She wins

Electing women in ethnically divided societies

Arindam Banerjee
Sayan Banerjee
Charles Hankla
Kunal Singh
Anjali Thomas

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She Wins - Electing Women in Ethnically Divided Societies: The Case of Bihar, India

Arindam Banerjee  
Policy and Development Advisory Group  
New Delhi, India

Sayan Banerjee  
University of Virginia

Charles Hankla  
Georgia State University

Anjali Thomas  
Georgia Institute of Technology

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Introduction

We know from previous research that women's political participation is a fundamental contributor to gender equality (Childs and Luvendusky 2013, O'Connell 2018, Iyer and Mani 2019). The increased presence of elected women is critical to improving government responsiveness on gender issues and to ensuring the robust design and implementation of welfare measures pertaining to women and children. Moreover, women’s political engagement is associated with a wide variety of positive developmental outcomes, including reduced corruption, better health outcomes, and improved educational opportunities (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, Clots-Figueres 2012, Esarey Schwindt-Bayer 2019). Perhaps the United Nations, in naming gender equality as one of its seventeen sustainable development goals, said it best: “Empowering women and promoting gender equality is crucial to accelerating sustainable development. Ending all forms of discrimination against women and girls is not only a basic human right, but it also has a multiplier effect across all other development areas.”

It is understandable, then, that the bulk of prior research on gender and politics in the developing world focuses on how to increase women representation in office. Few researchers, however, have addressed why, in ethnically diverse democracies like those found in many lower- and middle-income countries, some women candidates are successful while others are not. Indeed, most of the existing research does little to differentiate women candidates by by campaign strategies. Without understanding how voters react to women candidates and when and how women ultimately win electoral offices, evidence on gender and political representation will remain limited.

In this paper, we address these questions by exploring the interaction of gender, caste, and campaign strategies in India’s state-level elections, focusing on the state of Bihar. We are concerned

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1 https://www.sdgfund.org/goal-5-gender-equality
specifically with elections for the position of MLA, member of the state legislative assembly, i.e. the Vidhan Sabha. Our goal is to identify the key factors that impact women’s political success. The evidence and findings can hopefully be used by both policymakers and elected representatives to promote significant and inclusive gains in local socio-economic growth and improved gender parity.

We explore three broad areas. First, we examine questions of intersectionality in Indian politics by asking how gender, caste, and appeal interact to structure the preferences of voters. While these issues have received the attention of sociologists and anthropologists, we are among the first to examine systematically their implications for politics India’s states.

We begin by asking whether the burdens of lower caste status fall disproportionally on women candidates. Next, we draw on the literature in American politics to investigate whether women are likely to be more successful with stereotypically “feminine” electoral appeals to public goods rather than “masculine” appeals to security. We then test whether voters who have lived under a woman local leader will be more amenable to voting for a woman at the higher state level, where no quotas exist. These local leaders, the elected heads of village councils, are known variously as a Pradhan, Mukhia, or Sarpanch. Bihar’s state law requires that women be selected as Pradhans in 50% of villages, but it provides no gender reservation for state-level elections. We therefore explore the very important question of quota “spillover effects.” Do gender quotas at the local level, where they are easiest to implement, ease the path of women seeking electoral office at higher tiers? And, relatedly, are voters living in MLA constituencies already represented by a woman more likely to vote for a woman in future elections?

Our second group of analyses explores the interactive effect of party on support for women candidates. We anticipate that identifying a woman candidate with a particular political party will
dampen the effect of gender on vote choice. Party loyalty will take over and trump, we believe, the identity of the candidate. As a sub-question, we investigate the impact of affiliation with a right-wing upper-caste party (the BJP) with affiliation with a more leftist lower-caste party (the RJD).

For our final question, we ask whether voters who are more exposed to caste violence will be more interested in candidates making security related vote appeals and less likely to support a woman. We anticipate that women will be less able to make security appeals and will be at a disadvantage among voters, and by extension among districts, with a history of caste and communal violence. In other words, we expect that reduced political opportunities for women can be added to the many doleful consequences of civil violence.

To test our arguments, we accumulated original, primary data from a large survey experiment of voters in the Indian state of Bihar.\(^2\) The survey experiments were conducted in eight state legislative (Vidhan Sabha) constituencies through a random sample of 2000 respondents. Our surveys presented respondents with hypothetical candidates distinguished by caste, gender, campaign appeal, and political party in order to isolate the additive and interactive effects of each characteristic on voter preferences.

We complimented these survey experiments with interviews of 50 political party functionaries, NGO members, and current elected representatives in Bihar. These interviews were expected to shed light on the mechanisms and context behind the causal inferences established by the survey experiments. They also helped us understand better the “supply” side of the political marketplace, allowing us to gauge not only the behavior of voters but also the incentives affecting those who select, support, and fund potential candidates.

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\(^2\) Please note that the data were to be collected and analyzed in May 2020, but the coronavirus pandemic delayed the process and the field work was conducted over 35 days in December 2020- January 2021.
In the final analysis, the goal of our project is to shed light on the impediments faced by women seeking to engage politically in one of the world’s most diverse democracies. It is only by understanding these impediments that they can be overcome.

**Women Candidates and Voting**

During the last two decades, numerous scholars have explored the impact of candidate gender on electoral success. Most of these scholars have not found a direct bias against women candidates, but they do nevertheless show that gender matters for voting in more subtle ways (Brooks 2014, Dolan 2013, Clayton et al 2019). For example, Schneider and Bos (2013) argues the politicians, whether male or female, are considered by voters, at least in the United States, to be in a separate category. In other words, voters may refrain from applying their normal gender stereotypes to candidates. Brooks (2013) goes further, showing that when Amercian voters hold stereotypes about women candidates, these are generally positive stereotypes that can actually benefit their candidacies. Clayton et al (2019) extend these finding to the more traditional society of Malawi, again pointing to positive gendered beliefs among voters.

None of this means, however, that women do not face gender-specific barriers to election. First, there is the issue of the “double bind” identified by some scholars (Childs and Luvendusky 2013, Teele, Calla, and Rosenbluth 2018). Women may be expected to be “tough” in order to be elected, but they may also be penalized for showing any “tough” behavior. In the Indian context, voters have often perceived successful female politicians – including such leading figures as Indira Gandhi, Mamata Banerjee, Mayawati, and Phoolan Devi (a former dacoit) -- as tough. Women’s electoral prospects may also be hurt if they are unable to accumulate as much experience due to
their greater average involvement as parents. On the other hand, women who have elected not to marry and have children may be seen as less sympathetic by voters (Clayton et al 2019).

Whatever the case, the behavior of voters seems to be less of an impediment for women politicians than the “supply side” factors. In this respect, researchers speak of a funnel through which candidates must pass to appear on the ballot. The nature of this funnel varies from country to country, but in general it involves moving from eligibility for office, to a willingness to run, and finally to nomination (Krook and Schwindt-Bayer 2013). Existing evidence points to these last two stages as potential bottlenecks for women candidates, and therefore as possible explanations for why women are underrepresented in office around the world. In other words, it appears that women are less attracted to running for office, perhaps due to social and psychological differences or the greater demands on their time (Lawless and Fox 2005). And party gatekeepers may sometimes be reluctant to nominate certain groups of candidates, thinking that they will be less likely to emerge victorious. There is indeed evidence for this last dynamic in the United States with regard to race, though the same scholars do not find a gender effect (Doherty, Dowling, Miller 2019). It is possible, however, that such an effect may exist in other contexts.

The degree of this gatekeeping might be connected to specific party ideologies. For example, in a study of twelve parliamentary democracies, Caul (1999) identifies “new left values” as among the determinants of nominating more women. More to the point, however, evidence points to the dampening effect that strong party identity may have on the impact of candidate gender on vote choice. In other words, when voters are committed to a particular party, they are likely to vote for its nominee whatever that candidate’s gender. This dynamic seems clear in the United States (see Dolan 2014), but few have examined it in India.
Other researchers have investigated whether gender quotas, newly introduced in some countries, are helpful for potential women candidates. Here the evidence points to quotas as a strong driver of increased female participation in politics (Rincker 2017, Priebe 2017, Parthasarathy, Rao, and Palaniswamy 2019), though the extent to which they may fundamentally transform gender stereotypes may be limited (Beath, Christia, and Enikopolov 2013). Moreover, scholarship indicates that building women’s political representation may be easier in systems using closed-list proportional representation and harder in plurality systems like the United States and India (Paxton, Hughes, and Painter 2009).

A third group of scholars has examined how “intersectionality” might play out politically. The concept of intersectionality was first developed by Kimberlé Crenshaw (see Crenshaw 2017) and refers to the complex intermingling of identities that characterizes human behaviour as well as the exercise of power. Gender, race, sexual orientation, age, and other identities are not simply additive, but they interact in complex ways, and these interactions have implications for politics. This much seems well established in the literature, but few scholars have looked systematically at how intersectionality, especially between gender and caste, might play out in the Indian political context (though there are exceptions, i.e. Haq 2013).

We draw on these rich veins of knowledge in developing our own theoretical arguments, but we take the literature a important step forward. Rather than examining the causes of women’s underrepresentation in politics, we focus on identifying factors which might make it more or, perhaps, less challenging for women candidates. These include, as we discuss in more detail below, caste intersectionality, ethnic violence, and particular campaign appeals. And, rather than exploring the causes or impacts of quotas themselves, we are concerned with whether their
benefits “spillover” from lower to higher tiers. This is a question with significant policy relevance, since imposing quota can be much easier politically at the local level.

A final group of scholars, focusing instead on the policy impact of electing women, have examined whether female politicians behavior differently in office from their male counterparts (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004, Clots-Figueres 2012, Esarey Schwindt-Bayer 2019). Much of this literature has concentrated on the established democracies of the developed world, particularly the United States, but recent years have seen a clear uptick in studies tackling these questions in developing countries. Their findings are mostly clear – that more women in office translates into more public goods, less corruption, and more attention to traditional “women’s” concerns. While we do not examine here the policy impact of electing women, we are motivated by the clear findings that increasing the gender diversity of elected leaders has strong potential benefits.

The Context of India and Bihar

We test our arguments using original data from the Indian state of Bihar. Before proceeding further, it is worth exploring how gender plays into India politics in general and Bihari politics more specifically. In India’s 2019 Parliamentary Elections, a record 14% of successful national parliamentary, or Lok Sabha, candidates were women, of whom more than half came from underprivileged socio-economic backgrounds. Despite this progress, the Inter-Parliamentary Union continues to rank India only 143rd out of 192 countries for the proportion of elected women representatives in parliament, behind Pakistan (20.2%), Bangladesh (20.6%) and Nepal (32.7%).

Moreover, although the incumbent BJP government had promised in their 2014 campaign manifesto

3 https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=8&year=2020
to pass a bill to mandate women’s reservation in Parliament, they have failed to deliver on their campaign promise to date despite their strong majority during the term.

Because India’s constitution reserves for women a minimum of 33% of seats in Panchayati Raj institutions (India’s three-tiered local government assemblies) and as Pradhans, the situation is different at the local level. But the relative lack of female representatives at the central and state levels indicates that gender, in India as elsewhere, continues to play a major role in nomination and perhaps also voting decisions at all levels. This fact is significant for the effort to achieve gender equality in politics, and it also has resonance for sustainable development (Buch 2010). Recent studies have shown (1) that assembly constituencies in India with elected women representatives tend to achieve higher economic growth and (2) that women legislators are generally less corrupt and more efficient than their male counterparts (Baskaran et al. 2016).

Bihar is among India’s largest and poorest states, and it also has a history of caste prejudice and violence (Kumar 2018). In recent years, however, the state has made significant progress in its economic development, even as backward and scheduled caste mobilization has roiled it politics (Chakrabarti 2015).

