

Working paper

The facets of political inequality

Evidence from
consultative
processes in
Kampala

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Three Facets of Political Inequality: Evidence from Consultative Processes in Kampala*

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Abstract

Political inequality can take the form of gaps in citizens' voice (**input** inequality), in the degree of responsiveness of political systems (**throughput** inequality), and in the ways political decisions favor different groups of citizens differently (**output** inequality). We seek to disentangle these dimensions of political inequality in the context of a set of citizen consultative meetings organized as part of a process to construct a 'Citizens Charter' in Kampala. Two thirds of 2,312 potential participants were invited to attend 188 small-scale consultative meetings, half of which were randomly assigned to be led by local government officers or by nongovernmental third parties. Using data on pre-meeting preferences of citizens and meeting leaders, attendance and interventions data during meetings, and collective decisions for each discussion topic covered during the meeting, we find clear evidence of input inequality, notably along gender lines, some evidence of throughput inequality, including suggestive evidence that bureaucrats are more responsive to men and to Luganda speakers, but weak evidence on output inequality. The results highlight the independence of three easily conflated dimensions and highlight the scope for ensuring equitable outputs despite inequalities in inputs.

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1 Introduction

A large body of research examines levels and causes of economic inequality but *political* inequality is much less well understood. We contribute to this area by applying a framework for assessing dimensions of political inequality to the study of a citizens consultative process in Kampala. In particular we seek to measure and compare *input* inequality—inequalities in the extent to which citizens engage in a political process, *throughput* inequality—inequalities in the extent to which political processes respond to individual preferences, and *output* inequalities—inequalities in whose preferences get represented in final outcomes.

Though these three dimensions are clearly interrelated (expectations of responsiveness might determine input decisions, for instance; output inequalities might result from inequalities in responsiveness) they are analytically distinct. We seek here to distinguish between them. Our analysis contributes both to evaluating the quality of inputs to the particular process we examine and to the conceptualization and measurement of political inequality more broadly.

We explore these questions through a study of a set of consultative meetings for citizens organized to gather input on the development of a Client Service Charter for the local public administration in Kampala, Uganda. Working in this context allows us to triangulate measurement and capture the preferences and behaviors of citizens and political elites both before and after the meetings themselves. In this setting we explore the links between inputs to a political process, the dynamics of the process itself, and the degree of skew of the decisions produced by this process.

Our setting is Kampala, Uganda, where a Citizens’ Charter is planned by the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA). Such a Charter (Doern 1993; Drewry 2005) makes public a set of commitments by the bureaucracy to citizens related to minimal parameters of service delivery. When moving from ideal type to practical document, though, a variety of choices must be made: the palette of services covered, who constitutes a “client” for the bureaucracy, how monitoring of standards should be done, whether punitive measures are to be specified for falling short of standards, and so on. To inform these choices, we worked with KCCA to organize a set of citizen meetings to discuss arguments in favor and against different options. The discussion leaders (facilitators) for these meetings are either KCCA employees (with the rank of ward administrator) or trained staff supplied by our implementation partner. The choice of topics where there might plausibly be diverging interests between different categories of citizens, as well as between citizens and bureaucrats, is what allows us to capture disparities in responsiveness.¹

Our summary findings are that there are stark, measurable, input inequalities, with, for instance, men and Luganda speakers engaging at significantly higher rates than women, or participants who are non-native speakers of Luganda. There is somewhat weaker evidence of throughput inequality. There is clear evidence that the views of discussion leaders have a strong influence on the outputs of discussions, though the city authority is largely even-

¹On the citizen side one such topic is whether more services should be provided online, or whether more investment should be made in face-to-face facilities. We expect that citizens with different levels of education would have opposing preferences in this case, as educational achievement is correlated with ease of navigating the Internet and retrieving a needed document from an official website. On the citizen–bureaucrat side, we expect a difference in preferences on issues like the inclusion of specific timelines of service delivery, or on the range of information that needs to be made public about Charter progress.

handed in whose preferences get heard. Lastly, and most optimistically, we also find there is little evidence of output inequality, at least in terms of the representation of views.

In the next section we provide a simple theoretical framework to help clarify the different dimensions of inequality, we then describe our context and measurement strategies in Section 3. Core results are given in Section 4; our discussion and policy implications are given in the Section 5.

2 Theory

2.1 Dimensions of political inequality

Although there has been considerable progress developing measures for economic inequality, there is little agreement on how to measure political inequality. The measurement problem likely results in part from the lack of conceptual clarity around what is meant by “political inequality”.

A simple conceptualization of political inequality focuses on variation in who can influence the outcomes of political decisions. This notion is at the heart of Dahl’s classic *Who Governs?* but is also central to game theoretic notions of power—as embodied for instance in the Shapley or Banzhaf indices. A longstanding criticism of this focus on power highlights inequalities in engagement in politics: who takes part, who is excluded? Understanding inequality in potential impact may not be of much value if individuals do not take part in decision-making in the first place. Deeper criticism points to inequalities in the ways that political systems benefit different types of people, possibly without them having to take action at all.

Rather than being thought of as rival notions of political inequality these ideas are often thought of as facets of political inequality and they can be usefully mapped onto three related concepts of *input* inequality, *throughput* inequality, and *output* inequality. These three are distinct, though evidently they can interact in possibly complex ways, generating considerable measurement challenges.²

For intuition, consider a simple model in which the welfare of an individual w_i is a linear function of their action a_i : $w_i = k_i + \pi_i a_i$. Across individuals we may observe variation in a_i , the extent to which individuals seek to alter outcomes, as well as variation in π_i , the extent to which efforts affect outputs.³ Last, we may see variation in welfare, w_i . Though simple, this structure highlights important ways in which these dimensions of inequality are and are not related. First, input and throughput inequality can produce output inequality but the effect of inputs and throughputs on output depends on the level of the other—for example, inequality in throughput might not induce inequality in outputs if there are no inputs. Second, input and throughput inequality do not *determine* output inequalities as variation in w_i can be driven primarily by variation in k_i .

In political interactions these dimensions diverge more strongly since one actor’s actions may

²There is no sense that these exhaust the possible dimensions of interest. For instance though currently concentrated in advanced industrial democracies, there is an emerging focus on perceptions of political inequality: understanding why citizens perceive themselves to be marginalized politically, and what the consequences of this are (Bowler et al. 2017; Eatwell and Goodwin 2018; Krause and Wagner 2019).

³Throughout the manuscript we use “outcomes” and “outputs” interchangeably.

exert positive or negative externalities on another. In some cases a given individual can benefit from the increased effectiveness of *another* individual, which can generate complex relations between dimensions of inequality.

To illustrate, imagine a simple world with two players, i and j . There is a status quo policy $x \in R^1$ and players have ideals x_i^* and x_j^* . Each can take an action a_i^* and a_j^* and these actions jointly determine a new status quo policy, $x' = x + \pi_i a_i + \pi_j a_j$. Here the π terms capture the influence of a given action over the outcome. Welfare is given by:

$$w_i = -(x_i^* - (x + \pi_i a_i + \pi_j a_j))^2 - a_i^2$$

In this set up we can consider inequality in inputs (a), throughput inequality (π), and inequality in outputs (w). All of these will depend on “structural conditions”, in this model captured by the location of the status quo.

In this model the best response of player i is:

$$a_i = \frac{\pi_i(x_i^* - x) - \pi_i\pi_j a_j}{1 + \pi_i^2}$$

Note that i 's engagement depends here on expectations of j 's engagement as well as beliefs about j 's effectiveness.

In equilibrium we have:

$$a_i^* = \frac{\pi_i}{1 + \pi_i^2 + \pi_j^2} \left((x_i^* - x) + (x_i^* - x_j^*)\pi_j^2 \right)$$

Inequality inputs depend, then, on a number of terms. The first term in parentheses captures direct efforts to bring policy into line with one's own preferences. The second captures a strategic component arising from policy disagreement where i 's actions depend on how different i and j s preferences are as well as j 's power. The appearance of π_j^2 in the denominator captures pure freeriding effects. If i and j agree on policy, then each puts in less effort the more power the *other* has.

The policy outcome is then:

$$x' = \frac{1}{1 + \pi_i^2 + \pi_j^2} x + \frac{\pi_i^2}{1 + \pi_i^2 + \pi_j^2} x_i^* + \frac{\pi_j^2}{1 + \pi_i^2 + \pi_j^2} x_j^*$$

where x' is a weighted average of the status quo and the ideals of i and j .

Welfare is then:

$$w_i = -(1 + \pi_i^2) \left(\frac{(x_i^* - x) + (x_i^* - x_j^*)\pi_j^2}{1 + \pi_i^2 + \pi_j^2} \right)^2$$

In this world, an increase in throughput inequality can sometimes increase overall welfare and reduce output inequality.

Figure 5 in the Appendix section illustrates how input and output inequalities can vary as a function of changes in throughput inequalities, with changes mappings depending on the extent to which underlying interests are more or less aligned relative to the status quo.

2.2 Consultative processes and assessment of inequalities

In recent years, there has been a rise in the use of deliberative and other consultative processes at the community level. Over only a 10-year period, the World Bank has allocated approximately USD 85 billion to projects related to local participatory development (Mansuri and Rao 2013, 15). Such processes are expected to result in greater effectiveness of better-designed development aid projects (Casey 2018; Humphreys, Sanchez de la Sierra, and Van der Windt 2019; Waddington et al. 2019; White, Menon, and Waddington 2018). Multiple transmission mechanisms operate to generate this increased effectiveness. Communities have better information about preferences and aid priorities on the ground when compared to a central bureaucracy or to an outside donor. A process that involves the wider community can generate perceptions of fairness and legitimacy in the final outcome of the consultation (Olken 2010). Finally, the incorporation of a wider set of voices in the community consultation can result in priorities that are skewed toward the needs and preferences of the most vulnerable members of the community (Olken 2010).

In practice, these processes do not always lead to their expected benefits (White, Menon, and Waddington 2018). One reason for this is the potential for such efforts to succumb to elite capture (Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov 2017; Lund and Saito-Jensen 2013; Mansuri and Rao 2004; Sheely 2015). This phenomenon may be due to the ability of political elites to sway, or even disregard, the aggregate preferences of the citizens being consulted. In more extreme cases, though, it can also involve shaping the composition of the group of citizens being consulted in a manner that alters the final outcome of the consultation (see Sheely 2015, 252–53). A second reason is the possibility that participatory processes simply reinforce natural patterns of unequal engagement based on socio-economic status, rather than overcome them (e.g., Karpowitz, Mendelberg, and Shaker 2012; Parthasarathy, Rao, and Palaniswamy 2019). In such consultative arenas participation requires considerable resources of community information, cultural capital, social network connections, political efficacy, education, or eloquence. In the absence of some of these, specific subgroups in the community are less willing to express their preferences, which could ultimately result in incongruence between preferences and consultation outputs.⁴ A final reason is the distortionary effects that discrimination on the part of consultation facilitators could exert (e.g., Parthasarathy, Rao, and Palaniswamy 2019). Though evidence here comes primarily from bureaucratic audits, it nevertheless speaks to the potential of local bureaucrats and politicians to engage in preferential treatment and discrimination (Butler and Crabtree 2017; Hemker and Rink 2017; Giulietti, Tonin, and Vlassopoulos 2019; McClendon 2016; White, Nathan, and Faller 2015). Personal experience with such disparities in treatment, or belief in the fact that discrimination is at play, could lead to citizens opting to reduce the frequency of their engagement with the institution.

⁴The extent to which this is a problem is a function of the distribution of preferences across groups with varying levels of participation.

In the current project, we frame these issues that potentially plague consultative processes as manifestations of *political inequality*, either within subgroups of citizens, or between citizens and elites. The first challenge we set ourselves to is: *How can we best measure the degree of political inequality between citizens? What is the relative degree of political power between citizens and political elites?*

Although there is broad concern about the problem of political inequality, there are currently no shared or validated approaches to measuring it. One important dimension of the phenomenon is the differential responsiveness of bureaucrats to citizens with varying socio-demographic backgrounds (Einstein and Glick 2017). Another dimension is the differential “voice” that citizens exhibit when choosing whether and how strongly to make demands of their political institutions (Kasara and Suryanarayan 2015; Parthasarathy, Rao, and Palaniswamy 2019). Understanding how great such disparities in “voice” or responsiveness are, and what institutional factors moderate their magnitude is important for understanding sources of democratic discontent (Bratton 2009). However, there are no best practices for measuring such gaps.⁵ We cannot offer here measurement techniques or instruments with cross-situational validity. What we provide, however, is an example where the power of random assignment, and the degree of control that field experiments afford a researcher, can help in isolating these three dimensions, and reveal a way in which these questions can be tackled.

Experimentally structured consultative fora (Humphreys, Masters, and Sandbu 2006; Karpowitz, Mendelberg, and Shaker 2012) allow close examination of participant and discussion facilitator patterns of attendance at meetings, as well as good measurement of pre- and post- attitudes, along with behavioral measures during the meetings themselves. In this way, we hope to build on past efforts by connecting subjective perceptions of responsiveness to actual indicators of political and bureaucratic responsiveness. We hope to further the research agenda by connecting measures of influence to broader structures of inequality, and by simultaneously gathering traditional and innovative survey measures.

3 Design

3.1 Context: KCCA and the *Citizen’s Charter*

Our study examines community consultations regarding the establishment of a Citizens’ Charter in Kampala, Uganda. The executive authority that manages service delivery in the city, the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA), has been considering finding ways of improving service delivery and citizens’ perception of its activities. Created in 2010 to replace the Kampala City Council (KCC), KCCA is responsible for managing the capital city and has power to collect fees and taxes from commercial activities taking place in the city. Whereas the KCC was a popularly-elected institution, KCCA is an appointed institution. Its Execu-

⁵One example of this challenge is the measurement of Sustainable Development Goal 16, and specifically target indicator 16.7 (“responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision-making”). For an indicator of political responsiveness, that aims to assess to what extent political actors and institutions act on the wishes of citizens, the measurement strategy is based on people’s subjective assessment of whether they are able to influence decisions in their local area. This process is potentially fraught with measurement error and biases, as well as not necessarily indicative of the actual degree of responsiveness people would receive *were they to attempt to make a demand of an institution*.

tive Director is appointed by the President based on the recommendation of a national Public Service Commission, and is accountable to a Minister for Kampala Capital City and, finally, to Parliament.

Though KCC was replaced, some of its component elements continued to survive in the KCCA—most important of all, the position of Lord Mayor of Kampala. The Lord Mayor is popularly elected and is the political head of the Authority, complementing the Executive Director, who is the head of the technocratic branch.⁶ Both are accountable to the Minister for Kampala Capital City, yet not to each other. This bicephalous arrangement places the organization in a challenging position: needing to provide services to a population that may not have full support for the technocratic branch of the organization.

One way to establish a process through which service delivery could be monitored and improved with the assistance of the population is a Citizen’s Charter (also known as a Service Charter). Such a document might hold a solution to the challenges experienced by KCCA by means of its public nature. It would outline parameters of service provision that KCCA commits to abiding by. These parameters can be set on a spectrum of varying precision: from diffuse promises of “reasonable” waiting times to precise specifications of, for example, days of waiting, documents needed, fees required, offices that are responsible for addressing complaints, and contact details of responsible officials. Though unenforceable through the court system, these provisions constitute a “toolkit” (Castellani 2017) for citizens to be able to monitor service delivery, and to act upon instances where provision is not up to standards.

The expectation is that such a set of provisions can alter incentives and resources, both on the *supply-side* of service provision (KCCA) and the *demand-side* (citizens/customers). By agreeing to a public monitoring of standards, the potential for a public failure is also brought into sharp relief, facilitated by the existence of clear yardsticks by which progress can be measured. At a deeper level, a Charter achieves a fragmentation of a hitherto monolithic institution by creating constituencies with diverging interests. The public image costs of service delivery failures are absorbed by the higher management, while the hassles of dealing with disgruntled customers are likely borne by middle management. Both these groups now have an incentive to exert pressure on lower-level public servants to improve services at the point of delivery. In the latter instance, the *demand-side*, a Charter improves the information available to citizens to assess service provision, which allows for an accountability link between politicians and voters (Besley and Burgess 2002; Gottlieb 2016; but, see Dunning et al. 2019). The existence of such a document could also increase the willingness of citizens to report malfeasance and incompetence, as it conveys the signal that the organization is open to input and scrutiny from citizens.

KCCA had intended to create such a Charter for some time, in line with a wave of Charters created at the national level in Uganda after 2010.⁷ In Spring 2018 KCCA approached the research team with a request to design the data collection process that could lead up to a Charter document. In light of the willingness of the institution to engage in the creation of the Charter, the research team agreed to design the process and manage the data collection

⁶A change in the KCCA law in 2019 has given the Lord Mayor expanded power over the budget of the technocratic branch.

