A legitimacy chain approach to security sector reform: Working for citizens and states

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About the commission

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Introduction

Security sector reform (SSR) has become a prominent policy instrument to prevent states from collapsing, relapsing into civil war, and in securing the lives and livelihoods of a state’s citizens. Hence, the effectiveness of the security sector is typically measured in two ways. First, by the ability of the security forces to operate to maintain order and peace, and second, by how effectively the security sector is managed, monitored, and held accountable by the body of citizens.¹

Successful SSR requires high levels of legitimacy across the entire security sector. Most research on SSR focuses on a military for external defence and police for maintaining domestic order, yet in reality the security sector is made up of a chain. These links include the military, intelligence services, police, judges, and prisons – all of which need to work in tandem in order for the system to function and maintain itself.

One way to think about how these different actors within the security sector relate to each other is to consider them as part of a “legitimacy chain” in which the links work together to ensure that the security sector protects a state’s borders from external threats, prevents state collapse and relapse into civil war, and secures the lives and, by enforcement of property rights, the livelihoods of its citizens. If the police are effective at stopping criminal activity, for example, but the judicial system is corrupt, incompetent, or understaffed, then citizens and those attempting to support the system will lose faith in that system and security is lost. And, if the army fails in its duties, the police then become more vulnerable to attack, or because the courts are corrupt, police efforts come to naught. This logic highlights a high degree of interdependence among the core components or links in the security system chain. A critical question is how to uncover the different ways in which each of the many links can be made sufficiently legitimate in the eyes of domestic and at times interstate audiences, such that the security sector can in fact reform, and just as critically, maintain itself indefinitely.

When one canvasses the security sector, it is possible to identify three ideal types. The first type consists of a unified security sector that serves the broad population. The second type comprises an ethnically or territorially fragmented

security sector in which two or more groups maintain their own security forces, each protecting different constituencies. The third type consists of a personalistic, loyalty- or patronage-based security sector, in which an executive or warlord retains a military force whose loyalty is to the leader, and any security provided to that leader’s family and extended network depends on that leader’s varying calculations of which individuals or constituencies merit “his” (it is almost invariably a male) security provision.

In reviewing the literature and evidence on the varieties of security sectors, in a unified security sector both a resumption of civil war and state collapse appear rare. These systems also do relatively well in terms of securing the livelihoods of citizens (i.e. they create a secure space in which market transactions can occur and long-term investments become rational). Such security sectors emphasise:

1. The welfare of citizens (bottom up) rather than the tenure of the governing regime (top down).
2. The representation and empowerment of citizens over protection.
3. The movement beyond narrower security ideas (freedom from fear) to wider issues of well-being (freedom from want).

In these settings, citizens are seen as partners not clients.

States with fragmented security sectors are also relatively unlikely to experience state collapse and relapse to civil war, but only if rival forces anticipate that taking up arms again would be very costly. Yet, because rival parties in fragmented security sectors often seek to preserve the option of resuming war, they are more likely to prioritise the build-up of a strong fighting force over the reform the entire security sector (one thinks of both Afghanistan and Iraq here). This means that the focus of such sectors tends to be on the military and physical aspects of security rather than encompassing a broader sense of human security and citizen interests.

States with loyalty-based security sectors seem to be relatively unstable. Even when there is peace, challengers who seek to take control of the state and the rewards that go with that control are likely to arise and pursue a higher price for their loyalty. This often involves taking up arms as a way to bargain for a better deal. The corruption endemic to such loyalty-based security sectors means that this type of security sector fares relatively poorly in terms of ensuring human security.

In the two decades since release of the UN development report of 1994 there has been a steady increase in both concern and debate for “human” security. The concept of “human” security rather than traditional “national security” or even simply “security” has emerged from broad recognition that along with war and more physical threats to human existence, poverty and other assaults on individual and collective human dignity below the level of the state as a form of political association have been, and continue to be, major causes of conflict. Human security is often thought of as comprising a multidimensional sense of security that includes: 1) economic security (e.g. freedom from poverty); 2) food security (e.g. access to food); 3) health security (e.g. access to health care and protection from diseases); 4) environmental security (e.g. protection from such dangers as environmental pollution and depletion); 5) personal security (e.g. physical safety from such things as torture, war, criminal attacks, domestic violence, drug use, suicide, and even traffic accidents); 6) community security (e.g. survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups as well as the physical security of these groups); and 7) political security (e.g. enjoyment of civil and political rights, and freedom from political oppression). See Paris R, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 87–102. Quote found on p. 91.
security and advancing any broader interests of the citizenry, and may also lead to state collapse (particularly through coups) and a relapse into civil war. A chief difficulty is endemic uncertainty: periodic violence and shifting loyalties make it irrational to invest in long-term projects, which means that economic development sufficient to support a broader population becomes impossible, and citizens who wish to be protected by the patronage network become dependent on cheaply accessible natural resources (e.g. gold, diamonds, petroleum) or high-return cash crops such as opium poppies or coca.