Bihar is located in northeast India and as per Census 2011 population of 105 million, higher than Germany or Turkey.4 Its per capita GDP was about US$450 in 2019, making Bihar one of the poorest states on the subcontinent. A recent economic boom, driven at least in part by the success of its much-hailed Chief Minister Nitish Kumar, has also made Bihar one of the fastest growing Indian states, at 10.5%.5 But tremendous poverty remains, and caste prejudice and violence is a regular feature of life in Bihar (Witsoe 2013).

4 https://www.census2011.co.in/census/state/bihar.html
5 https://www.prsindia.org/parliamenttrack/budgets/bihar-budget-analysis-2020-21
Demographically, the state has among the largest percentage population of Scheduled Caste people (SCs, also known as Dalits or, formerly, untouchables) in the country, at about 16%. Forward, or high caste, individuals make up an estimated 15%, especially Bhumihars, Rajputs, and Brahmins. Other Backward Caste groups (OBCs), especially the numerous Yadavs and Kurmis, make up the plurality of the population, at about 50%, and Muslims round out the numbers at about 17%.

Confrontations among these castes have their origins as least as far back as the Raj, when the British governed through mostly forward caste zamindars, who – like medieval nobles – had responsibility for collecting taxes and enforcing order within their lands (Kumar 2018). After independence and the abolition of the zamindari system, many members of backward castes (though few Dalits) managed to acquire land and move up the social ladder. The history of caste-based rule, combined with these post-independence changes, helped drive a politics deeply rooted in caste antagonisms, and also, of course, in caste alliances. These sometimes play out beyond the bounds of regular politics, as when caste militias such as the forward caste Ranvir Sena perpetrate violence. But more often their effects are visible in the structure of electoral competition in the state.

Today, politics in Bihar revolves primarily around competition between three political parties. The long-term (now former) chief minister (CM), Lalu Prasad Yadav, is leader of the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD, or National People’s Party). This party grew from the Janata movement which had opposed Congress Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and had captured power in the wake of her relinquishment of dictatorial power after the 1975-77 Emergency. Lalu Yadav’s party was left-of-center ideologically, but was built mostly around his enormous Yadav caste and its co-ethnic
allies (Jaffrelot and Kumar 2009). During his time as CM, Lalu Yadav was praised for advancing the fortunes of the poor and backward castes, but was also seen as deeply corrupt and unconcerned with development (Witsoe 2013). Lalu Yadav’s wife Rabri Devi became Bihar’s first, and to date only, female Chief Minister in 1997 after Lalu Yadav’s involvement in a corruption scandal forced him to resign as Chief Minister, though she was widely perceived to be a figurehead.

In the Indian political system, a state’s chief executive is called the Chief Minister and is chosen by a majority vote of the state legislative assembly. The current Chief Minister, Nitish Kumar, is the leader of the Janata Dal-United Party (JDU). Kumar is a member of the second most numerous backward caste grouping (jati) in Bihar, the Kurmis, and his party reflects these alliances. At the same time Kumar has tried to move beyond caste politics to some extent by focusing on good governance and development issues (Kumar 2018). Kumar has also sought to champion women’s interests through public provisioning and through the introduction of the 50% gender quotas in local government, though not necessarily in the realm of providing opportunities to women candidates at higher levels of government (Spary 2020).

The power of the Congress Party, one of India’s two truly national political entities, has been almost completely eroded in Bihar, and support for the communists has also dwindled. But the other national party – the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – has become a very significant player in the state. The rise of Narendra Modi, India’s current Prime Minister, was felt strongly in the state and led the BJP – commonly perceived as a Hindu nationalist upper-caste party, to win a significant number of seats in the state using, in part, caste appeals. The party’s alliance with the JDU, however, has meant that Nitish Kumar has stayed on as CM.

With respect to gender issues, Bihar is among nine Indian states which have provisions mandating a more robust 50% reservation for women in local government. The state has a history
of gender discrimination, but its leaders are increasingly aware of the problem and taking action. Part of our goal is to understand how support for women politicians can best be provided.

Understanding gender and voting in Bihar, then, is important in its own right. But Bihar is also an extremely useful case for understanding these dynamics as in other highly divided democracies. As noted above, caste violence is endemic in many parts of Bihar, but not to the same degree in every district. There are gender quotas at the local but not the state level. There is strong partisan competition combined with free elections. All of these factors make Bihar a perfect place to test our arguments.

Theory and Hypotheses

In the diverse and complex electoral environment of a state such as Bihar, previous research points to the impact of local caste and communal violence on the efficacy of security versus public goods appeals. Banerjee (2018) demonstrates that individuals who have experienced violence are much more open to promises of security from candidates rather than promises of providing public goods. This dynamic is reversed for those with less exposure to violence.

All of this stands to reason, but we still do not know whether the presence of violence in a particular locale impacts the competitiveness of women candidates for office. Nor do we understand what specific types of electoral appeals resonate with voters and how they are impacted by the gender of the candidate. In addition, we are still largely ignorant about how the intersectionality of various identities may play out in Indian politics. And we know little about how exposure to women at various levels of government shapes voters’ perceptions of new women candidates running for office. With these issues in mind, we test hypotheses around three broad
topics. Within these topics, we ask a series of critical questions and, in response to them, pose a number of hypotheses.\(^\text{10}\)

**Intersectionality: Gender, Caste, and Appeal**

Within the rubric of intersectionality, we pose three related questions. This first is as follows:

*Does gender impact the effectiveness of campaigning on security from ethnic violence versus campaigning on improved provision of public goods?*

Past research has indicated that women political candidates may have more traction presenting themselves in traditionally “feminine” ways, for example as compassionate or as mother-figures (Ono and Yamada 2020, Spary 2007). They may be at a disadvantage when it comes to more stereotypically masculine policy appeals around, for example, law and order, and defense. We test here to see if similar dynamics are present in the Indian context.

**H1:** Women candidates who promise caste or communal security will be at greater disadvantage in MLA elections than those who promise improved public goods.

\(^{10}\) Note that these hypotheses, along with our methodology, are part of a pre-analysis plan which we have pre-registered through egap.
Does living in a village governed by a woman local executive increase the willingness of voters to elect a woman at the higher, state level? Does living in a constituency already represented by a women MLA increase the willingness of voters to choose another woman candidate?

In answering the first question, we seek to contribute to the literature on the effects of local gender quotas on representation in India (Bhavnani 2009, Goyal 2020a, 2020b) and to the question of quota spill overs. Previous scholars have shown that caste quotas for university admission in India may spillover into high school performance (Bhattacharjee 2019) and that gender quotas for proportionally allocated legislative seats spill over into single-member-district seats in South Korea (Shin 2014).

In the Indian context, Goyal (2020) examines whether gender quotas in the Delhi Municipal Corporation have upstream effects on the prevalence of women candidates in state elections. She finds that each increase in local female representation at the municipal level significantly increases the prevalence of local women candidates who contest state elections and the likelihood that local and re-contesting state-level women candidates and incumbents secure party nominations. She also uses a conjoint experiment similar to the one we present here to examine whether voters in local female constituencies prefer women candidates in state elections. Our study seeks to build on Goyal’s findings to investigate a similar question in a different and more varied context – the state of Bihar – which has higher levels of caste violence. In addition, we explore the question as it pertains to the panchayat institutional structure, which is for rural areas and operates distinctly from municipal local governments. We ask here whether quotas at a lower tier of government (the village panchayat) spill over into voting decisions for women candidates at a higher tier (the state). Given
that it is often politically easier to impose quotas at the local level, this question has significant policy implications.

In addressing the second question, and comparing it to the results of the first, we seek to shed light on how the level of government affects voter attitudes towards women candidates. While we expect exposure to women pradhans to shape voters’ perceptions, we anticipate an even greater effect of exposure to women MLAs.

**H2a:** Voters are more likely to support women candidates in MLA elections if they live in a village which is or has been led by a women pradhan.

**H2b:** Voters are more likely to support women candidates in MLA elections if they live in a constituency represented by a female MLA.

*How do the caste and religious backgrounds of women candidates impact their success in seeking state office? Are OBC, Dalit, or Muslim women more or less likely than their male counterparts to win state office?*

There is a tremendous amount of new research in intersectionality showing convincingly that identities are not additive but rather interactive. Spary (2007, p263-264) notes for example the importance of caste, religious and class identities in India, which may produce as much difference among women as between women and men. How these intersectionalities play out among women political candidates is a less explored question. On the one hand, Jensenius (2016) notes that minority-group women may face an advantage when it comes to being selected by parties to run
for public office since parties can “cash in the ‘complementarity bonus’ of being able to count someone as both a woman and a minority” (p440). Indeed, she finds both in the context of state and parliamentary level elections in India, that parties have in recent decades nominated more women candidates in constituencies reserved for Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) and that, in fact, much of the increase in the nomination of women candidates in India in recent years has occurred in reserved constituencies. She interprets these patterns as a result of “parties resisting changes to existing power hierarchies” (p441), meaning that parties have responded to pressure to nominate more women by doing so at the cost of their least powerful male politicians – SC and ST men. On the other hand, however, minority women may still face a double disadvantage when it comes to voters who may perceive both their caste and gender identity to be hindrances to their candidacy or their performance in office.

Previous scholars, then, have begun exploring how intersectionality affects parties’ choices of candidates in India (Spary 2007, Jensenius 2016). We focus on a different question: how intersecting identities of gender and caste affect voter perceptions. Inspired by past research, we expect that the gender and caste identity of candidates will combine in the minds of voters, likely to the detriment of women candidates who are also from lower caste or Muslim backgrounds.

**H3:** Women candidates from scheduled caste and Muslim backgrounds will be at a greater disadvantage than comparable male candidates in MLA elections.

_Gender and Parties_

The second broad topic that we address relates to the role that parties and party affiliation play in mediating gender and voting. More specifically, we address first the following questions:
Are voters more accepting of women candidates from some political parties than others? Is there a significant difference in support for women candidates between left- and right-wing parties, and between traditionally upper-caste and traditionally lower-caste parties? Does the presence of political party on the ballot reduce the impact of gender in voting decisions?

Given the important role that parties play in shaping women’s representation in the Indian context (Jensenius 2016, Bhavnani 2009), we thus examine how partisan affiliation might mediate gender voting. As noted above, previous research has indicated that partisan loyalty can trump gender effects in voting (Dolan 2014). We expect to observe the same dynamics in India. There is perhaps less clarity in how the ideology of particular political parties might matter. Following Caul (1999), we expect that voters for a leftist, lower caste-oriented party such as the RJD may be more open to voting for a woman than a rightist, upper-caste party such as the BJP. In addition to ideology, we expect that these differences between the parties may also stem from more restrictive norms for upper-caste women relative to lower-caste women.

\textbf{H4a:} When candidates are associated with a political party, the impact of gender on voting decisions will be reduced.

\textbf{H4b:} When candidates and voters are co-partisans, the impact of gender on voting decisions will be reduced.
H4c: Women candidates affiliated with the RJD will find more support than those affiliated with the BJP, other things equal.

*Are women potential candidates treated differently by political party activists? Is there a “pipeline” problem in Indian state elections?*

**Gender, Violence, and Discrimination**

The final broad topic that we address concerns the complex interrelationship between gender, violence, and discrimination. A consideration of this topic leads to the following questions:

*How does local caste and communal violence affect the electoral prospects of women candidates at the state level? Does this interact with the campaign appeals that candidates use?*

We are interested in exploring how voting functions in divided societies, where civil violence is endemic. Past research has shown that the experience of political violence reduces the motivation of women to participate in politics while increasing the motivation of men (Hadzic and Tavits 2019). There is also significant evidence that women are generally stereotyped as more peaceful than men (Hansen 2013). With these findings in mind, we suspect that higher levels of such violence, by putting at a premium the stereotypically masculine trait of providing physical protection, may redound to the benefit of male candidates. To our knowledge, we are the first to answer this important question with systematic data.
**H6a:** Women candidates will be at a disadvantage in MLA elections among voters who have experienced caste or communal violence.

