Publications

Informal monitoring and enforcement can increase the efficacy of public service delivery. Nagavarapu and Sekhri study the Targeted Public Distribution System of India and find that Scheduled Castes (SC) have a higher take-up of government subsidised food when facing SC delivery agents. The researchers provide evidence suggesting that this effect works through increased informal monitoring and enforcement when the delivery agent is corrupt.

Pakistan, like Mexico, suffers from a distorted tax system replete with special provisions for vested interest groups, often justified on the grounds of equity or redistribution. The result is that the tax collection falls short of what is needed to maintain levels of service provision or meet MDG goals. There is insufficient financing to provide for the infrastructure needs for investment, or even to maintain existing investment, with tax/GDP ratios at 10% or less (as in the Pakistan case). In most cases, the tax breaks are inadequate in meeting distributional considerations.

This paper provides evidence that graduates of elite public institutions in India have an earnings advantage in the labour-market even though attending these colleges has no discernible effect on learning outcomes. Data do not bear out the predictions of signaling or networking theories of human capital. Using original survey data, Sheetal Sekhri finds that college networks do not facilitate job search. Also, the wage-premium does not dissipate with experience. However, the number of college friends in the same industry does explain the wage premium.