⁷Prominent institutions which produced at least one Client Charter are the Administrator General, the Judicial Service Commission, the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, the Ministry of Water and the Environment, the National Forestry Authority, and the Ugandan Registration Bureau.

throughout.

3.2 Consultations

Though the data collection process is structured so as to generate useful information from citizens which could ultimately help our partners in KCCA during the Charter creation process, the rich information that is generated on the dynamics of interaction make it possible to study facets of political inequality and the extent to which consultative processes can cut through these inequalities.

We focus especially on a set of 188 *collective consultations* held with citizens around Kampala, studied in conjunction with rich baseline survey data. From the total of 288 villages (also called “LC1 units”) that were randomly sampled for participating in a baseline survey, two thirds were randomly selected to take part in consultations. Half of these ($T1_1$), held meetings in which the facilitator was non-governmental and trained to guide the discussions without interfering with her personal or political opinion. The other half ($T1_2$) were led by a KCCA facilitator. These can be thought of as the same treatment, and the difference in outcomes between the two treatment arms can be used to assess the impact of bureaucratic leaders on outcomes. The remaining one third of villages were considered a pure control (T_0).

In each LC1 we sampled 8 citizens for the baseline survey following a sample procedure explained below. In $T1_1$ and $T1_2$ villages we invited the citizens to the meetings. These meetings took place either in a central location of the village itself, or in a small hotel venue situated at a small distance from a few villages, so as to serve as a central location for meetings in all these villages. The citizens were called in advance of the meeting, and also reminded about the event on the same day. We provided the participants with money for transportation to the event and refreshments. At the consultative meetings citizens discussed basic parameters of the Charter in order to elicit their preferences for a design. In the meetings two enumerators recorded real-time interactions between participants, how much time each participant spoke and which type of interaction they engaged in: either voluntary or encouraged by the enumerator.

To assess the influence of citizens on this process, we exploit variation in which citizens are randomly invited to participate in consultations led by KCCA officials ($T1_2$) or by moderators from a neutral organization ($T1_1$). Assignments generate treatment and control groups for both participation, as well as for the types of consultation.

Table 1 describes our treatment design in more detail. Our project tries to answer a larger number of questions, referring both to the results of consultations, the effects of participating in these meetings, as well as how people use the information about the rights they have under the Charter. The current analysis, however, will only delve into the questions that can be answered based on T_1 , particularly related to patterns of participation in consultations, and how the preferences of the different actors in these interactions (citizens and discussion leaders) get reflected in the final outcomes of the meetings.

3.3 Sampling

In order to achieve a representative sample of citizens that interact with KCCA, we select respondents relying on two strategies:

Table 1: Factorial design

		N planned	N realized
T_0 : Control	Villages	96	97
	Individuals	768	773
$T1_1$: Neutral consultative forums	Villages	96	93
	Individuals	768	745
$T1_2$: KCCA-led consultative forums	Villages	96	95
	Individuals	768	761
TOTAL	Villages	288	285
	Individuals	2304	2312

Notes: ¹ T_0 contains 97 villages instead of the planned 96 due to one respondent accidentally sampled in village ID 904; this village should have been replaced entirely by our field team. ² In 8 villages, no meetings could be organized even after repeated mobilization attempts, due to an insufficient number of participants. In these instances we opted to combine 2 meetings into 1, which is why we have fewer realized meetings than initially planned.

- Geographical representative sample of residents in Kampala (N=2064);
- Sample of respondents from organizations that represent specific professional categories who conduct their business in Kampala, such as market vendors, motorcycle taxi drivers, or *matatu* taxi operators (N=240).

From our 288 units of randomization, we sampled 258 units from the villages comprising Kampala and 30 clusters from organizations that represent specific professional categories in the city.⁸ This approach allowed us to capture respondents who are residents in Kampala through the geographical sampling, and those who work in Kampala but might reside in neighboring areas to the capital city. Since KCCA works closely with businesses and professional organizations, this strategy also allowed us to capture the preferences of these groups and involve them in the creation of the accountability tool of the Citizen Charter.

In each unit we selected 8 respondents, for a total of 2,304 respondents.⁹ Both men and women who were over 18 years old, Ugandan citizens, and were able and willing to attend the meetings were eligible for participation in the study. Their availability for attending meetings was assessed through a direct question asked immediately before the baseline survey. Any individual who declared they would not be willing to attend consultative meetings was not included in the baseline¹⁰. We present a more detailed account of the sampling strategy in

⁸Based on the 2018 information from the Electoral Commission of Uganda, Kampala is comprised of 848 villages (also called LC1 administrative units). These are further grouped into 98 Parishes (LC3 administrative units), and further aggregated into 5 divisions (LC5 units: Central, Kawempe, Makindye, Nakawa, and Rubaga). Our sampling protocol is based on data from 2014, with slightly different total numbers: 855 villages, and 97 parishes.

⁹Due to occasional issues with replacements, the realized sample size is 2,312. These issues typically refer to total or partial replacement of sampling points in villages, which in turn resulted in occasional oversampling.

¹⁰Only 15 respondents (out of 10,363 replacements) refused to take part in the survey because they were not willing to participate in the meetings. Other 20 respondents refused to take part in the survey for various reasons, among them: being sick, not having time, or planning to move out of Kampala in the near future.

subsection 7.1 of the Appendix.

3.3.1 Geographical sample from villages

We followed a two-step randomization approach. In the first step we selected 258 villages out of 836 villages, obtained after removing 19 villages with no buildings in them from the original number of 855 villages.¹¹ From these units, we created 8 blocks defined by latitude, longitude, and the number of buildings in the village, using their median as threshold. From each block we randomly sampled in direct proportion to the size of the village:

- if they contained fewer than 30 buildings in them, they were assigned a selection probability of 0;
- if they contained more than 700 buildings in them, they were assigned a selection probability of 1;
- for sizes between 30 and 700, the selection probability varied directly proportional to the size.

In the second step, we randomly selected 8 survey respondents per village. In order to do so, we first selected a building structure. We randomly scattered approximately 988,000 points across all Kampala buildings.¹² From those, in each village, we sampled 8 points. We did this by slicing the village into 8 cells (based on latitude and longitude) so that each cell contains the same number of points. From each cell we sampled 1 point. In Figure 1, on the left we can see an example of the dispersion of the points in a particular village. The right-hand side panel shows an example of 8 buildings that could *potentially* have been sampled for the study in that village. This strategy awarded larger buildings a greater probability of selection, under the assumption that, on average, larger buildings contain more residents.

Once the residential unit was selected, the eligible members of the household were listed in a roster. We blocked by gender and randomly picked a member from the specified gender. Thus, we produced a sample of 4 men and 4 women in each village.

3.3.2 Sampling associations representing professional categories


In order to complete the sample with citizens that do not necessarily live in the city but are users of the services that KCCA offers, we randomly sampled members of associations that represent specific professional interest, like those of Boda-Boda (motorcycle taxi) drivers, of small business owners, or of sellers in markets. 30 such clusters were selected.

We collected a list of professionals' associations in Kampala, and asked for permission to access their membership roster for the purposes of sampling. From those associations who

¹¹The number of buildings in each village was assessed *after* removing all buildings with a surface area of less than 5 square meters, which would be indicative of a non-residential structure. The information used in this was generated city-wide in 2014 by means of LiDAR imagery. After closer examination, a further two parishes, Kyebando and Kawempe I were completely removed from our sampling frame, due to a large discrepancy between the number of buildings in our GIS data source and the number of households reported in the 2014 Census.

¹²The initial number of points scattered was 1,000,000, but the removal of the two problematic parishes and of extremely small buildings reduced this to approximately 988,000 points.

Figure 1: Sampling frame and final sample for one Kampala village



accepted¹³, we sampled 30 clusters of 8 respondents each (240 respondents in total) in direct proportion to the size of these groups in the Kampala population.¹⁴ In the end, Boda-Boda drivers accounted for 18 clusters (144 surveys), *matatu* operators for 6 (48 surveys), market sellers for 5 (40 surveys), and furniture makers for 1 cluster (8 surveys).

For those organizations for which we had personal and contact information (*matatu* operators and furniture makers), we randomly sampled the number of respondents from the list of members available. For market vendors we implemented a random walk in the markets in order to select the participants. For Boda-Boda drivers, we followed a two-step random sampling procedure. First, we randomly sampled villages from among the villages in Kampala that have at least 30 buildings in them. We then did a census of all Boda-Boda stages in the village, and in each stage we did a census of all affiliated Boda-Boda drivers. We used a programmed table of randomization to select 8 drivers in each village. In the case of market sellers and furniture makers we were able to block by gender, so as to select 4 men and 4 women in each cluster. Due to the almost exclusively male composition of the workforce involved in motorcycle taxi or *matatu* transportation, we were not able to block by gender for these professions.

3.4 Data

In order to capture the multifaceted nature of a concept like *political inequality*, we endeavored to collect both attitudinal and behavioral information from participants to our

¹³Of the organizations we contacted, an association representing women entrepreneurs in the city and the Rotary Club did not accept to participate.

¹⁴In the absence of reliable information about certain professions from the 2018 Uganda Statistical Abstract, or from the 2016/2017 Manpower Survey of Uganda, we aggregated information from newspaper articles, scientific publications and NGO reports to produce a rough estimate of population numbers.

consultative sessions at multiple moments in time. Such data allowed us to understand how attitudes inform behavior, such as choosing to take part in the consultations, as well as to see how experiences (behavior) impact attitudes downstream. As a brief example, this would be the case if a negative experience during consultations, e.g. being frequently interrupted by a facilitator, altered a respondents' perception of the responsiveness of KCCA. We also collected information about the process, such as the outcomes of the meetings, as these are the crucial decisions that allow us to see under what conditions preferences got translated more faithfully into decisions.

3.4.1 Baseline surveys

The first stage in our data collection comprised a baseline survey with 2,312 respondents. Of these, 2,072 respondents were selected from among *residents* of Kampala, and are representative of the residential population of the city. The other 240 respondents were recruited from among categories of professionals that conduct business in the city during the day, in the manner we describe in the previous section. The role of the baseline was to collect attitudinal data prior to the consultations, as well as to serve as a pool of potential participants to our consultations. In the survey we collected measures of socio-demographic indicators, as well as a few political orientations and behaviors: past history of community engagement and pro-social orientations, political participation and political information, political efficacy, social capital, as well as satisfaction with service provision in Kampala. The instrument also contained a battery of items that probed respondents' preferences with respect to core elements of Charter design: coverage, enforcement mechanisms, channels of redress in case of faulty service delivery, extent of consultations with local communities, among others.

In the course of implementing our consultative meetings, 18 meetings could not be carried out with respondents from the baseline. Some of these meetings failed at the initial stage of mobilization. Typical reasons for this were: (a) participants reported being busy at the time of the meeting, (b) having phones off throughout the day prior to the meeting, or (c) being out of Kampala, in the rural area. Others failed at the final stage of attendance. When a minimum of 4 respondents from the baseline could not be informed about an upcoming meeting, or were not in attendance on the day, the meeting was rescheduled. In the case of the 18 meetings, after multiple attempts, we decided to re-sample from the villages a further set of participants and re-attempt the meeting. For 117 of these newly-recruited participants we conducted a reduced baseline survey, comprising a set of basic socio-demographic and attitudinal questions, along with their Charter design preferences. This is the reason why some of the analyses below are reported with a sample size of close to 2,429 respondents.

We also administered a baseline survey to the facilitators to get their preferences on topics that were going to be discussed during the consultations, along with very basic socio-demographic data. With regard to KCCA, our facilitators were recruited from across the 5 divisions in the city, from among KCCA's ward administrators.¹⁵ The remaining facilitators were selected from our implementing partner's roster of employees, and are all survey operators and team leaders with experience in facilitation of meetings. Table 2 shows a few differences between the 25 facilitators that participated in our study. On average, KCCA facilitators are slightly older compared to IPA ones (42 years as opposed to 33), as well as slightly more likely to

¹⁵The position of ward administrator was created in 2012 to replace that of parish chief. These officers report directly to division town clerks, and are equivalent to technical officers.

Table 2: Comparison: IPA vs. KCCA facilitators

Characteristic	Mean IPA	Mean KCCA	t value	<i>p</i>	d.f.	90% CIs	
Gender (female)	0.3	0.400	-0.497	0.625	20.106	-0.520	0.320
Age	32.9	41.867	-3.316	0.004***	18.359	-14.639	-3.294
Language (Luganda)	0.1	0.267	-1.077	0.293	22.935	-0.487	0.154
Education (university)	0.7	1.000	-1.964	0.081*	9.000	-0.646	0.046

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

¹ Sample size is 25 respondents, of which 15 were recruited from among KCCA ward administrators.

speak Luganda, more educated (100% college graduates), and with a more balanced gender composition inside the group.

3.4.2 Behavioral data

Another set of data came from the meetings themselves. At each meeting two IPA enumerators monitored each interaction that took place between participants. They recorded the identity of the person speaking, as well as a series of contextual characteristics of the act of speech: (1) whether it was voluntary or at the invitation of the discussion leader; (2) whether it interrupted a previous speaker, (3) whether it made a point which disagreed with that made by a previous speaker, (4) whether it was off-topic, and so on.¹⁶ As this data was recorded using handheld electronic devices, we also obtained timestamps of the length of each intervention. We could therefore compute, for each respondent, the number of times they participated in the meeting, as well as the total length of interventions made over the course of the meeting. This data was then linked to the baseline data, for us to be able to easily investigate the socio-demographic correlates of engagement in the meetings.

During the course of implementing the meetings, in 8 villages we were unable, on repeated occasions, to organize a consultative meeting. In these cases, we made the decision to combine two of the villages in the same consultation, so as to achieve the minimum number of participants from the baseline. This is why the final sample of meetings comprises 188 distinct consultations, instead of the initially-planned 192.¹⁷

3.4.3 Meeting outcomes data

At the meetings, participants engaged in a semi-structured debate on a set of five topics connected to the Charter-related items in the baseline survey. The topics included were: 1) the level of detail at which budget expenditures should be presented to the population (from division- to village-level); 2) which channels of communication KCCA should invest in to maintain a dialogue with citizens (from village-level meetings to city-wide social media channels); 3) whether in making budget allocations KCCA should focus on increasing productivity or reducing gaps in standards of living; 4) whether taxes should be raised, maintained, or lowered, so as to provide more/fewer services; and, 5) whether the Charter provisions should be monitored by an external agent or by KCCA itself. Additionally, 4 smaller topics were

¹⁶For an example of the instrument see Appendix 7.15.

¹⁷It is also the reason why Table 1 shows only 93/96 IPA meetings realized, and 95/96 KCCA meetings successfully conducted.

also placed on the agenda: the most important areas where KCCA is performing well, most important areas where it is performing poorly, the service delivery aspects that KCCA should prioritize in the Charter, and whether in general KCCA is going in the right direction or not. At the conclusion of each topic the facilitator was asked to report the group’s decisions on the topic, as well as the level of disagreement inside the group for each decision.

3.4.4 Estimation

Throughout the following section, which presents the results from our baseline surveys and the data we collect during the consultations themselves, we mainly rely on linear models with cluster-corrected standard errors at the level of meetings/villages (when the unit of analysis is a participant to the consultations). We do not yet incorporate sampling weights into the analysis, though we intend to do so in future versions of the paper. We prefer the simplicity and robustness of linear models even when dealing with dichotomous outcomes (such as attendance to the consultative meetings). Such models also present the added benefit of the ease with which estimates can be interpreted directly from the tables of results.

For **input inequality** models are of the format

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \dots + \epsilon_i$$

where X_1, X_2, \dots , are the socio-demographic indicators we use: gender, ethnic background, education, and wealth. For **input inequality**, we evaluate two different outcomes, Y_i : 1) whether the respondent indicates participation in different political activities (answers to the baseline survey), and 2) whether a respondent attended the meeting (conditional on being invited). Though we use multiple regression for conventional participation, we investigate patterns of engagement to our consultations predominantly by means of simple univariate specifications.