**H6b:** Male candidates who promise caste or communal security will enjoy an advantage in MLA elections (over comparable male candidates who promise improved public goods) with voters who have experienced caste or communal violence.

**H6c:** Women candidates who promise caste or communal security will not enjoy a similar advantage with these voters over women candidates who promise improved public goods.

**Research Design**

To test the hypotheses that spring from our three topics, we conducted a conjoint survey experiment with 2000 respondents in the Indian state of Bihar. Such an approach is the most effective way of isolating various independent variables and estimating their potential causal relationships with vote choice and has been used extensively to answer similar questions (see Mutz 2011, Auerbach and Thachil, 2018, Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto 2015, Häusermann, Kurer, and Traber 2019). The randomization present in an experiment allows us to be confident that our causal relationships are real, while the survey element means that we are testing our arguments with data collected from real voters in the field.

As our sampling frame, we have selected four districts, two with high levels of violence and two with low levels of violence. These are located both in the northern and southern parts of Bihar. Within each of the four districts, we will examine two MLA constituencies. One of these will be represented by a woman and the other will be randomly selected from among the male
represented constituencies adjacent to it. This approach provides better identification for testing our hypotheses.

Within each of these constituencies, we have surveyed approximately 250 respondents. This was done by analyzing the electoral voting rolls for each polling district within the constituency and randomly selecting individuals to poll. The randomization was done by computer. If the enumerators were unable to find the person randomly selected, or if that person refuse to participate, they asked to question another adult in the same household. If that strategy failed, they sought another respondent with similar demographic characteristics living as close to the original respondent as possible. As some respondents had limited access to telephones or computers and others were illiterate, the enumerators proceeded door-to-door. The entire data collection was done through a digital data collection platform by android hand held devices with necessary data audit and geo location features to ensure error free data collection.

The enumerators asked the respondents to choose their preference in each of two pairs of hypothetical MLA candidates. These candidates were randomized according to the following traits: gender (male or female), caste (forward or upper, backward, dalit, and muslim), and appeal (public goods v. security). Gender and caste were indicated by the name of the candidate rather than explicitly mentioned. The enumerators then presented illustrations to the respondent of each of these two candidates, allowing the respondent to look while hearing the information read out loud. The drawings identified the gender of the candidate, but every additional identifier other than clothing color was standardized. For a third pair of candidates, enumerators again randomly selected a pair of candidates from the 16 possibilities mentioned above. This time, however, the first candidate in this pair represented the BJP and the second candidate represented the RJD. The
enumerators then presented a final pair of candidates to the respondent, using the same procedure as above, but this time with the first in the pair representing the RJD and the second the BJP.

Before presenting the candidate pairs, the enumerators asked whether the respondent or a close relative or friend has experienced caste or communal violence. They also asked for demographic characteristics, including age, gender, religion, jati, political party, education level, and literacy. In addition, after the candidate pairs, the enumerators undertook a brief household survey. The full survey instrument can be found in Appendix 1.

**Methodology**

We analyze our data using the method laid out in Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014). Specifically, we use a simple linear regression with robust standard errors clustered by respondent and including constituency fixed effects. We control for respondents’ age, education and gender and for candidate profile attributes including an indicator for the appeal, an indicator for whether the candidate is a woman and indicators for whether the candidate is Muslim, Forward Caste, or OBC. We leave membership in a scheduled caste as the reference category unless it is a key independent variable in the regression.

Following Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014), our unit of analysis is the candidate profile and our main dependent variable of interest is whether a given candidate profile with specific gender, identity and platform attributes is preferred by a given respondent. This is a binary variable “Preferred Candidate” coded on the basis of the question “If these two candidates were running against each other for MLA, and the election were held today, which would you vote
for?”. For each hypothesis, we run an alternative specification eliminating observations where the respondent indicated that they were neutral or only slightly preferred their choice of candidate.\textsuperscript{11}

The indicators for candidate gender, appeal, ethnicity and partisan affiliation are coded on the basis of the candidate profiles presented to the respondent. The other independent variables are coded on the basis of the responses to the survey questions provided in Appendix A. For ethnicity, we code a respondent as a co-ethnic of the candidate if she or he shares the same reported caste category as the hypothetical candidate (i.e. Scheduled Caste / Dalit, Other Backward Caste/OBC, or Forward Caste) or if she or he reports her religion as Islam and the hypothetical candidate is a Muslim.

To capture whether a respondent has been personally exposed to discrimination or violence on the basis of religion or caste, we create a variable “SelfDiscrimViolence” which is coded 1 if a respondent answered “yes” to whether they had personally faced any kind of discrimination or violence in the previous one year and if they reported that this discrimination or violence was based on caste or religion, and 0 otherwise. To capture the extent of decision-making power for women in the household, we create a variable “WomanDecisionIndex” based on the answers to each part of Question 33 where we will assign one point to each response where respondents report that a woman – that is, the respondent if she is a woman or Mother or Elder female members in the household – makes the relevant household decision. In Bihar, overall, women’s decision-making power have been on the rise. The improvements have been widespread from health metrics (births, immunizations, nutrition etc.) to empowerment metrics, such as participation of married women in household decisions, ownership of bank savings accounts, mobile phones, and so forth\textsuperscript{12}. The

\textsuperscript{11} The relevant question is “Please indicate how strongly you prefer this candidate over his or her competitor on a five point scale, with 5 meaning “strongly prefer” and 1 meaning “slightly prefer”. We define the strong preference sample as those cases in which the response is a 3 or higher.

\textsuperscript{12} Data: National Family Health Survey, 2019-20 and 2015-16 rounds.
state numbers on all of these above women’s decision-making parameters are still below the national average but the gaps have closed compared to 2015-16\textsuperscript{13}. The data from our survey allow us to examine how women’s decision-making within the household varies by key respondent characteristics such as their ethnicity and partisan affiliation.

We create the binary variable “WomanPradhan” which is coded 1 if the respondent answered “yes” to the question of whether her or his village has a current woman Pradhan and the binary variable “WomanPradhanEffectiveifApproach” which is coded 1 if the respondent reported that he or she approached the woman Pradhan with a problem and found her response to be helpful. Additionally, we create the binary variable “WomanPradhanEffective” which is coded 1 if the respondent reported that either a past or current woman Pradhan in the village was able to deal effectively with the respondent’s issues always, often or sometimes. The binary variable “WomanMLA,” which is based on electoral data, is coded 1 if the given state assembly constituency in which the respondent lives has a woman MLA, and 0 otherwise. The binary variable “WomanMLAHelp” is coded 1 if WomanMLA is 1 and if the respondent reported approaching their current MLA for help at least once in the previous year. Meanwhile, the binary variable “WomanMLAEffective” is coded 1 if the respondent had a woman MLA in his or her constituency in the past 10 years and if the respondent reported that the woman MLA was always, often or sometimes able to effectively deal with challenges in the constituency.

To add context to the survey experiment, we also conduct qualitative semi-structured interviews of over fifty party leaders and activists. These cannot be randomized and the results are therefore be more impressionistic. In order to ensure a diversity of perspectives, we interviewed women Pradhans and panchayat members, as well as party workers, community

\textsuperscript{13} Data: National Family Health Survey.
leaders and members of JEEVIKA, the Bihar Rural Livelihoods Promotion Society, a community led state run institution active in mobilizing women into collectives in the villages. We include our interview instruments for party workers in Appendix 2, women politicians in Appendix 3, and NGOs in Appendix 4.

Results

What then, do our data tell us about voting in India and its complex interactions with identity and appeal? We start out in Table 1 by presenting some basic regressions examining the extent to which potential voters in Bihar prefer or discriminate against women candidates running for state elections. Consistent with several studies done in a variety of contexts (e.g. Clayton et. al. 2020; Schwarz, Hunt and Coppock 2018), Table 1, Columns 1 and 2 show a systematic preference for women candidates amongst respondents in our sample. We find that this preference is particularly strong amongst female voters (Table 1, Columns 3 and 4) whereas male voters on average do not have a systematic preference nor a systematic distaste for women candidates.

These results are consistent with data from the qualitative interviews we conducted with women Pradhans and JEEVIKA leaders in Bihar. Some of the respondents lamented the role of male family members in holding power behind the scenes, and others indicated that it took time for them as women to be respected. One woman panchayat member, for example, stated that “during the initial days when I ventured out and made promises, people made fun of me. But I did not pay heed to them, and now I have delivered on my promises.”14 Another said that “the promises made by a woman are sometimes not taken seriously. Sometimes the elders make

14 Woman panchayat interviewee #1, Bihar, December 2020.
discouraging statements during the election campaign. I ask them to give me a chance to see my work.”

Nevertheless, a common theme of those interviewed was that women candidates were as popular, or more popular, than men. For some, this fact was due to the reservations for women at the local level, but others asserted that women are perceived as less corrupt and more public spirited than men.

For many of the respondents, their gender played no role in their probability of being elected. When asked whether she was likely to receive a nomination ticket from a party for MLA, one panchayat leader asserted that “it is not about being a man or a woman. If I am capable, why will I not get a ticket.” Another said that being a woman “has a positive effect because as a woman when someone is trying to do something then it is more impactful.” One JEEVIKA leader went as far to as to say that “woman don’t do chudur budur [bad deals]. Men are greedy and don’t keep their promises. Men get corrupt when they get power.” Some respondents, especially among the JEEVIKA leaders, even noted, consistent with our results, that women candidates prefer women elected officials.

Although we have not developed hypotheses around these issues, it is also worth noting that our aggregate model indicates a preference for public goods appeals (though this is driven by men voters, as discussed below) and against candidates who are Muslim and, to a much lesser extent, forward castes.

15 Woman panchayat interviewee #5, Bihar, December 2020.
16 Woman panchayat interviewee #2, Bihar, December 2020.
17 Woman panchayat interviewee #6, Bihar, December 2020.
18 Woman JEEVIKA interviewee #2, Bihar, December 2020.
19 Woman JEEVIKA leader interviewees #5 and #6, Bihar, December 2020.
Anti-Muslim prejudice is a well-documented feature of Indian politics, but less support for forward caste candidates may seem more puzzling. We suspect that, given that forwards make up only about a fifth of the Bihar population and are the traditional elites (Kumar 2018), co-ethnics lower on the social rung prefer to vote for other co-ethnics or for those from other groups that share a history of marginalization. It is also the case that the primary parties in Bihar, particularly the Janata Dal (United) and the Rashtriya Janata Dal, have been promoting non-Forward candidates for some time. We discuss the propensity of voters to select co-ethnics in another section below.

Intersectionality: Gender, Caste, and Appeal

We turn now to the first major topic of the study: the dynamics of intersectionality in Indian politics. The first question under this rubric is as follows: *Does gender impact the effectiveness of campaigning on security from ethnic violence versus campaigning on improved provision of public goods?* As noted above, we find strong evidence that, in the aggregate, voters prefer public goods appeals over security appeals. A preference for public goods appeals is also a feature of the qualitative interviews, though some respondents do note that women may prefer security. Although we note that panchayat elections occur at a different time from MLA elections, and likely have different dynamics, one woman Mukhiya identifies her principle appeals as “a ban on open defecation and also on child marriage,” while another mentions “tailoring classes for women in the panchayat.”