In the remainder of this memo, these three ideal type SSR variations are further examined by looking at a sample of SSR efforts since the end of the Cold War. After highlighting these variations, the subsequent section addresses how SSR should ideally be managed as holistically as possible, because of the high degree of interconnectedness of key security institutions: links in the legitimacy chain. Indeed, it follows that success in SSR demands a minimum threshold of legitimacy be acquired and maintained by each link in the chain.
Three ideal types of security sectors

Developing ideal types of the security sector is important as they can provide insight into how regimes might try to improve the effectiveness of their security to enhance state stability and prevent state collapse. Moreover, although the onus of the task falls onto domestic constituencies, external actors do have tools to incentivise actors to reform their security sectors. One need only consider British efforts in Sierra Leone and American efforts in Liberia. These ideal types can be understood as strategies used by regimes to accomplish their goals, but there is variation in whether these goals relate to building an effective fighting force and/or securing the livelihoods of the entire population. Each of these ideal types can be linked to cases in which an attempt at SSR took place since the end of Cold War, which makes it possible to examine what has been attempted, what has worked, and what has failed.

The integrated, unified security sector

The first ideal type is the integrated, unified security sector. Unlike adversaries in interstate wars, civil warring parties are located in a single country and unless the state is partitioned—a possible, but unlikely outcome—the opposing parties will have to live together within those borders once conflict ends. Parts of the armed forces can maintain a presence in their respective areas of control, but creating a unified military through integration is also a possibility.

In a recent article, political scientists Ronald Krebs and Roy Licklider define military integration as the inclusion of the formerly warring parties—of which there are often more than two—and/or the populations they represent in the state’s new national military. Creating a unified security sector essentially harkens back to Max Weber’s argument that the state should have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a bounded territory. Although military integration is fairly common, it is not a default policy. Political scientist Caroline Hartzell estimates that only 40% of the peace agreements that ended the 128 civil wars from 1945 to 2006 called for some form of integration of the military.

forces of the adversaries.  

A considerable portion of the quantitative literature on SSR has focused on efforts to reform opposing military forces in post-civil war states into a unified army. Political scientists Katherine Glassmyer and Nicholas Sambanis, for example, argue that rebels are often reluctant to demobilise, because once they lay down their weapons they not only lose crucial bargaining power, but the government can renege on the promises made during peace negotiations.

Integration of rebels into a consolidated government army affords rebels with greater certainty that the government is sincerely committed to peace, because it makes reneging on the peace agreement more costly to the government. However, Glassmyer and Sambanis find that integration does not have a significant impact on preventing civil war recurrence, though they find that this is often because of the poor implementation of military integration provisions (which may signal a lack of intention to honour bargaining commitments) not the provisions themselves.  

Looking at 15 cases of civil war recurrence, political scientist Charles Call finds that peace is more sustainable if relevant elites are included in the national army and the police force.

According to Call, the inclusion of former rivals in the post-war security sector is crucial because the concentration of control in the security sector by one side would make this control illegitimate, ultimately undermining the prospects for durable peace and thereby raising the spectre of a recurrence of civil war and state collapse.  

Most of the work on security sector reform has been focused on security sector provisions as mediated through peace agreements, yet most civil wars end by military victory rather than just through the conclusion of negotiated settlements. To investigate whether there is a difference in settlement types in maintaining the peace, political scientist Monica Toft employs a statistical analysis on civil war termination through settlements and victories. She finds that all else equal, victory decreases the likelihood of war recurrence, whereas negotiated settlements increase it. Toft explains that the reason victories are less likely than peace agreements to lead to civil war recurrence is that the defeated party would risk outright destruction if it were to take up arms again.  

Translating this insight to civil wars that have ended through the conclusion of an agreement, Toft shows that peace agreements that credibly guarantee great harm to potential defectors are most likely to succeed in maintaining the peace. Hence,