For **throughput inequality** we implement here three types of analyses. We regress meeting outcomes (dummy for whether the topic of the Charter was chosen in the meeting or not) on 1) facilitator ID fixed effects, and 2) a dummy indicator referring to whether the meeting was led by a KCCA or an IPA facilitator. In the prior approach, we rely on the adjusted R^2 from such a model as a measure of the degree of influence facilitators have over the meeting outcomes.¹⁸ Finally, 3) we regress the match between meeting participants’ preferences with respect to Charter design and meeting outcomes on socio-demographic predictors, a dummy indicator whether the meeting was led by a KCCA or an IPA facilitator, and the multiplicative interaction between these two. The specification, clustered at the level of meetings, is presented below:

$$Match_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 KCCA + \beta_3 X_1 KCCA + \epsilon_i$$

For **output inequality**, we rely on specifications of the format

¹⁸In fact, the adjusted R^2 is the *lower bound* for this degree of influence of facilitators. We direct the reader to fn. 36 of Humphreys, Masters, and Sandhu (2006) for why this is the case.

$$Match_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 Attended + \beta_3 X_1 Attended + \epsilon_i$$

where X_1 denotes the socio-demographic indicators we use. In this analysis our outcome measures, $Match_i$, also represent the match between participants' pre-meeting preferences for Charter design and meeting outcomes. *Attended* is a dummy indicator for whether the respondent opted to attend the meeting they were invited to or not. This analysis as well is clustered at the level of meetings. The estimate on β_3 gives us the extent to which particular social groups are more likely to get meeting outcomes that are more in line with their pre-meeting preferences depending on whether they attend the meeting and express their preferences, or not.

4 Results

We provide results in four parts. We first establish the structure of baseline differences in preferences over outcomes across dimensions of difference in Kampala. We then assess, in turn, inequalities in inputs to decision making, inequalities in responsiveness encountered during the decision-making process, and inequalities in the outputs from these processes.

4.1 Preference disparities

We examine a set of issues for which there is significant divergence of opinion between more and less advantaged citizens. Specifically, the questions under discussion relate to:

1. the level at which budget expenditures should be reported: division, parish, or village;
2. the most appropriate channel of communication with citizens: in-person meetings at village-level, drop-in centers at division-level, or social media channels;
3. the guiding principle which should guide budget allocations in the city: stimulating productivity, or reducing disparities in living standards;
4. whether fees and taxes should be increased in exchange for more services, kept at current levels, or reduced at the cost of fewer services;
5. the appropriate institution which should be tasked with monitoring adherence to Charter standards: an external actor, or KCCA itself.

The magnitude of the variation in views on these issues is presented in Table 3. Each combination of outcome and category in the table represents a multinomial logistic regression of the outcome (our five main Charter discussion topics) on the socio-economic characteristic listed in the "Category" column: gender, native language, education, and wealth, along with a composite index of socio-economic advantage constructed from these 4 characteristics.¹⁹ The third column of the table presents the level of the outcome for which the coefficient is estimated (the reference categories for the outcomes are listed in the table notes). As an

¹⁹We compute this index of socio-economic advantage by standardizing gender, education, the index of household wealth, and native language. We first standardize each of these components, and then average them for our final index. The index of household wealth is obtained as a factor-based scale, using the loadings from a Principal Components Analysis as weights. The items that comprise the wealth scale are: radio, television, bicycle, refrigerator, microwave oven, car or motorcycle, computer, and an Internet connection.

Table 3: Charter preferences: effect of socio-economic predictors

Outcome	Category	Contrast	Coef. estimates			Model fit		
			Coef.	SE	<i>p</i>	<i>R</i> ²	Sig. test	<i>p</i> test
Report budget: detail	Gender (male)	Parish level	-0.0099	0.1725	0.9543	0.0002	0.8047	0.6688
		Village level	-0.0902	0.1134	0.4264			
	Luganda	Parish level	0.0378	0.1747	0.8286	0.0015	5.0590	0.0797
		Village level	0.2290	0.1107	0.0386*			
	Education	Parish level	0.0382	0.0217	0.0786	0.0026	8.4537	0.0146*
Village level		-0.0157	0.0133	0.2377				
Wealth	Parish level	0.1221	0.0795	0.1248	0.0044	14.3997	0.0007***	
	Village level	-0.1197	0.0547	0.0287*				
Index of advantage	Parish level	0.2802	0.1555	0.0718	0.0030	9.8197	0.0074**	
	Village level	-0.1497	0.1067	0.1607				
Channels of communication	Gender (male)	Drop-in centers	0.0319	0.0915	0.7276	0.0001	0.3371	0.8449
		Social media	0.0677	0.1288	0.5992			
	Luganda	Drop-in centers	-0.1742	0.1026	0.0896	0.0009	3.9632	0.1378
		Social media	-0.1455	0.1324	0.2719			
	Education	Drop-in centers	0.0070	0.0119	0.5530	0.0106	47.3586	0.0000***
Social media		0.1069	0.0170	0.0000***				
Wealth	Drop-in centers	0.1423	0.0512	0.0054**	0.0127	56.5266	0.0000***	
	Social media	0.4234	0.0581	0.0000***				
Index of advantage	Drop-in centers	0.1247	0.0932	0.1810	0.0105	46.5141	0.0000***	
	Social media	0.7963	0.1211	0.0000***				
Growth vs. equality	Gender (male)	Mostly productive	-0.6965	0.2124	0.0011**	0.0037	18.0510	0.0012**
		Neither, nor	-0.2253	0.2086	0.2804			
		Mostly neediest	-0.4149	0.2127	0.0512			
		Neediest	-0.5463	0.1604	0.0007***			
	Luganda	Mostly productive	0.2777	0.2265	0.2204	0.0006	3.1363	0.5353
Neither, nor		0.1962	0.1959	0.3169				
Mostly neediest		0.3147	0.2124	0.1385				
Neediest		0.2393	0.1482	0.1064				
Education	Mostly productive	-0.0271	0.0265	0.3061	0.0005	2.3998	0.6627	
	Neither, nor	-0.0176	0.0257	0.4935				
	Mostly neediest	-0.0374	0.0273	0.1697				
	Neediest	-0.0215	0.0202	0.2857				
Index of advantage	Mostly productive	-0.3150	0.1043	0.0026**				
	Neither, nor	-0.1318	0.0974	0.1760				

Table 3: Charter preferences: effect of socio-economic predictors (*continued*)

Outcome	Category	Contrast	Coef. estimates			Model fit					
			Coef.	SE	<i>p</i>	<i>R</i> ²	Sig. test	<i>p</i> test			
Growth vs. equality	Wealth	Mostly neediest	-0.2933	0.1122	0.0090**	0.0031	15.0761	0.0045**			
		Neediest	-0.2205	0.0721	0.0023**						
	Index of advantage	Mostly productive	-0.6313	0.1964	0.0013**						
		Neither, nor	-0.1778	0.1954	0.3628						
		Mostly neediest	-0.5009	0.1947	0.0101*						
	Neediest	-0.4190	0.1461	0.0042**							
Raising fees and taxes	Gender (male)	Keep fees same	0.0992	0.0907	0.2740	0.0003	1.2566	0.5335			
		Raise fees	0.0252	0.1280	0.8440						
	Luganda	Keep fees same	-0.0015	0.0921	0.9866						
		Raise fees	-0.3291	0.1209	0.0065**						
	Education	Keep fees same	0.0686	0.0116	0.0000***						
		Raise fees	0.0678	0.0152	0.0000***						
	Wealth	Keep fees same	0.2085	0.0476	0.0000***				0.0048	23.2303	0.0000***
		Raise fees	0.2213	0.0594	0.0002***						
	Index of advantage	Keep fees same	0.4742	0.0850	0.0000***						
		Raise fees	0.3448	0.1186	0.0037**						
Monitor Charter	Gender (male)	External monitoring	0.3170	0.0912	0.0005***	0.0043	12.7459	0.0004***			
	Luganda	External monitoring	-0.0513	0.0947	0.5878						
	Education	External monitoring	0.0764	0.0106	0.0000***						
	Wealth	External monitoring	0.1914	0.0464	0.0000***						
	Index of advantage	External monitoring	0.5368	0.0827	0.0000***						

Note: ****p* < 0.001, ***p* < 0.01, **p* < 0.05. ¹ Outcomes are the preferences for Charter items, as recorded in the baseline survey. ² All models are multinomial specifications. McFadden's *R*² reported. Chi-square tests reported for assessing model fit. ³ Analyses are clustered at the level of villages. ⁴ Index of wealth is computed as a factor-based scale from a Principal Components Analysis of ownership of a set of household items: radio, television, bicycle, refrigerator, microwave oven, car or motorcycle, computer, and an Internet connection. ⁵ Index of socio-economic advantage is computed by standardizing gender, education, the index of wealth and native language. We first standardize each of these components, and then average them for our final index. ⁶ Reference category for *report budget* is "division level". ⁷ Reference category for *channels of communication* is "in-person consultations". ⁸ Reference category for *growth vs. equality* is "most productive". ⁹ Reference category for *raising fees and taxes* is "lower fees and taxes". ¹⁰ Reference category for *monitoring Charter* is "monitoring by KCCA management". ¹¹ **This descriptive analysis was not pre-registered.**

example, the first two lines of the table show results from a regression of preference for the level at which budget expenditures should be made public on gender. The coefficient column reports a coefficient of -0.0099 , which represents the difference between men and women in the log odds of opting for parish level as opposed to division level (the reference category). The associated standard error, along with a significance test, are presented in the fifth and sixth columns of the table. The final three columns show fit statistics for the specifications presented: McFadden’s pseudo- R^2 , a χ^2 Likelihood Ratio test, and the p value for this test.

What characteristics of citizens are informative for understanding variation in preferences? From Table 3 we see that gender and language only weakly structure preferences. Gender is relevant for 2 of the 5 issues: growth vs. equality in budget allocations and external vs. internal monitoring of Charter standards, if we use the significance level of the likelihood ratio test as a criterion. Similarly, language is only relevant for one of the issues: raising fees and taxes in exchange for more services at the municipal level. In contrast, wealth and education clearly structure preferences. We uncover a consistent effect across all 5 issues for wealth, and across 4 of the 5 issues for education (preference for growth vs. equality in budget allocations being the only exception). Our composite index of advantage appears able to structure preference across all five Charter topics.

Broadly, more advantaged citizens are more supportive of measures that are focused on stronger growth-enhancing bureaucratic structures. They favor more centralized communications via social media channels rather than village consultations, a larger tax base for KCCA with external monitoring, and investments that prioritize aggregate productivity over the welfare of the neediest.

4.2 Input inequality

How do citizens vary in the degree or in the ways that they participate in political processes? As we argued above, biases in political outcomes might simply be an indication that inputs into the system are skewed, rather than a sign that the political system is differentially responsive to different groups. We pursue this avenue of inquiry by investigating whether the same characteristics that structure variation in preferences, examined in the last section, also map on to variation in traditional channels of participation (e.g. attending demonstrations, contacting politicians, voting), and whether inequalities we see carry over to the citizen deliberations we organize, which were, we note, designed to minimize such disparities (by organizing them close to the residence of participants, by offering financial compensation for participants’ time, and by using phone or in-person mobilization).

4.2.1 Inequality in political participation

Our baseline survey of 2,312 individuals (the majority of whom are Kampala residents) offers a good snapshot of the political behavior in Kampala.²⁰ During the course of the survey we asked our respondents whether in the past year they had engaged in a list of political and social activities. On the political side, we inquire about contacting a KCCA official, an LC1 chairperson, a media outlet, an MP, joining a community action, participating in a demonstration, or voting at the national elections in 2016. For each activity we examine

²⁰Questions about political participation were not asked of our 117 newly-sampled participants for the 18 meetings that could not be convened.

differences across the same categories as before: by gender (dichotomous), highest educational level reached, wealth (as measured by a index of household possessions constructed through Principal Components Analysis²¹), ethnicity (proxied by whether the respondent is a Luganda speaker or not), political interest, and political efficacy. The latter is a composite indicator consisting of two items: how responsive the political system is perceived to be by the individual, and how competent to participate in politics the respondent perceives themselves to be.

Table 4 presents results. We first note that a general measure of political interest relates strongly with measured activities, which, while not surprising, serves as a useful reality check on the measures. In most of the specifications gender stands out as an important factor in explaining variation in engagement. Across most of our different participatory acts, men are more likely to engage with political actors and issues than women. Though still unclear to what extent this reverberates into disparities in political representation, findings by Gottlieb, Grossman, and Robinson (2018) do suggest that the issues that men and women find important differ across policy domains and can sometimes exhibit meaningful differences. Disparities can also be observed in the case of wealth, education, and ethnic background, though these come out only for some activities and not others. Our omnibus measure of engagement (count) shows strong variation on all dimensions, save language, and, importantly, partisanship.

More significantly, we see that all dimensions—save language—explain variation in engagement specifically with KCCA. Men, those with a higher level of education, wealthier respondents, as well as those with a higher degree of political interest and political efficacy, tend to engage more frequently with the institution.

In summary, this evidence suggests that those who usually get in contact with KCCA, to make a complaint, ask for a service, or inquire for information, are more likely to be more privileged in multiple ways: male, better educated, and wealthier.

4.2.2 Disparities in Consultation Participation: Extensive Margin

We envisioned the consultations carried out with citizens as a preference aggregation system that overcomes two difficulties present in any survey-based interaction. First, they would allow participants to express themselves beyond the confines of a set of closed-ended questions, and to probe the reasons why they hold certain preferences. Second, by using mobilization and offering financial compensation for time spent in the meeting, we hoped to reduce the costs of attendance and with them, hopefully, the disparities in participation that regular channels like voting or protests exhibit. In this section we turn to an account of whether we have succeeded in our second goal, by asking: Who attends the meetings? Are established patterns of engagement present in conventional political processes evident for our consultation process as well?²²

²¹In our baseline survey we probed whether the respondent possesses a set of household items: radio, television, bicycle, refrigerator, microwave oven, car or motorcycle, mobile phone, computer, and an Internet connection. From these items we derived a household wealth index, based on factor loadings derived from a Principal Component Analysis.

²²Before moving on to the substantive results, we direct the reader to section 7.2, where the balance tables for our randomization are displayed. The results suggest excellent balance between the group of citizens invited to meetings and the rest of the sample (in Table 12) and between invited participants who were asked

Table 4: Political participation in Kampala: individual differences

Outcome	Predictor	Coef.	SE	<i>p</i>	95% CIs	N
Join action	Gender (male)	0.039	0.017	0.023*	0.005 0.074	2310
	Education	-0.002	0.002	0.281	-0.006 0.002	2310
	Wealth	-0.008	0.007	0.285	-0.022 0.006	2301
	Luganda speaker	0.028	0.018	0.121	-0.007 0.062	2310
	Index of advantage	0.005	0.015	0.722	-0.025 0.036	2301
	Voted NRM	0.074	0.025	0.003**	0.026 0.123	1177
	Political interest	0.053	0.006	0.000***	0.041 0.065	2306
	Political efficacy	0.044	0.013	0.001***	0.019 0.069	2262
Contact media	Gender (male)	0.073	0.011	0.000***	0.052 0.094	2311
	Education	0.005	0.001	0.000***	0.003 0.008	2311
	Wealth	0.022	0.006	0.000***	0.011 0.034	2302
	Luganda speaker	0.009	0.012	0.458	-0.015 0.033	2311
	Index of advantage	0.070	0.011	0.000***	0.048 0.093	2302
	Voted NRM	0.012	0.017	0.486	-0.022 0.045	1178
	Political interest	0.033	0.004	0.000***	0.024 0.042	2307
	Political efficacy	0.014	0.008	0.062	-0.001 0.029	2263
Contact KCCA	Gender (male)	0.106	0.018	0.000***	0.071 0.141	2312
	Education	0.011	0.002	0.000***	0.007 0.015	2312
	Wealth	0.046	0.009	0.000***	0.029 0.064	2303
	Luganda speaker	0.028	0.018	0.108	-0.006 0.063	2312
	Index of advantage	0.140	0.017	0.000***	0.107 0.173	2303
	Voted NRM	-0.015	0.028	0.590	-0.071 0.040	1178
	Political interest	0.048	0.007	0.000***	0.034 0.061	2308
	Political efficacy	0.046	0.012	0.000***	0.022 0.070	2263
Contact MP	Gender (male)	0.033	0.008	0.000***	0.017 0.048	2312
	Education	0.002	0.001	0.087	0.000 0.004	2312
	Wealth	0.012	0.004	0.010*	0.003 0.020	2303
	Luganda speaker	-0.003	0.007	0.720	-0.017 0.012	2312
	Index of advantage	0.030	0.008	0.000***	0.014 0.046	2303
	Voted NRM	-0.015	0.015	0.305	-0.045 0.014	1178
	Political interest	0.019	0.004	0.000***	0.012 0.027	2308
	Political efficacy	0.020	0.006	0.001***	0.009 0.031	2263
Contact LC1	Gender (male)	0.089	0.020	0.000***	0.050 0.129	2312
	Education	0.002	0.003	0.418	-0.003 0.007	2312
	Wealth	0.011	0.011	0.347	-0.012 0.033	2303
	Luganda speaker	0.076	0.019	0.000***	0.039 0.114	2312
	Index of advantage	0.087	0.020	0.000***	0.047 0.126	2303
	Voted NRM	0.027	0.027	0.322	-0.027 0.081	1178
	Political interest	0.047	0.007	0.000***	0.033 0.061	2308
	Political efficacy	0.045	0.015	0.002**	0.016 0.074	2263
Demonstration	Gender (male)	0.010	0.006	0.119	-0.002 0.022	2310
	Education	0.001	0.001	0.049*	0.000 0.003	2310
	Wealth	0.005	0.003	0.116	-0.001 0.011	2301
	Luganda speaker	0.000	0.006	0.979	-0.012 0.012	2310
	Index of advantage	0.015	0.006	0.012*	0.003 0.026	2301
	Voted NRM	-0.008	0.008	0.319	-0.025 0.008	1177
	Political interest	0.008	0.002	0.001**	0.003 0.012	2306
	Political efficacy	-0.006	0.004	0.127	-0.013 0.002	2261
Vote	Gender (male)	0.107	0.020	0.000***	0.067 0.147	2297
	Education	-0.002	0.003	0.364	-0.008 0.003	2297
	Wealth	-0.020	0.010	0.046*	-0.040 0.000	2288
	Luganda speaker	0.020	0.021	0.343	-0.021 0.060	2297
	Index of advantage	0.022	0.019	0.242	-0.015 0.059	2288
	Political interest	0.059	0.007	0.000***	0.046 0.073	2293
	Political efficacy	0.089	0.013	0.000***	0.063 0.116	2250
Count: participation items	Gender (male)	0.442	0.051	0.000***	0.342 0.543	2429
	Education	0.020	0.007	0.004**	0.006 0.034	2429
	Wealth	0.078	0.028	0.006**	0.023 0.133	2419
	Luganda speaker	0.102	0.053	0.054	-0.002 0.206	2429
	Index of advantage	0.358	0.052	0.000***	0.255 0.460	2419
	Voted NRM	0.075	0.068	0.276	-0.060 0.209	1178
	Political interest	0.232	0.022	0.000***	0.190 0.275	2425

Table 4: Political participation in Kampala: individual differences (*continued*)

Outcome	Predictor	Coef.	SE	<i>p</i>	95% CIs	N
	Political efficacy	0.255	0.037	0.000***	0.181 0.328	2263

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. 95% confidence intervals are presented.