Contrary to our pre-registered hypothesis, women candidates do not seem to perform better when they make public goods appeals. Likewise, men candidates are not more popular among
voters when they make security appeals. We present these models in Table 1, Columns 5 and 6. Despite these null results, a number of very interesting findings do nevertheless emerge from the data. First, women voters exhibit a strong preference for candidates who offer protection, whatever their gender. This result indicates strongly that women in Bihar do indeed feel more vulnerable to discrimination and violence than men, and that this vulnerability impacts their votes. This effect is visible in Table 1, Columns 7 and 8, where the interaction term between women voters and security appeals is positive and statistically significant. It is also present in the qualitative interviews, where a group of JEEVIKA leaders note that women “feel uncomfortable and awkward to go outside alone. Women have to be accompanied with a male member of the family. Women safety is a concern.”

Second, we find that women voters give an extra boost of support to candidates who offer protection when those candidates are women. This dynamic, we speculate, provides evidence that women voters, on average, tend to believe that women candidates will be more inclined to take gender security seriously. Table 1, Columns 7 and 8 show this relationship with their positive and significant triple interaction terms.

So, to summarize, there is no reason to believe that, due to gender stereotyping, women are more effective with public goods appeals and men with security appeals. There is, however, ample evidence that women are more attracted to candidates of any gender offering security, and that they especially prefer woman candidates focused on that issue.

We next tackle the following questions: Does exposure to women incumbents at different levels of government affect the willingness of voters to elect a woman at the higher, state level? How does the performance of these women incumbents modify voter attitudes to woman candidates

21 Woman JEEVIKA leader group interviewees #9, Bihar, December 2020.
in state-level elections? As a reminder, the leadership roles in 50% of Bihar’s local panchayats are reserved for women. Our initial expectation, listed in the pre-analysis plan, was that voters living in a local panchayat with a female leader – a Pradhan or Mukhiya – would be more inclined to vote for women at the non-reserved higher tier of the state legislative assembly. We also anticipated that this effect would be augmented when voters have interacted with their woman Pradhan and had been satisfied with her performance. In other words, we were testing for a “spill over effect” in gender reservations. This expectation was based evidence of such spill overs in other countries (Shin 2015) and in other contexts in India (Goyal 2020, 2020b, Bhattacharjee 2019).

As shown in Table 2, Columns 1 and 2, however, a close analysis of the data reveals no such spillover effect. Voters who say that they currently have or have had a woman Pradhan are no more likely to select woman candidate for MLA than those who have not, and the perceived effectiveness of the Pradhan also has no effect.

We also explore the related possibility that voters who live in an MLA constituency represented by a woman will be more likely to select a woman MLA candidate. As already noted, there are no reservation for woman MLAs, but we selected districts such that roughly half of respondents would be represented by a woman in the state legislative assembly. Again, however, we find no relationship between exposure to woman politicians at the state level and support for a woman MLA candidate (see Table 2, Columns 3 and 4).

There is, in Bihar, a reservation at the state assembly level for members of scheduled castes. Work by Spary (2007) and Jensenius (2016) has explored whether reservations for scheduled castes might increase the role of women in politics as well. We investigate a related question: whether MLA centric caste reservations also help women by increasing the propensity of voters
in reserved districts to vote for women. Again, in Table 2, Columns 5 and 6, we find no evidence that they do.

In the qualitative interviews, there is some evidence that reservations at the panchayat level encourage women to run for office at higher tiers. While many respondents did not express a desire for an MLA ticket, others had clearly developed a taste for politics and wanted to move forward in their careers. A common refrain in the interviews is also that women holding village leadership roles have experienced altered belief about the role of women. One respondent, for example, notes that: “Earlier women used to be confined to their homes. Only men went out but now women also go out of their homes. They are getting educated and are now being able to make independent decisions.”22 Another says that life “will definitely change and it has to change because earlier women were restricted to their homes and now women come out and play different roles like Mukhiya, Ward, and Sarpanch. A win for one woman is a win for all the women.”

However, some of these benefits might be offset by a phenomenon known as Mukhiya-Pati, in which male relatives – usually but not always the Mukhiya or Pradhan’s “pati” or husband -- conscript a woman to fill a reserved seat and then exercise power in the background. There is some evidence of this occurring in the interviews, for example when one respondent says that: “During the year 2011 my son was Mukhiya. After him I also became Mukhiya under his influence when the seat got reserved for women in the year 2016.”23 More tellingly, in at least two interviews with women Mukhiyas/Pradhans, we observed that their husbands were referred to as “Mukhiya ji”.24 In one of these cases, the woman Mukhiya noted that if the male residents of her village

22 Woman panchayat interviewee #2, Bihar, December 2020.
23 Woman panchayat interviewees #4, Bihar, December 2020.
24 Woman panchayat interviewees, Bihar, December 2020
approach her with problems her husband deals with these (though she says that she does as well).\footnote{Woman panchayat interviewee #8, Bihar, December 2020}

That said, it is clear that in many other cases, the elected women are the ones wielding power.

In the final analysis, therefore, the survey experiment indicates that there is little “spillover” of reservations at one level into votes at another or of reservations for one marginalized group (scheduled castes) into votes for another (women), at least at the level of voter attitudes. We interpret this as evidence that reservations, in order to work effectively, must be targeted at all tiers and for all groups that need more representation. Policy-makers cannot depend on reservations in one area to have an impact on another through changing perceptions, at least in the short to medium term.

At the same time, panchayat reservations may be slowly changing attitudes towards women in ways that will improve their ability to win at the state level. These attitudes may simply take longer to be reflected in quantitative research. Perhaps even more importantly, the interview data indicate that women themselves are beginning to see their roles in society differently, an important step towards more equal representation.

We now address our next questions: \textit{How do the caste and religious backgrounds of women candidates impact their success in seeking state office? Are OBC, Dalit, or Muslim women more or less likely than their male counterparts to win state office?} These are, of course, questions of intersectionality (see Crenshaw 2017) where we explore whether candidate identities are separate and additive, or whether there is something distinct (from the voter’s perspective) about combinations of these identities (i.e. Muslim women).

The data here do reveal a “double disadvantage” for Muslim women, though only among respondents with the most strongly held views (see Table 3, Columns 1 and 2). This double
disadvantage does not extend to women of other groups. We speculate that negative stereotypes of Muslim women in particular must be driving this result, but further research will be needed to fully explain it, and the issue does not come up in our qualitative analysis.

We also find that candidates of both genders who are Muslim or Scheduled Caste do better with co-ethnic voters, while no such effect is observable among Forward and Backward caste Hindus (see Table 2, Columns 3, 4, 5, and 6). This effect points to a desire among voters from more marginalized groups for descriptive representation in the state legislature, a desire that is less pronounced among voters from more politically represented groups. It is notable that the willingness of Forward and Backward Caste Hindus to vote for candidates from other groups is a positive sign for the development of Bihar’s political system.

**Gender and Parties**

Parties play a critical role in shaping women’s representation in the Indian context (e.g. Bhavnani 2009, Spary 2014, Jensenius 2016) and elsewhere (e.g. Lovenduski and Norris 1993, Caul 1999). With this in mind, we now turn to examining our second major topic: how partisan affiliation might mediate gender voting. As noted above, previous research has indicated that partisan loyalty can trump gender effects in voting (Dolan 2014). We expect to observe the same dynamic in India. There is perhaps less clarity in how the ideology of particular political parties might matter. Given previous research suggesting that right-wing voters may be less open to women seeking higher office than left-wing voters (Saha and Weeks 2020, Schwarz, Hunt and Coppock 2018), we might presume that voters for a leftist, lower-caste party such as the RJD may be more open to voting for a woman than a rightist, upper-caste party such as the BJP. However, there may also be gender
stereotypes associated with left-wing and right-wing parties (e.g. Sanbonmatsu and Dolan 2009, Cassese and Holman 2018) that may complicate this dynamic.

We turn first to exploring how partisan alignments modify the preferences for women candidates. We begin by examining our pre-registered hypothesis that “When candidates are associated with a political party, the impact of gender on voting decisions will be reduced.” Table 4, Columns 1 and 2, show marginal support for this hypothesis in the full sample and the subsample of respondents who reported strong preferences for their choice of candidate. Specifically, the results show that there is a systematic preference for women candidates not aligned with a party both in the full sample and in the strong preference sample. However, a candidate’s partisan alignment diminishes this preference (significant at the 10% level). Overall, then, women candidates are neither preferred nor discriminated against when they are aligned with a party. This finding is echoed in our qualitative interviews as well. For example, one female mukhiya we interviewed noted: “At present people are in favour of the NDA alliance and irrespective of the gender of the candidate if a candidate is from NDA, he/she would win.”

Given the importance of parties in the Indian context in shaping the electoral success of women candidates (e.g. Spary 2014), party labels may at least partly explain why overall preferences for women candidates do not translate into actual votes for women candidates.

We next turn to our pre-registered hypothesis that “When candidates and voters are co-partisans, the impact of gender on voting decisions will be reduced.” Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 investigate this hypothesis using the variable “Co-Partisan” which is coded 1 if the candidate is presented as belonging to the same party for which the respondent indicated that she or he will vote in the next election. As the results in Columns 3 and 4 show, the interaction between “Co-
Partisan” and the indicator for a female candidate is negative but not statistically significant either in the full sample (Column 1) or in the strong preference subsample (Column 2). However, while we do not find evidence that co-partisanship has a significant modifying effect, the results show a systematic preference for women candidates who do not share the party of the voter in our overall sample. Meanwhile, we find that voters do not display a gender preference one way or the other for candidates who are co-partisans.

Finally, we turn to our pre-registered hypothesis that “Women candidates representing the RJD will find more support than those representing the BJP, other things equal.” Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 restricts the sample to candidate profiles affiliated with either the RJD or the BJP, and examines whether women candidates affiliated with the BJP gain less support than women candidates affiliated with the RJD. The results across both columns show that there is no significant difference in the degree to which there is a preference for women candidates affiliated with the BJP relative to women candidates affiliated with the RJD.

To further probe differences across parties, we conduct exploratory tests to examine whether caste - and specifically the way that caste intersects with gender expectations in Hindu nationalist ideology- might shape differences in how party affiliation shapes support for women candidates. In particular, we examine the possibility that leaders and core supporters of the BJP – a traditionally Hindu upper-caste party - may be particularly disapproving of upper caste women candidates running for office due to social restrictions being more prevalent amongst women belonging to upper castes (see Field, Jayachandran and Pande 2010; Eswaran, Ramaswami and Wadhwa. 2013). Indeed, consistent with the idea that upper caste women face more restricted gender roles than other women, we find in our sample that respondents belonging to Hindu upper castes reported significantly lower levels of decision-making power for women in their households
compared with Hindu respondents who were Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or OBC.\textsuperscript{27} Thus, we post that leaders and core supporters of the BJP may view the party’s championing of an upper caste woman candidate as running counter to the Hindu nationalist ideology espoused by the BJP – and that of its affiliate organizations like those belonging to the \textit{Sangh Parivar} - which has involved preserving traditional caste and gender roles even as the party has sought to bring women into the public domain (Sarkar 1999, Hasan 2010). Moreover, given these views of the BJP leadership and core support base on caste and gender roles, voters may expect BJP leaders to discriminate against upper-caste women candidates in terms of intra-party allocations of resources and support which in turn may affect the success of such candidates in campaigning and carrying out their duties while in office. Given the fact that there are assembly seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and not for women, these expectations of discrimination may hold even when comparing the BJP’s treatment of upper-caste women to SC women – in particular, while voters may expect BJP leaders to provide support to SC women candidates in seats reserved for SCs (e.g. Jensenius 2016), they may have little reason to expect that BJP leaders would champion upper-caste women candidates in unreserved seats.