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8 Whether this “peace” is a just peace is a separate, and of course critical question. But given the difficulty of judging justice objectively, the physical destructiveness of civil war in general, the now common problem of refugees, and the chance a renewed war might spread, many observers historically weigh peace more heavily than justice.
security sector reform plays a crucial role in achieving long-term peace, since it would make defection costly for spoilers of the peace agreement. In addition, the bulk of the quantitative work on the effect of military integration on the durability of peace codes military integration as a dummy variable. Yet, there is a great deal of variation when it comes to military integration. Recognising this variation, Krebs and Licklider construct a three-dimensional framework to understand the nature of military integration provisions and the implementation of these provisions. Their first dimension pertains to the magnitude of the military integration. This dimension reflects whether the composition of the army is heavily skewed toward one set of combatants or whether the composition is more balanced. The extent of the horizontal integration of units forms their second dimension. A state can have a single military, but this military could be made up of several different units that are constituted on the basis of the former warring parties. If this is not the case – meaning that units consist of a mix of former fighters from all of the warring parties – one can speak of a high level of horizontal integration. However, a high level of horizontal integration does not necessarily mean that the leadership of the military is shared. To measure this aspect of military integration, Krebs and Licklider recognise that a vertical integration of the officer corps is an important third dimension of military integration. The composition of the security sector in post-genocide Rwanda is a key example for how the vertical integration of the officer corps operates. While Rwanda’s national army consists of both Hutu and Tutsi soldiers, the officer corps consists almost entirely of Tutsi officers. This has made it possible for the Rwandan government to claim that the Rwandan security sector is unified and fully integrated, while, in reality, the Tutsi officers retain exclusive decision-making power within the security sector.

A perfectly integrated, unified security sector scores high on each of the three dimensions identified by Krebs and Licklider, yet it is rare. Drawing on 11 case studies, they show that neither deep nor shallow military integration tend to change the former opposing parties’ preferences over whether to resume armed fighting. Moreover, Krebs and Licklider also find that it is relatively easy for former rivals to extricate themselves from military integration processes should they wish to take up arms again. Rather, they find that military integration may be a consequence rather than a cause of peace: in other words, when the underlying conditions for peace exist, military integration succeeds, and when they do not, integration fails.

9 Toft, M, Securing the peace: The durable settlement of civil wars, (Princeton University Press, 2009)
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
It is important to point out that military integration is only one aspect of SSR, one link in the legitimacy chain. Indeed, for SSR to succeed it should improve relations of the state with the population as a whole. A telling example is the SSR effort following the civil war in Sierra Leone (1991–2002). With the conclusion of a peace agreement, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was deployed in 1999. Once the security situation was largely stabilised in 2001, policymakers within Sierra Leone, with strong external support from the UK, turned their attention to various SSR-related tasks such as strengthening the Ministry of Defence, building the capacity of the police forces, and developing a new national security policy. By the end of the civil war, a broad political consensus had emerged between the government and the general population that significant SSR had to take place. This new national security policy was shaped by consultations with the local populations conducted by the Office of National Security (ONS). The ONS was established to provide the government information on security matters outside of the capital. Accordingly, the ONS had links throughout the entire country. The ONS used its emergent information network to manage a consultation process, in which locals from several regions reported their most pressing security concerns.

Importantly, the high degree of ownership over the SSR process in Sierra Leone meant that the government policy prioritised human security over traditional security-related goals. For instance, building the capacity of the police was prioritised over that of the military forces. The subsequent successful SSR process in Sierra Leone shows that citizens have to believe that the state is working for them, not as a predator, and that all citizens are to be treated in the same way.

These same dynamics followed the civil war in El Salvador (1980–1992). Although the war had been over distributional issues (mostly land), the overarching craving for reform of the security sector affected the content of the Chapultepec Accords; the share devoted to security overwhelmed that devoted to all other issues combined, and the level of detail regarding security provisions was also striking. It also explains why, when inconsistencies, cheating, and bitter-enders threatened to derail the plan, skilful intervention by UN mediators was able to persuade both sides to continue the process toward non-violent conflict resolution. El Salvador’s transition from conflict to peace is considered to be “among the most successful implementations of a peace agreement in the post-Cold War period.” After the Accords were signed, the ceasefire held, the

17 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, African Perspectives on Security Sector Reform (New York: United Nations, 2010). Similar dynamics followed the war in El Salvador but were more self-directed. Similar dynamics followed the war in El Salvador but were more self-directed.
opposition disarmed and officially joined El Salvador’s political system forming the nation’s second-largest political party, and the elections held in 1994 were, at the time, the sole example of free and fair elections in a post-war environment.  

While we know that a feeling among the population that the state is working for them is the ideal, in order for an integrated security sector to form and function, there does seem to be something about the need for a feeling of unity, comity, and the like. It is extremely challenging for policymakers to develop this feeling of unity. Indeed, while the government and armed opposition forces are combined to form a single military in many post-war countries, these security sectors are commonly only unified on paper and key provisions are dropped during the implementation of those words on paper. The next section turns our attention to these more fragmented security sectors.

