Rwanda: Responding to the US threat to remove AGOA preferences

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In brief

- The second-hand clothing ban in the East African Community (EAC) is a policy aimed at spurring the development of the local EAC apparel industry. However, the US government has threatened to remove trade preferences that are provided to EAC countries if they do not reverse the tariff increases on second-hand clothing imports.
- Kenya decided to unilaterally revert to the pre-2016 tariffs which poses a challenge for the collective EAC position.
- This brief evaluates the options available to Rwanda and the potential impacts of reverting to pre-2016 tariffs and not rescinding the ban on second-hand clothing.
- The researchers conclude that Rwanda has little to gain but much potentially to lose by proceeding with their increased tariffs and eventual second-hand clothing import ban due to the strong incentives for apparel firms to relocate to Kenya.
- The researchers recommend that Rwanda and other EAC countries follow the lead of Kenya in dealing with the US as this would allow time for member countries to agree a medium-term strategy for developing the apparel industry while maintaining preferential access to US markets.

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Background to the current situation

Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania agreed on a joint Common External Tariff (CET) in 2005 in an important step towards the integration of the markets of the East African Community (EAC). Rwanda (and Burundi) joined the CET of the EAC in 2009. Typically, a common external tariff is part of a customs union, which allows for the free flow of goods between countries without restriction, and a further step towards full integration in a common market that allows for the free movement of labour and other services between countries.

Africa has been a beacon of cooperation in the recent geo-political landscape. While populist parties and leaders have led to the US’ withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and the UK’s announced withdrawal from the European Union, African countries have chosen to continue on the path towards the greater integration of the African market. This has been clear with negotiations of deeper integration within regional trade areas, including the EAC, as well as with the negotiation of the Tripartite Free Trade Area, and initial discussions on the Continental Free Trade Area.

Within the EAC, the countries have jointly negotiated the tariff levels for all goods entering the EAC region from outside of the region. The result has involved classification of all goods entering the EAC region into one of three tariff bands (0%, 10%, or 25%), or classification as Sensitive Items (SI), which are allowed to have much higher tariff rates. The application of these tariff levels has been uniformly consistent. In cases where countries have wished to be exempt, for a period, from the CET tariff levels, the EAC country has applied for, and received, special permission from the EAC Council of Ministers, before applying a tariff rate that differs from that of the CET.

One of the goods on the Sensitive Items (SI) list is second-hand clothing, discarded mainly from high-income countries. Recently, it was decided jointly by the EAC countries to ban second-hand clothing imports, beginning in 2019. This joint action was consistent with the, by necessity, joint nature of trade policymaking by the member countries of the EAC.

This progress towards co-operation within the EAC took a step backwards in May, 2017 when Kenya, under threat of losing preferential access to the US market through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), unilaterally chose to revert to the tariff prevailing in 2015-16. This decision by Kenya has placed Rwanda as well as Uganda and Tanzania in a difficult situation, and the purpose of this paper is to put forward considerations that might shape the government’s response in light of this situation.
EAC context: Collective decision-making

When one member country of a regional trade agreement unilaterally changes import tariffs (or bans) on goods coming into the country without the full consideration of the EAC Council of Ministers, it undermines collective decision-making in the EAC. Rwanda and the other members might legitimately raise Kenya’s unilateral policy toward the second-hand import ban at subsequent meetings of the Council of Ministers, and discuss ways to promote more effective collective positions towards external trading partners in the future.

Evaluating the credibility of the threat

Aside from the intra-EAC international political considerations mentioned above, Uganda and Rwanda need to determine how to respond to the current situation. The first step is to consider whether or not the US threat of removal of AGOA preferences is credible. Clearly, Kenya believes that the threat is credible. Otherwise, it would not have decided to reduce its tariffs.

To evaluate the credibility of the US threat, historical context on two dimensions is in order. First, what has led the US in the past to remove AGOA preferences? The following is a complete list of the instances in which African countries have been removed from the list of countries eligible for AGOA trade preferences (see page 4).

In short, in all of the cases above where AGOA access has been removed by the US, the reason has been explicitly or implicitly related to lack of democracy and/or lack of human rights. In no case to date has the US removed AGOA access over a country’s trade policy. Indeed, there appears to be a double standard in how AGOA eligibility is applied. The SACU countries (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) require import licenses for second hand clothing, which are available only on humanitarian grounds. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) region thus imposes a near complete ban on the importation of second hand clothing, but this has never been considered reason for removing AGOA eligibility. What is even more surprising is that this is not a large US industry at stake—the US exports of second-hand clothing to the entire East African Community was less than $30 million, which is a truly trivial number in the US context. The threat is, therefore, highly unusual.

Still, despite this overall context, the current US administration under President Donald Trump is less predictable than previous administrations. For this reason alone, the threat should be seen as credible. Rwanda should expect that the US will block AGOA access should the tariff increases remain in place. President Trump has made it clear that he is not interested in making explicit effort to advance the interests of other nations, including developing nations. President Trump has also made clear that he would like to be perceived as protecting “America’s interests”, even if those interests are a relatively tiny fraction of the US economy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>AGOA removal period</th>
<th>Explicit or likely reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>Jan. 1, 2011 – present</td>
<td>Insufficient progress in the area of human rights¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Jan 1, 2005 – Oct, 2011</td>
<td>Failure of a peace agreement, and the failure to hold elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>December 23, 2009 – October 2011</td>
<td>Military coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>December 23, 2009 – October, 2011</td>
<td>Coup d’état²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>December 20, 2012 – present</td>
<td>Military coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>January 1, 2015 – present</td>
<td>Problems with “protection of internationally recognised worker rights”³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>January 1, 2015 – present</td>
<td>Human rights abuses and political instability⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>January 1, 2015 – present</td>
<td>Human rights abuses and political instability ⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2015 -</td>
<td>Human rights abuses and political instability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Potential responses and likely outcomes

Therefore, the current choice facing Rwanda (as well as Uganda and Tanzania) is relatively clear. If they continue with the second-hand clothing ban, then they will lose AGOA access. If they do not reverse the tariff increases, they will lose AGOA access for this industry. Reversing the tariff increases is essentially a status quo option.

Whether Rwanda and Uganda make the same decision regarding the second-hand clothing tariff is not of material consequence for the outcome. If Rwanda and Uganda both rescind the tariff increase and announce they do not plan a ban, they will join Kenya in this reversal. Although Tanzania’s final position is uncertain, it is understood it is likely to offer a tariff of 35% which is reverting to a key element of the pre-2016 tariffs (albeit not the 0.25c/kg amount) and this may be enough for the US administration. In either case, what matters, as will be clear below, is that at least one country in the EAC, Kenya will have rescinded the ban.

Let us first analyse the option of reducing the tariffs, since the core analysis of it is simpler.

Case 1: Rwanda reduces their tariffs to pre-2016 levels

This outcome comes closest to retaining the status quo for Rwanda. In this case, Rwanda maintains AGOA access to the US market. The overall importance of that is illustrated in Box 1. This shows that through duty-free market access, AGOA has facilitated considerable and growing exports for Rwanda in a variety of emerging markets (both garments and other). It also shows that AGOA is contributing to an increasing share of exports to the US, amounting to $24 million in 2016.

However, second-hand clothing continues to be imported. The domestic apparel sector is not accorded the assumed special protection that it would receive with the banning of second-hand clothing imports. If one of the other EAC countries (e.g. Tanzania) continues with the higher-tariffs on second-hand clothing, there may be concern that second-hand clothing would in future be smuggled from Rwanda/Uganda to Tanzania, but that would be of greater concern for Tanzania. At the same time, Tanzania could not fault Rwanda or other EAC members for reversing their policies, since this policy shift was clearly instigated by Kenya.
Box 1: The importance of AGOA for Rwanda’s trade

The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) provides duty-free market access to the US for qualifying sub-Saharan African beneficiary countries across a wide range of products.

In 2016, AGOA eligible-items accounted for 9% of total imports into the US from Rwanda (around $24 million). For this, 2% are related to apparel and 7% relates to other AGOA designated items (see Figure 1). These constitute large shares of exports and relate to emerging export products for Rwanda.

Figure 1: US imports from Rwanda – 2016 shares AGOA eligible versus rest

In terms of trends, while Figure 2 shows an overall decline in imports from Rwanda into the US, Figure 3 shows that the imports from Rwanda into the US specifically associated with AGOA designated products have actually increased over the same period.

Figure 2: US imports from Rwanda - AGOA designated versus rest (2009-2016)

Figure 3: USA imports from Rwanda - AGOA designated only (2009-2016)
**Case 2: Rwanda does not rescind the second-hand clothing ban**

In principle, if all of the EAC countries were jointly implementing a tariff increase and eventual ban, the trade-off would be between maintaining AGOA access on the one hand and the protection of the apparel sector on the other hand. However, with Kenya’s decision to revert to pre-2016 tariff levels, the aforementioned trade-off has now vanished. The first part of the trade-off holds: Rwanda will lose AGOA access. Unfortunately, the second part of the trade-off does not apply, as this action cannot be expected to benefit the domestic apparel industry.

The reason is as follows. Under the Case 2 scenario, firms that choose to locate in Kenya will continue to be able to service the US market through AGOA preferences. These Kenyan-based firms will also be able to service the EAC market through Kenya’s membership in the EAC. As a result, there is very little incentive for new firms to set up in Rwanda (or Uganda for that matter), and there may well be sufficient incentive for firms to leave Rwanda for Kenya to take advantage of the continued AGOA access in Kenya. With the AGOA access “tilting the playing field” in Kenya’s favour, it would be a challenge to avoid smuggling of second-hand clothes coming into Rwanda (and Uganda) from Kenya. Indeed, the recent increase in Rwanda’s tariffs has already strongly increased the incidence of smuggled goods, with a discovery of 80 tonnes smuggled into the country between March and May 2017 alone. Hence, any potential protection offered by the second-hand clothing ban to the Rwandan apparel industry is strongly undermined by Kenya’s decision to rescind the ban.

Therefore, in the Case 2 scenario, we cannot expect the growth and development of the Rwandan apparel industry. It might happen, but it is quite unlikely. However, what is virtually certain is the consequence of the removal of AGOA preferences. Current and future AGOA exports in all sectors where they currently occur would be lost. AGOA has had a considerable impact on exports from Africa (Frazer and Van Biesebroeck, 2010). Rwanda (and Uganda) would very likely lose their current exports, as in most cases the AGOA preferences have been central to the African export expansion.

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Box 2: The overall importance of AGOA (US) versus the East African Community

Figure 4 provide some indication for how much more important AGOA (and duty-free exports to the US) is to Rwanda, versus the potential of the second-hand clothing ban (possible increased exports to the East African Community). It does so by applying a method for identifying export opportunities to Rwanda (Cameron and Viviers, 2017). This shows that for textiles, the major five markets are the US, followed by Germany, France, the UK, Italy, and the United Arab Emirates.

The only EAC market in the top 20 is Kenya, though its potential is nine times as small as the US market. The overall potential for Tanzania, Uganda, and Burundi is too small to appear.

**Figure 4: Top 20 export opportunities in textiles for Rwanda.**

![Chart showing top 20 export opportunities in textiles for Rwanda.](source: Cameron and Viviers, 2017)

Not only will existing exports into the US under AGOA be at risk, but also potential additional (to date untapped by Rwanda) exports to the US. Based on the Cameron and Viviers (2017) study, Rwanda has the opportunity to tap into new (or further existing) potential import demand in the US market for over 210 different product types, valued at $9 billion.

Within this set of products roughly 54% of the ‘untapped’ potential is associated with product lines qualifying under AGOA (see Figure 5), valued at around $4.2 billion.

This indicates that there are a significant number of products for which Rwanda can aim to increase exports to the US under AGOA – which would be at risk in the event of Rwanda losing its overall AGOA status.

**Figure 5: Rwanda’s ‘untapped’ potential from US (AGOA versus Rest) – 2016**

![Chart showing Rwanda’s ‘untapped’ potential from US (AGOA versus Rest) – 2016.](source: Cameron & Viviers, 2017)
While the second-hand clothing ban aims to develop the domestic apparel sector, and while there is some evidence that such a ban might have been effective in this goal during the period 1981-2000 (Frazer, 2008), this logic does not apply when Kenya is allowed to service that same market while maintaining AGOA preferences. Moreover, the final goal of development is not to serve the domestic market, but to serve the export market. Each of the newly industrialised countries that have risen up the rungs of the manufacturing ladder in the process of their development (Korea, Taiwan, China) have achieved this through apparel exports, not solely through apparel production for the domestic market. Therefore, exports are definitely the long-term goal, even if this goal might be facilitated by temporary protection of the domestic apparel sector for the purpose of birthing a domestic industry. However, even if that logic of domestic production were to apply in this case (and Kenya’s decision ensures that it does not apply), it does not make sense to cut Rwanda (or Uganda) off from the massive potential of the US export market, when the long-term goal is, in fact, access to that market (and other industrialised country markets). Box 2 illustrates the extent to which Rwanda’s export opportunities are tailored to the US, which provides by far the biggest potential in terms of textiles. Similarly, Box 2 shows that the overall potential of exports to the US far exceed any type of opportunities within the EAC (both with and without Kenya).

Conclusions

Under the circumstances, it seems the best policy option for Rwanda and other EAC countries would be to follow the lead of Kenya in its dealings with the US, and agree to revert back to the pre-2016 tariff levels agreed between the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) and Kenya. This would allow time for the EAC members to discuss fully a medium-term strategy to developing the industry while maintaining preferential access to the US apparel market. Such a discussion could be based on careful analytical underpinnings that would weigh any consequences -- for job creation, investments, and exports -- of protecting the domestic apparel market compared with losses of preferential access to the US market.

References