As a result, an upper-caste woman candidate’s affiliation with the BJP may lead voters to perceive her as “weak” due to her treatment within the BJP party organizations. However, voters may not expect leaders of other parties – whose leadership and core support base is dominated by lower-castes - to treat women candidates or upper-caste women candidates unfavorably. Thus, they may be more supportive of women candidates affiliated with lower-caste parties – such as the RJD or JD(U) in the Bihar context – fielding women candidates regardless of their caste.

\textsuperscript{27} Specifically, the difference amongst Hindu upper- caste and other Hindu voters in the women’s decision-making index described earlier is 0.43 and the p-value is 0.047.
The results in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 examine these possibilities by testing whether upper-caste women candidates affiliated with the BJP receive less support than upper-caste women affiliated with the RJD. The results show that affiliation with the BJP significantly undermines support for upper-caste women candidates compared to affiliation with the RJD in the full sample (Column 3) and does so marginally in the strong preference sample (Column 4). Meanwhile, affiliation with the BJP does not significantly modify support for upper-caste men candidates or for lower-caste women candidates in either sample. These results support the idea that voters may expect upper-caste women candidates to be treated relatively unfavorably within the BJP party organization due to the gender norms prevalent amongst Hindu upper-castes who dominate the BJP’s leadership and core support base (Thachil 2014, Suryanarayan 2019). Meanwhile, they may expect upper-caste women candidates to be treated better within the RJD whose leadership and core support base is more dominated by lower-castes amongst whom less restrictive gender norms prevail. Thus, our results suggest that voters are willing to switch support from the BJP to the RJD when faced with an upper-caste woman candidate. The fact that the results are weaker in the strong preference sample may convey that some voters may make this switch reluctantly and thus have less strong preferences about their chosen candidate.

Overall, therefore, we find broad support for our pre-registered hypotheses that party labels and co-partisanship trump gender when it comes to voting. These results offer a potential novel explanation for why women are under-represented in Indian politics overall. Previous work has highlighted the important role that party gatekeepers play in the Indian context when it comes to women candidates (e.g. Bhavnani 2009; Spary 2014; Jensenius 2016; Goyal 2020), implying that women’s representation in public office at the state and national level would improve if parties were to nominate more women candidates. In Bihar in particular, the major parties have fielded
only a small proportion of women candidates despite the fact that turnout amongst women voters surpassed that of men voters in the most recent state assembly elections.\textsuperscript{28}

Our research suggests, however, that even if parties were to nominate more women, certain party labels undermine voters’ underlying preference for upper-caste women candidates. In particular, in the case of right-wing traditionalist ethnic parties – the BJP in our context – party affiliation may result in a candidate’s identity as an upper-caste women actually hurting voter preferences for the candidate. Thus, our results suggest that increases in party nominations of women may not be enough to improve women’s representation without a change in voters’ perceptions of parties’ treatment of certain women candidates. In practice, of course, women candidates may have qualities that are appealing to voters regardless of their party affiliation. For example, one female panchayat ward member we interviewed referred to a woman MLA who is “an Olympic shooter” and claimed that this MLA “won because of her capabilities although she contested with a ticket from BJP. She would have done really well even without BJP’s ticket.”\textsuperscript{29} Another female panchayat ward member noted that this woman MLA was “a shooter, she is educated and her father Digvijay Singh was also in Politics.”\textsuperscript{30}

\textit{Gender, Violence, and Discrimination}

Our final broad topic concerns the relationship between gender, caste, and violence. The first important take-away of our results is that the overall advantage that women candidates enjoy is confined to districts with low levels of caste violence and discrimination (See Table 6), though the finding fall slightly below the level of significance in the strong preference sample. This dynamic

\textsuperscript{28} Smriti Kak Ramachandran. “Women voters outnumber men, but fewer fielded” \textit{Hindustan Times} 21 October 2020.
\textsuperscript{29} Woman panchayat interviewee #1, Bihar, December 2020.
\textsuperscript{30} Woman panchayat interviewee #3, Bihar, December 2020.
may be a consequence of the gender stereotype that men are better able to provide the security needed in tenser and more dangerous parts of the state, while women may be associated with good governance in places where the security situation is more stable.

We turn our attention next to ethnic minorities with a long history of discrimination against them - specifically, Scheduled Castes, of which Dalits (“Untouchables”) are a component, and Muslims. Violence and civil rights abuses against the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes have been a long ignored feature of Indian society. The Prevention of Atrocities Against Scheduled Castes/Tribes, 1989 have been a landmark ethnic hate crime and civil rights legislation designed to address the violence and discrimination. While data was unreliable due to low response rates and state apathy in the early years of the law’s implementation, we now have a better idea where Bihar stands in the national scale as the law have since been institutionalized. Bihar is consistently one of the worst states when it comes to atrocities against Scheduled Castes/Tribes. Case in point, in 2014, Bihar had the highest criminal cases pending for violence against Scheduled Castes of all Indian provinces\textsuperscript{31}. Coming to our study and looking intra-state, First, we find that voters in high violence districts have a much stronger preference for SC candidates (See Table 6, where SCs are the reference category). This may well be because Scheduled Caste members are among the most likely to suffer harm in such districts and therefore prioritize voting for a co-ethnic who may take their precarious situation more seriously.

So, voters in high violence districts tend to prefer Scheduled Caste representatives and, in contrast with their counterparts in low violence districts, have no preference for women. In this context, it is especially interesting to note that voters who have experienced caste discrimination personally have a clear preference for women candidates (See Table 7, Columns 1 and 2). These

findings may indicate that personal experience with discrimination makes voters prefer women candidates on the assumption that they will be more sensitive to such issues. But when voters live in a community more broadly threatened by violence, they are comparatively more attracted to male candidates due to gender stereotypes. More research will be needed to tease out these complex relationships.

Our final analysis explores whether the pro-woman effect of previous exposure to caste discrimination remains when voters have been represented by a woman MLA. We also test whether this effect is dependent on the overall level of violence in a district. We find that, in fact, voters in districts that have been represented by a woman MLA are also strongly inclined to support a women candidate when they have experienced discrimination (see Table 7, Columns 3, 4, 5, and 6). It is especially notable that the strength of this effect is greatest in high violence districts, meaning that past experience with discrimination and with a woman MLA seems to override to some extend the relative benefit that men seem to enjoy in these places.

Generalizability and Conclusions

Our study has a wide variety of implications for understanding voting behavior in Bihar and in India more broadly. These implications can be classified into three groups: (1) those that deal with gender and caste intersectionality, campaign appeals, and reservations, (2) those that address the role of political parties, and (3) those that touch on the impact of violence and discrimination on voting.

Beginning with the first group of results, we find that, in the aggregate, voters prefer women candidates and candidates who offer public goods, and they are less inclined to support Forward Caste candidates and, most strikingly, Muslims. Breaking the results down, however, it
becomes clear that women prefer women candidates, all candidates who offer protection, and especially women candidates who offer protection. By contrast, men have no gender preference in their selections and they tend to prefer candidates who offer public goods. These results indicate that women voters do indeed care about descriptive representation, that they feel more vulnerable to personal security threats than men, and that they tend to believe women leaders may understand and act on these threats more effectively than men.

In the light of these results, it may seem logical that other marginalized groups of voters - Muslims and members of Scheduled Castes – would prefer promises of security over promises of public goods. Interestingly, there is no evidence that this is true. That said, it is the case that SC and Muslim voters prefer co-ethnic candidates, just as women prefer female candidates. In addition, SC voters give an extra boost to SC candidates who make security appeals, though the same is not the case for Muslim voters. Again, this is evidence that voters who are members of marginalized groups do care about seeing members of those groups in office and that, in general, they feel more vulnerable than members of less marginalized communities.

In addition, our results indicate that, among respondents with strongly held views, Muslim women suffer a double disadvantage. There is no comparative double disadvantage for other groups. This is evidence for at least one form of intersectionality in India politics and may be due to particular stereotypes associated with this group.

Turning to the important questions of how reservations impact voting behavior, we find that having had a women Pradhan does not increase the likelihood that voters will select a woman MLA, whether or not the woman Pradhan is seen as effective. Moreover, voters from MLA constituencies reserved for Scheduled Castes do not show a preference for women candidates or for women SC candidates, or even for SC candidates.
All of this is evidence against the presence of a “spillover effect” for reservations from the local to the state level and instead an indicator that, if policy-makers want to increase women’s representation in state assemblies, they will need to impose reservations at that level as well. It is important to note, however, that our qualitative interviews point to some changes in attitudes towards the role of women at the village level. They also suggest that panchayat reservations may be helping to create a cohort of women politicians and change makers who aspire to take up bigger roles at higher levels and change the political dynamics at the state level as well.

We now turn to the results from our second broad topic – gender and parties. Overall, consistent with our expectations, we find that while voters have a preference for women amongst candidates not aligned with a political party, they display no systematic gender preference among party-affiliated candidates or among co-partisan candidates more specifically. We do not find support for the notion that women candidates affiliated with right wing parties - the BJP in our context - gain less support than women candidates affiliated with centrist or left-wing parties - the RJD in our context. We do find, however, that upper-caste women candidates affiliated with the BJP gain significantly less support than similar candidates affiliated with the RJD. The findings are consistent with the gender norms prevalent amongst the BJP’s predominantly Hindu upper-caste leadership and support base, which dictate the greatest social restrictions for upper-caste women. They support the idea that voters expect BJP leaders and functionaries to treat their upper-caste women candidates less favorably in terms of intra-party allocations of support and therefore perceive upper-caste women affiliated with the BJP as weak candidates.

Our final category of results concerns how the experience of violence and discrimination mediates voting behavior in India. We find, first, that people in low violence districts tend to prefer women candidates, whereas those living in more violent districts are more inclined towards
men (or, rather, their preference for women disappears). This is compatible with the stereotyping argument that voters perceive men as more effective at providing security. In addition to their greater orientation towards men candidates, voters in high violence districts prefer Scheduled Caste candidates, which is not the case in low violence districts (where Backward Caste candidates are more preferred). This may be because caste-based violence makes voters want a representative from a more marginalized group, though more research will be necessary to confirm this intuition.

In this context, it is interesting to note that personal experience with discrimination makes people more likely to vote for women. It may be that people who report discrimination think women candidates will do more for them. Of course, as we have just noted, people in more violent districts do not prefer women, which may be an indicator that violence and discrimination have disparate effects. Personally, experiencing discrimination may lead voters to seek candidates they perceive as more sensitive to their concerns, while living in an area with high levels of violence may condition voters to prefer voting for men who are perceived as better able to provide protection.

At the same time, however, we find that, even in high violence districts, exposure to caste discrimination combined with experience of being represented by a woman MLA, voters are still inclined to support woman candidates. This finding suggests that the negative effect of violent districts on support for women candidates may potentially be offset by other factors, including more exposure to woman’s leadership.

While we believe that all of these findings will illuminate the dynamics of identity and voting in the Indian state of Bihar, we are also convinced that they will shed light on gender and voting in a much wider variety of contexts. In particular, our research can help explain the patterns of voting in highly divided societies experiencing civil violence, as well as in those holding
elections at a multitude of tiers. It can help us understand the ways in which a variety of different critical variables interact with gender in structuring vote choice, adding complexity to our understanding of women candidates and their success.
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Table 1: Basic and Appeal Models

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Full Sample</th>
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<th>Model 3 Full Sample</th>
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<td>.077*** (.009)</td>
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</table>

N | 15968 | 14266 | 15968 | 14266 | 15968 | 14266 | 15968 | 14266

OLS regression. Robust standard errors clustered on respondent in parentheses. Unit of analysis is candidate profile. All models include district fixed effects and controls for respondent gender, age, and education. All tests are 2-tailed.