The ethnic or territorially fragmented security sector

Following a civil war, former conflict parties may try to create a unified army, but they may also seek to maintain their own forces to control specific parts of a state’s territory, resulting in a fragmented security sector. The Ivory Coast after the conclusion of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, signed on 4 March 2007, is one such example. The Ouagadougou Political Agreement stipulates the integration of the Ivory Coast’s two rival forces, the government forces and the Forces Nouvelles, into a joint operational structure. However, this joint operational structure was specified to be under the command of two parallel chiefs of staff.

Consequently, the rival forces operating in the Ivory Coast were ‘unified’ only on paper. The reality was that the forces served under separate, non-integrated chains of command. To put it in the framework of Krebs and Licklider, there was neither horizontal integration of the armed forces nor vertical integration of the officer corps. More to the point, each territorially bounded civilian constituency was likely to consider only its own armed forces legitimate, therefore creating, again in the context of Weber’s definition of the state, two separate de facto pseudo states.

A fragmented security sector might be more stable than one would initially expect. Consider two situations identified by Toft in which the permanent termination of a civil war is relatively likely. A first situation is a situation in which there is a guarantee of long-term, neutral, and skilful cooperation aimed at SSR. This situation relates to the ideal type of an integrated, unified security sector outlined above. The second situation identified by Toft is a situation in which the

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surviving combatants remain relatively balanced in their capacity to deal and sustain harm.\(^{23}\) This situation relates to what can be described as an ethnic or territorial fragmented security sector, given that the rival parties remain strong enough to inflict significant harm on one another.

Indeed, there is some evidence that speaks in favour of a fragmented security sector as opposed to a unified security sector when it comes to stability.\(^{24}\) In an analysis that focuses on what explains ceasefire durability, political scientist Page Fortna finds that ceasefire agreements that specify demilitarised zones and the separation of forces are significantly more likely to hold.\(^{25}\) This would suggest that, at least on the short term, an integrated, unified security sector may not always be preferable.

By contrast, Hartzell shows that peace is more likely to be prolonged if the conflict parties share military power when the war has ended.\(^{26}\) Shifting the focus to the implementation of military power-sharing provisions, Matthew Hoddie and Hartzell also find that the implementation of military power-sharing provisions has a particularly strong impact on the durability of peace.\(^{27}\)

While a fragmented security sector does not necessarily lead to a resumption of armed fighting, improving relations with the broader population and protecting its interests proves more challenging. Consider, for example, SSR in post-conflict Sudan during the implementation period of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The CPA stipulated that both the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A in the South could maintain their own forces, which legitimised a territorially fragmented security sector.\(^{28}\) Moreover, Paragraph 7(a) of Chapter VI of the CPA specified that “No armed group allied to either party shall be allowed to operate outside the two forces.” In other words, the peace agreement ensured that no other armed party could challenge the Government of Sudan or the SPLM/A in their respective areas of control under their distinct and separate armed forces.

The fragmented security sector in Sudan between 2005 and 2011 essentially maintained the status quo as it had been at the end of the civil war, except for the armed fighting itself. Yet, the return to a full-blown civil war remained a real possibility. Many within South Sudan were afraid that the North would not accept the outcome of the January 2011 referendum. As such, there was a


\(^{24}\) A notable exception is a study by Walter, in which she finds that quotas in which the composition of the new military force is specified, are not significantly more likely to make negotiated settlements more stable. See Walter, B, Committing to peace: The successful settlement of civil wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 63-86.


\(^{28}\) The CPA is available at: http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/Sud%202005050109.pdf.
massive build-up of the armed forces on both sides, but particularly on the South Sudanese side. In 2004, the SPLM/A had around 30,000 fighters, but by 2012, with the recruitment of additional soldiers and integration of militias and rival armed groups, this figure had grown nearly eight-fold, to 230,000. Although this significant increase served as an effective way to signal that non-compliance with the outcome of the referendum on independence would be costly for Khartoum, civilian control over the security sector was completely absent. In addition and significantly, the considerable resources spent on building up the army meant less funding for improving the daily lives of the general population in South Sudan, with some estimating that upwards of 60% of the budget was spent on the military, while much of the population faced (and still faces) starvation.

Moreover, effective reform of the police forces is also challenging in fragmented security sectors. For example, international efforts to restructure the police in Bosnia and Herzegovina were ineffective because of the delicate ethno-political power-sharing model in place in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the war that ended with the Dayton Peace Agreement concluded on 14 December 1995. Transforming a highly fragmented police system into a de-politicised single structure turned out to be virtually impossible, and is likely to continue into the foreseeable future.

