristan Agency	6-Jul-15	11:17 AM	Peshawar
Shah Nasir	Housing Scheme FATA Program manager	6-Jul-15	4:00 PM	Peshawar
Saifullah and Nasir Dawar	Journalists	6-Jul-15	9:30 PM	Peshawar
Ayaz Khattak	Security Incharge Jalozai Camp	7-Jul-15	11:20 AM	Jalozai
Raina Shah	Field Officer PDMA	7-Jul-15	12:25 PM	Jalozai
IDPs group	Refugees of Jalozai camp	7-Jul-15	12:50 PM	Jalozai
Aziz Rehman	Al-Khidmat Foundation Member	9-Jul-15	3:25 PM	Private camp Bannu
Noor ali Jan	Refugee at Al-Khidmat Camp	9-Jul-15	3:55 PM	Private camp Bannu
Dr. Hameed Ur Rehman	Agency Surgeon North Waziristan	9-Jul-15	9:30 PM	Bannu
Ahmad Dawar	Refugee Hosting Community Bannu	10-Jul-15	11:25 AM	Bannu
Mohibullah	Refugee Hosting Community Bannu	10-Jul-15	12:30 PM	Bannu
Umar Daraz Wazir	Journalist	10-Jul-15	10:40 PM	Bannu
Imad Khan	Bannu Bazar Local Shopkeeper	11-Jul-15	12:38 PM	Bannu
Usman Dawar	IDP having a shop in Bannu Bazar	11-Jul-15	1:00 PM	Bannu
Muhammad Nasir	Bannu Bazar Local Shopkeeper	11-Jul-15	1:30 PM	Bannu
Zer Abad Khan	IDP in Bannu Bazar	11-Jul-15	9:40 PM	Bannu
Yousaf	Bannu Bazar Local Shopkeeper	11-Jul-15	10:00 PM	Bannu
Arif Dawar	Refugee in Baka Khel Camp	13-Jul-15	9:00 AM	Bannu
Fareedullah	Refugee in Baka Khel Camp	13-Jul-15	9:23 AM	Bannu
Ghaus Mureed	X-ray technician Baka Khel Camp	13-Jul-15	9:40 AM	Bannu
IDP students in WITE college	College in Baka Khel camp	13-Jul-15	10:00 AM	Bannu
Dr. Naseem Khan	Doctor in Baka Khel Camp	13-Jul-15	10:55 AM	Bannu
Major Tauseef	Camp Incharge Baka Khel	13-Jul-15	11:10 AM	Bannu
Asghar	Refugees Shopkeeper in Jalozai camp	14-Jul-15	9:00 AM	Jalozai
Khadim	Refugees Shopkeeper in Jalozai camp	14-Jul-15	9:15 AM	Jalozai
Zarghoon Shah	Refugees Shopkeeper in Jalozai camp	14-Jul-15	9:25 AM	Jalozai
Buzarg Jameel	Refugees Shopkeeper in Jalozai camp	14-Jul-15	9:40 AM	Jalozai
Izzat Ullah	Refugees Shopkeeper in Jalozai camp	14-Jul-15	10:00 AM	Jalozai
Rasheed	Refugees Shopkeeper in Jalozai camp	14-Jul-15	10:15 AM	Jalozai
Qabool Khan	Refugees Shopkeeper in Jalozai camp	14-Jul-15	10:30 AM	Jalozai
Aziz Ullah	Refugees Shopkeeper in Jalozai camp	14-Jul-15	10:45 AM	Jalozai
Malik Khaan Marjan	Malak	15-Jul-15	2:10 PM	Peshawar
Sher Alam	President General Workers Assosiation	15-Jul-15	4:00 PM	Peshawar
Zahid Khan	President Hotels Association	27-Jul-15	11:25 AM	Swat
Abdur Rehmaan	Traders Federation	27-Jul-15	2:20 PM	Swat
Fazal Hameed	Building Labor President	27-Jul-15	5:35 PM	Swat
Suhrab Khan	Ex Nazim	28-Jul-15	12:35 PM	Swat
Khwaja Abdul Bari	Silk Factory Owner	28-Jul-15	8:10 PM	Swat
Muhammad Aziz	District Officer Agriculture	29-Jul-15	10:20 AM	Swat
Ahmed Shah	Spokesman Swat Qoumi Jirga	29-Jul-15	4:40 PM	Swat
Noor Muhammad	Chairman Chamber of Commerce	30-Jul-15	10:35 AM	Swat
Muhammad Rafeeq	Silk and Commerce Industry	30-Jul-15	6:10 PM	Swat
Shamshir Ali	Coordinator Khpal Koor Foundation	31-Jul-15	10:20 AM	Swat
Muhammad Rafeeq	elected Rep of Labor colony	31-Jul-15	4:00 PM	Swat
Ahmed Khan	President Silk Industry	31-Jul-15	6:00 PM	Swat
Khpal Kor Focus Group	Khpal Kor Foundation	1-Aug-15	10:40 AM	Swat
Rehmat Ali Khan	President Vegetables and Fruits Association	1-Aug-15	3:00 PM	Swat
Gul e Khandana	School Teacher	2-Aug-15	10:27 AM	Swat
Muhammad Alam	Advocate	2-Aug-15	1:00 PM	Swat
Salam Pur	Cottage Industry	3-Aug-15	10:00 AM	Swat
Mati U Rehman	Labor at cottage Industry	3-Aug-15	11:00 AM	Swat
Muhammad Shareef	Labor at cottage Industry	3-Aug-15	11:25 AM	Swat
Haji	President Mines Association	3-Aug-15	3:30 PM	Swat
Eng Zahid Khan	Regional Head SRSP	4-Aug-15	10:35 AM	Swat

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