***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

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Table 2: Reservation Models

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<td>.016 (.012)</td>
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<td>-.035*** (.011)</td>
<td>-.037*** (.012)</td>
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<td>-.247*** (.009)</td>
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<td>.082*** (.010)</td>
<td>.077*** (.009)</td>
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<td>.077*** (.009)</td>
<td>.081*** (.010)</td>
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<td>-.075 (.009)</td>
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OLS regression. Robust standard errors clustered on respondent in parentheses. Unit of analysis is candidate profile. All models include district fixed effects and controls for respondent gender, age, and education. All tests are 2-tailed. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10
Table 3: Intersectionality Models

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<th>Model 1 Full Sample</th>
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<td>.024** (.010)</td>
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<td>.011 (.011)</td>
<td>.011 (.011)</td>
<td>.012 (.011)</td>
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<td>-.245*** (.009)</td>
<td>-.247*** (.009)</td>
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<td>BJP Candidate</td>
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<td>.082*** (.010)</td>
<td>.077*** (.009)</td>
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<td>-.074*** (.009)</td>
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<td>.052** (.020)</td>
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N 15968 14266 15968 14266 15968 14266

OLS regression. Robust standard errors clustered on respondent in parentheses. Unit of analysis is candidate profile. All models include district fixed effects and controls for respondent gender, age, and education. All tests are 2-tailed. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10

Table 4: Partisan Alignments and the Preference for Women Candidates
Table 4: How Parties Shapes the Preference for Women Candidates

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<td>0.03**</td>
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<td>0.02*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cand. Woman * Cand. Party</td>
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<td>-0.03*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-partisan</td>
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<td>0.36***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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<td>Protect Appeal</td>
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<td>-0.25***</td>
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<td>-0.13***</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<td>R-squared</td>
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The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the given candidate profile was chosen. Robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Caste and Gender and Partisan Alignment

<table>
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<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Full Sample</th>
<th>(2) Strong Pref.</th>
<th>(3) Full Sample</th>
<th>(4) Strong Pref</th>
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<td>Woman Candidate</td>
<td>0.00 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.02)</td>
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<td>Upper-Caste Candidate</td>
<td>-0.05*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.05*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.06** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.07*** (0.03)</td>
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<td>Cand. Woman * Cand. Upper</td>
<td>0.06 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.06 (0.04)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate BJP vs RJD</td>
<td>0.15*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.16*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.14*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.15*** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cand. Woman * Cand. BJP vs RJD</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.02)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.02)</td>
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<td>Cand. Upper * Cand. BJP vs RJD</td>
<td>0.03 (0.03)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.03)</td>
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<td>Cand. Woman * Cand. Upper * Cand. BJP vs RJD</td>
<td>-0.10** (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.09* (0.05)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect Appeal</td>
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<td>-0.18*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.18*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.18*** (0.01)</td>
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<td>OBC Candidate</td>
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<td>-0.01 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.00 (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Candidate</td>
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<td>-0.08*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.07*** (0.02)</td>
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The dependent variable is a binary indicator for whether the given candidate profile was chosen. Robust standard errors clustered by respondent in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6: High and Low Violence District Models

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<th>Model 2 Low Violence Districts</th>
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<td>Strong Preference Sample</td>
<td>Full Sample</td>
<td>Strong Preference Sample</td>
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<td>Woman Candidate</td>
<td>.021* (.011)</td>
<td>.015 (.012)</td>
<td>.009 (.012)</td>
<td>.011 (.013)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forward Caste Candidate</td>
<td>-.004 (.016)</td>
<td>-.010 (.017)</td>
<td>-.067*** (.016)</td>
<td>-.066*** (.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Backward Caste Candidate</td>
<td>.038** (.015)</td>
<td>.041*** (.015)</td>
<td>-.021 (.016)</td>
<td>-.025 (.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Candidate</td>
<td>-.138**** (.016)</td>
<td>-.141*** (.016)</td>
<td>-.127*** (.016)</td>
<td>-.121*** (.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Appeal</td>
<td>-.259*** (.012)</td>
<td>-.266*** (.013)</td>
<td>-.231*** (.013)</td>
<td>-.226*** (.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJP Candidate</td>
<td>.117*** (.013)</td>
<td>.118*** (.013)</td>
<td>.037*** (.013)</td>
<td>.044*** (.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RJD Candidate</td>
<td>-.115*** (.013)</td>
<td>-.116*** (.013)</td>
<td>-.036*** (.013)</td>
<td>-.046*** (.014)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>7850</td>
<td>7186</td>
<td>8118</td>
<td>7080</td>
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OLS regression. Robust standard errors clustered on respondent in parentheses. Unit of analysis is candidate profile. All models include district fixed effects and controls for respondent gender, age, and education. All tests are 2-tailed. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10
Table 7: Caste Discrimination Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full Sample</td>
<td>Strong Preference Sample</td>
<td>High Violence Districts</td>
<td>Previous Women MLAs</td>
<td>Full Sample</td>
<td>Strong Preference Sample</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman Candidate</td>
<td>.009 (.008)</td>
<td>.07 (.009)</td>
<td>-.014 (.019)</td>
<td>-.013 (.020)</td>
<td>.002 (.017)</td>
<td>-.011 (.018)</td>
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<td>Forward Caste Candidate</td>
<td>.097*** (.012)</td>
<td>.093*** (.012)</td>
<td>.035 (.023)</td>
<td>.043* (.025)</td>
<td>.103*** (.025)</td>
<td>.096*** (.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Backward Caste Candidate</td>
<td>.141*** (.011)</td>
<td>.141*** (.012)</td>
<td>.095*** (.025)</td>
<td>.101*** (.027)</td>
<td>.168*** (.023)</td>
<td>.173*** (.024)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scheduled Caste Candidate</td>
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<td>.130*** (.012)</td>
<td>.133*** (.024)</td>
<td>.133*** (.026)</td>
<td>.113*** (.022)</td>
<td>.112*** (.023)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security Appeal</td>
<td>-.245*** (.009)</td>
<td>-.247*** (.009)</td>
<td>-.230*** (.019)</td>
<td>-.220*** (.021)</td>
<td>-.281*** (.018)</td>
<td>-.289*** (.019)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BJP Candidate</td>
<td>.077*** (.009)</td>
<td>.082*** (.010)</td>
<td>.018 (.019)</td>
<td>.021 (.021)</td>
<td>.108*** (.020)</td>
<td>.109*** (.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RJD Candidate</td>
<td>-.075*** (.009)</td>
<td>-.082*** (.010)</td>
<td>-.029 (.019)</td>
<td>-.032 (.020)</td>
<td>-.105*** (.020)</td>
<td>-.107*** (.020)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caste Discrimination</td>
<td>-.050*** (.017)</td>
<td>-.052*** (.018)</td>
<td>-.074*** (.025)</td>
<td>-.080*** (.027)</td>
<td>-.067** (.031)</td>
<td>-.080** (.033)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Woman Candidate X Caste Discrimination</td>
<td>.095*** (.034)</td>
<td>.099*** (.035)</td>
<td>.152*** (.050)</td>
<td>.165*** (.053)</td>
<td>.113* (.062)</td>
<td>.137* (.062)</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>14266</td>
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</table>

OLS regression. Robust standard errors clustered on respondent in parentheses. Unit of analysis is candidate profile. All models include district fixed effects and controls for respondent gender, age, and education. All tests are 2-tailed. ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10
Appendix 1: Survey Experiment Instrument

Survey Experiment Instrument – IGC Project – 7/10/2020

Informed Consent Component

Thank you for considering taking part in our research survey. We will begin with some background information to ensure your willingness to participate.

Project Background
Title: She Wins - Electing Women in Ethnically Divided Societies: The Case of Bihar
Principal Investigators: Charles Hankla (Georgia State University, USA), Arindam Banerjee (PDAG, Delhi), Sayan Banerjee (University of Virginia), Anjali Thomas (Georgia Institute of Technology, USA).
Sponsor: International Growth Centre

Procedures
My name is ______ and I have come from PDAG, a New Delhi based organisation. We are conducting a study on politics in Bihar for which we will be interviewing voters across the state.
Responses from the study will be used to write articles for journals and newspapers. This study is being conducted by US-based Dr. Charles Hankla from Georgia State University, Dr. Anjali Thomas from Georgia Tech and UK-based Dr. Sayan Banerjee from the University of Essex. It is an independent study and is no way affiliated to any party or government. The information shared by you as part of the survey will be strictly confidential and your identity will be anonymized. If you decide to take part in the study, you will listen to four sets of two hypothetical candidates for the state legislative assembly and choose your preferred candidate in each set. You will also provide some background information about yourself. You will only interact with the surveyor reading this to you, and the survey will be done here and now. It should take 15-20 minutes to complete the study. We hope that you would help us in making this study successful by participating in it.

Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal
You do not have to be in this study. You may skip questions or stop participating at any time.

Contact Information
Contact Dr. Charles Hankla at +1 404 413 6169, chankla@gsu.edu
Kunal Singh – 8009381625, kunal.singh@pdag.in

Consent
Are you ready to take part in the study?
1. Yes 2. No
Sampling

[We have selected 4 districts, two with high levels of violence and two with low levels of violence. These are located both in the northern and southern parts of Bihar. Within each of the 4 districts, we will examine two MLA constituencies. One of these will be represented by a woman and the other will be randomly selected from among the male represented constituencies adjacent to it.]

Within each of these constituencies, we will survey approximately 250 respondents. This will be done by acquiring the voting rolls for each polling district within the constituency and randomly selecting about 30 individuals to poll. The randomization will be done by computer. If the enumerators are unable to find the person randomly selected, or if that person refuses to participate, they will ask to questions another adult in the same household. If that fails, they we seek another respondent with similar demographic characteristics living as close to the original respondent as possible.]

Background Survey Component – Part 1

I am going to begin by asking you a series of questions about your background and experiences.

Enumerator: Take note of the village name and location.

1. What is your gender?
   a. Male
   b. Female

2. Are you married?
   a. Married
   b. Never Married
   c. Divorced
   d. Widowed
   e. Separated

3. How many children do you have?
   a. None
   b. 1-2
   c. 3-5
   d. 6 or more

4. What is your jati?
a. Chamar  
b. Dusadh  
c. Other SC/ST  
d. Jadav  
e. Koeri  
f. Kurmi  
g. Other OBC  
h. Forward Caste  
i. Other or None  

5. What is your religion?  

a. Hindu  
b. Muslim  
c. Sikh  
d. Jain  
e. Christian  
f. Other or None  

5. What kind of work do you do?  

a. Agricultural wage laborer  
b. Non-agricultural wage laborer  
c. Cultivator / small landowner  
d. Large landowner  
e. Artisan / independent worker  
f. Small business owner  
g. Owner of business with more than 4 employees  
h. Household worker  
i. Professional  
j. Salaried employee  
k. Unemployed  
l. Disabled  

6. What is your age?  

a. 18-20  
b. 21-29  
c. 30-39  
d. 40-49  
e. 50-59  
f. 60-69  
g. 70 and above  

7. What is your education level?
a. Less than 3 years  
b. 3-5 years  
c. 6-8 years  
d. 9-12 years  
e. Some university or post-secondary  
f. University degree or higher
Survey Experiment Component

Now we are going to ask you to imagine that the elections for Bihar’s State Legislative Assembly are being held today. We are going to give you three pairs of possible candidates for MLA and ask you to choose your favorite candidate from each pair.

[Note: For the first two pairs, enumerators will use the app to randomize a pair of hypothetical candidates from among the 16 possibilities [2 X Gender, 4 X Jati, and 2 X Appeal] listed on the following pages. They will then present drawings to the respondent of each of these two candidates. They will allow the respondent to look while they also read the information out loud.