The personalistic, loyalty-based security sector

A third type of security sector is the personalistic, loyalty-based security sector, in which the executive retains a military force and this force is premised on patronage and personal loyalty networks. According to political scientist William Reno, one of the leading scholars on patronage politics in Africa, patronage networks provide the “social context in which armed group leaders arise and influence how they obtain and use resources.” Patronage influences who leaders recruit to assume positions of power within the state or within the armed opposition. A classic example of a leader exerting control through patronage is Mobutu Sese Seko, who ruled Zaire from 1965 to 1997. Mobutu heavily

privileged his tribe in order to stay in power.

Leaders of states that try to maintain security through patronage not only buy the loyalty of military and police forces, but also of militias that operate outside of the formal structures of the state. Of the 332 pro-government militias between 1981 and 2007 identified by Carey et al., 117 or 35% are connected to the government through an individual state official, as opposed to connected through a state or military institution, political party, or a subnational government.35

If there is stability in a loyalty-based security sector, it is likely due to the inability of the opposition to form a viable armed threat to the incumbent leader or warlord. Political scientist Jesse Driscoll explains how patronage politics is at the heart of post-conflict stability in Tajikistan.36 Examining how the civil war in Tajikistan ended, Driscoll shows how the government side used the promise of future financial rewards to lure warlords into the state. A critical point of departure of this study is that while many civil wars end in a military victory by the incumbent regime, this rarely involves a comprehensive battlefield defeat. Instead, insurgent field commanders are often selectively co-opted within the state.

To test this argument, Driscoll created a dataset of 97 field commanders with biographical information on each of these commanders, including information such as the number of the fighters they command. Of these 97 field commanders, 57 joined the state between 1992 and 1997. A closer look at why these field commanders aligned with the state suggests that regardless of their individual characteristics, they were granted amnesty and allowed to make large sums of money. A survival analysis based on these data suggests that former warlords who had ties to the KGB or the former ‘deep state’ were relatively likely to keep their jobs. Yet Driscoll finds that in general warlords were likely to be pushed out of their jobs. By December 2006, only 16 out of the 57 field commanders that had joined the state between 1992 and 1997 remained. Former warlords were pushed out of their jobs at a rate of about three per year. As Driscoll puts it, “Most field commanders found that the arrangement which initially convinced them to join the state was void within a decade.”37 What is more, in most of the cases in which former warlords lost their jobs, this occurred in the context of pitting different warlord factions against one another. This suggests that in addition to co-opting, the regime led by President Emomali Rahmon also engaged in a divide-and-rule strategy to maintain a state monopoly on the use of legitimate violence within the state.

In a study that indirectly addresses dynamics related to patronage politics, political scientist Milli Lake shows that efforts to build post-conflict institutions aimed at establishing a rule of law are often undermined because of transactional politics. Lake draws on several data sources, including both NGO reports and media-based datasets like ACLED and the UCDP GED, to identify 329 conflict incidents in North Kivu and South Kivu between 2005 and 2012. With the help

37 Ibid
of legal experts from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lake finds that 79 of these 329 cases constituted a basis for a case file. Focusing on these 79 cases, Lake further finds that only 36 of these cases were in fact a case file. What is more, only eight of these 36 case files led to a trial. A qualitative assessment of the factors that explain why certain cases progress towards a trial suggests that elites often obstruct accountability efforts against adversaries when doing so can be exchanged for political, military, or economic payoffs from rival factions. In other words, Lake shows how the threat of possible prosecution is used as a bargaining strategy to acquire and retain power in these types of systems.  

Although the studies by Driscoll and Lake highlight that states with a loyalty-based security sector can be stable, they also show that this stability is contingent on an incumbent leader’s ability to obtain and retain loyalty through the use of a mix of bribes and threats.

Social scientist Alex de Waal has studied these sorts of political dynamics, in which power is first and foremost about access to resources while at the same time resources are needed to sustain power and the various client networks that underpin those power positions. Therefore leaders of differing parties will try maximise their budget so as to maximise their chances of survival. According to de Waal: “By threatening or staging a rent-seeking rebellion, a commander, chief or local administrator attracts attention, advertises his intent and determination, and strikes up a round of bargaining. [...] The rebellion is settled through a payroll peace: its leader is given a promotion and his fighters are put on the army payroll: arrears are paid, pay rises awarded, and more soldiers – real ones and ghosts – are salaried.”