¹ Estimates are obtained from a set of linear regressions including each of the predictors one by one.

² Analyses do not incorporate sampling weights, and are clustered at the level of villages.

³ **This descriptive analysis was not pre-registered.**

To begin with, we must point to the fact that a sizable share of invited respondents opted not to attend, in spite of the financial incentives offered for participation. Only 55.1% of the 1,656 respondents surveyed (1539 in baseline and 117 re-sampled) ultimately attended a meeting. Those who attended are split roughly equally between IPA (451) and KCCA (462), with the difference in attendance between the two types of meetings not statistically significant.

Table 5 presents estimates from a series of univariate linear regressions of whether a respondent from the baseline attended the meeting they were assigned to or not.²³ The sample size here consists of all baseline respondents who received an invitation, along with the 117 respondents who were re-sampled as replacements. Each line of the table presents an estimate from a socio-demographic or attitudinal characteristic which attendance at meetings was regressed on. The results point to a relative success. Compared to conventional forms of political participation, our consultations have been able to erase differences in engagement based on gender and education.²⁴ With respect to wealth, we even see a small tendency for *poorer* residents to attend a meeting at a higher rate than wealthier peers.

For a summary test of the extent to which respondents with a higher socio-economic status are more likely to attend consultations, we use the same index of advantage described above. The results indicate that despite weaker engagement by wealthier subjects, there is no strong general relation between advantage and participation ($\beta = -0.031$, $SE = 0.021$).

We further explored whether a set of standard attitudinal indicators are predictive of the willingness to attend consultations. As these meetings are organized with the active participation of KCCA, we included a predictor of whether the respondent has felt mistreated by the organization in the past. We also add a general index of political engagement (constructed from political interest and political efficacy), and an index of pro-sociality. The latter is obtained as the sum of hours an individual reports being willing to engage in on a weekly basis on behalf of their community: road sweeping, maintaining boreholes, cleaning a health facility, or burning garbage. We find that, with the exception of a respondent’s level of political engagement, none of the attitudinal predictors have a statistically significant effect on the outcome. Individuals who have felt mistreated in the past at the hands of KCCA are

to attend either a KCCA-led or an IPA-led meeting (in Table 13).

²³Though we have stressed the importance of attending the meeting one is allocated to, over the course of the project we have also allowed for participants to attend another meeting organized in their division, if they could not attend their own. Only 14 participants out of 913 opted for this strategy; they are coded as having attended their meetings.

²⁴With respect to gender we had taken extra steps to make sure that the entire set of participants in meetings is balanced across gender categories. When confronted with absenteeism, enumerators were asked to exit the meeting venue and inquire among passers by whether anyone was willing to attend a consultation. The only condition set was that they had to be of the same gender as the absent baseline participants.

Table 5: Outcome: attendance at meetings

Factor	Coef.	SE	<i>p</i>	95% CIs		N
Socio-demographics						
Gender (male)	0.006	0.026	0.810	-0.045	0.057	1539
Education	-0.002	0.003	0.484	-0.008	0.004	1539
Wealth	-0.040	0.012	0.001***	-0.063	-0.017	1535
Language (Luganda)	0.025	0.025	0.318	-0.024	0.074	1539
NRM vote	-0.020	0.035	0.559	-0.089	0.048	790
Index of advantage (4 items)	-0.031	0.021	0.144	-0.072	0.011	1535
Political attitudes and behaviors						
Treatment by KCCA	0.000	0.010	0.961	-0.020	0.019	1518
Index of political engagement	0.108	0.019	0.000***	0.071	0.145	1509
Index of pro-sociality	0.001	0.001	0.168	0.000	0.002	1539

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. 95% confidence intervals are presented.

¹ Estimates are obtained from a set of linear regressions including each of the covariates one by one. ² Outcome is whether the participant attended the meeting they were assigned to or not.

³ Analyses do not incorporate sampling weights, and are clustered at the level of meetings.

⁴ The index of political engagement is constructed as an average between standardized items for political interest, political efficacy (internal and external), and a count of how many participation channels a person has engaged in the the preceding year. ⁵ The index of pro-sociality

is a sum of the number of hours respondents would be willing to spend in a week on the following community activities: road repair, road sweeping, maintaining boreholes, cleaning the health facility, and garbage burning. ⁶ Higher values for *treatment by KCCA* denote a good self-reported treatment.

⁷ **All analyses presented here have been pre-registered.**

not more likely to avoid consultative meetings. Neither are those who have demonstrated more pro-social orientations.

Though we remain concerned about the influence of political engagement on the likelihood of participating in the citizen meetings, we are also nevertheless encouraged by this pattern. It suggests that our meetings have not been a venue in which the inequalities observed in traditional participatory arenas are reproduced, and in which only those most satisfied with KCCA and most community-minded have come to offer their opinions.


4.2.3 Disparities in consultation participation: Intensive Margin

Using the behavioral data collected during the meetings²⁵, we provide measures of the level of engagement during the meetings.

The panels in Figure 2 show evidence of a reasonable degree of participation during the meetings. The majority of respondents make between 3 and 11 voluntary interventions during the consultation, which would roughly correspond to speaking once or twice for each topic. It must be emphasized that these are interventions made *without* a request from the facilitator. If we take these into consideration as well, the majority of participants take a position for between 6 and 13 times. This is evidence of exchange taking place in the meetings, though of

²⁵As meeting interactions were coded simultaneously by two enumerators, we obtain the quantities reported here by averaging the values obtained from them in terms of duration and number of times each respondent spoke during a meeting. For one meeting, a device malfunction meant we could not retrieve data from the second enumerator. In this instance, we used the only available set of data points.

Figure 2: Distribution of number of interventions made, total time spoken, and average intervention length for consultation participants



a limited nature.²⁶ Participants are offering their views and sometimes might even follow-up on an intervention made by a fellow participant. The middle panel in Figure 2 depicts the total duration of time each participant spoke for during the meeting. Despite evidence of a

²⁶We consider this to be the case based on the fact that in each meeting 5 substantive topics were discussed, plus a further 4 smaller topics related to KCCA. Under these circumstances, 6–13 interventions likely means the average participant spoke only about once per topic. If participants restricted comments to a subset of topics, the figures suggest the potential for an initial intervention and a follow-up. Though certainly informative, this dynamic falls short of fully deliberative.

Table 6: Systematic differences in voluntary interventions during meetings

Factor	Coef.	SE	p	95% CIs		N
Gender (male)	0.801	0.303	0.009**	0.204	1.399	913
Education	0.102	0.038	0.008**	0.028	0.177	913
Wealth	0.353	0.177	0.048*	0.003	0.704	910
Language (Luganda)	1.227	0.306	0.000***	0.624	1.831	913
NRM vote	-0.063	0.421	0.880	-0.896	0.769	478
Index of advantage	1.506	0.288	0.000***	0.936	2.075	910

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. ¹ Estimates are obtained from a set of OLS regressions including each of the covariates one by one. ² Outcome is the number of times individuals' made a point, without having been encouraged by the discussion leader, during the meeting they attended. ³ Analyses do not incorporate sampling weights, and are clustered at the level of meetings. ⁴ **Analyses have been pre-registered.**

Table 7: Systematic differences in total time spoken during meetings

Factor	Coef.	SE	p	95% CIs		N
Gender (male)	116.357	18.867	0.000***	79.124	153.590	913
Education	5.698	2.496	0.024*	0.765	10.630	913
Wealth	9.121	10.391	0.382	-11.467	29.708	910
Language (Luganda)	49.437	20.260	0.016*	9.452	89.421	913
NRM vote	-18.818	30.211	0.534	-78.529	40.893	478
Index of advantage	97.994	18.135	0.000***	62.109	133.880	910

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. ¹ Estimates are obtained from a set of OLS regressions including each of the covariates one by one.

² Outcome is the total time individuals spent speaking during the meeting.

³ Analyses do not incorporate sampling weights, and are clustered at the level of meetings.

⁴ **Analyses have been pre-registered.**

small number of very active speakers, the majority of participants spend between 2 and 10 minutes speaking. With these two quantities we compute the average time spent for each intervention for each of the respondents. We find these interactions to be relatively lengthy. Most participants have average interventions of between 25 seconds and a minute.

The next set of analyses turns to the question of whether variation in inputs is systematic, and explained by socio-economic covariates. For these analyses, we rely on data on baseline respondents who attended the meetings, which means our sample size is restricted to approximately 913 respondents. Table 6 presents a set of OLS estimates from specifications that sequentially include our socio-economic covariates. Each line represents a regression of the outcome on the socio-demographic indicators listed in the first column. This outcome is the total number of interventions made by each of the respondents during the meeting without having been asked to offer an opinion by the discussion leader.

We can see from the results presented that many dimensions of socio economic difference matter here. Just as in the case of traditional participation in political activities, gender continues to be a meaningful factor. On average, conditional on attending the meetings, men tend to have their voice heard more often than women. Similarly (and different to earlier results), those whose mother tongue is Luganda also request the floor more often than those for whom this language was acquired later in life. This is an unsurprising result, as language

skills would certainly make one more likely to make a short intervention in a public setting. Finally, in the bottom row of Table 6 we aggregate gender, education, wealth, and ethnic background into a single index of socio-economic disadvantage. In all, the results point to a strong relation with socio-economic characteristics: higher SES status individuals speak more often than their lower SES peers.

Similar patterns are found when we investigate the correlates of the total time spent speaking during the meeting. Table 7 shows estimates from a similar set of OLS models as presented in the previous table, relying on the same set of socio-economic factors. Similar characteristics as for the number of instances speaking are shown to have an effect, in the direction we expect: gender and being a Luganda native speaker, education, as well as our composite index of advantage.²⁷ Men, on average, speak about 2 minutes (116 seconds) more than women; when considering that the average cumulative time spent speaking in a meeting is somewhere between 5 and 7 minutes, the effect of gender appears substantial. To a lesser extent, this is the case for language as well, where Luganda native speakers spend on average almost a minute more speaking (50 seconds) than non-native speakers.

In summary, our consultative processes have been largely successful in achieving representativeness in descriptive terms—on the extensive margin—but not in terms of the *substantive* inputs to the process—the intensive margin. Here we see that disparities in engagement remain conspicuous. Although our meetings engage a more representative cross-section of Kampala’s population compared to conventional political activities like contacting elected representatives or attending a protest, dimensions of inequality re-emerge in who engages substantively.

4.3 Throughput inequality

Are the outcomes of consultations responsive to the view of citizens and is there structured inequality in this responsiveness? We address these two questions relating the level and the structure of responsiveness separately.

4.3.1 Levels of responsiveness

We use experimental variation to tackle the first question through two analyses. In particular we verify whether meeting outcomes are more in line with the participants’ preferences (1) based on differences in the characteristics of the facilitators, and (2) for meetings that are coordinated by IPA or KCCA facilitators.

The basic logic of our analysis of the degree of responsiveness can be seen in Figure 3. The Figure focuses on a topic that is unrelated to the Charter, as a plausibility check: whether or not the participants believe that the KCCA is “heading in the right direction.” For this question, we plot for each of our facilitators, the share of meetings, of the ones they led, that resulted in a decision that KCCA *is* on a right path. The circles denote this share; their size is determined by the number of meetings each facilitator has conducted.

The figure shows a clear difference between KCCA and IPA facilitators: The vast majority of meetings which are led by KCCA staff result in a vote of confidence in KCCA on the part of

²⁷In future versions of the analyses we will be able to refine our findings by excluding from this tally the interventions which are coded as “off-topic” by our enumerators.

Table 8: Meeting outcomes: facilitator FEs

Model	R^2	Adj. R^2	F-test	d.f.	p
Report budget: detail	0.209	0.093	1.800	(24, 163)	0.017**
Channels of communication	0.433	0.349	5.183	(24, 163)	0.000***
Growth vs equality	0.253	0.143	2.305	(24, 163)	0.001***
Raising fees and taxes	0.241	0.129	2.159	(24, 163)	0.003***
Monitor Charter	0.097	-0.036	0.726	(24, 163)	0.820
KCCA right direction	0.229	0.115	2.014	(24, 163)	0.006***

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. ¹ Estimates are R^2 values from regressions including facilitator ID fixed effects. ² Outcomes are the meeting outcomes, as recorded by the facilitators. ³ All models are OLS specifications. To ensure this, where needed, outcomes were dichotomized: “in-person meetings” were contrasted with “drop-in centers” and “social media channels”; “raise fees” was contrasted with “keep the same” and “lower fees”. ⁴ No clustering was needed. ⁵ **Analysis has been pre-registered.**

citizens. 8 out of 15 KCCA facilitators encounter 100% agreement with the statement that KCCA is going in the right direction, and 11 out of 15 encounter more than 80% agreement. On the other hand, only 1 out of 10 IPA facilitators encounter unanimous agreement, a result generated by them having organized only one meeting. Overall, the left hand-side panel presents a slightly more negative set of opinions: with the exception of facilitator 603, all of them encountered a mix of negative and positive decisions. The results clearly point to a pattern of skewness: meetings led by KCCA staff are more likely to result in a positive evaluation of KCCA on the side of the group, than in a negative one. This is not a conclusive piece of evidence; naturally, it could be the case that participants are falsifying their private preferences in a public situation in which they know the person facing them is a KCCA staff member. We emphasize that this evidence of influence does not imply a deliberate attempt to manipulate outcomes, since influence could operate simply via citizens reporting what they *think* the discussion leader wants to hear.

Figure 3: Meeting outcomes across facilitators: “Is KCCA going in the right direction?”




Table 8 presents a formal test of the extent to which meeting outcomes are determined by facilitators—intentionally or not—rather than by the citizens. The table presents, for each of our 5 main consultation topics (along with a topic referring specifically to KCCA), the share of the outcome of the meeting that can be explained by the presence of specific facilitators. We estimate this by including facilitator ID fixed effects (FEs) in a linear model predicting the outcome of the meeting.²⁸ The adjusted R^2 from such a model can be considered “a lower bound on the frequency with which leaders can directly alter outcomes” (Humphreys, Masters, and Sandbu 2006, 603). Table 8 suggests that clear evidence of facilitator influence exists in the case of 4 out of 5 Charter consultation topics: all except the optimal manner of monitoring Charter compliance. The effect is moderately strong, with between one tenth and one third of the variance explained by leader fixed effects (in the adjusted R^2 column of the table). The effect is also clearly visible in the meeting topic that refers to KCCA: whether the agency is going in the right direction.²⁹

Overall these results provide clear evidence that meetings do not simply reflect the views of citizens; rather leaders have a direct and strong impact on outcomes.