After the pair is presented, enumerators will now ask respondents to choose their preferred candidate of the two possible and to weigh the strength of their preference on a 5 point scale.]

1. If these two candidates were running against each other for MLA, and the election were held today, which would you vote for?

2. Please indicate how strongly you prefer this candidate over his or her competitor on a five point scale, with 5 meaning “strongly prefer” and 1 meaning “slightly prefer.”

[Enumerators will now use the app to produce a second randomly selected pair of candidates and repeat the procedure above.]

[For the third pair, enumerators will use the app to randomly select a pair of candidates from the 16 below, as before. This time, however, the first candidate in this pair will be representing the BJP and the second candidate will be representing the RJD. The enumerator will then ask the same above questions of the respondent.]

[For the third pair, enumerators will use the app to randomly select a pair of candidates from the 16 below, as before. This time, however, the first candidate in this pair will be representing the RJD and the second candidate will be representing the BJP. The enumerator will then ask the same above questions of the respondent.]
Sixteen possible candidates to be randomized into pairs

Candidate 1: (Female, Muslim, Security)

Enumerator presents generic drawing of a female candidate.

Enumerator says the following:

This is Shrimati Ansari, who is a candidate for MLA. She makes the following appeal to voters:

People like you too often have to live in fear of persecution and even violence from other groups. If elected, I will ensure that you and people like you can feel safe in your communities again.

Candidate 2: (Female, Muslim, Public Goods)

Enumerator presents generic drawing of a female candidate.

Enumerator says the following:

This is Shrimati Ansari, who is a candidate for MLA. She makes the following appeal to voters:

People like you too often have to suffer from a lack of basic amenities within your communities. If elected, I will ensure that you and your community experience more development.

Candidate 3: (Female, Forward, Security)

Enumerator presents generic drawing of a female candidate.

Enumerator says the following:

This is Shrimati Pandey, who is a candidate for MLA. She makes the following appeal to voters:

People like you too often have to live in fear of persecution and even violence from other groups. If elected, I will ensure that you and people like you can feel safe in your communities again.

Candidate 4: (Female, Forward, Public Goods)

Enumerator presents generic drawing of a female candidate.

Enumerator says the following:

This is Shrimati Pandey, who is a candidate for MLA. She makes the following appeal to voters:
People like you too often have to suffer from a lack of basic amenities within your communities. If elected, I will ensure that you and your community experience more development.

Candidate 5: (Female, OBC, Security)

Enumerator presents generic drawing of a female candidate.

Enumerator says the following:

This is Shrimati Sahu, who is a candidate for MLA. She makes the following appeal to voters:

People like you too often have to live in fear of persecution and even violence from other groups. If elected, I will ensure that you and people like you can feel safe in your communities again.

Candidate 6: (Female, OBC, Public Goods)

Enumerator presents generic drawing of a female candidate.

Enumerator says the following:

This is Shrimati Sahu, who is a candidate for MLA. She makes the following appeal to voters:

People like you too often have to suffer from a lack of basic amenities within your communities. If elected, I will ensure that you and your community experience more development.

Candidate 7: (Female, SC, Security)

Enumerator presents generic drawing of a female candidate.

Enumerator says the following:

This is Shrimati Paswan, who is a candidate for MLA. She makes the following appeal to voters:

People like you too often have to live in fear of persecution and even violence from other groups. If elected, I will ensure that you and people like you can feel safe in your communities again.

Candidate 8: (Female, SC, Public Goods)

Enumerator presents generic drawing of a female candidate.

Enumerator says the following:
This is Shrimati Paswan, who is a candidate for MLA. She makes the following appeal to voters:

People like you too often have to suffer from a lack of basic amenities within your communities. If elected, I will ensure that you and your community experience more development.

Candidate 9: (Male, Muslim, Security)

Enumerator presents generic drawing of a male candidate.

Enumerator says the following:

This is Shri Ansari, who is a candidate for MLA. He makes the following appeal to voters:

People like you too often have to live in fear of persecution and even violence from other groups. If elected, I will ensure that you and people like you can feel safe in your communities again.

Candidate 10: (Male, Muslim, Public Goods)

Enumerator presents generic drawing of a male candidate.

Enumerator says the following:

This is Shri Ansari, who is a candidate for MLA. He makes the following appeal to voters:

People like you too often have to suffer from a lack of basic amenities within your communities. If elected, I will ensure that you and your community experience more development.

Candidate 11: (Male, Forward, Security)

Enumerator presents generic drawing of a male candidate.

Enumerator says the following:

This is Shri Pandey, who is a candidate for MLA. He makes the following appeal to voters:

People like you too often have to live in fear of persecution and even violence from other groups. If elected, I will ensure that you and people like you can feel safe in your communities again.

Candidate 12: (Male, Forward, Public Goods)

Enumerator presents generic drawing of a male candidate.
Enumerator says the following:

This is Shri Pandey, who is a candidate for MLA. He makes the following appeal to voters:

People like you too often have to suffer from a lack of basic amenities within your communities. If elected, I will ensure that you and your community experience more development.

Candidate 13: (Male, OBC, Security)

Enumerator presents generic drawing of a male candidate.

Enumerator says the following:

This is Shri Sahu, who is a candidate for MLA. He makes the following appeal to voters:

People like you too often have to live in fear of persecution and even violence from other groups. If elected, I will ensure that you and people like you can feel safe in your communities again.

Candidate 14: (Male, OBC, Public Goods)

Enumerator presents generic drawing of a male candidate.

Enumerator says the following:

This is Shri Sahu, who is a candidate for MLA. He makes the following appeal to voters:

People like you too often have to suffer from a lack of basic amenities within your communities. If elected, I will ensure that you and your community experience more development.

Candidate 15: (Male, SC, Security)

Enumerator presents generic drawing of a male candidate.

Enumerator says the following:

This is Shri Paswan, who is a candidate for MLA. He makes the following appeal to voters:

People like you too often have to live in fear of persecution and even violence from other groups. If elected, I will ensure that you and people like you can feel safe in your communities again.

Candidate 16: (Male, SC, Public Goods)
Enumerate presents generic drawing of a male candidate.

Enumerate says the following:

This is Shri Paswan, who is a candidate for MLA. He makes the following appeal to voters:

People like you too often have to suffer from a lack of basic amenities within your communities. If elected, I will ensure that you and your community experience more development.
Post-Survey Experiment Evaluation:

[After the survey is complete, the enumerator will ask the respondent the following questions about the last pair presented.]

Thinking about the last pair of candidates you were presented:

1. Please describe the reason for your choice?
2. What was Candidate 1’s main promise?
3. What was Candidate 2’s gender?
4. What was Candidate 1’s jati?
Background Survey Component – Part 2

[Enumerators will next present the respondents with the following questions.]

Now I am going to ask you a few more questions about your background and experiences.

8. Which party did you vote for in the last MLA election?
   a. Janata Dal (United)
   b. BJP
   c. Other Government Party
   d. Rashtriya Janata Dal
   e. INC
   f. Communist Opposition
   g. Other Opposition
   h. Independent
   i. I didn’t vote
   j. I don’t recall

9. If the MLA election were held today, which party would you be most likely to vote for?
   a. Janata Dal (United)
   b. BJP
   c. Other Government Party
   d. Rashtriya Janata Dal
   e. INC
   f. Communist Opposition
   g. Other Opposition
   h. Independent
   i. I wouldn’t vote

10. How many times in the last year have you approached your current MLA for help?
    a. Never
    b. Once
    c. 2-4 times
    d. More than 4 times

11. In your opinion, how effective is your current MLA in dealing with the challenges faced by you and people like you in your constituency?
    a. Very Effective
    b. Somewhat Effective
    c. Somewhat Ineffective
    d. Very Ineffective
    e. Don’t Know/Can’t Say
12. How many times in the last year have you approached your current village Pradhan for help?
   a. Never
   b. Once
   c. 2-4 times
   d. More than 4 times

13. How often was your current village Pradhan able to deal effectively with your issues?
   a. All the time
   b. Most of the time
   c. Some of the time
   d. Never
   e. I have never brought issues before the Pradhan

14. Overall, how effective is your current village Pradhan at dealing with the challenges faced in your village?
   a. Very Effective
   b. Somewhat Effective
   c. Somewhat Ineffective
   d. Very Ineffective
   e. Don’t Know/Can’t Say

15. Does your village currently have a women Pradhan?
   a. Yes
   b. No

16. Has your village ever had a women Pradhan?
   a. Yes
   b. No

17. If yes, how often was the past or current woman Pradhan able to deal effectively with your issues?
   a. All the time
   b. Most of the time
   c. Some of the time
   d. Never
   e. I have never brought issues before the Pradhan

18. Prior to the current MLA, has your constituency ever had a female MLA in the past 10 years?
   a. Yes
   b. No
   c. Don’t Know/Can’t Say
19. If yes, how often was the past women MLA able to deal effectively with challenges in your constituency?
   a. All the time
   b. Most of the time
   c. Some of the time
   d. Never
   e. Don’t Know/Can’t Say

20. While speaking to people in the area, we have found that some of them have recently experienced discrimination while others say that they haven’t. Thinking about the past one year, have you personally faced any kind of discrimination? If so, how often?
   a. More than once a week
   b. About once a week
   c. About once a month
   d. A few times during the year
   e. A few times during my life
   f. Never

21. What do you believe this discrimination was based on? (Check all that apply)
   a. Jati
   b. Gender
   c. Religion
   d. Occupation
   e. Other
   f. I don’t know

22. While speaking to people in the area, we have found that some of their friends and family have recently experienced discrimination while others say that they haven’t. Thinking about the past one year, has a friend of a member of your family faced any kind of discrimination? If so, how often?
   a. More than once a week
   b. About once a week
   c. About once a month
   d. A few times during the year
   e. A few times during my life
   f. Never

23. What do you believe this discrimination was based on? (Check all that apply)
   a. Jati
   b. Gender
   c. Religion
   d. Occupation
   e. Other
   f. I don’t know
24. While speaking to people in the area, we have found that some of them have recently experienced violence while others say that they haven’t. Thinking about the past one year, have you personally faced any violence or threats of violence? If so, how often?
   a. More than once a week
   b. About once a week
   c. About once a month
   d. A few times during the year
   e. A few times during my life
   f. Never

25. While speaking to people in the area, we have found that some of them have recently experienced threats of violence while others say that they haven’t. Thinking about the past one year, have you personally faced any violence or threats of violence? If so, how often?
   a. More than once a week
   b. About once a week
   c. About once a month
   d. A few times during the year
   e. A few times during my life
   f. Never

26. What, in your opinion, were these acts of violence or threats of violence based on? (Check all that apply)
   a. Jati
   b. Gender
   c. Religion
   d. Occupation
   e. Other
   f. I don’t know

27. While speaking to people in the area, we have found that some of their friends or family members have recently experienced violence while others say that they haven’t. Thinking about the past one year, has a friend of a member of your family faced any violence or threats of violence? If so, how often?
   a. More than once a week
   b. About once a week
   c. About once a month
   d. A few times during the year
   e. A few times during my life
   f. Never
28. While speaking to people in the area, we have found that some of their friends or family members have recently experienced threats of violence while others say that they haven’t. Thinking about the past one year, has a friend of a member of your family faced any violence or threats of violence? If so, how often?
   a. More than once a week
   b. About once a week
   c. About once a month
   d. A few times during the year
   e. A few times during my life
   f. Never

29. What, in your opinion, were these acts of violence or threats of violence based on? (Check all that apply)
   a. Jati
   b. Gender
   c. Religion
   d. Occupation
   e. Other
   f. I don’t know

30. Have politicians or party workers ever assisted you in opposing discrimination or violence based on jati, religion, or gender?
   a. Yes
   b. No

31. If yes, please tell us who assisted you? (Check all that apply)
   a. My current MP. Was this person a woman? Yes/No
   b. My current MLA. Was this person a woman? Yes/No
   c. My current village Pradhan. Was this person a woman? Yes/No
   d. A previous MP. Was this person a woman? Yes/No
   e. A previous MLA. Was this person a woman? Yes/No
   f. A previous village Pradhan. Was this person a woman? Yes/No
   g. Another politician (not MP, MLA, Pradhan). Was this person a woman? Yes/No
   h. A party worker. Was this person a woman? Yes/No
**Intra-Household Gender Dynamics Component**

(Adapted from IHDS survey [https://www.ihds.umd.edu/sites/ihds.umd.edu/files/ihds2ehq.pdf](https://www.ihds.umd.edu/sites/ihds.umd.edu/files/ihds2ehq.pdf) and Prillaman [https://www.soledadprillaman.com/research](https://www.soledadprillaman.com/research))

[Following IHDS and other standard surveys, enumerator should administer this section to women respondents only. If the respondent happens to be male, enumerator should stop at the end of the previous section.]