South Sudan is exemplary here. According to de Waal, “[South Sudanese President Salva] Kiir’s principal method for controlling southern Sudan was patronage not military power.” Telling in this regard is that at independence in January 2011, the SPLM/A had 745 officers of a general rank, a figure that is 40 more than the four US armed services combined and second only in the world to Russia. By generously handing out the general rank, Kiir had essentially bought loyalty. Kiir and his followers also generated a budget to maintain the patronage system by enlisting ghost soldiers into the national army. The higher the salary of the soldiers within the South Sudanese army, the more funds could be generated through these ghost soldiers. It is therefore probably not a coincidence that, right after independence, the Legislative Assembly of South Sudan voted to double the pay of private soldiers to $150 per month, which is more than twice that of soldiers in the Sudanese Armed Forces. This salary was further raised to $220 in 2011. In 2006, more than 80 percent of military spending was allocated to military salaries and the military budget was overspent by 363 percent. These

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42 It may be the case that ‘rank patronage’ is emerging as a solid social science indicator of SSR failure. See also Mashal, M, “Being an Afghan general is nice work if you can get it. And many do.” The New York Times, 12 December 2016, p. A9.
figures were typical for the subsequent years. The South Sudan case thus also illustrates that loyalty-based security sectors are by their very nature not likely to be well-managed, monitored or held accountable. Furthermore, they also mean that critical resources flow to a narrow segment of society rather than to the well-being of the broader population. This has serious consequences for SSR as out-of-work young people who are not part of the patronage network are forced either to leave to seek work, or become susceptible to employment in terrorist or illicit economic activity.

Crucially, the mismanagement of the oil sector (notably the 2012 shutdown of production) and the decline in oil prices meant that the South Sudanese government under Kiir was no longer able to pay for the loyalty of its followers, resulting in civil war. The outbreak of the civil war in South Sudan shows the instability of a regime that bases its power on patronage rather than military capacity. However, patronage and military capacity is not a black or white question. Leaders at the top of a patronage system commonly take great care to protect themselves, but this protection often comes from some kind of Praetorian Guard rather than the regular army.

In South Sudan one such elite guard is the Du Kot Beny: a militia from Kiir’s home area and tribal community which is fiercely loyal to Kiir and his inner circle. The Du Kot Beny were fashioned into an efficient unit in the years following the conclusion of the CPA. The structure, recruitment, and equipment of such guards units is a tell: the most important post-conflict consideration for leaders is their own tenure, regardless of the sacrifices that tenure demands of citizens more broadly.

A similar type of elite guard loyal to the executive can be found in Chad. Chad’s national army is all-inclusive in terms of ethnicity and regional origins, but it is also a fairly ineffectual army. By contrast, the Chadian Presidential Guard, which includes some 5,000 well-trained and well-equipped soldiers, are drawn from a small societal circle. This Chadian elite fighting force has prevented several coup attempts of the executive and has successfully defended the capital from rebel attacks several times.

The effectiveness of the Chadian elite force in preventing coup attempts illustrates the findings of a study by De Bruin. This quantitative study suggests that regimes that create additional security forces to counterbalance possible armed opposition, in fact, have a higher chance to experience a coup attempt. In other words, political turmoil is more likely in states with a security sector in which certain elements are not subject to civilian oversight. However, crucially, De Bruin also finds that coup attempts are less likely to succeed if a counterbalancing strategy is in place. Paradoxically then, in spite of the higher likelihood of coup attempts, the net risk of being ousted through a coup is less if a counterbalance force is in place.50 The next section addresses the prospects for holistic (and sustainable) SSR in each of the three security sector ideal types.

The legitimacy chain

The seminal 2005 OECD-DAC report on SSR concludes that “One of the clearest lessons of the past is that when problems in the security system are approached in a piecemeal fashion, without reference to broad goals and underlying structural problems, security-system governance is generally not improved significantly.”\(^{51}\) Sarah Detzner, in her review of contemporary SSR in Africa, concludes that SSR efforts “should be as holistic as possible, as reforming one portion of a highly-interconnected set of institutions (for example, police but not prisons) is unsustainable at best.”\(^{52}\) The best way to grasp the need for holistic security sector reform is to think of it as a “legitimacy chain” in which without a minimum threshold of link legitimacy, the security sector is not going to be able to function to secure the lives (and by extension, livelihoods) of a state’s citizens. This section shows that in an integrated, unified security sector, legitimacy chains are most likely to be established, and to become self-sustaining.

At the heart of the successful SSR effort in Sierra Leone lies a policy that focused on both restructuring the army and the many alternative security providers. Security providers were seen as a system of actors that needed to be fully legitimated in order to be integrated and effective. Indeed, the first draft of the National Security Policy stressed that national security was part of wider aspects of government activity, economics, and civil society.\(^{53}\) Accordingly, policy-makers within Sierra Leone started to emphasise building the capacity of the police forces from 2001 onwards.\(^{54}\) Thus, a relatively well-functioning police force, seen as legitimate by most citizens of Sierra Leone, subsequently helped

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to deliver security to the citizens of post-conflict Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{55}

In addition, the intelligence services were part of the SSR process in Sierra Leone. Post-conflict regimes often try to prevent any reform of intelligence services, as a lack of oversight over the intelligence services allows the government side to continue its repressive and corrupt activities.\textsuperscript{56} Ashington-Pickett explains how one of the priorities of the SSR was to de-politicise the intelligence services through the systematic removal of party politics from the Office of National Security. The overall goal of this reform was to create an intelligence service that would “primarily support the rule of law and protect the constitution, not individuals, parties or tribal groupings.”\textsuperscript{57} The reform of the intelligence service in Sierra Leone was by and large successful, resulting in a high degree of civilian oversight and civil society involvement.\textsuperscript{58} With its legitimacy enhanced, its effectiveness rose, again enhancing its legitimacy, and creating a self-sustaining positive spiral.

In addition to the reform of the police and the intelligence services, SSR in Sierra Leone focused on the reform of the armed forces, the ministry of defence, the judicial apparatus, and the prison system. In other words, SSR in Sierra Leone was truly holistic, not simply in conception (i.e. on paper), but policymakers undertook considerable personal risks to implement an integrated and comprehensive SSR. In the end these efforts succeeded: SSR in Sierra Leone contributed to a well-functioning integrated, unified security sector, which, in turn was effective at securing the lives Sierra Leone’s citizens. Hence, the successful SSR in Sierra Leone suggests that it is crucial that all relevant actors—each link in the legitimacy chain—within the security sector are supported and included in SSR processes.

Compared to integrated, unified security sectors, the legitimacy chain is relatively unlikely to be secured across security sectors which are divided by territory and attached identities. By definition, in ethnic or territorially fragmented security sectors, the armed opposition continues to maintain a fighting force.

\textsuperscript{55} Chanaa, J, Security Sector Reform: Issues, challenges and prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 4–5. Note that the critical importance of competent law enforcement personnel supported by a legitimate judicial system was noted by Sir Robert Thompson as a key component of counterinsurgency during the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960. Thompson argued that because by its very nature, law enforcement criminalises violent actors, it simultaneously increases its own legitimacy and drains legitimacy from active or potential insurgents. Thompson was the first to argue that the real fight in a guerrilla war was not about insurgents or even ideology, but about legitimacy. If the incumbent government could maintain or reacquire legitimacy, it held the advantage almost regardless of the correlation of armed forces. The application of this insight to the SSR legitimacy chain should be clear. See Thompson, R, Defeating communist insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966).


in parallel to the government force. In essence, maintaining an armed force preserves a fall-back option of returning to violence.\(^59\) One way incumbent regimes try to preserve an effective fall-back option, while pretending to engage in SSR, is to maintain or develop an effective intelligence service and an elite force. For instance, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A paid lip service to SSR by agreeing in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 that they would support joint units, but they also maintained their own separate armed forces. Crucially, however, the peace agreement stipulated that the National Security Service had to dismantle its operational arm: “The National Security Service shall be professional and its mandate shall be advisory and focused on information gathering and analysis.”\(^60\) Yet, this provision of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was never implemented. Instead, the National Assembly adopted a bill which preserved the existing structure of the National Security Service. In fact, the National Security Service even gained command of a paramilitary force.\(^61\)

Furthermore, since the former warring parties want to maintain an armed force as a fall-back option in states with a fragmented security sector, the military is often prioritised over police and other security institutions. Often limited financial resources are disproportionately used to strengthen the army, rather than to reform the security sector as a whole (e.g. by investing in an independent judiciary and well resourced police forces).\(^62\) In addition, similar to the armed forces, whatever police forces do exist are usually fragmented. This undermines the legitimacy of the police force in areas where both rival forces are based. A telling example in this regard is post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, where rival police forces often became caught up in local conflicts.\(^63\)

However, it should be noted that in fragmented security sectors in which the rival forces are geographically separated (i.e. few to no isolated patchwork enclaves), former rebel parties most often manage to maintain order. As political scientist Rocklyn Williams points out rebel fighters often fulfil police functions in rebel controlled areas and have contributed positively to the physical security of

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59 In an important theoretical article following immediately upon the heels of the collapse of the Cold War order, political scientist Barry Posen argued that in these situations, minority groups existed in a kind of security dilemma, in which none of the groups (including an incumbent government) could increase its own security without decreasing the security of neighbours, even in cases where ethnic actors did not actually wish to resume hostilities. Posen argued that because groups cannot sufficiently know the other side’s intentions, and because recent violence makes worst-case assumptions about other actors seem most reasonable, the result is a mistrust spiral which tends to lead to mutual over-arming, and makes a resumption of civil war both more likely and, should fighting resume, more destructive. See Posen, B, “The security dilemma and ethnic conflict,” Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 27–47.

60 The CPA is available at: http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/fullpeace/Sud%2020050109.pdf.


their communities. One need only consider the Kurdish peshmerga in northern Iraq which turned out to be the only force capable of providing resistance to the 2014 ISIS/L onslaught.

The legitimacy chain is unlikely to be secured in loyalty-based security sectors for at least five reasons. First, a disproportionate part of any financial resources available to provide security are spent on buying and maintaining loyalty rather than on transforming the security sector into something that can protect the livelihoods of a state’s citizens. Second, there is little civilian oversight in loyalty-based security sectors. Paying bribes is easier when there is no accountability. Third, the judicial system in loyalty-based security sectors is often also corrupt, as legal impunity is exchanged for loyalty. Fourth, the police are too often partial in loyalty-based security sectors. For instance, community police in South Sudan are known to take sides of loyalists in cattle disputes. Similarly, in 2011 and 2012 Mali experienced a “police war” which has been blamed on widespread frustration over a corrupt police force. Fifth, and most importantly, leaders within patronage-based systems almost always maintain a separate fighting force that is purposively kept outside of any reforms. Intelligence services and elite guard units in loyalty-based security sectors are usually excluded from SSR efforts because these units permit the government side to continue its repressive and corrupt activities. This is not surprising, as the evidence suggests that elite forces are an effective instrument to thwart coup attempts. The implications are clear: in patronage-based security sectors, the chief objective is tenure maximisation for leader. Indeed, elite guards were left out SSR efforts in Chad, the DRC, and the Central African Republic.

to elite troops, governments in states with a loyalty-based security sector often sponsor armed militias.\textsuperscript{73} Carey et al. identify 332 pro-government militias between 1981 and 2007.\textsuperscript{74} Detzner notes how “governments often resist the inclusion of these non-state actors in SSR efforts, because to do so would be to forfeit a valuable, semi-deniable tool.”\textsuperscript{75}

In short, when assessing post-Cold War SSR efforts, effective SSR proved rare or when implemented, ephemeral. A plausible explanation for this common inability to secure the entire ‘legitimacy chain’ is that post-conflict, most security sectors are either fragmented or loyalty-based.

In conclusion, there are many different security institutions and types of security systems and some work better than others. An integrated security sector seems to make a resumption to civil war rare and it also seems to do relatively well in terms of securing the livelihoods of citizens (these two factors are clearly related). Nominal states with fragmented security sectors are also relatively unlikely to experience a relapse to war, particularly if the rival forces anticipate that taking up fighting again would be too costly. Yet, because rival parties in a fragmented security sector want to preserve the fall-back option of resuming war, they are more likely to build up a strong fighting force than to reform the entire security sector. Some links in the chain will remain too weak to support either effective or lasting reform. This means that the focus rests on military security rather than a broader human security. States with loyalty-based security sectors are relatively unstable. Even when there is peace, challengers are likely to seek control of the state and the rewards that go with it or, alternatively, challengers want a higher price for their loyalty and take up arms to bargain for a higher price. Moreover, the corruption epidemic in loyalty-based security sectors means that this type of security sector does relatively poorly in terms of ensuring human security as resources are diverted to building up those forces and securing their loyalty.

When looking at different cases of security sector reform initiatives, one can observe a number of idiosyncratic features across cases. However, it is clear that security provisions in general most likely function for a citizen body if the regime reforms the entire security sector: all the links in the chain including the military, the police, a supporting impartial judiciary (including an effective prison system), and a truly national intelligence service, all staffed by individuals who have primary loyalty and accountability to the population more broadly – in other words, truly public servants.\(^76\) Legitimacy can be generated in different ways, but post-conflict regimes enjoy higher levels of legitimacy when citizens believe that the government is working for them, not as a predator; and that all citizens are treated in the same way. For this reason, regimes often enjoy high levels of legitimacy when the security sector transforms into an integrated, unified security sector. Ethiopia and Sierra Leone are telling examples in this regard. However,

integrated security sectors are rare in post-conflict states. The key question is this: if structure largely determines outcomes, what tools might domestic actors and well-meaning third parties have to identify and enable a comprehensive approach to SSR. How do we move from fragmented and loyalty-based security sectors to integrated ones?

The SSR in Sierra Leone suggest that it is crucial for the effectiveness of SSR that the security sector is secured and made effective along the entire legitimacy chain. Planning for this has to be undertaken in advance, and appropriate resources and oversight devoted to a holistic approach.

SSR efforts should not only focus on the military, but also on government sponsored militias, the police, the judicial apparatus, the prison system, and the intelligence services. Only by doing so can the system become self-sustaining: a critical concern in an era where even limited and well-intended foreign assistance is sooner or later going to be viewed as illegitimate by the societies and governments they are attempting to help.

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