Table 9 presents a test for whether outcomes differ, on average, between meetings headed by KCCA or by IPA facilitators. This analysis helps us distinguish between influence that reflects idiosyncrasies of leaders and influence that is structured by institutional affiliation. For this analysis we regress the meeting outcomes on a dummy indicator for the background of the facilitator. The coefficients reported in the third column of the table are precisely the effect of this dummy. In 3 of the 5 substantive issues we see virtually no difference between IPA and KCCA facilitators. However, in the case of raising fees in exchange for more services, as well as preference for channels of communication with KCCA, we are able to observe an effect: meetings headed by KCCA staff are more likely to result in a decision to support higher fees relative to lower fees, by a multinomial log-odd of 1.388 ($SE = 0.666, p < .05$). Such meetings are also more likely to result in a decision to support more intensive use of social media channels, by a multinomial log-odd of 1.267 ($SE = 0.658, p < .10$). Similarly, meetings that are facilitated by KCCA staff are more likely to result in the group of participants reporting that KCCA is going in the right direction. Judging the evidence in Table 9 on the whole, though, we would have to recognize that meeting outcomes are only partly influenced by having a KCCA as opposed to an IPA facilitator running the discussions.

Table 9: Meeting outcomes: IPA vs. KCCA facilitators

Model	Category	Coef.	SE	p
Report budget: detail		-0.041	0.046	0.388
Channels of communication	Drop-in centers	-0.445	0.851	0.601
	Social media	1.267	0.658	0.056*
Growth vs. equality		-0.009	0.064	0.890
Raising fees and taxes	Raise fees	1.388	0.666	0.039**
	Keep fees same	0.788	0.594	0.186
Monitor Charter		-0.067	0.050	0.200
KCCA right direction		0.164	0.090	0.088*

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

¹ Estimates are for the effect of whether the meeting is a KCCA-led meeting or not.

² Outcomes are the meeting outcomes, as recorded by the facilitators. ³ Models 1, 3, 5 and 6 are OLS specifications; Models 2 and 4 are multinomial logistic regressions with trichotomous outcomes. This is why 2 coefficients are reported for the latter models.

⁴ Analyses are clustered at the level of facilitators. ⁵ Reference category for *channels of communication* is “in-person consultations”. ⁶ Reference category for *raising fees and taxes* is “lower fees and taxes”. ⁷ **Analysis has been pre-registered.**

Table 10: Meeting outcomes: facilitator FE for advantaged and disadvantaged villages

Type	Model	R^2	Adj. R^2	F-test	d.f.	p
Advantaged villages	Report budget: detail	0.440	0.266	2.531	(22, 71)	0.002***
	Channels of communication	0.484	0.324	3.031	(22, 71)	0.000***
	Growth vs equality	0.448	0.276	2.614	(22, 71)	0.001***
	Raising fees and taxes	0.357	0.157	1.790	(22, 71)	0.035**
	Monitor Charter	0.262	0.033	1.143	(22, 71)	0.326
	KCCA right direction	0.240	0.005	1.019	(22, 71)	0.454
Disadvantaged villages	Report budget: detail	0.273	0.061	1.289	(21, 72)	0.212
	Channels of communication	0.575	0.451	4.640	(21, 72)	0.000***
	Growth vs equality	0.306	0.103	1.510	(21, 72)	0.101
	Raising fees and taxes	0.264	0.049	1.231	(21, 72)	0.254
	Monitor Charter	0.178	-0.062	0.742	(21, 72)	0.776
	KCCA right direction	0.290	0.083	1.399	(21, 72)	0.148

Note: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. ¹ Estimates are R^2 values from regressions including facilitator ID fixed effects. ² Outcomes are the meeting outcomes, as recorded by the facilitators. ³ All models are OLS specifications. To ensure this, where needed, outcomes were dichotomized: “in-person meetings” were contrasted with “drop-in centers” and “social media channels”; “raise fees” was contrasted with “keep the same” and “lower fees”. ⁴ No clustering was needed.

⁵ **Analysis has been pre-registered**

4.3.2 Inequalities in responsiveness

We use two approaches to assess whether some citizens are more likely to have their views represented by decisions than others, again making use of experimental variation.

First, in Table 10 we implement the same analysis as before but separately for villages that contain a relatively high or low level of advantaged citizens. If advantaged citizens are less subject to influence by meeting leaders then the patterns we saw above should be weaker in these villages. In fact, we see, that in most cases, leader influence appears stronger in more advantaged villages than in less advantaged villages.

In a second analysis we assess whether some groups are more likely than others to achieve outcomes they value when meetings are led by KCCA staff. To estimate this, we run specifications that look similar to the one we report in Equation 1, where we use the example of gender. In these models we include one-by-one the socio-demographic predictors we have, a dummy indicator for whether the meeting was run by a KCCA facilitator or not, and the multiplicative interaction term between these two. The outcome in these models is the match (yes/no) between participants’ pre-meeting preferences and the meeting outcomes. To answer our question, we hone in on the estimate for the interaction term (β_3), as this quantifies how the various socio-demographic groups fare under our two kinds of meetings in terms of the convergence between their preferences and meeting outcomes. The results are reported in Table 11.

$$Match_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * gender + \beta_2 * KCCA + \beta_3 * gender * KCCA + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

A brief look at the table shows that no such disparate effect exists. Throughout our 5 outcomes, and the 4 different socio-demographic factors we consider, there is virtually no evidence that a sub-group encounters better representation with a particular type of facilitator. The sole exception to this statement is for the match between preferences for raising fees and taxes and meeting outcomes in the case of educational groups ($\beta = 0.019, SE = 0.008, p < .05$). In all other cases, though, the effect of socio-demographics on the preference–outcomes match is similar irrespective of whether the facilitator comes from within KCCA or not.

Overall these results support two conclusions. First, meeting leaders exert significant influence on outcomes, but second they are not, in general, more responsive to more advantaged citizens.

²⁸Because an R^2 from a multinomial logistic specification has a different substantive interpretation to that from a linear specification, we avoid running the former type of model. This means that, in 2 cases (“channels of communication” and “raising fees and taxes”) we have had to dichotomize the outcome.

²⁹The figures displayed in section 7.6 of the Appendix present a graphical summary of these FE models similar to the one in Figure 3. In Figure 12 the reader can see that it is more likely for an IPA facilitator to encounter, across all meetings they have led, a high degree of agreement with the statement that “KCCA should invest more in in-person meetings with citizens at the village-level” In our baseline survey, approximately 60% of citizens support this channel of communication. Conversely, KCCA facilitators are more likely to encounter only partial agreement with this statement. Figure 14 shows the opposite dynamic for whether fees and taxes should be raised or not. IPA facilitators are more likely to encounter a situation of agreement with the position that fees should *not* be raised, compared to KCCA facilitators. We could see in Figure 7a that raising taxes and fees in exchange for more services is a position that is favored by KCCA staff, but only by a minority of baseline respondents.

Table 11: Interaction effects: socio-economic background and type of facilitator

Outcome	Factor	Coef.	SE	<i>p</i>	95% CIs	N
Budget level of detail	Gender (male)	-0.025	0.059	0.668	-0.142 0.091	899
	Language (Luganda)	0.017	0.061	0.783	-0.103 0.136	899
	Education	0.004	0.007	0.549	-0.010 0.019	899
	Wealth	0.027	0.035	0.437	-0.042 0.096	896
	Index of advantage	0.008	0.058	0.890	-0.107 0.123	896
Channels of communication	Gender (male)	0.035	0.071	0.627	-0.106 0.175	901
	Language (Luganda)	0.017	0.070	0.811	-0.121 0.155	901
	Education	0.003	0.008	0.708	-0.013 0.019	901
	Wealth	0.005	0.035	0.887	-0.064 0.074	898
	Index of advantage	0.017	0.065	0.797	-0.111 0.145	898
Growth vs. equality	Gender (male)	-0.011	0.062	0.863	-0.132 0.111	903
	Language (Luganda)	-0.074	0.062	0.229	-0.196 0.047	903
	Education	-0.010	0.007	0.164	-0.025 0.004	903
	Wealth	-0.025	0.036	0.493	-0.096 0.046	900
	Index of advantage	-0.076	0.056	0.181	-0.187 0.036	900
Raising fees and taxes	Gender (male)	0.041	0.065	0.532	-0.088 0.170	899
	Language (Luganda)	-0.022	0.066	0.741	-0.152 0.109	899
	Education	0.019	0.008	0.015*	0.004 0.035	899
	Wealth	0.018	0.034	0.605	-0.050 0.085	896
	Index of advantage	0.094	0.058	0.108	-0.021 0.208	896
Monitor Charter	Gender (male)	0.004	0.064	0.952	-0.123 0.131	903
	Language (Luganda)	0.075	0.062	0.224	-0.047 0.198	903
	Education	-0.003	0.008	0.691	-0.019 0.012	903
	Wealth	-0.018	0.033	0.589	-0.082 0.047	900
	Index of advantage	-0.016	0.061	0.789	-0.137 0.104	900
Stacked outcomes	Gender (male)	0.008	0.029	0.780	-0.049 0.065	4505
	Language (Luganda)	0.003	0.030	0.927	-0.056 0.061	4505
	Education	0.003	0.003	0.461	-0.004 0.009	4505
	Wealth	0.001	0.014	0.942	-0.028 0.030	4490
	Index of advantage	0.005	0.027	0.861	-0.048 0.058	4490

Note: ****p* < 0.001, ***p* < 0.01, **p* < 0.05. 95% confidence intervals are presented. ¹ Estimates are for the interaction effect between the socio-economic factor and whether the meeting is a KCCA-led meeting or not. These are obtained from a set of linear regressions. ² Outcome is whether the preference of the respondent measured pre-meetings matches the meeting outcomes. ³ Analysis is restricted to respondents from baseline who attended the consultation meetings. ⁴ Analyses do not incorporate sampling weights, and are clustered at the level of meetings. ⁵ **Analyses have not been pre-registered.**

4.4 Output inequality

Finally, we turn to inequalities in outputs. We tackle here the issue of whether certain categories of citizens are more favored by the final outcome of the meetings than others (*output inequality*). To achieve this, we rely on a series of linear models, where the dependent variable is whether there is a match between a participant’s pre-meeting preferences and the meeting outcomes. This is then regressed, sequentially, on the characteristics we use in this paper to denote socio-economic advantage, on whether the respondent attended the meeting or not, and the multiplicative interaction between the two. The specification, using gender as an example of a demographic characteristic, is presented in Equation 2.

$$Match_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * gender + \beta_2 * attended + \beta_3 * gender * attended + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

Figure 4 gives a graphical overview of the multiple specifications we implement. Each panel in the figure presents three average marginal effects of a specific socio-demographic factor: for those in attendance at the meeting, for absentees, and the average value (a weighted

mean of the previous two, with group sizes used as weights). We present a panel for each combination of the five indicators and five Charter outcomes, along with a set of five panels that come from a stacked analysis of all five outcomes.

Our first conclusion from examining the results is that no subgroup in our sample appears to consistently get their way in the consultations. When comparing the average effects across rows within each of the columns, we are presented with an inconclusive picture. Education and wealth shape the extent to which groups are able to get meeting outcomes that are in line with their preferences. Their effects, though, are not consistent across issues. Whereas for channels of communication with citizens, and for the extent of budget reporting detail wealthier people are *less* likely to get what they want from the meeting, the situation is reversed for Charter monitoring mechanisms and for raising of fees. For these latter two issues, wealthier participants are *more* likely to get what they want from the meetings than their peers.³⁰ The results for our omnibus test, presented in the bottom row of Figure 4, paint a similarly encouraging picture: there is little evidence of output inequality, with all groups encountering a similar degree of congruence between meeting output and preferences.

The second conclusion we can draw from the figure is that there is no differential output–preference congruence gap between subgroups depending on whether they attend or not the consultative meetings. For a few items, we do see differences between the subgroup that participated and the one which did not attend. For the case of the optimal way of monitoring Charter compliance and gender, men and women who participated encounter the same degree of congruence. Among absentees, however, men register a higher degree of congruence between preferences and outcomes compared to women. However, there is no difference between these gender-based congruence gaps, as the interaction effect is not statistically significant.³¹ This situation is repeated for every single of the 30 specifications we test, suggesting that there is no differential impact in terms of the quality of representation these subgroups receive depending on whether they attend consultations or not.

Though we have been unable to detect inequality in outputs due to participation, this conclusion does suggest our meetings have been an effective conduit for popular preferences. Even with 743 respondents choosing not to attend out of 1656 invited, we find no issue for which this absence has contributed to a mismatch between preferences and meeting outcomes. From this perspective, this is a welcome finding, indicating that the decisions made by our consultative meetings are not skewed in favor of the preferences of a specific subgroup of the population of Kampala.


5 Conclusions

Having weaved through a number of distinct analyses, covering the three dimensions of political inequality we listed at the beginning, we have come to the point of stock-taking. We anchor the discussion on the three questions we started the previous section with: (1) What

³⁰The effects show an interesting pattern, which we plan to investigate in future work: for budget reporting detail, channels of communication with citizens, and preference for growth vs. equality when making budget allocations, the average effect of socio-demographic factors tends to be *negative*. For Charter monitoring, as well as raising fees and taxes, the average effect is *positive*.

³¹Since this is not immediately visible from our marginal effects plot, we also include the coefficient table in section 7.10 of the Appendix, on page 58.

Figure 4: Preference–outcome convergence for Charter topics for participants and absentees in consultative meetings



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Notes: (1) 95% confidence intervals are presented. (2) Estimates are for the effect of socio-demographic factors on whether the meeting outcome matches the pre-meeting respondent preferences or not, for each of the 5 discussion topics. Specifications are linear models. (3) Each unique combination of outcome and socio-demographic factor (listed above the plot panels) represents a tested specification; this includes the factor, a participation in meetings dummy indicator, and the multiplicative interaction between the two. For each such specification, 3 estimates are presented in the panel: the effect of the socio-demographic factor for attendees, absentees, and the overall effect (a weighted average of the previous two, with the group sizes as weights). (4) The participation dummy indicator has been centered prior to including them in the specification. (5) Analyses do not incorporate sampling weights, and are clustered at the level of meetings. (6) ******The analysis has not been pre-registered in this form; we initially planned to only focus on main effects of socio-demographic factors.**

is the degree of inequality in participation between citizens in our consultative meetings? (2) What is the corresponding degree of inequality in ability to obtain an outcome in the meetings between citizens and facilitators? (3) Who are the citizens better able to get what they want out of the meetings?

For the first question, we have shown that our consultative meetings have managed to draw in a representative cross-section of the residents of Kampala on most dimensions. While true that participants disproportionately come from among the ranks of those already politically engaged, on common socio-demographic indicators our group of participants are representative of the wider population. This stands in contrast to standard repertoires of participation, such as attending demonstrations, contacting elected representatives, or voting. In these instances, we consistently see inequalities in inputs based on gender, education, and wealth, in addition to the same pattern based on political engagement. A plausible explanation for this is the influence of our mobilization process to the consultative meetings. This has combined phone mobilization with small financial incentives for attending, and emphases on the importance of participation for civic life in Kampala. We highlight the importance of these strategies for ensuring adequate descriptive representation in the pool of participants to similar consultative processes.

Examining meeting dynamics paints a different picture, however. During the actual consultations themselves, established patterns of inequality re-emerge: men, more educated respondents, and Luganda speakers are more active in the meetings, both in terms of how frequently they express a position, and how long they speak for. Wealth plays a more limited role, impacting only how often the participant takes the floor to speak. From this perspective, we continue to observe the same dynamics of inequality in participation that were observed for more traditional types of political participation. These meaningful differences in inputs take on additional importance when considering that they match differences in preferences for Charter design reported prior to the consultations. Considering these disparities, we believe efforts to stimulate the engagement disadvantaged groups are important, and could help narrow this gap. They could also serve to promote citizen satisfaction with such processes, and the willingness the citizens to engage in similar processes in the future.

On the issue of how much the meeting outcome is driven by facilitators or participants, we have revealed facilitator influence to be a visible presence almost across the board. With respect to all issues, except the optimal way of monitoring Charter compliance, we find that about a tenth to a third of the variation in meeting outcomes can be explained by facilitator identity. This is a *lower bound* on the degree of influence facilitators have, and points to a continued influence of facilitators in this process (Humphreys, Masters, and Sandbu 2006). At the same time, this influence doesn't automatically translate in a skewed pattern of decisions. Only 2 of the 5 substantive topics of discussion exhibit a clear difference in meeting outcomes between KCCA and IPA discussion leaders. Though we have clearly shown facilitator influence to exist, we have failed to also detect pervasive elite capture (Sheely 2015) in this context. Neither have we been able to uncover elite bias: the systematic favoring, in terms of outcomes, of a subgroup among our participants, defined on the basis of socio-demographic characteristics. Along all the Charter design choices, there is no evidence that KCCA facilitators favor a subgroup of participants in a systematic fashion. When evaluated in this manner, our meetings have been a success. Discussion leaders who might be thought to have a vested interest in the outcome of a meeting are equally unbiased compared to those

who lack similar incentives.³²

Finally, we turn to the issue of whether the decisions arrived at in these settings favor a specific sub-group. The answer to this question is “no”. Across the 5 issues, and 5 different ways of categorizing our participants, we find a similar degree of convergence between groups’ preferences and meeting outcomes. Though wealth and education sometimes structure this match, their impact is inconclusive when assessed across issues. From the perspective of the quality of decisions made in these fora, this is an encouraging result—the more advantaged among our citizens have also not been able to capture meeting decisions. The meetings have allowed even more disadvantaged participants, with a lower degree of engagement during the process, to experience the same degree of responsiveness as their more advantaged peers. On the other hand, we find limited benefits in terms of preference-decision convergence that accrue from participation. This convergence did not improve by virtue of participation in the consultations, irrespective of which socio-demographic group we examine. Although participating in such consultative processes might contribute to the legitimacy of a decision (as found by Olken 2010), the degree of satisfaction or of compliance to it, we find that they do not improve the quality of representation citizens receive.

We found meeting outcomes were close to citizens’ preferences collected at baseline. While this indicates that facilitators did not influence the outcome of the consultations in the direction of their own preferences, it could also make one skeptical of the value of the consultations. In particular, if collecting data by means of surveys alone is enough for learning about citizens’ preferences do entities like the KCCA need to organize consultation meetings? It is still early days to say anything definitive about the value of these consultations, but with the future work that we have planned we will be able to show whether participating in these meetings influences participants’ perceptions of the responsiveness of their local government.

³²Section 7.7 in the Appendix shows that for the main Charter items, the preferences of IPA and KCCA facilitators are actually very similar to each other.

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7 Appendices

7.1 Detailed sampling strategy

We present here a broad overview on the core features of the sampling process for the Kampala sample, with a focus on the replacements that had to be performed throughout the process.

7.1.1 Sampling process

The data at the basis of our sampling consists of a census of all buildings in Kampala, performed by KCCA in 2014. The raw data came in the form of shapefiles, which had to be pre-processed to be of use in the sampling procedure. Prior to sampling, all buildings with a surface of less than 5 sq. meters were removed from the building data (under the assumption that they could not be residential units), and all villages that did not have any buildings within their boundaries were excluded.³³ Over the remaining buildings, we scattered 1,000,000 random points, which technically represent our sampling frame. Larger structures get a greater number of points, which increase their likelihood of selection into the sample, under the assumption that they contain a larger number of residents. Some trimming had to be done. In a few cases, points fell outside of the geographic boundaries of Kampala. This happened when a building was placed outside of the city boundaries or when it straddled the border. Additionally, we had to exclude all points from two parishes (Kyebando and Kawempe I) from the outset, as we discovered that there is a large discrepancy between the number of households (based on the 2014 Census data) and the number of buildings (from the KCCA shapefiles) in those parishes.³⁴

At the end of this process, we sampled from 823 villages, following these steps:

- Create 8 blocks of villages based on latitude, longitude and number of buildings in villages; the median value was used as threshold. The final villages were selected from these blocks, with a modified PPS procedure: all villages of over 700 buildings were selected with probability 1, all villages below 30 buildings were selected with probability 0, and those between 30 and 700 were selected with probability directly proportional to their size (in terms of numbers of buildings);
- Each of the selected villages was “sliced” into 8 geographic areas based on longitude and latitude, constructed so that they contain a roughly equal number of buildings. 4 segments were constructed based on longitude, and each of these was split in half based on latitude;
- From each of these segments one point (which fell on a building) was randomly sampled. This was where our enumerators were sent to do a survey;
- When reaching the building, the enumerators would determine if it was residential or commercial. If the latter was the case, they would replace the building using a protocol we devised;
- If the building was residential, or part residential and part commercial, the enumerator would do a census of all units in the building, and randomly select one to interview;

³³This was detected by overlapping the village boundaries and the building data. 19 villages were found, in this way, not to have any buildings in them.

³⁴Our implementing partners in IPA Uganda confirmed that such a large discrepancy suggests problems with the building data in those parishes. Only approximately 12,200 points and 13 villages were contained in these two parishes.

- Once the unit was selected, the enumerator would do a census of all unit members who were 18 and Ugandan citizens. The respondent of the designated gender would be randomly selected from among the ones available.³⁵ If none could be found of the designated gender, the enumerator would replace the building based on the protocol.

In case the building selected through the procedure outlined above was not eligible (not residential³⁶), the surveyors were instructed to select the following building to the right. If there was more than one residential unit in the building, the one selected for interviewing was chosen in the following way:

- First, the enumerator listed all the residential units (skipping shops or other businesses) in a form and numbered them, starting from the lower level and from left to right;
- Once all the units were listed and were assigned a number, the enumerator enters the information in a randomization table programmed in the tablet. This table is programmed to randomly pick one number from 1 to n , with n designating the total number of units in the building.

A further 240 respondents were selected by virtue of their profession. Here we include: boda-boda drivers, matatu operators, market vendors, and furniture makers. For these groups we typically operated with a sampling frame (matatu operators, furniture makers, and market vendors³⁷). The only exception to this were boda-boda drivers, for whom we sampled villages geographically, did a census of all stages in a village, and then randomly selected participants from stages in proportion to the size of the stages.

7.1.2 Replacements

The need for replacing respondents, as well as entire villages, appeared early on in the course of the survey. This was due to a few factors:

- The lack of information in our GIS data regarding buildings. We could not distinguish between commercial and residential structures in our data, which meant that enumerators had to replace many commercial buildings and, in some cases, entire villages that were predominantly comprised of commercial structures.
- The relatively small size of some villages, which meant that enumerators would only complete 5–6 surveys in some villages, after all replacement of buildings had been done.
- The tight control the research team exerted over the process: enumerators were sent to specific geographic points; gender could not be replaced inside a household; households could not be replaced inside a building.

When replacing entire villages³⁸, we did so by selecting a replacement village from among all

³⁵In each village, 4 men and 4 women had to be selected. By design we excluded those without Ugandan citizenship from our population of interest.

³⁶Most of the non residential buildings were churches, commercial buildings like malls or supermarkets or office facilities.

³⁷For market vendors we worked with a list of all markets in Kampala and the number of registered vendors in them.

³⁸This typically happened because of the village containing mostly commercial buildings or encompassing an industrial area of warehouses. In a few cases this happened because our implementing partners informed us that the village is comprised almost exclusively of refugees, or because of security concerns.

1st order and 2nd order neighboring villages³⁹, with probability proportional to the size of the village (in terms of numbers of buildings). All in all 15 villages had to be entirely replaced. In 12 of the 15 cases the initial replacement was sufficient to collect the needed 8 surveys. Two villages had to be replaced a second time, while one village had to be replaced a total of 4 times. Partial village replacements had to be performed when enumerators managed to do only part of the required 8 surveys, until they exhausted all possibilities of replacement of buildings. In these instances, enumerators asked for a set of “top-up” sampling points from a neighboring village, which we did by adopting the method described above: sampling from all 1st order and 2nd order neighboring villages. A total of 50 villages had to undergo partial replacement. In 35 of the 50 a single round of replacement was enough to gather the 8 needed surveys; the remaining 15 villages required a second round of replacements.

³⁹2nd order neighbors are neighboring villages of neighboring villages of the original village.

7.2 Balance tables

We present here a set of balance tables that assess the quality of our randomization. Table 12 presents the sample differences between respondents who were invited to the consultative meetings (T_1) and our “pure control” sample of respondents, who only participated in the baseline (T_0). The table shows perfect balance across treatment and control.

Table 12: Balance table: pure control versus meetings

Factor	Mean control	Mean meetings	Diff. mean	SE diff.	z -statistic	p	95% CIs	
Gender (male)	0.54	0.54	0.00	0.02	-0.19	0.85	-0.04	0.03
Luganda	0.55	0.54	-0.01	0.03	-0.40	0.69	-0.07	0.05
Education	11.18	10.95	-0.23	0.23	-0.99	0.33	-0.69	0.23
Wealth	1.18	1.15	-0.02	0.06	-0.40	0.69	-0.15	0.10
Index of advantage	0.02	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	-1.05	0.29	-0.07	0.02
Political efficacy	0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.04	-0.29	0.77	-0.09	0.07
Pro-sociality	16.71	16.42	-0.29	1.44	-0.20	0.84	-3.13	2.56

Table 13: Balance table: IPA versus KCCA meetings

Factor	Mean IPA	Mean KCCA	Diff. mean	SE diff.	z -statistic	p	95% CIs	
Gender (male)	0.56	0.53	-0.03	0.03	-1.10	0.27	-0.08	0.02
Luganda	0.53	0.51	-0.02	0.05	-0.47	0.64	-0.11	0.07
Education	10.70	11.11	0.41	0.34	1.20	0.23	-0.26	1.08
Wealth	1.07	1.17	0.11	0.09	1.24	0.22	-0.06	0.28
Index of advantage	-0.03	-0.01	0.03	0.04	0.67	0.51	-0.05	0.10
Political efficacy	0.06	-0.01	-0.07	0.06	-1.20	0.23	-0.19	0.05
Pro-sociality	15.97	16.39	0.42	2.22	0.19	0.85	-3.99	4.82

Table 13, on the other hand, shows the sample differences, within the group of respondents who were invited to meetings, between those who attended IPA-led meetings (T_{1_1}) to KCCA-led ones (T_{1_2}). We find again that there is no difference on a number of socio-demographic and political attitudinal and behavioral indicators between the two sub-groups.

7.3 Figure illustrating theoretical relationships between dimensions of inequality





Figure 5: Figure shows equilibrium effort and welfare given different levels of throughput inequality and different status quo values. Player 1 (solid lines) has ideal policy -0.5 . Player 2 (dotted lines) has ideal policy $+0.5$. Throughput inequality corresponds to player 2 having greater influence on outcomes than player 1. Under throughput equality, input inequality and output inequality are achieved simultaneously with a centrist status quo. Under throughput inequality, input equality and output equality can not both be achieved simultaneously.

7.4 Figures on input inequality

Figure 6 shows a broad overview of the gaps in political participation between men and women in Kampala. Full circles refer to estimates of percentages, while vertical lines give a sense of the degree of uncertainty around these shares of respondents.⁴⁰ On average, men have higher rates of participation in almost all activities presented in the figure. Some of the largest gaps can be encountered for contacting KCCA officials or LC1 chairpersons, as well as voting in national elections. The bottom panel of Figure 6 also shows a predictable pattern: more educated residents tend to participate in politics to a greater degree, though it must be pointed out that the relationship between education and participation is slightly more muted than the one involving gender. University graduates are clearly more likely to contact KCCA than their lower educated peers, and this relationship tends to also hold for contacting media outlets. However, when it comes to joining community actions, those with a primary education or less are clearly more active than university graduates. The case of contacting MPs and participating in demonstrations are impossible to evaluate, due to the extremely small percentage of respondents who reported engaging in such activities.

Figure 6: Political participation by gender and education in Kampala




⁴⁰Sampling weights have not been used to compute the proportions in the figure.

7.5 Variation in preferences across populations


For the issue of whether citizens would prefer higher taxes and fees levied by KCCA in exchange for better services in Kampala, we see considerable variation in preferences between the different actors involved in the Charter development process in Figure 7a. We plot here answers for the same question, asked in turn of (1) the full set of 2,429 citizens that took part in our sample, (2) a convenience sample of 40 KCCA staff located in the institution’s central office, who we surveyed in March 2018, and (3) the full set of facilitators. In the interest of aiding comparison we can also add information about the aggregate results from the consultations, as recorded by the meeting discussion leaders. Finally, we are also able to present what KCCA central office staff *believe* citizens would prefer, recorded as part of the same survey as their own preferences.

Figure 7: Preferences of multiple actors for 2 discussion topics in citizen consultations

(a) Preferences for higher fees and taxes in exchange for services



(b) Preferences for monitoring of Charter compliance



The issue of higher fees is one that sharply splits KCCA staff and citizens of Kampala. Indeed, this was one of the main reasons why we chose it as among the discussion topics for the consultative sessions, as this level of disagreement requires further debate, in an attempt to

see whether the two positions could be partly reconciled.⁴¹ We see that the preference of staff is overwhelmingly in favor of expanding services paid for from higher fees and taxes. That of citizens is more split, though roughly 50% of respondents would prefer maintaining taxes (as well as service delivery) at their current level. When asked what citizens would prefer, though, we notice a pronounced belief among staff that citizens are primarily preoccupied with keeping taxes and fees as low as possible. Approximately 60% of staff believe citizens would accept lower quality services as long as this results in lower tax bills—relatively far off from the actual estimate of around 30%. Facilitators turn out to be closer to the actual preferences of citizens, with about 60% of them opting for maintaining both fees and services at current levels. In an instance such as this, where there is a high degree of alignment between the aggregate preference of discussion leaders (ward administrators) and of citizens, we would expect meeting outcomes to reflect this faithfully. As we can see, this is indeed the case: approximately 60% of meetings of the 188 for which we have data report reaching a decision to keep fees constant.

We can see a similar dynamic in Figure 7b, this time with respect to whether, once in force, Charter standards should be monitored by an external political institution, or by KCCA management itself: meeting outcomes turn out to be close to the preferences of facilitators and citizens. Though not reported here, this conclusion also holds for whether citizens prefer that expenditures in the city be reported publicly at division, parish, or down to the village level.

From one perspective, our results indicate that, in terms of preference aggregation, there is not much to distinguish a population survey from holding a large number of small-scale citizen consultative meetings. Though we admit that citizens might get a heightened sense of satisfaction from the participation in such a process, and from the opportunity to convey their complaints to a member of the institution, in terms of raw preferences we do not record a marked benefit.

We present in Figures 8, 9 and 10 the remaining three topics referring to the Charter that were covered during the meetings. We see that the issue of what level of disaggregation should the Kampala budget have when presented to citizens also splits citizens from KCCA central office staff. The difference between citizens and facilitators, however, is considerably smaller. For the remaining two issues, the differences are more muted.

7.6 Summary of meeting outcomes across facilitators

The following plots present a breakdown of meeting outcomes for each of the facilitators in our study. Each plot presents one of the 5 substantive Charter topics from our deliberative meetings. We tabulated for each of the facilitators the share of the meetings they led that resulted in a particular outcome. A facilitator is depicted by a filled circle, with the size of this circle denoting the number of meetings this facilitator has led.

⁴¹We structured our consultation design process in the following way. The initial survey with KCCA central office staff (a different group than the ward facilitators we use as discussion moderators) allowed us to devise a list of 15 potential topics that we could put to citizens. The information from the baseline, contrasted with the preferences of KCCA staff, helped us in narrowing down this list to 5 topics submitted for citizen consultations.

Figure 8: Preferences for level of detail of budget reporting




Figure 9: Preferences for KCCA communication channels




Figure 10: Preferences for allocation principles: growth vs. equality




Figure 11: Meeting outcomes across facilitators: KCCA should report expenditures at village-level




Figure 12: Meeting outcomes across facilitators: KCCA should invest in face-to-face meetings with citizens in villages




Figure 13: Meeting outcomes across facilitators: budget allocations to target neediest




Figure 14: Meeting outcomes across facilitators: KCCA should raise fees and taxes





Figure 15: Meeting outcomes across facilitators: Charter should be monitored externally



7.7 Facilitator preferences: IPA vs. KCCA

The following set of plots show the preference distribution along the five main Charter topics for KCCA and IPA discussion leaders in our meetings. We point the reader to the considerable degree of similarity in preferences between the two types of facilitators.

Figure 16: KCCA vs. IPA facilitators: reporting of expenditures




Figure 17: KCCA vs. IPA facilitators: communication channels with citizens




Figure 18: KCCA vs. IPA facilitators: budget allocations to target neediest




Figure 19: KCCA vs. IPA facilitators: raising fees and taxes




Figure 20: KCCA vs. IPA facilitators: monitoring of Charter




Table 14: Pearson correlations: socio-demographics

	Age	Gender	Luganda	Education	Wealth	Vote for NRM	Index of advantage
Age	1	-0.02	0.12	-0.07	0.02	0.07	0.01
Gender		1.00	-0.02	0.04	0.04	-0.10	0.50
Luganda			1.00	-0.06	-0.08	-0.22	0.39
Education				1.00	0.39	-0.07	0.57
Wealth					1.00	-0.06	0.63
Vote for NRM						1.00	-0.21
Index of advantage							1.00

¹ Unstandardized variables used in all instances except the index of advantage.

² The index of advantage is computed as an average of standardized versions of the following indicators: gender, Luganda mother tongue, education, and wealth.

7.8 Correlation structure for socio-demographics

Table 14 presents the Pearson correlations between socio-demographic factors in our baseline data. Age, gender, Luganda mother tongue, education and wealth were included in their unstandardized form. The index of socio-economic disadvantage is computed as an average of standardized versions of gender, Luganda mother tongue, education, and wealth.

Table 15: Outcome: attendance at meetings

Factor	Coef.	SE	<i>p</i>	95% CIs		N
Socio-demographics						
Gender (male)	0.003	0.024	0.893	-0.044	0.050	1656
Education	-0.003	0.003	0.296	-0.009	0.003	1656
Wealth	-0.040	0.011	0.001***	-0.063	-0.017	1651
Language (Luganda)	0.030	0.025	0.216	-0.018	0.079	1656
NRM vote	-0.020	0.035	0.559	-0.089	0.048	790
Index of advantage (4 items)	-0.032	0.019	0.093	-0.070	0.005	1651
Political attitudes and behaviors						
Treatment by KCCA	0.000	0.010	0.961	-0.020	0.019	1518
Index of political engagement	0.108	0.019	0.000***	0.071	0.145	1509
Index of pro-sociality	0.001	0.001	0.168	0.000	0.002	1539

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. 95% confidence intervals are presented.

¹ Estimates are obtained from a set of linear regressions including each of the covariates one by one. ² Outcome is whether the participant attended the meeting they were assigned to or not.

³ Analyses do not incorporate sampling weights, and are clustered at the level of meetings.

⁴ The index of political engagement is constructed as an average between standardized items for political interest, political efficacy (internal and external), and a count of how many participation channels a person has engaged in the the preceding year.

⁵ The index of pro-sociality is a sum of the number of hours respondents would be willing to spend in a week on the following community activities: road repair, road sweeping, maintaining boreholes, cleaning the health facility, and garbage burning. ⁶ Higher values for *treatment by KCCA* denote a good self-reported treatment.

7.9 Analysis of meeting attendance on full sample

Table 15 conducts a robustness check for the analyses presented in Table 5 in the main body, with a slightly enlarged sample. To the 1,539 respondents from the baseline who were initially invited to the meetings, we add the 117 respondents re-sampled from the 18 villages where the initial set of meetings could not be conducted.

7.10 Results from analysis of output inequality

Our analysis of output inequality is presented under the form of a marginal effects plot, in Figure 4. In this section we also present the raw estimation results from these models, to accompany the plot in the main body of the paper.

Table 16: Output inequality: socio-economic background and participation in meetings

Outcome	Factor	Coef.	SE	<i>p</i>	95% CIs	N	
Budget level of detail	(Intercept)	0.741	0.020	0.000***	0.702 0.781	1616	
	Gender (male)	-0.001	0.022	0.951	-0.045 0.042	1616	
	Attended	0.027	0.032	0.397	-0.036 0.091	1616	
	Gender x Attended	-0.044	0.043	0.308	-0.128 0.041	1616	
	(Intercept)	0.714	0.022	0.000***	0.670 0.758	1616	
	Luganda	0.050	0.025	0.052	0.000 0.100	1616	
	Attended	-0.009	0.035	0.808	-0.078 0.061	1616	
	Luganda x Attended	0.020	0.044	0.643	-0.066 0.107	1616	
	(Intercept)	0.817	0.034	0.000***	0.751 0.884	1616	
	Education	-0.007	0.003	0.017*	-0.013 -0.001	1616	
	Attended	0.083	0.063	0.192	-0.042 0.208	1616	
	Education x Attended	-0.007	0.005	0.185	-0.018 0.003	1616	
	(Intercept)	0.770	0.022	0.000***	0.726 0.814	1611	
	Wealth	-0.025	0.012	0.048*	-0.049 0.000	1611	
	Attended	0.022	0.034	0.506	-0.044 0.089	1611	
	Wealth x Attended	-0.022	0.024	0.343	-0.069 0.024	1611	
	(Intercept)	0.742	0.017	0.000***	0.708 0.775	1611	
	Index of advantage	-0.032	0.021	0.130	-0.073 0.009	1611	
	Attended	0.000	0.023	0.997	-0.045 0.045	1611	
	Advantage x Attended	-0.040	0.043	0.361	-0.126 0.046	1611	
	Channels of communication	(Intercept)	0.514	0.025	0.000***	0.466 0.563	1617
		Gender (male)	0.010	0.026	0.688	-0.041 0.062	1617
		Attended	0.002	0.037	0.953	-0.070 0.074	1617
		Gender x Attended	0.016	0.052	0.764	-0.087 0.118	1617
		(Intercept)	0.527	0.025	0.000***	0.478 0.576	1617
		Luganda	-0.014	0.031	0.652	-0.075 0.047	1617
		Attended	-0.025	0.038	0.511	-0.101 0.051	1617
		Luganda x Attended	0.067	0.050	0.178	-0.031 0.165	1617
(Intercept)		0.616	0.044	0.000***	0.529 0.703	1617	
Education		-0.009	0.003	0.013*	-0.015 -0.002	1617	
Attended		-0.056	0.070	0.423	-0.195 0.082	1617	
Education x Attended		0.006	0.006	0.323	-0.006 0.017	1617	
(Intercept)		0.583	0.027	0.000***	0.530 0.636	1612	
Wealth		-0.053	0.015	0.000***	-0.082 -0.024	1612	
Attended		-0.021	0.036	0.566	-0.092 0.050	1612	
Wealth x Attended		0.017	0.022	0.426	-0.026 0.061	1612	
(Intercept)		0.520	0.020	0.000***	0.481 0.559	1612	
Index of advantage		-0.076	0.026	0.004**	-0.127 -0.025	1612	
Attended		0.007	0.025	0.788	-0.042 0.055	1612	
Advantage x Attended		0.083	0.044	0.064	-0.005 0.170	1612	
(Intercept)		0.769	0.020	0.000***	0.730 0.809	1620	

	Gender (male)	-0.057	0.023	0.013*	-0.102	-0.012	1620
	Attended	-0.028	0.033	0.392	-0.094	0.037	1620
	Gender x Attended	0.042	0.045	0.357	-0.048	0.131	1620
	(Intercept)	0.730	0.022	0.000***	0.686	0.773	1620
	Luganda	0.017	0.025	0.493	-0.032	0.066	1620
	Attended	0.011	0.036	0.769	-0.060	0.081	1620
	Luganda x Attended	-0.031	0.047	0.504	-0.124	0.061	1620
	(Intercept)	0.733	0.039	0.000***	0.655	0.811	1620
	Education	0.000	0.003	0.885	-0.006	0.007	1620
	Attended	0.035	0.064	0.583	-0.091	0.161	1620
	Education x Attended	-0.004	0.006	0.519	-0.015	0.008	1620
	(Intercept)	0.767	0.024	0.000***	0.720	0.814	1615
	Wealth	-0.024	0.011	0.038*	-0.047	-0.001	1615
	Attended	-0.004	0.034	0.910	-0.072	0.064	1615
	Wealth x Attended	-0.005	0.024	0.839	-0.053	0.043	1615
	(Intercept)	0.738	0.017	0.000***	0.704	0.773	1615
	Index of advantage	-0.039	0.021	0.063	-0.081	0.002	1615
	Attended	-0.007	0.023	0.773	-0.053	0.040	1615
	Advantage x Attended	-0.012	0.045	0.798	-0.101	0.078	1615
	(Intercept)	0.387	0.023	0.000***	0.342	0.431	1615
	Gender (male)	0.030	0.024	0.215	-0.018	0.077	1615
	Attended	0.003	0.034	0.922	-0.064	0.071	1615
	Gender x Attended	0.052	0.046	0.258	-0.039	0.143	1615
	(Intercept)	0.395	0.022	0.000***	0.351	0.439	1615
	Luganda	0.014	0.025	0.568	-0.035	0.063	1615
	Attended	0.015	0.036	0.681	-0.057	0.086	1615
	Luganda x Attended	0.030	0.051	0.554	-0.070	0.130	1615
	(Intercept)	0.322	0.038	0.000***	0.246	0.397	1615
	Education	0.007	0.003	0.025*	0.001	0.014	1615
	Attended	0.048	0.066	0.463	-0.081	0.178	1615
	Education x Attended	-0.001	0.006	0.815	-0.013	0.010	1615
	(Intercept)	0.369	0.024	0.000***	0.323	0.416	1610
	Wealth	0.029	0.012	0.016*	0.006	0.053	1610
	Attended	0.004	0.035	0.916	-0.066	0.073	1610
	Wealth x Attended	0.029	0.024	0.230	-0.018	0.076	1610
	(Intercept)	0.403	0.018	0.000***	0.367	0.438	1610
	Index of advantage	0.074	0.024	0.002**	0.027	0.121	1610
	Attended	0.034	0.023	0.144	-0.012	0.081	1610
	Advantage x Attended	0.040	0.041	0.324	-0.040	0.120	1610
	(Intercept)	0.615	0.020	0.000***	0.575	0.655	1621
	Gender (male)	0.051	0.024	0.036*	0.003	0.098	1621
	Attended	0.030	0.034	0.370	-0.036	0.096	1621
	Gender x Attended	-0.044	0.046	0.338	-0.135	0.046	1621
	(Intercept)	0.648	0.022	0.000***	0.606	0.691	1621
	Luganda	-0.011	0.027	0.696	-0.065	0.043	1621
	Attended	0.018	0.035	0.615	-0.052	0.088	1621
	Luganda x Attended	-0.020	0.049	0.679	-0.117	0.076	1621
	(Intercept)	0.498	0.040	0.000***	0.418	0.577	1621
	Education	0.013	0.003	0.000***	0.006	0.020	1621
	Attended	0.080	0.071	0.260	-0.060	0.221	1621

Monitor Charter	Education x Attended	-0.006	0.006	0.286	-0.018	0.005	1621
	(Intercept)	0.596	0.022	0.000***	0.552	0.641	1616
	Wealth	0.039	0.013	0.003**	0.014	0.064	1616
	Attended	0.021	0.033	0.530	-0.045	0.086	1616
	Wealth x Attended	-0.007	0.023	0.773	-0.052	0.039	1616
	(Intercept)	0.642	0.016	0.000***	0.611	0.673	1616
	Index of advantage	0.084	0.023	0.000***	0.039	0.129	1616
	Attended	0.009	0.023	0.684	-0.036	0.054	1616
	Advantage x Attended	-0.041	0.044	0.361	-0.128	0.047	1616
	(Intercept)	0.605	0.010	0.000***	0.585	0.626	8089
	Gender (male)	0.007	0.012	0.572	-0.017	0.030	8089
	Attended	0.007	0.015	0.639	-0.023	0.037	8089
	Gender x Attended	0.004	0.021	0.844	-0.037	0.045	8089
	(Intercept)	0.603	0.011	0.000***	0.581	0.625	8089
Luganda	0.011	0.013	0.382	-0.014	0.037	8089	
Attended	0.002	0.017	0.887	-0.030	0.035	8089	
Luganda x Attended	0.012	0.022	0.573	-0.031	0.055	8089	
(Intercept)	0.597	0.019	0.000***	0.559	0.634	8089	
Education	0.001	0.002	0.476	-0.002	0.004	8089	
Attended	0.039	0.031	0.202	-0.021	0.100	8089	
Education x Attended	-0.003	0.003	0.314	-0.008	0.003	8089	
(Intercept)	0.617	0.011	0.000***	0.595	0.639	8064	
Wealth	-0.007	0.006	0.260	-0.018	0.005	8064	
Attended	0.005	0.017	0.773	-0.028	0.037	8064	
Wealth x Attended	0.002	0.011	0.833	-0.019	0.024	8064	
(Intercept)	0.609	0.008	0.000***	0.593	0.626	8064	
Index of advantage	0.003	0.010	0.806	-0.018	0.023	8064	
Attended	0.009	0.012	0.446	-0.014	0.032	8064	
Advantage x Attended	0.005	0.019	0.790	-0.033	0.044	8064	
Stacked outcomes	(Intercept)	0.605	0.010	0.000***	0.585	0.626	8089
	Gender (male)	0.007	0.012	0.572	-0.017	0.030	8089
	Attended	0.007	0.015	0.639	-0.023	0.037	8089
	Gender x Attended	0.004	0.021	0.844	-0.037	0.045	8089
	(Intercept)	0.603	0.011	0.000***	0.581	0.625	8089
	Luganda	0.011	0.013	0.382	-0.014	0.037	8089
	Attended	0.002	0.017	0.887	-0.030	0.035	8089
	Luganda x Attended	0.012	0.022	0.573	-0.031	0.055	8089
	(Intercept)	0.597	0.019	0.000***	0.559	0.634	8089
	Education	0.001	0.002	0.476	-0.002	0.004	8089
	Attended	0.039	0.031	0.202	-0.021	0.100	8089
	Education x Attended	-0.003	0.003	0.314	-0.008	0.003	8089
	(Intercept)	0.617	0.011	0.000***	0.595	0.639	8064
	Wealth	-0.007	0.006	0.260	-0.018	0.005	8064
Attended	0.005	0.017	0.773	-0.028	0.037	8064	
Wealth x Attended	0.002	0.011	0.833	-0.019	0.024	8064	
(Intercept)	0.609	0.008	0.000***	0.593	0.626	8064	
Index of advantage	0.003	0.010	0.806	-0.018	0.023	8064	
Attended	0.009	0.012	0.446	-0.014	0.032	8064	
Advantage x Attended	0.005	0.019	0.790	-0.033	0.044	8064	

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$. 95% confidence intervals are presented.

¹ Outcome is whether the preference of the respondent measured pre-meetings matches the meeting outcomes.

² Analysis is restricted to respondents who were invited to attend consultation meetings.

³ Analyses do not incorporate sampling weights, and are clustered at the level of meetings.

Table 17: Systematic differences in voluntary interventions during meetings

Factor	Coef.	SE	p	95% CIs		N
Gender (male)	0.089	0.040	0.026*	0.011	0.168	913
Education	0.011	0.005	0.026*	0.001	0.021	913
Wealth	0.039	0.021	0.058	-0.001	0.080	910
Language (Luganda)	0.156	0.039	0.000***	0.080	0.233	913
NRM vote	-0.031	0.051	0.536	-0.132	0.069	478
Index of advantage	0.176	0.038	0.000***	0.100	0.252	910

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

¹ Estimates are obtained from a set of OLS regressions including each of the covariates one by one. ² Outcome is the natural logarithm of the number of times individuals' made a point, without having been encouraged by the discussion leader, during the meeting they attended. Variable was transformed so as to control for outliers; 1 was added to each value so as to prevent transformed values of $-\infty$.

³ Analyses do not incorporate sampling weights, and are clustered at the level of meetings.

Table 18: Systematic differences in total time spoken during meetings

Factor	Coef.	SE	p	95% CIs		N
Gender (male)	2.613	0.456	0.000***	1.713	3.514	913
Education	0.135	0.058	0.021*	0.021	0.249	913
Wealth	0.322	0.252	0.204	-0.178	0.822	910
Language (Luganda)	1.216	0.487	0.013*	0.256	2.177	913
NRM vote	-0.289	0.678	0.671	-1.629	1.051	478
Index of advantage	2.361	0.437	0.000***	1.496	3.225	910

Note: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

¹ Estimates are obtained from a set of OLS regressions including each of the covariates one by one. ² Outcome is the square root of the total time individuals spent speaking during the meeting. Variable was transformed so as to control for outliers.

³ Analyses do not incorporate sampling weights, and are clustered at the level of meetings.

7.11 Robustness checks for analyses of engagement during consultation meetings


Tables 17 and 18 represent robustness checks for analyses of engagement during the meetings, presented in Tables 6 and 7 in the main body of the paper. As we showed in Figure 2, the total number of voluntary interventions made and the total time spent speaking during the meeting are both positively skewed. To address the possibility that outliers are driving the results, we re-run the specifications presented in the main body with a set of transformed outcomes. We use here the logarithm of the total number of interventions, and the square root of the total time spent speaking in the consultative meeting.

7.12 Village distribution on socio-economic advantage

We present in the main body of the paper (Table 10) an analysis of the share of variance in meeting outcomes explained by facilitator identity. This is disaggregated by whether meetings are held with representatives of more socio-economically advantaged or disadvantaged villages.

We present here the distribution of this village-level index of socio-economic advantage, obtained by averaging 2 standardized indicators of educational achievement and wealth.

Figure 21: Socio-economic distribution of villages in our sample



7.13 Partnership and Ethics

The project relies on a close collaboration between the research team at WZB, KCCA, IPA and the International Growth Center (IGC).

The initial idea for creating the Charter originated with a group of bureaucrats at KCCA who wanted to establish an accountability tool with citizens. The idea was discussed with the research team at WZB, who was quickly interested in collaborating with KCCA on building this tool and exploring theoretical questions important for policy related to political inequality and citizen engagement. KCCA is offering logistical support for the project; moreover, as the ultimate custodian of the Charter, it is KCCA's responsibility to author the final Charter document.

IPA is providing research support and data collection expertise in Kampala, as well as facilitating the coordination between the actors, and working closely with WZB on summarizing and preparing the data to handle over to KCCA for the creation of the Charter. Their global vision on creating evidence for policy design also brings on board the skills necessary to reach the appropriate institutions for future impact in the field of accountability and citizen engagement.


Another partner in the project is the International Growth Center (IGC). IGC is providing funding as well as facilitating the engagement with different actors in the project given its strong relations with institutions in Kampala and understanding of the local context.

The emphasis of the research team, IGC, and KCCA on having all the actors on board with the project has caused some of the delays in the field work. This is primarily due to the need for gathering letters of support from all the actors involved in public service delivery and citizen engagement in Kampala: the Executive Director of KCCA, the Lord Mayor and the Minister for Kampala.

We have ethics clearance from local Ugandan institutions, as well as an approval from the ethics committee at WZB in Berlin. Moreover, we have received international IRB approval from IPA international, based in the USA. In Uganda, we have received clearance from MUREC, as well as UNCST (Ugandan National Committee for Science and Technology).

7.14 Timeline

Figure 22: Timeline of activities



7.15 Instruments

This section lists the main instruments we use during the phase of citizen consultative meetings.

7.15.1 Consultation outcomes record

Consultation Outcomes Record

**PLEASE COMPLETE THE SECTION BELOW DURING THE MEETING,
AS TOPICS GET DISCUSSED BY THE PARTICIPANTS**

For **each** of the following items **please indicate in the first column the option that was finally chosen by the group**. Also indicate **in the second column the level of agreement in the group** for the chosen option by selecting one of the three options provided. Please **read participants the full text of the question**, so they are made aware of the tradeoffs involved in the issue.

<p>1. Currently, KCCA provides information to citizens on how the budget money gets spent at division level.</p> <p>An advantage of reporting investments at parish or even village level is that it gives citizens more information about how their taxes and the fees they pay get spent which makes it easier to hold KCCA accountable.</p> <p>A disadvantage is that information like this takes KCCA time and resources to produce. This information might also make citizens focus too much on local investments and make it harder for KCCA to make long-term investments for Kampala more broadly.</p> <p>At which level do you think KCCA should present to citizens how money gets spent in different parts of the city?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Division level <input type="checkbox"/> Parish level <input type="checkbox"/> Village level <input type="checkbox"/> Even split between options <input type="checkbox"/> I don't know</p>	<p>How many agreed?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> All agree <input type="checkbox"/> Most agree <input type="checkbox"/> Few agree</p>
<p>2. KCCA is considering ways to improve communications with Kampala citizens about its activities and how tax revenues are used. One way to do so is to try to go directly in the communities, and hold small consultation meetings with citizens, similar to this one. Another approach is to use drop in centers or to use social media, like WhatsApp.</p> <p>An advantage of meetings like this is that KCCA can hear directly from citizens who might otherwise not contact KCCA. A disadvantage is that organizing such meetings requires a lot of time and resources from KCCA, as well as from citizens, who have to make the time to attend the meetings.</p> <p>An advantage of social media channels, like Instagram or Facebook is that they are cheaper and can be used at any time. A disadvantage is that not everyone can comfortably use the Internet, which means using social media to disseminate information may only make it easier for the wealthier or the more educated citizens to gain access to information.</p> <p>Another possibility is to have more investment in division-level customer centers, where citizens can come. An advantage is the people can go at any time. A disadvantage is that it can take time to go and maybe not everyone who has an issue will bring it to these centers.</p> <p>Which of the following ways do you think KCCA should pursue?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Have KCCA staff hold regular consultations at the village level with citizens <input type="checkbox"/> Build up capacity of drop-in centers at division level, where citizens could walk in and ask questions</p>	<p>How many agreed?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> All agree <input type="checkbox"/> Most agree <input type="checkbox"/> Few agree</p>

**PLEASE LEAVE ABOUT 15 MINUTES AT THE END OF THE MEETING
FOR THE FOLLOWING 4 QUESTIONS**

I would like to end by proposing a couple of topics to discuss about KCCA's activities and its performance. In the next 15 minutes of the meeting, I would like to ask you to give your opinion on which areas you think KCCA is performing particularly well, which ones you are less satisfied with, and a general opinion about the institution's performance. As with the previous questions, different people might think differently about these topics depending on how much they interact with KCCA and in which areas; some of you might interact with them more as a business owner, some others as a regular citizen and some other might have never interacted with KCCA so it is natural that opinions vary here.

<p>6. Could you please tell me any three areas in which you think the KCCA is performing particularly well? (write below) These could be with regard to different sectors, such as roads, lighting, business support, or with regard to aspects of their performance, such as in service delivery, responsiveness, or transparency.</p>	<p>How many agreed with the final list of items?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> All agree <input type="checkbox"/> Most agree <input type="checkbox"/> Few agree</p>
<p>7. Are there are any three services that KCCA currently provides that you are dissatisfied with? (write below)</p>	<p>How many agreed the final list of items?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> All agree <input type="checkbox"/> Most agree <input type="checkbox"/> Few agree</p>
<p>8. If KCCA were to include in the Charter some specific standards for some sectors, which three sectors should it prioritize?</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p>	<p>How many agreed?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> All agree <input type="checkbox"/> Most agree <input type="checkbox"/> Few agree</p>
<p>9. In general, do you think that KCCA is on the right track? (write below)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> Even split between options</p>	<p>How many agreed?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> All agree <input type="checkbox"/> Most agree <input type="checkbox"/> Few agree</p>

**PLEASE FILL IN THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AFTER THE
MEETING IS OVER AND THE PARTICIPANTS HAVE LEFT THE
VENUE**

Please also tell us a few of your impressions about how the meeting went.

10. Did you feel that this group was distracted during the meeting?
- Concentrated
 - Somewhat distracted
 - Very distracted
11. Did you feel that this group was willing to share information, or was it more reluctant to share?
- Willing to share
 - Neither
 - Reluctant to share
12. Overall, did you feel that there were many divisions in the group? What kind of division was there?
- Few divisions
 - Group split into about two groups with different ideas
 - Group split into more than two smaller groups with different ideas
13. How did the participants to the meeting generally speak about the topics they were presented with?
- In general, participants did not present any arguments for their position, but simply said that they prefer A instead of B
 - In general, participants sometimes gave no arguments for their position, and sometimes referred to personal experiences to support their position
 - In general, participants justified why they prefer A instead of B by referring to a personal experience
 - In general, participants sometimes referred to personal experiences to support their position, and sometimes referred to an abstract principle (e.g. social justice, accountability)
 - In general, participants justified why they prefer A instead of B by referring to an abstract principle
14. What did the group participants generally refer to when arguing for their position?
- The costs and benefits for themselves
 - The costs and benefits for residents of their village
 - The costs and benefits for a wider group defined by social characteristics (e.g. women, workers, *boda* drivers)
 - The costs and benefits for all residents of Kampala

 - They simply stated their position without any reasoning.
15. From among the participants, who would you say was the **most** influential in the group (**most** able to convince others of the quality of their arguments)?
Please write down their ID number: _____
16. From among the participants, who would you say was the **least** influential in the group (**least** able to convince others of the quality of their arguments)?
Please write down their ID number: _____

17. What was the main language used for these discussions? _____

18. What was the second language used for these discussions (if any)? _____

7.15.2 Behavioral instrument during consultations

Behavioral instrument during meetings

The instrument measures:

1. Number of instances of speaking and the duration of each instance disaggregated by (allow multiple):
 - a. interruptions (defined as speaking over someone)
 - b. speaking **off-topic** (defined as talking about something that is outside of the menu of choices on the agenda, which the discussion leader will outline at the outset).
 - c. Making your own case independent of what others have said.
 - d. Concurring with others
 - e. Making a counterargument (i.e. making an argument for why you disagree with someone)
 - f. Making disparaging comments (e.g. saying something like the following in response to other participants' ideas –“I think that's a stupid idea.”)
2. Number of instances a participant's issue gets picked up by others and the duration of each instance.
3. Number of instances a participant gets interrupted such that they are unable to finish their sentence.
4. Number of times a participant signals agreement (verbal, or physical e.g., by nodding) to another participant's proposal.
5. Same as 3, but for disagreement.

		Number of Instances of Speaking														
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
		Duration (in seconds)														
[Participant 1 code]	Interruptions															
	Off-topic															
	Own case															
	Concurring															
	Disagreeing															
	Disparaging comment															
[Participant 2 code]	Interruptions															
	Off-topic															
	Own case															
	Concurring															
	Disagreeing															
	Disparaging comment															
[Participant 3 code]	Interruptions															
	Off-topic															
	Own case															
	Concurring															
	Disagreeing															
	Disparaging comment															
[Participant 4 code]	Interruptions															
	Off-topic															
	Own case															
	Concurring															
	Disagreeing															
	Disparaging comment															
[Participant 5 code]	Interruptions															
	Off-topic															
	Own case															
	Concurring															
	Disagreeing															
	Disparaging comment															
[Participant 6 code]	Interruptions															
	Off-topic															
	Own case															
	Concurring															
	Disagreeing															
	Disparaging comment															
[Participant 7 code]	Interruptions															
	Off-topic															
	Own case															
	Concurring															
	Disagreeing															
	Disparaging comment															
[Participant 8 code]	Interruptions															

	Off-topic																		
	Own case																		
	Concurring																		
	Disagreeing																		
	Disparaging comment																		

Duration of Speaking

	Invited	Interrupted	Cited
[Participant 1 code]			
[Participant 2 code]			
[Participant 3 code]			
[Participant 4 code]			
[Participant 5 code]			
[Participant 6 code]			
[Participant 7 code]			
[Participant 8 code]			

7.15.3 Exit survey for participants

Kampala Citizen's Charter Consultations | Exit Survey

1. Your ID at this meeting (1 – 15)											2. Gender					
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	<input type="checkbox"/> Male	<input type="checkbox"/> Female
3. In which village (LC1) do you live?																

4. Discussion topic	A. What was the group's decision?	B. Did you change your views on this issue?	C. Are you happy with the group's decision?
Level at which KCCA should provide information on budget expenses	<input type="checkbox"/> At division level (LC3) <input type="checkbox"/> At parish level (LC2) <input type="checkbox"/> At village level (LC1) <input type="checkbox"/> No decision <input type="checkbox"/> Don't remember	NO YES	
Ways of communication between KCCA and citizens	<input type="checkbox"/> In-Person consultations in the village <input type="checkbox"/> Drop-in centers at the division level <input type="checkbox"/> Invest in social media channels <input type="checkbox"/> No decision <input type="checkbox"/> Don't remember	NO YES	
Ways to monitor KCCA's performance	<input type="checkbox"/> An external group <input type="checkbox"/> KCCA management <input type="checkbox"/> No decision <input type="checkbox"/> Don't remember	NO YES	
Allocation of KCCA resources between solving inequalities in the city and promoting development (scale from 1 to 5)	<input type="checkbox"/> Growth <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4 <input type="checkbox"/> Needy communities <input type="checkbox"/> No decision <input type="checkbox"/> Don't remember	NO YES	
Level of fees collected by KCCA	<input type="checkbox"/> Raise fees and more services <input type="checkbox"/> Keep fees and same services <input type="checkbox"/> Reduce fees and less services <input type="checkbox"/> No decision <input type="checkbox"/> Don't remember	NO YES	

Kampala Citizen's Charter Consultations | Exit Survey

<p>5. If KCCA had to choose between these topics to include in the Charter, could you tell me, which ONE do you think is most important to include?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Level at which KCCA should provide information on budget expenses</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Ways of communication between KCCA and citizens</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Ways to monitor KCCA's performance</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Allocation of KCCA resources between solving inequalities in the city and promoting development</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Level of fees collected by KCCA</p>																
<p>6. The Charter might contain specific standards for service delivery. For what area of service delivery would you most like to see specific standards in the Charter?</p> <p>CHOOSE UP TO THREE</p> <table style="width: 100%; border: none;"> <tr> <td style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> Fixing roads</td> <td style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> Drainage</td> <td style="width: 33%;"><input type="checkbox"/> Public health</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Business licenses</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Management of schools</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Public infrastructure (other than roads)</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Garbage collection (in markets and public spaces)</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Water and sanitation</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Other _____</td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Management of markets</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> City public toilet maintenance</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Physical planning</td> <td><input type="checkbox"/> Health services (public hospitals and clinics)</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>		<input type="checkbox"/> Fixing roads	<input type="checkbox"/> Drainage	<input type="checkbox"/> Public health	<input type="checkbox"/> Business licenses	<input type="checkbox"/> Management of schools	<input type="checkbox"/> Public infrastructure (other than roads)	<input type="checkbox"/> Garbage collection (in markets and public spaces)	<input type="checkbox"/> Water and sanitation	<input type="checkbox"/> Other _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Management of markets	<input type="checkbox"/> City public toilet maintenance		<input type="checkbox"/> Physical planning	<input type="checkbox"/> Health services (public hospitals and clinics)	
<input type="checkbox"/> Fixing roads	<input type="checkbox"/> Drainage	<input type="checkbox"/> Public health														
<input type="checkbox"/> Business licenses	<input type="checkbox"/> Management of schools	<input type="checkbox"/> Public infrastructure (other than roads)														
<input type="checkbox"/> Garbage collection (in markets and public spaces)	<input type="checkbox"/> Water and sanitation	<input type="checkbox"/> Other _____														
<input type="checkbox"/> Management of markets	<input type="checkbox"/> City public toilet maintenance															
<input type="checkbox"/> Physical planning	<input type="checkbox"/> Health services (public hospitals and clinics)															
<p>7. What organization did the facilitator belong to?</p> <p style="text-align: right;"> <input type="checkbox"/> ¹ IPA <input type="checkbox"/> ² KCCA <input type="checkbox"/> ³ A university <input type="checkbox"/> ⁴ Don't remember </p>																
8.	Before this meeting did you already know the following persons?															
A. Participant 1	NO YES (ME!)															
B. Participant 2	NO YES (ME!)															
C. Participant 3	NO YES (ME!)															
D. Participant 4	NO YES (ME!)															
E. Participant 5	NO YES (ME!)															
F. Participant 6	NO YES (ME!)															
G. Participant 7	NO YES (ME!)															
H. Participant 8	NO YES (ME!)															
J. Participant 9	NO YES (ME!)															
K. Participant 10	NO YES (ME!)															
L. Participant 11	NO YES (ME!)															
M. Participant 12	NO YES (ME!)															
N. Participant 13	NO YES (ME!)															
O. Participant 14	NO YES (ME!)															
P. Participant 15	NO YES (ME!)															
I. Facilitator	NO YES (ME!)															

Kampala Citizen's Charter Consultations | Exit Survey

<p>9. Do you think the facilitator listened to you as carefully as he/she listened to other participants in the meeting?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Yes (as carefully) <input type="checkbox"/> No (not as carefully)</p>
<p>10. Do you think the other members of the meeting listened to you in as carefully as they listened to other participants in the meeting?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Yes (as carefully) <input type="checkbox"/> No (not as carefully)</p>
<p>11.What is the overall satisfaction with the meeting?</p> <p> Unsatisfied  Somewhat satisfied  Very Satisfied</p>
<p>12.Overall, was the language used during the meeting clear and easy to follow?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Clear <input type="checkbox"/> Somewhat unclear <input type="checkbox"/> Very unclear</p>
<p>13. How much do you think this meeting is going to affect the outcome of the Charter?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> NOT AT ALL <input type="checkbox"/> A LITTLE <input type="checkbox"/> VERY MUCH</p>
<p>14.Any other comment you have about the meeting?</p>
<p>15.Anything else you would like to say about the Charter that you did not say at the meeting?</p>

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