32. How would you best describe your position in your household?

   a. Head of household
   b. Wife of head of household
   c. Daughter of head of household
   d. Mother of head of household
   e. Sister of head of household
   f. Other

33. Please tell me who in your family decides the following things?

   I. How much money to spend on food or clothing in the household?
      a. Respondent (Yes/No)
      b. Husband (Yes/No)
      c. Senior Male (Yes/No)
      d. Senior Female (Yes/No)
      e. Others (Yes/No)
      f. Not Applicable/No one

   II. Whether to buy an expensive item such as a refrigerator or TV?
       a. Respondent (Yes/No)
       b. Husband (Yes/No)
       c. Senior Male (Yes/No)
       d. Senior Female (Yes/No)
       e. Others (Yes/No)
       f. Not Applicable/No one

   III. What to do if you fall sick?
        a. Respondent (Yes/No)
        b. Husband (Yes/No)
        c. Senior Male (Yes/No)
        d. Senior Female (Yes/No)
        e. Others (Yes/No)
        f. Not Applicable/No one
IV. Whether to buy land or property?
   a. Respondent (Yes/No)
   b. Husband (Yes/No)
   c. Senior Male (Yes/No)
   d. Senior Female (Yes/No)
   e. Others (Yes/No)
   f. Not Applicable/No one.

V. Until what level your children should be educated?
   a. Respondent (Yes/No)
   b. Husband (Yes/No)
   c. Senior Male (Yes/No)
   d. Senior Female (Yes/No)
   e. Others (Yes/No)
   f. Not Applicable/No one

VI. At what age your daughter(s) should be married?
   g. Respondent (Yes/No)
   h. Husband (Yes/No)
   i. Senior Male (Yes/No)
   j. Senior Female (Yes/No)
   k. Others (Yes/No)
   l. Not Applicable/No one

VII. Whom to vote for in an election?
   a. Respondent (Yes/No)
   b. Husband (Yes/No)
   c. Senior Male (Yes/No)
   d. Senior Female (Yes/No)
   e. Others (Yes/No)
   f. Not Applicable/No one

VIII. Whether to attend a village assembly meeting?
   a. Respondent (Yes/No)
   b. Husband (Yes/No)
   c. Senior Male (Yes/No)
   d. Senior Female (Yes/No)
   e. Others (Yes/No)
   f. Not Applicable/No one

THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING
Appendix 2: Qualitative Interview Instrument – Party Workers

Informed Consent Component

Thank you for considering taking part in our research survey. We will begin with some background information to ensure your willingness to participate.

Project Background
Title: She Wins - Electing Women in Ethnically Divided Societies: The Case of Bihar
Principal Investigators: Charles Hankla (Georgia State University, USA), Arindam Banerjee (PDAG, Delhi), Sayan Banerjee (University of Essex, UK), Anjali Thomas (Georgia Institute of Technology, USA).
Sponsor: International Growth Centre

Procedures
You are being asked to take part in a research study. If you decide to take part, you will respond to a series of open-ended questions about state legislative elections in Bihar. You will also provide some background information about yourself. You will only interact with the interviewers reading this to you, and the interview will be done here and now. It should take only about one hour of your time. The results will be used to better understand voting for state elections in Bihar.

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If you allow us, we will record the interview. If not, we will only take notes. We will keep the recordings and interview notes in a locked box.

Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal
You do not have to be in this study. You may skip questions or stop participating at any time.

Contact Information
Contact Dr. Charles Hankla at +1 404 413 6169, chankla@gsu.edu
Contact Arindam Banerjee, Partner, Policy Development and Advisory Group, New Delhi, arindam.banerjee@pdag.in

Consent
If you are willing to volunteer for this research please begin the interview.
1. Y 2. N
Interview Component

1. How old are you? Where are you from? What is your regular employment and your jati? Is there anything else about your background that can help us understand your career?

2. Please tell us about which political party you work for and how you came to work for it? What were your motivations?

3. Talk to us about the nature of your party work. Are you involved in selecting and grooming candidates for the Bihar Legislative Assembly and in what capacity?

4. What are the characteristics of MLA candidates that party leaders most value?

5. What are the characteristics of MLA candidates that you most value?

6. Roughly how many potential aspirants do you have for a given party nomination for a given MLA seat?

7. How does the gender of the prospective candidate enter into your calculations? Do you believe that voters in Bihar are open to electing women MLAs?

8. How do leaders within your party view prospective women candidates? Are women candidates seen as electable by the party?

9. What is the typical profile of women who approach you to become MLA candidates in terms of education, jati, occupation, previous political experience etc.?

10. What do you think are the main motivations for women approaching you to become MLA candidates? Are they often encouraged/supported by a male family member?

11. What characteristics do you value when selecting women to be candidates?

12. What characteristics do (other) leaders in your party value when selecting women to be candidates?

13. Do most women candidates you field come from political families?

14. In which types of constituencies do you tend to field women candidates?

15. Can you describe a few recent examples where the party has chosen a woman candidate over male candidate? What factors helped the woman be chosen over the man?

16. Are there cases where certain male party leaders are opposed to women candidates? How does the party overcome this opposition?
17. In your judgement, do jati and religion affect women candidates differently from men candidates in Bihar? If so, how? Does coming from a political family affect a female candidate’s prospects?

18. How do a candidate’s jati and religion affect your party’s calculations in nominating MLA candidates? Do these calculations vary between men and women?

19. What strategies do women candidates typically use to mobilize voters? Are these typically different from the strategies used by male candidates?

20. In advising your party’s MLA candidates, do you recommend different campaign strategies for male and women candidates? If so, what differences?

21. What are your thoughts as to the sorts of campaign appeals which are most effective for MLA candidates? Do these vary between men and women? Across jatis?

22. Do you believe that women are in a better or worse position than men to offer protection from caste and communal violence? Are they in a better or worse position than male politicians to promote the provisions of public goods and services?

23. Do you think that reservations for women at the gram panchayat level have made voters more receptive to having women candidates at the MLA level? Why or why not?

THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING
Appendix 3: Qualitative Interview Instrument – Women Politicians

Informed Consent Component

Thank you for considering taking part in our research survey. We will begin with some background information to ensure your willingness to participate.

Project Background
Title: She Wins - Electing Women in Ethnically Divided Societies: The Case of Bihar
Principal Investigators: Charles Hankla (Georgia State University, USA), Arindam Banerjee (PDAG, Delhi), Sayan Banerjee (University of Essex, UK), Anjali Thomas (Georgia Institute of Technology, USA).
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Contact Arindam Banerjee, Partner, Policy Development and Advisory Group, New Delhi, arindam.banerjee@pdag.in

Consent
If you are willing to volunteer for this research please begin the interview.
1. Y
2. N
Interview Component

1. How old are you? Where are you from? What is your regular employment and your jati? Is there anything else about your background that can help us understand your career?

2. Please tell us about which political party you represent and how you came to join it? What were your motivations?

3. Please tell us about your past political career and your current position. If you are currently a leader at the panchayat level, have you ever considered running for the legislative assembly?

4. Tell us about your experiences seeking nomination from your party. What was the process? Did you feel that it was fair?

5. Tell us about your last election. How close was it and who was your primary opponent? What sorts of political appeals did you and your opponent make? Which did you find to be more effective?

6. In your experience, how has being a woman affected your political career? Has it been easier or more difficult to be nominated for office? Has it been easier or more difficult to win elections?

7. Do you believe that your gender has affected the sorts of political appeals that you make to voters? How do you generally appeal to voters? Do you find that appeals to safety and security are more effective or appeals to public goods, or something else?

8. How does your jati background and your religion affect your political career? Does being a woman impact how your jati and religion influence your political appeals? Would you have been as successful if you had come from a different jati or religion? Why?

9. What are the characteristics of MLA candidates that your party leaders most value? How do leaders within your party view prospective women candidates? Are women candidates seen as electable by the party?

10. What are the characteristics of MLA candidates that you most value?

11. What is the typical profile of the women you know who are elected to political office in terms of education, jati, occupation, previous political experience etc.?

12. What do you think are the main motivations for women seeking elected office? Are they often encouraged or discouraged by a male family member? Do they often come from political families?

13. In which types of constituencies do you think women are most successful?

14. Can you describe a few recent examples where your party has chosen a woman candidate over male candidate? What factors helped the woman be chosen over the man?
15. Are there cases where certain male party leaders are opposed to women candidates? How does the party overcome this opposition?

16. How do a candidate’s jati and religion affect your party’s calculations in nominating MLA candidates? Do these calculations vary between men and women?

17. Do you think that reservations for women at the gram panchayat level have made voters more receptive to having women candidates at the MLA level? Why or why not?

THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING
Appendix 4: Qualitative Interview Instrument – NGOs

Informed Consent Component

Thank you for considering taking part in our research survey. We will begin with some background information to ensure your willingness to participate.

Project Background
Title: She Wins - Electing Women in Ethnically Divided Societies: The Case of Bihar
Principal Investigators: Charles Hankla (Georgia State University, USA), Arindam Banerjee (PDAG, Delhi), Sayan Banerjee (University of Essex, UK), Anjali Thomas (Georgia Institute of Technology, USA).
Sponsor: International Growth Centre

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Contact Arindam Banerjee, Partner, Policy Development and Advisory Group, New Delhi, arindam.banerjee@pdag.in

Consent
If you are willing to volunteer for this research please begin the interview.
1. Y 2. N
Interview Component

1. How old are you? Where are you from? What is your regular employment and your jati? Is there anything else about your background that can help us understand your career?

2. Talk to us about the nature of your rural development work. What do you do on a day-to-day basis?

3. What are the primary challenges facing the people you work with? Do they suffer from a lack of access to public goods and services? Do they suffer from caste or communal discrimination and violence?

4. How much impact does the local MLA have on your work? What about local panchayat leaders? How do these elected officials affect your work and rural development more generally?

5. In your experience, are women elected officials more or less effective than men in offering protection from caste and communal violence? Are they more or less effective than men in promoting the provision of public goods and services? Can you give us some examples?

6. Do women elected leaders from disadvantaged backgrounds and jatis behave differently than their male counterparts? Are women leaders from such backgrounds more or less attuned to issues of rural development? To issues of caste and communal violence? Can you give us some examples?

7. Do you think that reservations for women at the gram panchayat level have made voters more receptive to women’s leadership? Have these reservations had an impact on women’s role in society more generally? Why or why not?

THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING
The International Growth Centre (IGC) aims to promote sustainable growth in developing countries by providing demand-led policy advice based on frontier research.

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Contact us
International Growth Centre,
London School of Economic and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE